# Change and Continuity in the 2008 Elections

Books

### Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich & David W. Rohde

• Chapters
• Front Matter
• Back Matter
• Subject Index
• ## More Praise: For Change and Continuity

Change and Continuity is the preeminent text on American elections and voting behavior. The book utilizes the context of the most recent presidential and congressional elections to introduce students to the core concepts and theories needed for studying voting behavior. It draws on survey and historical data to answer questions about voter participation, electoral choice, and the changing nature of political parties in contemporary American politics. Perhaps most important, Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde do a wonderful job of weaving all of these lessons of electoral scholarship into a substantive narrative that captures students’ interest. I use Change and Continuity every time I teach elections and voting behavior, and I cannot imagine teaching the course without it.”

, Florida State University

“When I have taught voting and elections, or related courses in the past, I have routinely used the Change and Continuity books by Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde. The textbook successfully blends theoretical discussion of political behavior with accessible, compelling narratives of recent presidential and congressional campaigns and current findings from the venerable American National Election Studies series, helping students understand the ways in which political scientists study elections and voting. Perhaps most important, the authors also place recent elections in a rich historical context, illustrating the key trends in the public mood, party allegiances, and voting patterns over time.”

, Texas A&M International University

## Dedication

To Lee J. Abramson

## Tables and Figures

Tables
• 1-1 Current or Most Recent Office Held by Declared Candidates for President: Two Major Parties, 1972–2008 17
• 1-2 Estimated Probabilities of Candidate Nominations, ADS and Norrander Models, 2008 29
• 1-3 Results of Democratic Caucuses, 2008 31
• 1-4 Results of Democratic Primaries, 2008 32
• 1-5 Results of Republican Caucuses, 2008 34
• 1-6 Results of Republican Primaries, 2008 35
• 2-1 Changes in Turnout among Voting-Eligible Population between 2004 and 2008, Nationwide and in States that Switched from Republican to Democrat 54
• 3-1 Presidential Election Results by State, 2008 58
• 3-2 Presidential Election Results, 1832–2008 65
• 4-1 Voter Turnout in National Elections, 1945–2008 86
• 4-2 Voter Turnout in Presidential Elections, 1828–1916 88
• 4-3 Percentage of Adults Who Voted for Each of the Major-Party Candidates, 1920–2008 91
• 4-4 Percentage of Electorate Who Reported Voting for President, by Social Group, 2008 96
• 4-5 Percentage of Whites Who Reported Voting for President, by Strength of Party Identification and Sense of External Political Efficacy, 2008 106
• 4-6 Percentage of Electorate Who Reported Voting for President, by Party Identification, Issue Preferences, and Retrospective Evaluations, 2008 111
• 5-1 How Social Groups Voted for President, 2008 118
• 5-2 Relationship of Social Characteristics to Presidential Voting, 1944–2008 128
• 6-1 Relative Ranking of Presidential Candidates on Feeling Thermometer: Response Distribution and Vote Choice, 2008 144
• 6-2A Distribution of Responses on Presidential Candidate Trait Evaluations, 2008 146
• 6-2B Major-Party Vote for Obama and McCain by Presidential Candidate Trait Evaluations, 2008 147
• 6-3 Most Important Problem as Seen by the Electorate, 1972–2004 151
• 6-4 Four Criteria for Issue Voting, 2008, and Comparisons with 1972–2004 Presidential Elections 158
• 6-5 Major-Party Voters Who Voted for Obama, by Seven-Point Issue Scales, 2008 161
• 6-6 Apparent Issue Voting, 2008, and Comparisons with 1972–2004 Presidential Elections 162
• 6-7 Distribution of Electorate on Net Balance of Issues Measure and Major-Party Vote, 2008 165
• 6-8 Percentage of Major-Party Voters Who Voted for Obama, by Opinion about Abortion and What They Believe McCain's and Obama's Positions Were, 2008 167
• 7-1 Evaluation of Government Performance and Major-Party Vote, 2008 174
• 7-2 Evaluation of Party Seen as Better on Most Important Political Problem and Major-Party Vote, 2008 176
• 7-3 Public's Assessments of Personal Financial Situation and Major-Party Vote, 1972-2008 178
• 7-4 Public's View of the State of the Economy and Major-Party Vote, 1980–2008 180
• 7-5 Evaluations of the Incumbent's Handling of the Economy and Major-Party Vote, 1980–2008 182
• 7-6 Evaluations of Three Foreign Policy Issues and Major-Party Vote, 2008 184
• 7-7 President's Handling of Two Foreign Policy Issues and Major-Party Vote, 2008 185
• 7-8 President's Handling of Job and Major-Party Vote, 1972–2008 186
• 7-9 Summary Measure of Retrospective Evaluations of the George W. Bush Administration and Major-Party Vote, 2008 189
• 7-10 Percentage of Major-Party Voters Who Voted for Obama, by Balance of Issues and Summary Retrospective Measures, 2008 190
• 8-1 Party Identification in Presidential Years, Pre-election Surveys, 1980–2008 198
• 8-2 Party Identification among Whites, 1980–2008 201
• 8-3 Party Identification among Blacks, 1980–2008 202
• 8-4 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Party Identification, 1952–2008 205
• 8-5 Approval of Incumbent's Handling of the Economy among Partisan Groups, 1984–2008 210
• 8-6 Balance of Issues Positions among Partisan Groups, 1976–2008 213
• 8-7 Retrospective Evaluations among Partisan Groups, 2008 217
• 8-8 Percentage of Major-Party Voters Who Voted for Obama, by Party Identification and Summary of Retrospective Evaluations, 2008 218
• 9-1 House and Senate Incumbents and Election Outcomes, 1954–2008 230
• 9-2 House and Senate General Election Outcomes, by Party and Incumbency, 2008 233
• 9-3 Party Shares of Regional Delegations in the House and Senate, 1953, 1981, and 2009 234
• 9-4 Party Spending in House and Senate Contests, 2008 240
• 9-5 Success in House and Senate Elections, Controlling for Office Background, Party, and Incumbency, 2008 243
• 9-6 Average Vote Percentages of House Incumbents, Selected Years, 1974–2008 247
• 9-7 Incumbents’ Share of the Vote in the 2008 House Elections, by Challenger Campaign Spending 249
• 9-8 Incumbents’ Share of the Vote in the 2008 House Elections, by Challenger Experience and Spending 251
• 9-9 House Seat Losses by the President's Party in Midterm Elections, 1946–2006 261
• 9-10 Percentage of Vote Received by Winning House Candidates, by Party and Type of Race, 2008 265
• 10-1 How Social Groups Voted for Congress, 2008 271
• 10-2 Percentage of White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for the House, by Party Identification, 1952–2008 276
• 10-3 Percentage Who Voted Democratic for the House and Senate, by Party Identification and Incumbency, 2008 278
• 10-4 Percentage of Voters Who Supported Incumbents in House Voting, by Party Identification and Evaluation of Incumbent's Performance, 2008 279
• 10-5 Percentage Who Voted Democratic for the House, by Evaluation of Bush's Job Performance, Party Identification, and Incumbency, 2008 280
• 10-6 Percentage Who Voted Democratic for the House and Senate, by Party Identification and Presidential Vote, 2008 282
• 10-7 Percentage Who Voted Democratic for the House, by Presidential Vote, Party Identification, and Incumbency, 2008 283
• 11-1 Possible Candidates for the 2012 Democratic Presidential Nomination, as of September 20, 2009 299
• 11-2 Projected Population of the United States, by Race and Hispanic Origin, 2010–2050 301
• 11-3 Possible Candidates for the 2012 Republican Presidential Nomination, as of September 20, 2009 302
• A7-1 Evaluation of Government Performance on Most Important Problem and Major-Party Vote, 1972–2004 308
• A7-2 Evaluation of Party Seen as Better on Most Important Problem and Major-Party Vote, 1972–2000 and 2008 309
• A8-1 Party Identification among Whites, 1952–1978 310
• A8-2 Party Identification among Blacks, 1952–1978 311
• A8-3 Approval of Incumbent's Handling of Job, by Party Identification, 1972–2008 312
Figures
• 1-2 Length of Multicandidate Campaigns, 1976–2008 27
• 1-3 Competitiveness of the 2008 Democratic Nomination, Obama and Clinton 28
• 2-1 States That Voted Republican at Least Four out of Five Elections, 1988–2004, with Number of Electoral Votes 40
• 3-1 Electoral Votes by State, 2008 61
• 3-2 Obama's Margin of Victory over McCain, 2008 70
• 3-3 Results of the 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 Presidential Elections 78
• 4-1 Percentage of Voting-Age Population and of the Politically Eligible and the Voting-Eligible Population, 1920–2008 92
• 5-1 Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Race, 1944–2008 126
• 5-2 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Region, 1952–2008 130
• 5-3 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Union Membership, 1944–2008 133
• 5-4 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Social Class, 1944–2004 134
• 5-5 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Religion, 1944–2008 137
• 5-6 White Major-Party Voters Who Voted Democratic for President, by Social Class and Religion, 1944–2004 140
• 6-1 Example of a Seven-Point Issue Scale: Jobs and Standard of Living Guarantees 153
• 6-2 Median Self-Placement of the Electorate and the Electorate's Placement of Candidates on Issue Scales, 2008 154
• 8-1A Approval of Democratic Incumbents’ Handling of Job, by Party Identification, 1980, 1996, and 2000 208
• 8-1B Approval of Republican Incumbents’ Handling of Job, by Party Identification, 1972, 1976, 1984, 1988, 1992, 2004, and 2008 209
• 9-1 Democratic Share of Seats in House and Senate, 1953–2009 232
• 9-2 Competitive House Districts, 2007–2008 241

Paul R. Abramson is a professor of political science at Michigan State University. He is coauthor of Value Change in Global Perspective (1995) and author of Political Attitudes in America (1983), The Political Socialization of Black Americans (1977), and Generational Change in American Politics (1975). Along with John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, he is the coauthor of fourteen additional books in the Change and Continuity series, all of which were published by CQ Press.

John H. Aldrich is Pfizer-Pratt University Professor of Political Science at Duke University. He is coeditor of Positive Changes in Political Science (2007) and author of Why Parties? (1995) and Before the Convention (1980). He is past president of the Southern Political Science Association and the Midwest Political Science Association. In 2001 he was elected a fellow of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.

David W. Rohde is Ernestine Friedl Professor of Political Science and director of the Political Institutions and Public Choice Program at Duke University. He is coeditor of Why Not Parties? (2008), author of Parties and Leaders in the Post-reform House (1991), coeditor of Home Style and Washington Work (1989), and coauthor of Supreme Court Decision Making (1976).

The Authors, from Left to Right: David W. Rohde, John H. Aldrich, and Paul R. Abramson

## Preface

On November 4, 2008, Democrat Barack Obama was elected president. In addition, the Democrats made substantial gains in the congressional elections. Having already won in 2006 a net thirty seats in the U.S. House of Representatives and six seats in the Senate, as well as control of both chambers, the Democrats added another twenty-one House seats and eight Senate seats in 2008.

Only four years earlier, some pundits had called the 2004 Republican victory a signal that the GOP had consolidated a long-term majority, whereas by 2009 some were pronouncing the Republicans nearly defunct. In our view, it is fairly easy to explain why the Republicans lost. We provide substantial evidence that the Democratic victory largely resulted from negative evaluations of George W. Bush and the Republican Party. Granted, this is not a novel explanation, but we believe it to be correct and we support it with a great deal of evidence.

Our Analysis

In our study of the 2008 elections, we rely on a wide variety of evidence. We begin by analyzing the election results of both the presidential and the congressional elections. Our investigation of the nomination process in Chapter 1, coauthored with Brian Pearson, includes new material examining alternative models that predict the probability of success. In our study of both the nomination contest and the general election campaign, we examine polls, especially those conducted by the Gallup Organization.

Throughout much of our book, we refer extensively to surveys from four sources. In studying voter turnout, we employ the Current Population Survey (CPS) conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. The CPS provides information on the registration and voting of nearly 133,000 individuals from over eighty thousand households. In examining voting patterns, we rely heavily on a survey of over twenty thousand voters interviewed as they exited the voting polls and conducted by Edison Media Research/Mitofsky International for a consortium of news organizations, commonly referred to as the “pool poll.” And in studying the party loyalties of the American electorate, we analyze the General Social Surveys conducted by the National Opinion Research Center at the University of Chicago, which measured party identification twenty-seven times between 1972 and 2008, usually relying on about 1,500 respondents.

Our main source of survey data is the 2008 American National Election Studies (ANES) survey based on 2,323 face-to-face interviews conducted before the 2008 election and 2,102 interviews conducted after the election, using the version of the data released for analysis in May 2009. This study is part of an ongoing series funded mainly by the National Science Foundation. These surveys, carried out by a team of scholars at the University of Michigan, began with a small study of the 1948 election; the first major study was in 1952. They have studied every subsequent presidential election, as well as all thirteen midterm elections from 1954 to 2002. In the course of our book, we use data from all twenty-nine surveys conducted between 1948 and 2008.

The ANES data are available to scholars throughout the world. Although we are not responsible for the data collection, we are responsible for our analyses. The scholars and staff at the ANES are responsible for neither our analyses nor our interpretation of these data.

Acknowledgments

Many people assisted us with this study. We would like to begin by thanking our research assistants, Michael C. Brady and Melanie S. Freeze at Duke University and Tae-Eun Song at Michigan State University.

Lee J. Abramson, to whom we dedicate this book, helped us calculate the issue preferences of the electorate and also commented on several of the chapters.

Jack Citrin of the University of California at Berkeley made helpful suggestions for our discussion of presidential politics in California. In our study of turnout, we were greatly assisted by Michael P. McDonald of George Mason University, who provided us with information about the Current Population Survey. Russell J. Dalton of the University of California at Irvine and Robert W. Jackman late of the University of California at Davis helped us locate information about cross-national estimates of voter turnout. Abraham Diskin of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem helped us locate turnout data for Israel; Lawrence LeDuc at the University of Toronto helped us find turnout results for Canada; Michael Mintrom of the University of Auckland helped us find turnout results from New Zealand; and Dennis Patterson of Texas Tech University helped us locate turnout results from Japan. William Claggett at Florida State University read our chapter on turnout and provided several suggestions. We owe special thanks to Corwin D. Smidt at Michigan State University for his assistance in constructing our measure of religious tradition.

Abraham Diskin made helpful suggestions on our discussion of Israeli politics, as did Michal Shamir of Tel Aviv University. Martin J. Bull of the University of Salford and Joseph LaPalombara of Yale University made suggestions for our discussion of Italian politics. Finally, Kaare Strøm of the University of California at San Diego contributed suggestions to our summary of Swedish politics, and Dennis Patterson commented on our summary of Japanese politics.

We are especially grateful to Janet C. Abramson for copyediting our manuscript before we submitted it to CQ Press.

At CQ Press we are grateful to Charisse Kiino for encouragement and Allison McKay for help in the early editorial stages. We are especially grateful to them for finding reviewers who had assigned our book in the past, thereby allowing us to receive input from instructors and, indirectly, from students. The reviewers were Craig Brians, Virginia Tech University; Dennis Chong, Northwestern University; Helen Abbie Erler, Kenyon College; Brad Gomez, Florida State University; Kay Schlozman, Boston College; and Sean Theriault, University of Texas at Austin. We are grateful to Gwenda Larsen, our production editor. Sabra Bissette Ledent did an excellent job of copyediting the manuscript.

This book continues a series of fourteen books that we began with a study of the 1980 elections. In many places we refer to our earlier books, all of which were published by CQ Press. Some of this material is available online through the CQ Voting and Elections Collection, which can be accessed through many academic and public libraries.

Like our earlier books, this one was a collective enterprise in which we divided the labor. Paul Abramson had primary responsibility for Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 11, John Aldrich for Chapters 1, 6, 7, and 8, and David Rohde for Chapters 2, 9, and 10.

abramson@msu.edu
aldrich@duke.edu
david.rohde@duke.edu
• ## Appendix

TABLE A7-1 Evaluation of Government Performance on Most Important Problem and Major-Party Vote, 1972–2004

TABLE A7-2 Evaluation of Party Seen as Better on Most Important Problem and Major-Party Vote, 1972–2000 and 2008

TABLE A8-1 Party Identification among Whites, 1952–1978 (percent)

TABLE A8-2 Party Identification among Blacks, 1952–1978

TABLE A8-3 Approval of Incumbent's Handling of Job, by Party Identification, 1972–2008 (percent)

## Notes

Introduction to Part I

1. Adam Nagourney, “Obama: Racial Barrier Falls in Heavy Turnout,” New York Times, November 5, 2008, 1.

2. “Signed, Sealed, Delivered,” The Economist, November 6, 2008.

3. For an analysis of the strategies in this election, see John H. Kessel, The Goldwater Coalition: Republican Strategies in 1964 (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1968).

4. See, for example, Benjamin Ginsberg and Martin Shefter, Politics by Other Means: The Importance of Elections in America (New York: Basic Books, 1990); and Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing Democracy: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002).

5. See Paul R. Abramson et al., “Fear in the Voting Booth: The 2004 Presidential Election,” Political Behavior 29 (June 2007): 197–220.

6. http://Polifact.com has compiled a list of more than five hundred promises that Obama made during the 2008 campaign and tracks whether he has fulfilled them.

7. Robert Pear, “Health Care's Early Pledges,” New York Times, May 12, 2009, A1, A16; Robert Pear, “45 Centrist Democrats Protest Secrecy of Health Care Talks,” New York Times, May 12, 2009, A16; Jonathan Weisman and Naftali Bendavid, “New Splits Emerge in Health-Plan Talks,” Wall Street Journal, August 22, 2009, A4.

8. The final seat was decided on June 30, 2009, when Republican incumbent Norm Coleman of Minnesota ended his legal challenge to his Democratic challenger, Al Franken.

9. Lanny J. Davis, “The Obama Realignment,” Wall Street Journal, November 6, 2008, A19.

10. Harold Meyerson, “A Real Realignment,” Washington Post, November 7, 2008, A19.

11. James W. Ceaser, Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney Jr., Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 1. The issue of Time was published on November 24, 2008.

12. Kevin P. Phillips, The Emerging Republican Majority (New Rochelle, N.Y.: Arlington House, 1969).

13. Phil Gailey, “Republicans Start to Worry about Signs of Slippage,” New York Times, August 25, 1988, E5.

14. The Democrats held control of the U.S. House from the Eighty-fourth Congress, elected in 1954, through the 103rd Congress, elected in 1992.

15. The Republicans had unexpectedly gained control of the U.S. Senate in the 1980 elections and held it until the 1986 midterm elections.

16. The GOP lost control during this period when Sen. James M. Jeffords of Vermont left the Republican Party to become an independent and voted with the Democrats on the organization of the Senate.

17. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, Red over Blue: The 2004 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 2.

18. For a discussion of the history of this concept, see Theodore Rosenof, Realignment: The Theory that Changed the Way We Think about American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003).

19. Ceaser and Bush, Red over Blue, 22.

20. Fred Barnes, “Realignment, Now More Than Ever: The Next Best Thing to a Permanent Majority,” Weekly Standard, November 22, 2004. Even before the 2006 midterm elections in which the Democrats regained control of the House and the Senate, there were reasons to be skeptical about these claims. For our own views before the 2006 midterm elections, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, “The 2004 Presidential Election: The Emergence of a Permanent Majority?” Political Science Quarterly 120 (Spring 2005): 33–57; and Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006), 266–278.

21. V. O. Key Jr., “A Theory of Critical Elections,” Journal of Politics 17 (February 1955): 4.

22. V. O. Key Jr., “Secular Realignment and the Party System,” Journal of Politics 21 (May 1959): 198.

23. These states were, and still are, the most heavily Democratic states. Both voted Republican in seventeen of the eighteen presidential elections between 1856 and 1924, voting Democratic only when the Republican Party was split in 1912 by Theodore Roosevelt's Progressive Party candidacy. For a discussion of partisan change in the New England states, see Chapter 3.

24. V. O. Key Jr., Parties, Politics, and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1964), 186.

25. James L. Sundquist, Dynamics of the Party System: Alignment and Realignment of Political Parties in the United States, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1983), 4.

26. Lawrence G. McMichael and Richard J. Trilling, “The Structure and Meaning of Critical Realignment: The Case of Pennsylvania, 1928–1932,” in Realignment and American Politics: Toward a Theory, ed. Bruce A. Campbell and Richard J. Trilling (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1980), 25.

27. Byron E. Shafer, ed., The End of Realignment? Interpreting American Electoral Eras (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1991). See, for example, Joel H. Silbey, “Beyond Realignment and Realignment Theory,” 3–23; Everett Carll Ladd, “Like Waiting for Godot: The Uselessness of ‘Realignment’ for Studying Change in Contemporary American Politics,” 24–36; and Byron E. Shafer, “The Notion of an Electoral Order: The Structure of Electoral Politics at the Accession of George Bush,” 37–84. Shafer's book also contains an excellent bibliographical essay: Harry F. Bass, “Background to Debate: Reader's Guide and Bibliography,” 141–178.

28. David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002).

29. We maintain that during past realignments there have been increases in turnout and that new issues have divided the electorate. Mayhew writes that the thesis that turnout increases when there is a realignment is a basic claim of students of realignment (Electoral Realignments, 20). Regarding issues, he argues that “at least as regards the U.S. House, realigning elections hinge on national issues, nonrealigning elections on local ones” (24).

30. For recent evidence based on an analysis of congressional and presidential election results that supports this conclusion, see James E. Campbell, “Party Systems and Realignments in the United States: 1868–2004,” Social Science History 30 (Fall 2006): 359–386.

31. See David W. Brady, Critical Elections and Congressional Policy Making (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1988), presents important evidence on changes during the 1890s. See also Peter F. Nardulli, “The Concept of a Critical Realignment, Electoral Behavior, and Political Change,” American Political Science Review (March 1995): 10–22; and Gary Miller and Norman Schofield, “Activists and Partisan Realignment in the United States,” American Political Science Review (May 2003): 245–260. In Electoral Realignments, Mayhew comments on Brady's and Nardulli's work. (The Miller and Schofield article appeared a year after Mayhew's book was published.) For a more extensive presentation of Nardulli's thesis, see his Popular Efficacy in the Democratic Era: A Reexamination of Electoral Accountability in the United States, 1828–2000 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005).

32. In addition to the eleven states that formed the Confederacy (Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia), Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, and Missouri were slave states. The fifteen free states in 1848 were Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Wisconsin. By 1860 three additional free states—California, Minnesota, and Oregon—had been admitted to the Union.

33. As James M. McPherson writes, “Republicans did not even have a ticket in the ten southern states, where their speakers would have been greeted with a coat of tar and feathers—or worse—if they had dared to appear.” Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil War Era (New York: Oxford University Press, 1988), 223.

34. Ronald Inglehart and Avram Hochstein, “Alignment and Dealignment of the Electorate in France and the United States,” Comparative Political Studies 5 (October 1972): 343–372.

35. Russell J. Dalton, Paul Allen Beck, and Scott C. Flanagan, “Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies,” in Electoral Change in Advanced Industrial Democracies: Realignment or Dealignment? ed. Russell J. Dalton, Scott C. Flanagan, and Paul Allen Beck (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984), 14.

36. Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “The Not So Simple Act of Voting,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), 202.

37. Note that Inglehart and Hochstein were comparing France and the United States.

38. Bo Särlvik and Ivor Crewe, Decade of Dealignment: The Conservative Victory of 1979 and Electoral Trends in the 1970s (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983).

39. Harold D. Clarke et al., Absent Mandate: Canadian Electoral Politics in an Era of Restructuring (Toronto: Gage Educational Publishing, 1966), 183.

40. Most of the respondents were interviewed before and after the election. Many of the questions we are interested in, such as whether people voted, how they voted for president, and how they voted for Congress, were asked in the survey conducted after the election. The postelection survey included 2,102 respondents.

41. The 2002 midterm survey was conducted by telephone. The ANES did not conduct a midterm survey in 2006.

42. For a brief nontechnical introduction to polling, see Herbert Asher, Polling and the Public: What Every Citizen Should Know, 7th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007). For a more advanced discussion, see Herbert F. Weisberg, The Total Survey Error Approach: A Guide to the New Science of Survey Research (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005).

43. For a brief discussion of the procedures used by the Survey Research Center to carry out its sampling for in-person interviews, see Paul R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983), 18–23. For a more detailed description, see Survey Research Center, Interviewer's Manual, rev. ed. (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, 1976).

44. The magnitude of the sampling error is greatest for proportions near 50 percent and diminished somewhat for proportions above 70 percent or below 30 percent. The magnitude of the error diminishes markedly for proportions above 90 percent or below 10 percent.

45. The ANES pre-election poll was conducted from September 2, 2008, to November 3, 2008. During that period, at least forty-three other polls were conducted. They show Bush's approval ranging from a low of 20 percent to a high of 31 percent, with an average approval level of 26.6 percent.

46. For an excellent table that allows us to evaluate differences between two groups, see Leslie Kish, Survey Sampling (New York: Wiley, 1965), 580. Kish defines differences between two groups to be significant if the results are more than two standard errors apart.

47. For 2008—as well as for 1958, 1960, 1974, 1976, 1992, 1994, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2002, and 2004—a weighting procedure is necessary to obtain a representative result, and so we report the “weighted” number of cases. For 2008 we weight by v080101 when we are presenting results relying solely on the preelection interview (for example, when we report the party identification of whites and of blacks or the relationship of presidential approval to party identification). When we report results that include any variable from the postelection interview (for example, whether people said they voted, how they voted for president, or how they voted for Congress), we weight by v080102.

48. Actually, the 2008 ANES survey includes a black supplement and a Latino supplement. The weighting factors we employ reduce the numbers of blacks and Latinos so that they represent the actual proportion of blacks and Latinos in the electorate. In the weighted pre-election survey, there are 1,839 whites, 279 blacks, and 211 Latinos. In the unweighted survey, which presents the actual numbers sampled, there are 1,442 whites, 583 blacks, and 509 Latinos. As of this writing, the ANES has not reported the appropriate procedures for analyzing the black supplement or the Latino supplement. Readers should recognize that in those parts of Chapters 4, 5, 8, and 11 analyses of race will somewhat overstate the number of whites and substantially understate the number of blacks and Latinos.

1. The Nomination Struggle

1. The Iowa Electronic Market http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu) gives market-determined prices based on buying and selling shares in candidate fortunes. These imply an estimate of the likelihood of winning. On October 6, 2007, for example, the probability of Clinton winning the nomination was 0.67, with Obama at 0.17, John Edwards at 0.05, and the rest of the field at 0.10. Republicans were led by Giuliani with 0.33, followed by former Massachusetts governor Mitt Romney at 0.29, Thompson at 0.20, McCain at 0.08, and the rest of the field (including former Arkansas governor Mike Huckabee) at 0.10. http://Intrade.com (http://intrade.com) lists contract prices on the nomination contests. We used contract prices as of December 24, 2006, to predict potential Democratic and Republican presidential candidates. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 312–320.

2. See Joseph A. Schlesinger, Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966); and Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

3. Since World War II, the U.S. Senate has been a major source of presidential candidates. However, until 2008 only two sitting senators had ever been elected president, Warren G. Harding in 1920 and John F. Kennedy in 1960. For a discussion of the factors that influence whether senators seek the presidency, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, “Progressive Ambition among United States Senators: 1972–1988,” Journal of Politics 49 (February 1987): 3–35.

4. This is sometimes referred to as the “Johnson rule,” because Texas passed special legislation to allow Lyndon Johnson to run simultaneously for vice president and for reelection to the U.S. Senate in 1960.

5. The one exception was in 1836 when the Whigs ran three separate candidates to oppose the sitting vice president, Martin van Buren. The Republican Party has always used simple majority rule to select its nominees. The Democratic Party required that the nominee be selected by a two-thirds majority in every convention from its founding (except 1840) until 1936, when the requirement changed to a simple majority.

6. Because some states object to this feature, or object to registration with a party at all, any Democratic delegates so chosen would not be recognized as properly selected. Parties in those states use other procedures for choosing their delegates.

7. Louisiana and Maine began their delegate selection proceedings via caucus before February 5 (and Hawaii ran its first stage from January 25 to February 5), but they were not punished because they did not actually select delegates to the national convention until later. Nevada was also not punished because it was chosen by the national party to hold its caucus before the window opened.

8. The results are for the Democratic Party and do not include “superdelegates.” The Republican versions look very similar. For more details, see John H. Aldrich, “The Invisible Primary and Its Effects on Democratic Choice,” PS: Political Science and Politics 42 (January 2009): 33–38.

9. Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1968 (New York: Pocket Books, 1970).

10. Quoted in ibid., 153.

11. He was helped in this effort by the fact that one-third of the delegates had been chosen in 1967, before Johnson's renomination faced serious opposition.

12. The Republican Party does not require that its delegates be bound. Many states (especially those that hold primaries and follow Democratic Party rules) do bind Republican delegates.

13. To be sure, there were calls from supporters of Clinton for her to maintain her candidacy, especially in light of the still unresolved situation about the delegates from Florida and Michigan. The Clinton campaign, however, chose to slowly wind down the level of competition and effectively accept defeat, without actually withdrawing formally until the convention itself. For a discussion of the importance of superdelegates in 1984, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), 25. For the best journalistic account of the 2008 nomination contest, including a discussion of the role played by super-delegates, see Dan Balz and Haynes Johnson, The Battle for America 2008: The Story of an Extraordinary Election (New York: Viking, 2009).

14. This account of the importance of pre-primary campaigning is developed in Phil Paolino, “Candidate Name Recognition and the Dynamics of the Pre-Primary Period of the Presidential Nomination Process” (PhD diss., Duke University, 1995).

15. See Aldrich, “Invisible Primary.”

16. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), chap. 1, for more details on the nomination campaigns in 2000.

17. EMILY's List, a group that supports female candidates, draws its name from an acronym of this line.

18. The most important adaptation politicians have made to campaign finance requirements is the acquisition and use of “soft money”—that is, money that can be raised and spent without limit for party-building and turnout efforts. Soft money became controversial in 1996 because of the increasingly vast sums raised, the sources of the contributions, and alleged misuse of soft money for promoting the election of candidates. Soft money is not, however, a major factor in intraparty competition, including presidential nomination campaigns.

19. See, for example, Thomas E. Mann, “Money in the 2008 Elections: Bad News or Good?” http://www.brookings.edu/opinions/2008/0701_publicfinance_mann.aspx.

20. See, for example, Michael Muskal and Dan Morain, “Obama Raises $55 Million in February; Clinton Reports Surge in Funds,” Los Angeles Times, March 7, 2008, http://articles.latimes.com/2008/mar/07/nation/na-money. 21. See John H. Aldrich, Before the Convention: Strategies and Choices in Presidential Nomination Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980). Larry M. Bartels, in Presidential Primaries and the Dynamics of Public Choice (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1988), examines the electoral process underlying these dynamics. 22. Actually, there was a potentially serious third candidate in 1980, California governor Jerry Brown. In this contest, he acquired the nickname “Governor Moonbeam” and so received very little support. Thus this case was reduced almost immediately to two major or serious candidates. 23. Jesse Jackson was also a candidate throughout the entire 1984 contest, but he was never likely to actually be the Democratic nominee. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, chap. 1. 24. We use New Hampshire rather than Iowa because Iowa has varied from being less than a week before New Hampshire to being several weeks before and because the window of time available to other states opens only after the New Hampshire primary. The campaign is considered to have ended when a candidate has secured the commitment of a majority of delegates or when his or her last opponent or opponents announces their concession. 25. See Randall E. Adkins and Andrew J. Dowdle, “How Important Are Iowa and New Hampshire to Winning Post-Reform Presidential Nominations?” Political Research Quarterly 54 (June 2001): 431–444; and Wayne P. Steger, Andrew J. Dowdle, and Randall E. Adkins, “The New Hampshire Effect in Presidential Nominations,” Political Research Quarterly 57 (September 2004): 375–390. 26. Barbara Norrander, “The End Game in Post-Reform Presidential Nominations,” Journal of Politics 62 (November 2000): 999–1013. 27. They argue that southern candidates are advantaged because relatively few run. Moreover, they argue that since 1976 parties have often nominated southern candidates. The Democrats nominated southerners in 1976, 1980, 1992, 1996, and 2000, whereas the Republicans nominated southern candidates in 1988, 1992, 2000, and 2004. 28. For more details, see John H. Aldrich and Brian Pearson, “Understanding the 2008 Presidential Nomination Campaigns,” unpublished paper, Duke University, 2008. 29. The presidential nominee may not, however, have a completely free hand in choosing his or her running mate. For example, McCain may have wanted to choose Joe Lieberman, an independent Democrat from Connecticut and Gore's running mate in 2000. But Lieberman is pro-choice, and by choosing him McCain risked being challenged by the delegates. 2. The General Election Campaign 1. The district system is not the only alternative to the statewide selection of presidential electors. For example, in 2004 a ballot proposal in Colorado would have allocated its electors according to proportional representation. For a discussion, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 55. 2. Compare with ibid., 35–36. 3. The eight states were Hawaii, Massachusetts, Minnesota, New York, Oregon, Rhode Island, Washington, and Wisconsin. See Chapter 3 on long-term voting patterns. 4. California, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Iowa, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, New Jersey, New Mexico, Pennsylvania, and Vermont. 5. For a discussion of electoral vote strategies in 1988–1996, see Daron R. Shaw, “The Methods behind the Madness: Presidential Electoral College Strategies, 1988–1996,” Journal of Politics 61 (November 1999): 893–913. There were methodological mistakes in Shaw's analysis. After reanalyzing Shaw's data, Andrew Reeves, Lanhee Chen, and Tiffany Nagano conclude that none of Shaw's substantive conclusions are supported by their study; see “A Reassessment of “The Methods behind the Madness: Presidential Electoral College Strategies, 1988–1996,” Journal of Politics 66 (May 2004): 616–620. Shaw acknowledges errors in his analysis, but maintains that correcting for these errors leads to few changes in his conclusions. See “Erratum for “The Methods behind the Madness: Presidential Electoral College Strategies, 1988–1996,’” Journal of Politics 66 (May 2004): 611–615. For a fuller development of Shaw's thesis, see Daron R. Shaw, The Race to 270: The Electoral College and the Campaign Strategies of 2000 and 2004 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006). 6. McCain's success in securing his nomination earlier could have been an advantage, but he had difficulty getting media coverage in the face of the ongoing Democratic drama. See Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 76. 7. Unless otherwise indicated, the national poll results cited in this chapter were taken from http://realclearpolitics.com. This Web site collected data from national polls and averaged them over a period (usually about a week). This approach “smoothed” the variations across polls. 8. The polling data cited in this paragraph were taken from http://pollingreport.com. 9. Matthew Mosk, “In Money Race, Obama Has the Advantage,” Washington Post, June 7, 2008, A1. 10. Michael Luo and Jeff Zeleny, “Reversing Stand, Obama Declines Public Financing,” New York Times, June 20, 2008, A1. 11. See Emily Cadel and Alex Knott, “Former Bush Donors: Still Hesitant about Backing McCain,” http://cqpolitics.com, June 10, 2008. 12. Fredreka Schouten, “McCain Totals His Highest Donations in June,” USA Today, July 11, 2008, 4A. 13. Emily Cadel, “With Party Help, McCain Budgets for$400 Million,” http://cqpolitics.com, July 10, 2008.

14. Emily Cadel, “Obama Outspending McCain, Big Time,” cqpolitics. com, August 21, 2008; Matthew Mosk, “Obama Campaign Reports Raising 66 Million in August,” Washington Post, September 15, 2008, A3. 15. Michael Luo, “Obama Led Opponent in Spending in August,” New York Times, September 22, 2008, A19. 16. In all of these states Latinos constituted 10 percent or more of the eligible voters. See Larry Rother, “Obama and McCain Expand Courtship of Hispanics,” New York Times, July 17, 2008, A16. 17. Kathy Kiely, “Latino Vote ‘Up for Grabs,’ Could Swing Election,” USA Today, June 27, 2008, 8A. For a summary of the controversy about the Latino vote in 2004, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 111. 18. See Perry Bacon Jr. and Juliet Eilperin, “Candidates Pushing Hard for the Latino Vote,” Washington Post, July 14, 2008, A6. 19. New York Times, September 5, 2008, A1. 20. See Adam Nagourney and Jeff Zeleny, “Already, Obama and McCain Map Fall Strategies,” http://nytimes.com, May 11, 2008. 21. John M. Broder, “Obama, Adopting Economic Theme, Criticizes McCain,” New York Times, June 19, 2008, A19. 22. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 97. 23. Michael D. Shear and Juliet Eilperin, “McCain Launches Verbal Sortie, Calls Obama's Record Flimsy,” Washington Post, June 4, 2008, A1. 24. Ibid. 25. Patrick Healy and Michael Cooper, “Rival Tickets Are Redrawing Battlegrounds,” http://nytimes.com, September 7, 2008. 26. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 82. 27. Jill Lawrence, “Giuliani Attacks Democratic Ticket as Untested,” USA Today, September 4, 2008, 2A. 28. David Jackson and Kathy Kiely, “Attacks Are Order of the Day,” USA Today, August 1, 2008, 4A. 29. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, trans. Harvey C. Mansfield and Delba Winthrop (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2000), 611. 30. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 85. 31. Michael Cooper and Michael Powell, “McCain Camp Says Obama Plays ‘Race Card,’” New York Times, August 1, 2008, A1. 32. Richard Wolf and Martha T. Moore, “Armey Predicts Obama Will Hit Blockade of ‘Bubbas,’” USA Today, September 4, 2008, 8A. 33. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 94. 34. See Bob Benenson and Tim Starks, “GOP Hopes Palin Resonates with Three Groups,” http://cqpolitics.com, September 4, 2008. 35. “The Power of Palin,” Newsweek, September 22, 2008, 37. 36. The sixteen states were Colorado, Florida, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia, and, Wisconsin. See Washington Post, June 8, 2008, A10. 37. The data are available at http://cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/map/candidate.visits. Of course, any measure like this is imperfect. CNN counted the number of times a state was visited. However, a brief stopover was treated the same as a full day with many appearances around the state. 38. The account in the remainder of this paragraph is taken from Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 98. 39. Ibid., 103. 40. Jill Lawrence, “Candidates’ First Debate Bolsters Obama in Poll,” USA Today, September 29, 2008, 1A. 41. E. J. Dionne Jr., “McCain's Dicey Gamble,” Washington Post, October 3, 2008, A23. 42. Adam Nagourney, “Concerns about Palin's Readiness as a Big Test for Her Nears,” New York Times, September 30, 2008, A16. 43. Robert Barnes and Juliet Eilperin, “Biden and Palin Square Off,” Washington Post, October 3, 2008, A1. 44. See “Instant Polls Find Biden Wins,” http://politicalwire.com, October 2, 2008. 45. Liz Sidoti, “McCain Campaign Writes Off Michigan, Turns to Indiana,” Durham Herald-Sun, October 3, 2008, A3. 46. Adam Nagourney, “Campaigns Shift to Attack Mode on Eve of Debate,” New York Times, October 7, 2008, A17. 47. See “CNN Poll: Obama Wins the Night,” http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com, October 7, 2008. 48. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 108. 49. Julie Kronholz, “Ready, Aim, Backfire: Nasty Political Ads Fall Flat,” http://online.wsj.com, October 16, 2008. 50. Michael Cooper and Megan Thee, “Poll Says McCain Is Hurting His Bid by Using Attacks,” New York Times, October 15, 2008, A1. 51. T. W. Farnam and Brad Haynes, “Democrats Far Outspend Republicans on Field Operations and Staff Expenditures,” http://online.wsj.com, November 3, 2008. 52. Newsweek, November 7, 2008, 86. 53. Eli Saslow, “Democrats Registering in Record Numbers,” Washington Post, April 28, 2008, A1. 54. Christopher Cooper and Susan Davis, “Obama Seeks to Add Black Voters,” http://online.wsj.com, June 30, 2008. 55. Miriam Jordan, “Latino Voter-Registration Drive Likely to Aid Obama,” http://online.wsj.com, September 25, 2008. 56. William M. Welch, “Study: Voter Interest High; Registrations Up 10 Million,” USA Today, November 3, 2008, 9A. 57. Rhodes Cook Letter, October 2008, 9. 58. See Christopher Cooper and Susan Davis, “Obama Seeks to Add Black Voters,” http://online.wsj.com, June 30, 2008. 59. Robert Barnes, “High Court Upholds Indiana Law on Voter ID,” Washington Post, April 29, 2008, A1. 60. Mary Pat Flaherty and William Branigan, “Justices Rule against Ohio GOP on Voter Issue,” Washington Post, October 18, 2008, A4. 61. Ibid.; Ian Urbina, “States’ Purges of Voter Rolls Appear Illegal,” New York Times, October 9, 2008, A1. 62. Lisa Lerer, “GOP Challenges to New Voters Set Back by Courts,” news. http://yahoo.com, October 25, 2008. 63. Dan Frosh and Ian Urbina, “Colorado Agrees to Restore Voters to Rolls,” New York Times, October 31, 2008, A21. 64. The data on early voting cited in this section were, unless otherwise indicated, taken from the Web site of Prof. Michael McDonald, George Mason University, http://elections.gmu.edu/Early_Voting_2008_Final.html. 65. USA Today, September 22, 2008, 1A. 66. Jonathan Weisman and Christopher Cooper, “Obama Seeks Advantage in Florida as Early Voting Starts,” http://online.wsj.com, October 21, 2008. 67. Jon Cohen and Kyle Dropp, “Early Voters Breaking Records,” Washington Post, October 30, 2008, A2. 68. The registration figures come from “Outsize Portion of Blacks Are Casting Early Ballots,” http://online.wsj.com, October 22, 2008. The early voting percentages are from http://elections.gmu.edu/early_vote_2008.html. 69. See note 64. 70. The polling figures in this paragraph were taken from Michael Cooper and Dalia Sussman, “Growing Doubts on Palin Take a Toll, Poll Finds,” New York Times, October 31, 2008, A1, A18. 71. Jeff Zeleny, “Donation Record as Colin Powell Endorses Obama,” New York Times, October 20, 2008, A1, A22. 72. Fredreka Schouten, “Obama's Ad Buys Dwarf TV Presence of McCain,” USA Today, October 28, 2008, 1A. 73. Bill Carter, “Infomercial for Obama Is Big Success in Ratings,” New York Times, October 31, 2008, A19. 74. Ibid. 75. There has been a lot of interesting research in recent years on the impact of presidential campaigns on outcomes. See, for example, Thomas H. Holbrook, Do Campaigns Matter? (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1996); James E. Campbell, The American Campaign (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2000); and Daron R. Shaw, “A Study of Presidential Campaign Effects from 1956 to 1992,” Journal of Politics 61 (May 1999): 387–422. For his most extensive treatment, see Shaw, Race to 270. 76. All exit poll results reported in this section were taken from CNN, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls/#val=USP00p1. 77. See, for example, Stuart Rothenberg, “Is 2008 a Realigning Election? Numbers Offer Some Clues,” Roll Call, November 10, 2008, 7; and Robert G. Kaiser, “Pollsters Debate America's Political Realignment,” Washington Post, November 23, 2008, A2. 78. On changing demographics and their political implications, see John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Scribner's, 2002). 3. The Election Results 2. See, for example, http://pollyvote.com, http://fivethirtyeight.com, realclearpolitics. com, http://pollster.com, and http://cqpolitics.com. 3. For a discussion of the relative predictive ability of the IEM and public opinion polls, see Robert S. Erikson and Christopher Wlezien, “Are Political Markets Really Superior to Polls as Election Predictors?” Public Opinion Quarterly 72 (Summer 2008): 190–215. (They conclude they are not.) For a discussion of http://Intrade.com, see Paul R. Abramson, “Using http://Intrade.com to Teach Campaign Strategies in the 2008 U.S. Presidential Election,” PS: Political Science and Politics 43 (January 2010). 4. For example, in their projections for the 2008 presidential election, Michael S. Lewis-Beck and Charles Tien discuss the possibility of a Bradley effect, noting that there was no evidence of such an effect in the Democratic presidential primaries. See “The Job of the President and the Jobs Forecast Model,” PS: Political Science and Politics 41 (October 2008): 687–690. Among the nine academic models presented in this issue, six predicted an Obama victory, two (including the Lewis-Beck and Tien model) a very close result, and one a McCain victory. These models, however, were based on data before the Wall Street meltdown in mid-September. 5. Polls also closed in Hawaii and Idaho, each with four electoral votes. Hawaii, a traditionally Democratic state as well as Obama's birthplace, was Obama's best state, whereas Idaho supported McCain. 6. “Transcript: McCain Concedes Presidency.” http://www.cnn.com/POLITICS/11/04/mccaintranscript/index.html. 7. In his landslide victory in 1964, Democrat Lyndon Johnson won 61.1 percent, and in 1976 Jimmy Carter won 50.1 percent. The presidential election results we refer to throughout this chapter are based on Presidential Elections, 1789–2008 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009). 8. James W. Ceaser, Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney Jr. present the margin of popular vote victories in all the presidential elections between 1896 and 2008 and conclude that the 2008 contest was “moderately competitive.” They report that Obama's margin of victory ranked nineteenth among these twenty-nine elections. See Ceaser, Busch, and Pitney, Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 1–5. 9. As we note in Chapter 2, in every election since 1972 Maine has used a system in which the plurality vote winner in the state receives two electoral votes and the plurality of each of its congressional districts receives that district's single electoral vote. Nebraska has used a similar system to allocate its votes since the 1992 election. In our previous books, we do not report these district-level results because these rules did not affect the outcome. 10. Kerry actually won only 251 electoral votes, because one Democratic elector in Minnesota voted for John Edwards, the Democratic vice presidential candidate. 11. We begin with the 1828 election because in 1824 state legislatures chose the presidential electors in six of the twenty-four states. It does seem very likely, however, that Andrew Jackson would have been the popular vote winner if all the states had had popular vote elections in 1824. By 1828 in only two states were state legislatures choosing the electors. 12. In the disputed election of 1876, records suggest that Samuel J. Tilden, the Democrat, won 51.0 percent of the popular vote and that Rutherford B. Hayes, the Republican, won 48.0 percent. In 1888 Grover Cleveland, the incumbent Democratic president, won 48.6 percent of the vote, and Benjamin Harrison, the Republican, won 47.8 percent. In the disputed 2000 election, Gore won 48.4 percent of the vote, and Bush won 47.9 percent. 13. These fourteen winners were James K. Polk (Democrat) in 1844, with 49.5 percent of the popular vote; Zachary Taylor (Whig) in 1848, with 47.3 percent; James Buchanan (Democrat) in 1856, with 45.3 percent; Abraham Lincoln (Republican) in 1860 with 39.9 percent; James A. Garfield (Republican) in 1880, with 48.3 percent; Grover Cleveland (Democrat) in 1884, with 48.9 percent; Cleveland in 1892, with 46.0 percent; Woodrow Wilson (Democrat) in 1912, with 41.8 percent; Wilson in 1916, with 49.2 percent; Harry S. Truman (Democrat) in 1948, with 49.5 percent; John F. Kennedy (Democrat) in 1960, with 49.7 percent; Richard M. Nixon (Republican) in 1968, with 43.4 percent; Bill Clinton (Democrat) in 1992, with 43.0 percent; and Clinton in 1996, with 49.2 percent. The results for Kennedy can be questioned, however, mainly because voters in Alabama voted for individual electors, and one can argue that Nixon won more popular votes than Kennedy. 14. Britain provides an excellent example of the effects of plurality vote win systems on third parties. In Britain, as in the United States, candidates for the national legislature run in single-member districts, and in all British parliamentary districts the plurality vote winner is elected. In all seventeen general elections since World War II ended in Europe, the Liberal Party (and more recently the Alliance and the Liberal Democratic Parties) has received a smaller percentage of seats in the House of Commons than its percentage of the popular vote. For example, in the May 2005 election the Liberal Democrats won 22 percent of the popular vote, but won only 10 percent of the seats in the House of Commons. 15. The New England states are Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont. Although the U.S. Census Bureau labels several border states and the District of Columbia as southern, we use an explicitly political definition—the eleven states that made up the old Confederacy, which are Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia. 16. These states are Arizona, Colorado, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Utah, and Wyoming. 17. For a comparison of Wallace's regional strength in 1968, Anderson's regional strength in 1980, and Perot's regional strength in 1992, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 73–76. 18. Although there are rare exceptions, presidential electors are pledged to support a presidential and a vice presidential candidate. Over eight thousand pledged electors have been selected since 1944, and only eight have failed to vote for the presidential candidate they were pledged to support. 19. Third-party candidates are not always underrepresented in the Electoral College. In 1948 J. Strom Thurmond, the States’ Rights Democrat, won only 2.4 percent of the popular vote but won 7.3 percent of the electoral vote. Thurmond won 55 percent of the popular votes in the four states he carried (Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina), all of which had low turnout. He received no popular vote at all in thirty-one of the forty-eight states. 20. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, trans. Barbara North and Robert North (New York: Wiley, 1963), 217. In the original, Duverger's proposition is “le scrutin majoritaire à un seul tour tend au dualisme des partis.” Duverger, Les partis politiques (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958), 247. For a discussion, see William H. Riker, “The Two-party System and Duverger's Law: An Essay on the History of Political Science,” American Political Science Review 76 (December 1982): 753–766. For a more recent statement by Duverger, see “Duverger's Law Forty Years Later,” in Electoral Laws and Their Political Consequences, ed. Bernard Grofman and Arend Lijphart (New York: Agathan Press, 1986), 69–84. For more general discussions of the effects of electoral laws, see Rein Taagepera and Matthew Shugart, Seats and Votes: The Effects and Determinants of Electoral Systems (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989); and Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination of the World's Electoral Systems (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1997). 21. Duverger's inclusion of “a single ballot” in his formulation is redundant because in a plurality vote win system there would be no need for second ballots unless needed to break ties. With a large electorate, ties will be extremely rare. 22. Duverger, Political Parties, 218. 23. William H. Riker, The Art of Political Manipulation (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1986), 79. 24. For the most extensive evidence for the 1968, 1980, and 1992 elections, see Paul R. Abramson et al., “Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot,” Political Science Quarterly 110 (Fall 1997): 349–367. For the 1996 and 2000 elections, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 118–120; and Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 124–126. 25. Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 55. 26. Strategic voting can occur under other voting systems as well, including runoff elections and proportional representation. For evidence about Israel and the Netherlands, see Paul R. Abramson et al., “Strategic Abandonment or Sincerely Second Best? The 1999 Israeli Prime Ministerial Election,” Journal ofPolitics 66 (August 2004): 706–728; and Abramson et al., “Comparing Strategic Voting under FPTP and PR,” Comparative Political Studies 43 (January 2010). 27. See George C. Edwards III, Why the Electoral College Is Bad for America (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2004). 28. For the most extensive argument in favor of this reform, see John R. Koza et al., Every Vote Equal: A State-Based Plan for Electing the President by National Popular Vote, 2nd ed. (Los Altos, Calif.: National Popular Vote Press, 2008). 29. For a discussion of the interstate compact proposal, see Ceaser, Busch, and Pitney, Epic Journey, 190. Their main criticism is that the proposed compact lacks provisions for runoff elections. 30. The only other elections in which incumbent presidents were defeated in two straight elections were in 1888, when Benjamin Harrison defeated Grover Cleveland, and in 1892, when Cleveland defeated Harrison. As David R. Mayhew shows, between 1792 and 2004 in-office parties held the White House about two-thirds of the time when they ran the incumbent president, but have only won half the time when they did not run an incumbent. See David R. Mayhew, “Incumbency Advantage in U.S. Presidential Elections: The Historical Record,” Political Science Quarterly 123 (Summer 2008): 201–228. 31. For two studies of the Whig Party, see Michael F. Holt, The Rise and Fall of the Whig Party: Jacksonian Politics and the Onset of the Civil War (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999); and Daniel Walker Howe, The Political Culture of the American Whigs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1979). 32. Former Whigs founded the Constitutional Union Party in 1860. Its candidate, John Bell, won 12.6 percent of the popular vote and thirty-nine of the 303 electoral votes. 33. For a discussion of agenda-setting during this period, see William H. Riker, Liberalism against Populism: A Confrontation between the Theory of Democracy and the Theory of Social Choice (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1982), 213–232; and John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 126–156. 34. As we described in the introduction to Part I, not all scholars agree with this assessment. The most important dissent is found in David R. Mayhew, Electoral Realignments: A Critique of an American Genre (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002), 43–69. 35. Michael Nelson, “The Presidential Election,” in The Elections of 1988, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1989), 195–196. 36. After the 2000 election, the Republicans and Democrats each had fifty senators, and the Republicans held control of the Senate by virtue of Vice President Dick Cheney's tie-breaking vote. When Sen. James M. Jeffords of Vermont left the Republican Party to become an independent and to vote with the Democrats on the organization of the Senate, the Democrats took control of the Senate from June 2001 until January 2003. 37. If one further takes into account that Maine and Nebraska use a district system to select their electors, there are actually fifty-six separate contests. 38. Since ratification of the Twenty-third Amendment in 1961, the District of Columbia has had three electoral votes, which it first cast in the 1964 election. 39. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 56. 40. Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election: Change Comes to America,” in The Elections of 2008, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 65. Pomper counts visits between September 8, 2008, after the two conventions, and election eve, November 3, 2008 (personal communication, May 6, 2009). The Florida contest did turn out to be close, with Obama winning by only 2.8 percentage points. In Virginia, Obama won by 6.3 percentage points, only slightly less than his 7.2–point national margin. 41. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, the West is made up of thirteen states: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming. But as Walter Dean Burnham points out, for presidential elections the ninety-sixth meridian of longitude provides a dividing line. See Burnham, “The 1980 Earthquake,” in The Hidden Election: Politics and Economics in the 1980 Presidential Campaign, ed. Thomas Ferguson and Joel Rogers (New York: Pantheon, 1981), 111. In this chapter, we consider Kansas, Nebraska, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and South Dakota to be western as well. Even though most of Texas lies to the west of the ninety-sixth meridian, we classify it as southern, because it was a Confederate state. 42. U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 101st ed. (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1980), 514. 43. Ironically, the media designate Republican-won states as “red states” and Democratic-won states as “blue states.” Red is the color often associated with revolution and socialism. For example, the song “The Red Flag,” composed by James Connell in 1889, became the official song of the British Labour Party. As for flags themselves, red is one of the three colors of the French tricolor, adopted in 1794 during the Revolution, and, aside from the hammer and sickle, the flag of the Soviet Union was red. 44. See Andrew Gelman et al., Red State, Blue State, Rich State, Poor State: Why Americans Vote the Way They Do (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2008). 45. Alan I. Abramowitz, The 2008 Elections (New York: Longman, 2009), 37. 46. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991). 47. Pomper also notes that the standard deviation among the states increased between 2004 and 2008. See Pomper, “Presidential Election,” 71. 48. See Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office, Figure 5-1, 112. Schlesinger does not report the exact values, but he provided them to us in a personal communication. Including the District of Columbia, which has voted for president since 1964, increases the standard deviation because the District always votes more Democratic than the most Democratic state. We have reported Schlesinger's results for states, not for his alternative results that include D.C. Likewise, our updated results are for the fifty states. 49. After the 2010 census, Texas seems likely to gain four House seats, and Florida, Georgia, and South Carolina one each. Louisiana is likely to lose one seat. If these projections hold and if the election rules do not change, the South will have 159 electoral votes. 50. V. O. Key Jr., Southern Politics in State and Nation (New York: Knopf, 1949), 5. 51. There have been many excellent studies of the postwar South. For one that presents state-by-state results, see Alexander P. Lamis, The Two-Party South, 2nd exp. ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1990). For three other studies, see Earl Black and Merle Black, Politics and Society in the Postwar South (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1987); Black and Black, The Rise of Southern Republicans (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2002); and David Lublin, The Republican South: Democratization and Partisan Change (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2004). 52. Alabama, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, and South Carolina are considered the five Deep South states. They are also the five states with the highest percentage of African Americans. 53. Earlier that month, southern Democrats suffered a defeat at the Democratic presidential nominating convention. Their attempts to weaken the civil rights platform were defeated. Meanwhile, Hubert Humphrey, then mayor of Minneapolis, argued that the platform was too weak and offered an amendment for a stronger statement. Humphrey's amendment passed by a vote of 651 ½–582½. 54. Kennedy made a symbolic gesture that may have helped him with African Americans. Three weeks before the election, Martin Luther King Jr. was arrested in Atlanta for taking part in a sit-in demonstration. Although all the other demonstrators were released, King was held on a technicality and sent to the Georgia State Penitentiary. Kennedy telephoned King's wife to express his concern, and his brother Robert F. Kennedy Jr., acting as a private citizen, made a direct appeal to a Georgia judge that led to King's release on bail. This incident received little notice in the press, but it had a great effect on the African American community. See Theodore H. White, The Making of the President, 1960 (New York: Atheneum, 1961), 321–323. 55. Chuck Todd and Sheldon Gawiser, with Ana Maria Arumi and G. Evans Witt, How Obama Won: A State-by-State Guide to the Historic 2008 Presidential Election (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 146–150, 160–164. 56. For a discussion of the reasons for this lack of attention, see Peter F. Galderisi and Michael S. Lyons, “Realignment: Past and Present,” in The Politics of Realignment: Party Change in the Mountain West, ed. Peter F. Galderisi et al. (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1987), 34. 57. Arizona seems likely to gain two House seats after the 2010 census, while Nevada and Utah are likely to gain one apiece. If so, the mountain West would have forty-eight electoral votes. 58. Eric R. A. N. Smith and Peverill Squire, “State and National Politics in the Mountain West,” in Galderisi et al., Politics of Realignment, 34. 59. Todd and Gawiser, How Obama Won, 141–145. 60. Arthur H. Miller, “Political Opinion and Regional Political Realignment,” in Galderisi et al., Politics of Realignment, 98. 61. Ibid., 100. 62. This will drop slightly if, as expected, Massachusetts loses one House seat after the 2010 census. 63. Fred R. Shapiro, ed., The Yale Book of Quotations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 251. Maine used to hold its statewide and congressional elections in September, and these races were sometimes seen as a bellwether for the national elections in November. This led to the expression “As Maine goes, so goes the nation.” The Republicans did well in these early elections in 1936 (and Landon carried the state in its November presidential election). These Maine victories, as well as the Literary Digest poll predicting a Landon win, encouraged some Republicans. 64. At the beginning of the 111th Congress, ten of the twelve U.S. senators from New England were Democrats. All twenty-two members of the U.S. House of Representatives from New England were Democrats. For more discussion, see Chapter 9. 65. Nicol C. Rae, The Decline and Fall of Liberal Republicans (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989), 145. 66. California became a state in 1850 and is the only state to gain representation after every reapportionment. This distinction seems likely to end, however. Some projections suggest it might lose one seat after the 2010 census; others suggest it will retain its fifty-five seats. Our discussion is based on the assumption that it will have the same number of seats. 67. We count Nixon as a resident of California in 1968, even though he officially ran as a resident of New York. 68. If one includes only major-party voters in 1968, Nixon received 51.7 percent of the vote in California and 50.4 percent in the nation as a whole. 69. Mark Baldassare, A California State of Mind: The Conflicted Voter in a Changing World (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 159. 70. “California Exit Polls—President,” http://msnbc.com, 2004, http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/5297147. 71. CNN Election Center ‘08, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls. 72. Baldassare, California State of Mind, 224. 73. For a figure demonstrating the Republican dominance between 1972 and 1988, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed., 47. 74. Marjorie Randon Hershey, “The Campaign and the Media,” in The Election of 1988: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1989), 74. Hershey did not claim that a Democratic presidential candidate could not win, but wrote that “another powerful environmental factor working for Bush was the so-called Republican lock on the electoral college.” 75. James C. Garand and Wayne T. Parent, “Representation, Swing, and Bias in U.S. Presidential Elections, 1872–1988,” American Journal of Political Science 35 (November 1991): 1000–1001. 76. Michael Nelson, “Constitutional Aspects of the Elections,” in Nelson, Elections of 1988, 103–195; I. M. Destler, “The Myth of the ‘Electoral Lock,’” PS: Political Science and Politics 29 (September 1996): 491–494. 77. Andrew Gelman, Jonathan N. Katz, and Gary King, “Empirically Evaluating the Electoral College,” in Rethinking the Vote: The Politics and Prospects of Electoral Reform, ed. Ann N. Crigler, Marion R. Just, and Edward J. McCaffrey (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 75–88. 78. For the electoral vote balance after the 2004 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 71–72. 79. Because South Carolina and Utah are each likely to gain one House seat, these thirteen Republican states should yield 102 votes in the 2012 election. Bear in mind that the Republican presidential candidate was a Texan in three of these five elections. 80. If, as expected, Arizona gains two House seats and Georgia gains one, these states will yield seventy electoral votes in 2012. 81. Florida will probably gain one House seat after the 2010 census. But because Louisiana and Missouri are each likely to lose a House seat, the overall number of electoral votes for these states will probably drop to eighty-five. 82. Six of these states are expected to lose one seat: Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania. Oregon is the only consistently Democratic state that seems slated to gain a House seat. If these projections hold, these consistently Democratic states (and D.C.) would yield 242 electoral votes. 83. Iowa is expected to lose a House seat, reducing the total to fifteen. 84. Ohio is expected to lose two House seats, while Nevada is expected to gain one, reducing the total to twenty-four. 85. If the projections discussed here are correct, the states that have voted Republican most of the time will yield 257 electoral votes; the states (plus D.C.) that have voted Democratic most of the time will yield 281 electoral votes. Introduction to Part II 1. According to Michael P. McDonald, 212,720,027 Americans were eligible to vote. See McDonald, “2008 General Election Turnout Rates,” http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html. We say “on or before” November 4 because in 2008 about one-third of voters voted before election day. 2. For an excellent set of articles dealing with some of the major controversies, see Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, eds., Controversies in Voting Behavior, 4th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001). For two excellent summaries of research on voting behavior, see Russell J. Dalton and Martin P. Wattenberg, “The Not So Simple Act of Voting,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), 193–218; and Morris P. Fiorina, “Parties, Participation, and Representation in America: Old Theories Face New Realities,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: Norton, 2002), 511–541. 3. For a more extensive discussion of our arguments, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, “Studying American Elections,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, ed. Jan E. Leighley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 700–715. 4. Paul F. Lazarsfeld, Bernard R. Berelson, and Hazel Gaudet, The People's Choice: How the Voter Makes Up His Mind in a Presidential Campaign (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1944), 27. See also Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954). Their index was created for analyzing voting in Erie County, Ohio, a basically rural setting with little racial diversity. 5. See Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Richard F. Hamilton, Class and Politics in the United States (New York: Wiley, 1972); and Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, exp. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981). For a more recent book using the perspective, see Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments in U.S. Party Coalitions (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1999). 6. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). For a recent assessment of the contribution of The American Voter, see William G. Jacoby, “The American Voter,” in Leighley, Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, 262–277. 7. For an excellent summary of research on political psychology, see Donald R. Kinder, “Opinion and Action in the Realm of Politics,” in The Handbook of Social Psychology, 4th ed., Vol. 3, ed. Gilbert T. Sullivan, Susan T. Fiske, and Gardner Lindzey (Boston: McGraw Hill, 1998), 778–867. For an alternative approach to the study of political psychology, see Paul M. Sniderman, Richard A. Brody, and Philip E. Tetlock, with others, Reasoning and Choice: Explorations in Political Psychology (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1991). See also Paul M. Sniderman, “The New Look in Public Opinion Research,” in Finifter, Political Science: The State of the Discipline II. For two other perspectives, see John R. Zaller, The Nature and Origins of Mass Opinion (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992); and Richard R. Lau and David P. Redlawsk, How Voters Decide: Information Processing during an Election Campaign (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 8. His single most important contribution is “The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics” in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David E. Apter (New York: Free Press, 1964), 206–261. For the best single summary of his views on voting behavior, see Philip E. Converse, “Public Opinion and Voting Behavior” in Nongovernmental Politics, ed. Fred I. Greenstein and Nelson W. Polsby, Vol. 4, Handbook of Political Science (Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, 1975), 75–169. For more recent summaries, see Philip E. Converse, “Researching Electoral Politics,” American Political Science Review 100 (November 2006): 605–612; and Philip E. Converse, “Perspectives on Mass Political Systems and Communications,” in The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior, ed. Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 144–158. 9. Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996). Although re-emphasizing the importance of party identification, this book also demonstrates a shift away from the social-psychological tradition employed by Miller and his colleagues in The American Voter. 10. Michael S. Lewis-Beck et al., The American Voter Revisited (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 11. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957); William H. Riker, A Theory of Political Coalitions (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1962). 12. See, for example, William H. Riker and Peter C. Ordeshook, “A Theory of the Calculus of Voting,” American Political Science Review 62 (March 1968): 25–32; John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, “The Paradox of Not Voting: A Decision Theocratic Analysis,” American Political Science Review 68 (June 1974): 525–536; and Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981). For summaries of much of this research, see Melvin J. Hinich and Michael Munger, Analytical Politics (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1977); Kenneth A. Shepsle and Mark A. Boncheck, Analyzing Politics: Rationality, Behavior, and Institutions (New York: Norton, 1977); and John H. Aldrich and Arthur Lupia, “Formal Modeling and Strategic Behavior in the Study of American Elections,” in Leighley, Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, 89–106. For an interesting perspective that combines rational choice and psychological approaches, see Samuel L. Popkin, The Reasoning Voter: Communication and Persuasion in Political Campaigns (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991). For an excellent introduction to American voting behavior that relies on a rational choice perspective, see Rebecca B. Morton, Analyzing Elections (New York: Norton, 2006). 13. For a more extensive discussion of the merits and limitations of these approaches, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, “Studying American Elections.” 14. The most important exception, at least in the study of elections, is Fiorina's Retrospective Voting, to which we refer extensively. The most widely known critique of the rational choice perspective is Donald P. Green and Ian Shapiro, Pathologies of Rational Choice Theory: A Critique of Applications inPolitical Science (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1994). For critiques of Green and Shapiro, see Jeffrey Friedman, ed., The Rational Choice Controversy: Economic Models of Politics Reconsidered (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966). 15. Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin, “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” American Political Science Review 95 (December 2001): 963–974. For a link to McDonald's results for 2008, see note 1. 4. Who Voted? 1. Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin argue that turnout should be measured by dividing the number of voters by the population eligible to vote. See McDonald and Popkin, “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” American Political Science Review 95 (December 2001): 963–974. We would have preferred to present the U.S. results using turnout based on both the voting-age and the voter-eligible population. Unfortunately, although this method would have been feasible for midterm elections, it would be difficult to compute the percentage voting for the House in presidential elections. If we had used the measure preferred by McDonald and Popkin, turnout would be somewhat higher in the United States, but it would still rank well below that in Switzerland. 2. In Australia, nonvoters may be subject to a small fine. In Belgium, they may suffer from future disfranchisement. 3. In both countries, turnout tends to be lower in noncompetitive districts. See Paul R. Abramson, Abraham Diskin, and Dan S. Felsenthal, “Nonvoting and the Decisiveness of Electoral Outcomes,” Political Research Quarterly 60 (September 2007): 500–515. 4. For a discussion of turnout in comparative perspective, see Mark N. Franklin, Voter Turnout and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established Democracies Since 1945 (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). Franklin shows turnout trends between 1945 and 1999 for all these countries except Portugal, Spain, and the United States (11). Russell J. Dalton presents turnout trends based on the voting-age population between the 1950s and 2000s in all these countries except Israel, Luxembourg, and Malta. See Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008), 37. 5. According to Michael P. McDonald, the voting-eligible population in 2008 was 212,720,027. McDonald, “2008 General Election Turnout Rates,” http://elections.gmu.edu/Turnout_2008G.html. Using his numbers, we would conclude that 81,417,295 nonvoters could have been eligible to vote. 6. This chapter focuses on one form of political participation, voting. For an excellent study of other forms of political participation, see M. Margaret Conway, Political Participation in the United States, 3rd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000). For a major study of other forms of political participation, see Sidney Verba, Kay Lehman Schlozman, and Henry E. Brady, Voice and Equality: Civic Voluntarism in American Politics (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1995). For a collection of essays on voting as well as other forms of political participation, see Russell J. Dalton and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Political Behavior (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007). 7. For a useful summary of the history of turnout in the United States, see Michael P. McDonald, “American Voter Turnout in Historical Perspective,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, ed. Jan E. Leighley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 125–143. 8. It is difficult to calculate the total number of voters, but in most elections more people vote for president than for any other office. 9. See Martin J. Kousser, The Shaping of Southern Politics: Suffrage Restrictions and the Establishment of the One-Party South, 1880–1910 (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1974). For a more general discussion, see Paul Kleppner, Who Voted? The Dynamics of Electoral Turnout, 1870–1980 (New York: Praeger, 1982), 55–82. 10. There has been a great deal of disagreement about the reasons for and the consequences of registration requirements. For some of the more interesting arguments, see Walter Dean Burnham, “The Changing Shape of the American Political Universe,” American Political Science Review 59 (March 1965): 7–28; Philip E. Converse, “Change in the American Electorate,” in The Human Meaning of Social Change, ed. Angus Campbell and Philip E. Converse (New York: Russell Sage, 1972), 266–301; Walter Dean Burnham, “Theory and Voting Research: Some Reflections on Converse's ‘Change in the American Electorate,’” American Political Science Review 68 (September 1974): 1002–1023. For two other perspectives, see Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Still Don't Vote and Why Politicians Want It That Way (Boston: Beacon Press, 2000); and Matthew A. Crenson and Benjamin Ginsberg, Downsizing America: How America Sidelined Its Citizens and Privatized Its Public (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2002). 11. For a rich source of information on the introduction of the Australian ballot and its effects, see Jerrold G. Rusk, “The Effect of the Australian Ballot on Split-Ticket Voting, 1876–1908,” American Political Science Review 64 (December 1970): 1220–1238. 12. Burnham presents estimates of turnout among the politically eligible population between 1789 and 1984 in “The Turnout Problem,” in Elections American Style, ed. James A. Reichley (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1987), 113–114. In a series of personal communications, Burnham provided us with estimates of turnout between 1988 and 2004: 52.7 percent in 1988, 56.9 percent in 1992, 50.8 percent in 1996, 54.9 percent in 2000, and 60.7 percent in 2004. McDonald and Popkin's estimates of turnout between 1948 and 2000 are available in Michael P. McDonald and Samuel L. Popkin, “The Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” American Political Science Review 95 (December 2001): 996. McDonald's estimates for the 2004 and 2008 elections are available on a Web site he maintains, http://elections.gmu.edu. 13. McDonald, “2008 General Election Turnout Rates,” http://elections.gmu/edu/Turnout_2008G.html. 14. Thomas E. Patterson, The Vanishing Voter: Public Involvement in an Age of Uncertainty (New York: Knopf, 2002). See also Pippa Norris, Democratic Participation Worldwide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 15. See note 13. 16. As Table 4-3 shows, the 1960 election was not only a high turnout election but also one in which a very small share of the electorate voted for a third-party or independent candidate. 17. Burnham estimated turnout at 65.4 percent, and McDonald and Popkin estimated it at 63.8 percent. See Burnham, “Turnout Problem,” 114; and McDonald and Popkin, “Myth of the Vanishing Voter,” 966. 18. See Glenn Firebaugh and Kevin Chen, “Vote Turnout among Nineteenth Amendment Women: The Enduring Effects of Disfranchisement,” American Journal of Sociology 100 (January 1995): 972–996. 19. For estimates of this reform on turnout, see Raymond E. Wolfinger and Jonathan Hoffman, “Registering and Voting with Motor Voter,” PS: Political Science and Politics 34 (March 2001): 86–92. David Hill argues that while motor voter legislation has made the election rolls more representative, it has had little effect on turnout. See David Hill, American Voter Turnout: An Institutional Perspective (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2006), 49–52, 55. 20. United States Election Project, “2008 Current Population Survey Voting and Registration Supplement,” http://elections.gmu/CPS_2008.html. The 2000 CPS was based on 80,667 respondents in each household studied. One person answers for all household members, and the survey provides information on about 132,812 respondents. We are grateful to McDonald for providing us with information on the number of respondents. As he points out, much of the information is not based on true self-reports (personal communication, May 22, 2009). The most important study to use the CPS remains Raymond E. Wolfinger and Steven J. Rosenstone, Who Votes? (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980). 21. As Wolfinger and Rosenstone demonstrate, about one-fifth of this decline resulted from the enfranchisement of eighteen–, nineteen–, and twenty-year-olds. Their nationwide enfranchisement stemmed from the 1971 ratification of the Twenty-sixth Amendment, which made it possible for more people to vote, but because these youth have low levels of voting, overall levels of turnout declined. See Wolfinger and Rosenstone, Who Votes? 58. 22. For our analysis of the reasons for the increase in turnout in 1992, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 120–123. As we point out, it is difficult to demonstrate empirically that Perot's candidacy made an important contribution to the increase in turnout. For additional analyses, see Stephen M. Nichols and Paul Allen Beck, “Reversing the Decline: Voter Turnout in 1992,” in Democracy's Feast: Elections in America, ed. Herbert F. Weisberg (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1995), 62–65; and Steven J. Rosenstone, Roy L. Behr, and Edward H. Lazarus, Third Parties in America: Citizen Response to Major-Party Failure, 2nd ed. (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996), 254–257. 23. In our analysis of the 1980, 1984, 1988, and 1992 elections, we also made extensive use of the Current Population Survey conducted by the U.S. Census Bureau. In 1996 only a preliminary report was available, but we used it wherever possible. In 2000 no report of the CPS was available at the time of our analysis. The Census Bureau published a detailed report of its 2004 survey in May 2005 and of its 2008 survey in July 2009. See U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008,http://www.census.gov/population/www/cps2008.html. 24. Half the respondents were asked: In talking to people about elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, or they just didn't have time. Which of the following statements best describes you? • One, I did not vote (in the election this November); • Two, I thought about voting this time—but didn't; • Three, I usually vote, but didn't this time; • Four, I am sure I voted. We classified respondents as voters if they were sure that they voted. The other half was asked a new version of the question: In asking people about the elections, we often find that a lot of people were not able to vote because they weren't registered, they were sick, they didn't have time to vote, or something else happened to prevent them from voting. And sometimes, people who usually vote or who planned to vote forget that something unusual happened on Election Day one year that prevented them from voting that time. So please think carefully for a minute about the recent elections, and other past elections in which you may have voted and answer the following questions about your voting behavior. During the past 6 years did you USUALLY VOTE in national, state, and local elections, or did you USUALLY NOT VOTE? During the months leading up to the election, did you ever plan to vote, or didn't you plan to do that? Which of the following best describes what you did in the elections that were held November 4: • Definitely did not vote in the elections. • Definitely voted in person at a polling place on election day. • Definitely voted in person at a polling place before election day. • Definitely voted by mailing a ballot to election officials before election day. • Definitely voted some other way. • Not completely sure of whether you voted or not. We classified respondents as voters if they were definitely sure they voted. There was no significant difference in reported voting between respondents asked the first (“old”) and the second (“new”) version of the question. Among respondents who were asked the first version (N = 1,053), 77.3 percent said they voted for president; among those who were asked the second version (N = 1,049), 76.5 percent said they voted for president. 25. Most analyses that compare the results of reported voting with those measured by the validation studies suggest that relative levels of turnout among most social groups can be compared using reported turnout. However, these studies suggest that blacks are more likely to falsely claim to have voted than whites. As a result, racial differences are always greater when turnout is measured by the vote validation studies. For results for the 1964, 1976, 1978, 1980, 1984, 1986, and 1988 elections, see Paul R. Abramson and William Claggett, “Racial Differences in Self-Reported and Validated Voting in the 1988 Presidential Election,” Journal of Politics 53 (February 1991): 186–187. For results for 1990, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, 382. For a discussion of the factors that contribute to false reports of voting, see Brian D. Silver, Barbara A. Anderson, and Paul R. Abramson, “Who Overreports Voting?” American Political Science Review 80 (June 1986): 613–624. For a more recent study that argues that biases in reported turnout are more severe than Silver, Anderson, and Abramson claim, see Robert Bernstein, Anita Chadha, and Robert Montjoy, “Overreporting Voting: Why It Happens and Why It Matters,” Public Opinion Quarterly 65 (Spring 2001): 22–44. 26. See Michael W. Traugott and John P. Katosh, “Response Validity in Surveys of Voting Behavior,” Public Opinion Quarterly 43 (Fall 1979): 359–377; and Barbara A. Anderson, Brian D. Silver, and Paul R. Abramson, “The Effects of the Race of the Interviewer on Measures of Electoral Participation on Blacks in SRC National Election Surveys,” Public Opinion Quarterly 52 (Spring 1988): 22–44. 27. In this analysis, we classify eleven respondents who said they voted but not for president as nonvoters. 28. Respondents were classified by the interviewer into one of the following categories: white; black/African American; white and black; other race; white and another race; black and another race; white, black, and another race. We classified only respondents who were white as whites; except for Asians, respondents in the other categories were classified as blacks. 29. See Warren E. Miller, Arthur H. Miller, and Edward J. Schneider, American National Studies Data Sourcebook, 1952–1978 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1980), table 5.23, 317. 30. According to the 1964 ANES survey, whites were 14.7 percentage points more likely to report voting than blacks. See ibid. 31. See U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2004,http://census.gov/prod/2006/p250.556.pdf, table B. 32. The results for 2004 are from “Election Results,” http://CNN.com, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2004/pages/results/state. The results for 2008 are from CNN Election Center ‘08, http://CNN.com, http://www/cnn/com/ELECTION/2008/results/polls. 33. Bear in mind that this tendency was found in all eight vote validation studies. The vote validation studies are not error-free, because some true voters may be classified as validated nonvoters if researchers cannot find a record that they registered or if the records inaccurately fail to show that they voted. The voting records in areas in which African Americans live are not as well maintained as those in areas in which whites are likely to live. Still, it seems unlikely that the finding that blacks are more likely to falsely report voting results from the poorer quality of black voting records. See Paul R. Abramson and William Claggett, “The Quality of Record-Keeping and Racial Differences in Validated Turnout,” Journal of Politics 54 (August 1992): 871–880. See also Carol A. Cassel, “Voting Records and Validated Voting Studies,” Public Opinion Quarterly 68 (Spring 2004): 102–108. 34. As we note in the introduction to Part I, there was a supplemental sample of blacks and Latinos, but we still do not have the information needed to analyze a representative version of this oversample. 35. As we explain in Chapter 3, we consider the South to include the eleven states of the old Confederacy. In our analysis of ANES surveys, however, we do not classify residents of Tennessee as southern because the University of Michigan Survey Research Center conducts samples in Tennessee to represent the border states. In this analysis, as well as analyses of ANES surveys later in this book, we classify the following ten states as southern: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Texas, and Virginia. 36. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, table 3. 37. Ibid. The Census Bureau includes several border states in its definition of the South. 38. Miller, Miller, and Schneider, American National Studies Data Sourcebook, table 5.23, 317. 39. U.S. Census Bureau, Current Population Survey, November 2006 and Earlier Reports,http://www.census.gov/cps, table A-2. 40. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, table 2. 41. See Benjamin Highton and Raymond E. Wolfinger, “The First Seven Years of the Political Life Cycle,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (January 2001): 202–209. 42. Our measure of family income is based on the respondents’ estimates of their family income in 2007 before taxes. In those cases in which respondents refused to reveal family income or in which interviewers thought respondents were answering dishonestly, we relied on the interviewers’ assessments. 43. Miller, Miller, and Schneider, American National Studies Data Sourcebook, table 5.23, 317. 44. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, table 7. 45. See Wolfinger and Rosenstone, Who Votes? 13–36. 46. Miller, Miller, and Schneider, American National Studies Data Sourcebook, table 5.23, 317. 47. The CPS has never measured religious preferences. 48. Miller, Miller, and Schneider, American National Data Sourcebook, table 5.23, 317. Between 1952 and 1976, Catholics were on average 8.0 percentage points more likely to vote in presidential elections, and between 1958 and 1988 they were 10.8 points more likely to vote in midterm elections. 49. Respondents were asked, “Would you call yourself a born-again Christian, that is, have you personally had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ?” 50. Lyman A. Kellstedt, “An Agenda for Future Research,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 293–299. 51. We are grateful to David C. Leege for providing us with the detailed information used to construct this measure. We constructed it as follows. Respondents who prayed several times a day received 2 points, those who prayed less often received a score of 1, and those who never prayed received 0 points. Those who attended religious services at least once a week received 2 points, those who attended less frequently received 1 point, and those who never attended received 0 points. Those who said religion provided “a great deal” of guidance in their lives received 2 points, those who said it provided “quite a bit” received 1 point, and those who said it provided “some” or no guidance received 0 points. Those who said the Bible was literally true or the “word of God” received 2 points, and those who said it “was written by men and is not the word of God” received 0 points. Respondents received a score of 1 for each ambiguous, “don't know,” or “not ascertained” response, but respondents with more than two such responses were excluded from the analysis. Scores ranged from 0 to 8. In regrouping the scores into three categories, we classified respondents with 8 points as “very high,” those with 6 or 7 points as “high,” and those with a score below 6 as “medium or low” on religious commitment. 52. Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003), 161. 53. R. Stephen Warner, New Wine in Old Wineskins: Evangelicals and Liberals in a Small-Town Church (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1977), 173. 54. The branching questions used to classify respondents into specific denominational categories were changed in 2008, and therefore it is not possible to replicate our analyses of the 1992, 1996, 2000, and 2004 categories. In creating these new classifications, we relied largely on the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation, Diverse and Dynamic (Washington, D.C.: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2008), 12. In addition, we were assisted by Corwin D. Smidt. Our classification for 2008 used the following procedures. We used the variable v083185x in the 2008 ANES survey to determine the respondent's denomination. Codes 110, 150, 200, 229, 230, and 270 for this variable were classified as mainline; codes 120–149, 165–200, 221, 223, and 250–269 were classified as evangelical. 55. See Miller, Miller, and Schneider, American National Election Studies Data Sourcebook, Table 5-23, 317. 56. U.S. Census Bureau, Voting and Registration in the Election of November 2008, table 6. 57. Silver, Anderson, and Abramson's analysis of the 1964, 1968, and 1980 vote validation studies finds that Americans with high levels of education do have very high levels of turnout. However, their analysis also finds that persons with high levels of formal education who do not vote are more likely to claim falsely that they voted than nonvoters with lower levels of formal education. See Silver, Anderson, and Abramson, “Who Overreports Voting?” Our analysis shows a similar pattern for the 1978, 1984, 1986, 1988, and 1990 vote validation studies. We do not know if a similar pattern would be found in 2008, but, if it were, the results in Table 4-4 may somewhat exaggerate the relationship between age and formal education. 58. According to Jeff Manza and Christopher Uggen, 5.3 million Americans were disfranchised in 2004 because they were parolees or ex-felons or were in prison or in jail on election day. See Manza and Uggen, Locked Out: Felon Disfranchisement and American Democracy (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 76. 59. U.S. Census Bureau, The 2009 Statistical Abstract of the United States March 24, 2009, table 221, http://www.census.gov/compendia/statab/cats/education/educational_attainment/html. 60. Richard A. Brody, “The Puzzle of Political Participation in America,” in The New American Political System, ed. Anthony King (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1978), 287–324. 61. Walter Dean Burnham, “The 1976 Election: Has the Crisis Been Adjourned?” in American Politics and Public Policy, ed. Walter Dean Burnham and Martha Wagner Weinberg (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1976), 24; Thomas E. Cavanagh, “Changes in American Voter Turnout, 1964–1976,” Political Science Quarterly 96 (Spring 1981): 53–65. 62. Ruy A. Teixeira, The Disappearing American Voter (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute, 1992), 66–67. Teixeira is skeptical about our finding that the ANES surveys show that turnout did not decline among college graduates. 63. We assume that educational levels were the same in 2008 as they were in 1960, but that reported levels of turnout were the same as they were in the 2008 survey. 64. Teixeira, Disappearing American Voter, 47. 65. Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 214–215. For another discussion of changes in registration requirements, see Hill, American Voter Turnout, 33–57. 66. Teixeira, Disappearing American Voter, 47. 67. Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy, 215. 68. Warren E. Miller, “The Puzzle Transformed: Explaining Declining Turnout,” Political Behavior 14, no. 1 (1992): 1–43. See also Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 95–114. 69. Robert D. Putnam, Bowling Alone: The Collapse and Revival of American Community (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2000), 265. 70. George I. Balch, “Multiple Indicators in Survey Research: The Concept ‘Sense of Political Efficacy,’” Political Methodology 1 (Spring 1974): 1–43. For an extensive discussion of feelings of political efficacy, see Paul R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983): 135–189. These are the same two fundamental attitudes that Teixeira studied in this first major analysis of the decline of turnout, and they are among the attitudes studied by Rosenstone and Hansen. 71. Ruy A. Teixeira, Why Americans Don't Vote: Turnout Decline in the United States, 1960–1964 (New York: Greenwood Press, 1987). In his more recent study, The Disappearing American Voter, Teixeira develops a measure of party-related characteristics that includes strength of party identification, concern about the electoral outcome, perceived difference between the parties, and knowledge about the parties and the candidates. See also Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy. 72. Our first analysis studied the decline of turnout between 1960 and 1980. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 85–87. For a more detailed analysis using probability procedures, see Paul R. Abramson and John H. Aldrich, “The Decline of Electoral Participation in America,” American Political Science Review 76 (September 1982): 502–521. 73. See note 72 for our analyses through 1980. For our analyses from 1984 through 2004, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), 115–118; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 103–106; Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, 117–120; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 81–84; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 86–99; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 97–100. 74. The questions used to build the standard measure of party identification are as follows: “Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an Independent, or what?” Persons who call themselves Republicans are asked, “Would you call yourself a strong Republican or a not very strong Republican?” Those who call themselves Democrats are asked, “Would you call yourself a strong Democrat or a not very strong Democrat?” Those who called themselves independents, named another party, or who had no preference were asked, “Do you think of yourself as closer to the Republican party or to the Democratic party?” Respondents with no preference are usually classified as independents. They are classified as “apoliticals” only if they have low levels of political interest and political involvement. In 2008 a question wording experiment was employed in which a randomly selected half-sample was initially asked, “Generally speaking, do you think of yourself as a Democrat, a Republican, an Independent, or what?” The order in which the two major parties are named has little effect. When the standard question was asked, 59 percent of party identifiers (N = 708) were Democrats; when the experimental question was asked, 55 percent of the party identifiers (N = 664) were Democrats. 75. For the seminal discussion of turnout from the rational choice perspective, see Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), 260–276. For a more recent formulation, see John H. Aldrich, “Rational Choice and Turnout,” American Journal of Political Science 37 (February 1993): 246–278. For a comment on Aldrich's essay, see Robert W. Jackman, “Rationality and Political Participation,” American Journal of Political Science 37 (February 1993): 279–290. 76. Our measure is based on the responses to two statements: “Public officials don't care much what people like me think,” and “People like me don't have any say about what the government does.” Respondents who disagreed with both of these statements were scored as high in feelings of effectiveness; those who agreed with one statement and disagreed with the other were scored as medium; and those who agreed with both statements were scored as low. Respondents who scored “don't know” or “not ascertained” to one statement were scored high or low according to their answer on the other statement. Those with “don't know” or “not ascertained” responses to both statements were excluded from the analysis. In 1988, 1992, 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008, respondents were asked whether they “strongly agreed,” “agreed,” “disagreed,” or “strongly disagreed” with the statements. In all six years, we classified respondents who “neither agreed nor disagreed” with both statements as medium on this measure. This decision has little effect on the results since only 3 percent of the respondents in 1988, 2 percent in 1992, 3 percent in 1996, 4 percent in 2000, 5 percent in 2004, and 5 percent in 2008 answered “neither agree nor disagree” to both statements. In 2008 this standard measure of feelings of “external” political efficacy was asked of only half of the sample. 77. These estimates are based on the assumption that each partisanship and strength of political efficacy category was the same size in 2008 as it was in 1960, but that the reported turnout for each category was the same as we observed in 2008. For an additional explanation of this procedure, see Abramson, Political Attitudes in America, 296. 78. We used an algebraic standardization procedure. To simplify our analysis, we combined whites with an eighth-grade education or less with whites who had not graduated from high school; we also combined weak partisans with independents who leaned toward a party. 79. This difference appears to result from the very low level of reported turnout among whites who had not graduated from high school. This group has a substantial effect on our estimates. In 1960, 47 percent of whites in the ANES survey had not graduated from high school; in 2008 this figure was down to 10 percent. 80. For a discussion of political trust, see Abramson, Political Attitudes in America, 193–238. For a more recent discussion, see Marc J. Hetherington, Why Trust Matters: Declining Political Trust and the Demise of American Liberalism (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2005). Russell J. Dalton reports a decline in confidence in politicians and government in fifteen of sixteen democracies. Although many of the trends are not statistically significant, the overall decline is impressive. Dalton's report includes results from the ANES, where the trend toward declining confidence is unlikely to occur by chance on two of the three questions. See Dalton, Democratic Challenges, Democratic Choices: The Erosion of Political Support in Advanced Industrial Democracies (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2004), 28–32. 81. Respondents were asked, “How much of the time do you think you can trust the government in Washington to do what is right—just about always, most of the time, or only some of the time?” 82. This question was asked of a randomly selected half-sample in 2008. 83. Respondents were asked, “Would you say the government is pretty much run for a few big interests looking out for themselves or that it is run for the benefit of all the people?” 84. Respondents were asked, “The political parties try to talk to as many people as they can to get them to vote for their candidate. Did anyone from the political parties call or come around to talk with you about the campaign this year?” 85. As Paul R. Abramson and William Claggett show, the effects of contacting potential participants persist even when one takes into account that political elites are more likely to contact people who have participated in the past. See Paul R. Abramson and William Claggett, “Recruitment and Political Participation,” Political Research Quarterly 54 (December 2001): 905–916. 86. Orley Ashenfelter and Stanley Kelley Jr., “Determinants of Participation in Presidential Elections,” Journal of Law and Economics 18 (December 1975): 721. 87. James DeNardo, “Turnout and the Vote: The Joke's on the Democrats,” American Political Science Review 74 (December 1980): 406–420. 88. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, 88–92; Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, 119–124; Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections, 108–112. 89. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, 124–128. 90. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections, 86–89. 91. Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election,” in The Election of 2000: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (New York: Chatham House, 2001), 114. 92. Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, “The 2004 Presidential Election: The Emergence of a Permanent Majority,” Political Science Quarterly 120 (Spring 2005): 43. 93. For our analysis of the impact of increased turnout in 2004, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 100–105. 94. The results for 1980, 1984, and 1988 are based on an actual check of the voting and registration records to determine whether respondents voted. However, the Republican advantage was also found when we studied reported electoral participation. 95. The kind and number of issues used varied from election to election. We used only issues on which respondents were asked to state their own positions and where they thought the major-party candidates were located. See Table 6-4 for the number of issues used in each election between 1980 and 2004. 96. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 92–93, 143. 97. As part of a question-wording experiment, only the question about blacks was asked to the entire sample, whereas the remaining six were asked to a randomly chosen half-sample. As a result, the number of cases for the balance of issues measure is only half the number for party identification or for our measure of retrospective evaluations. 98. The 2004 measure was based on (1) an evaluation of Bush's performance as president; (2) an assessment of how good a job the government was doing solving the most important problem facing the country; and (3) the respondent's assessment of which party would do a better job of dealing with the economy, terrorism, and keeping the United States out of war. 99. For the most influential statement of this argument, see Wolfinger and Rosenstone, Who Votes? 108–114. 100. Frances Fox Piven and Richard A. Cloward, Why Americans Don't Vote (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988), 21. See also Piven and Cloward, Why Americans Still Don't Vote. 101. Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, enlarged ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981), 226–229. Lipset emphasized the dangers of sudden increases in political participation. 102. Gerald M. Pomper, “The Presidential Election,” in The Elections of 1980: Reports and Interpretations, ed. Gerald M. Pomper (Chatham, N.J.: Chatham House, 1981), 86. 103. “When People Vote,” The Rhodes Cook Letter, March 2005, 7. Clearly, Cook resorts to hyperbole when he refers to U.S. turnout as “sky high.” U.S. turnout was not sky high by either cross-national standards (see Table 4-1) or by U.S. historical standards (Table 4-2). 5. Social Forces and the Vote 1. The social characteristics used in this chapter are the same as those used in Chapter 4. The variables are described in the notes to that chapter. For similar tables showing the results for elections between 1980 and 2004, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 98–99; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), 136–137; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 124–125; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 133–135; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 93–95; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), 98–100; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 109–110. 2. We frequently compare the 2008 results with those in 2004. In that year, the ANES survey was very small; it included only eight hundred self-reported voters. 3. For a discussion of our sources for these polls, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 358n3. We present an analysis of these exit poll results in Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, “The 2004 Presidential Election: The Making of a Permanent Majority?” Political Science Quarterly 120 (Spring 2005): 33–57. Exit polls have three main advantages: (1) they are less expensive to conduct than the multistage probability samples conducted by the Survey Research Center of the University of Michigan; (2) because of their lower cost, a large number of people can be sampled; and (3) because persons are selected to be interviewed as they leave the polling stations, the vast majority of respondents have actually voted. But these surveys also have four disadvantages: (1) organizations that conduct exit polls must now take into account the growing number of voters who vote early—about a third of all voters in 2008; (2) the self-administered polls used for respondents leaving the polls must be relatively brief; (3) it is difficult to supervise the fieldwork to ensure that interviewers are using the proper procedures to select respondents; and (4) these studies are of relatively little use in studying turnout because persons who do not vote are not sampled. For a discussion of the procedures used to conduct exit polls and their limitations, see Albert H. Cantril, The Opinion Connection: Polling, Politics, and the Press (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), 142–144, 216–218. 4. This brief discussion cannot do justice to the complexities of black electoral participation. For an important study based on the 1984 ANES survey of blacks, see Patricia Gurin, Shirley Hatchett, and James S. Jackson, Hope and Independence: Blacks’ Response to Electoral and Party Politics (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1989). For two important studies that use this survey, see Michael C. Dawson, Behind the Mule: Race and Class in African American Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1994); and Katherine Tate, From Politics to Protest: The New Black Voter in American Elections (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1994). For a summary of recent research on race and politics, see Michael C. Dawson and Cathy Cohen, “Problems in the Politics of Race,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ira Katznelson and Helen V. Milner (New York: Norton, 2002), 488–510. 5. With the weighted data, only one black voted for McCain. If one examines the black supplement, only two black voters did. The pool poll compares black women with black men, but there was no meaningful difference between them. Ninety-six percent of black women voted for Obama; 95 percent of black men did. 6. For a summary of evidence about the Latino vote in 2004, see David L. Leal et al., “The Latino Vote in 2004,” PS: Political Science and Politics 38 (January 2005). 7. For a review of research on Latinos as well as African Americans, see Paula McClain and John D. Garcia, “Expanding Disciplinary Boundaries: Black, Latino, and Racial Minority Groups in Political Science,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1993), 247–279. For analyses of Latino voting in the 1996 elections, see Rudolfo O. de la Garza and Louis DeSipio, eds., Awash in the Mainstream: Latino Politics in the 1976 Election (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1999). For a more recent review, see John D. Garcia, “Latinos and Political Behavior: Defining Community to Examine Critical Complexities,” in The Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, ed. Jan E. Leighley (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 397–414. 8. With the weighted sample, there are only thirteen Cuban American voters, seven of whom voted for Obama. Even with the Latino oversample, there are only twenty-two Cuban American voters. 9. For three reviews of research on women in politics, see Susan J. Carroll and Linda M. Zerelli, “Feminist Challenges to Political Science,” in Finifter, Political Science: The State of the Discipline II, 55–76; Nancy Burns, “Gender: Public Opinion and Political Action,” in Katznelson and Milner, Political Science: The State of the Discipline, 462–487; and Kira Sanbonmastu, “Organizing American Politics, Organizing Gender,” in Leighley, Oxford Handbook of American Elections and Political Behavior, 415–432. 10. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, 290. 11. The ANES survey reports six types of marital status: married, divorced, separated, widowed, never married, and partners who are not married. Here we compare the first two groups. Two different questions were used to measure marital status. Half the respondents were asked, “Are you married now, and living with your (husband/wife)—or are you widowed, divorced, separated, or have you never been married?” The other half were asked, “Are you married, divorced, separated, widowed, or have you never been married?” There was very little difference in the responses. Among respondents asked the standard version of the question (N = 1,100), 51.4 percent said they were married, and 24.8 percent said they had never been married. Among those asked the new question (N = 993), 48.6 percent said they were married, and 25.7 percent said they had never been married. 12. Exit polls ask voters to cast a “secret ballot” after they have left the polling station. They are handed a short form that records the respondent's behavior, political views, and demographic information. Use of this procedure reduces the pressure for the respondent to answer in a socially “acceptable” way. 13. Respondents were asked, “Do you consider yourself to be heterosexual or straight, homosexual or gay (lesbian), or bisexual?” This question was asked using an Audio Computer-Assisted Self-Interview (ACASI) in which the respondent enters his or her response into a personal computer. 14. The result in Table 5-1 is obviously wrong. If McCain had actually won 87 percent of the white vote in these states, he would have carried them by a very large margin. 15. Chuck Todd, Sheldon Gawiser, with Ana Maria Arumi and G. Evans Witt, How Obama Won: A State-by-State Guide to the Historic 2008 Presidential Election (New York: Vintage Books, 2009), 58, 81, 93. The surveys in all three states were sizable: 3,350 respondents in Florida, 2,814 in North Carolina, and 2,466 in Virginia. 16. Todd and Gawiser, How Obama Won, 31. 17. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 124–127. For cross-national evidence, see Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic, and Political Change in 43 Societies (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1997), 255; and Russell J. Dalton, Citizen Politics: Public Opinion and Political Parties in Advanced Industrial Democracies, 5th ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008), 145–152. 18. The Los Angeles Times sponsored a national exit poll of 5,154 voters as they left 136 polling stations throughout the United States. Sixty-five percent of the respondents were sampled as they left fifty voting places in California. 19. Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Class and Party in American Politics (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 2000), 87–121; Larry M. Bartels, Unequal Democracy: The Political Economy of the New Gilded Age (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2008), 64–126. 20. See, for example, Walter Dean Burnham, Critical Elections and the Mainsprings of American Politics (New York: Norton, 1970); Everett Carll Ladd Jr., with Charles D. Hadley Jr., Transformations of the American Party System: Political Coalitions from the New Deal to the 1970s, 2nd ed. (New York: Norton, 1978). 21. “Election Results 2008,” http://nytimes.com, http://elections.nytimes.com/2008results/presidential/national_exit-polls.html. Although this site shows exit poll results from 1972 to 2008, not until the 1988 election does it provide a breakdown of results among voters with postgraduate education. 22. In both the ANES survey and the pool poll, union members were only somewhat more likely to vote for Obama than nonmembers who lived in a union household. Among white union members in the ANES survey (N = 96), 53 percent voted for Obama; among nonmembers who lived in a union household (N = 71), 49 percent did. In the pool poll, 60 percent of all union members voted for Obama; among nonmembers who lived in a union household, 57 percent did. 23. For the single best summary, see Kenneth D. Wald, Religion and Politics in the United States, 4th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2003). For a discussion of religion and politics in a comparative context, see Pippa Norris and Ronald Inglehart, Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004). 24. The question, which was asked to all Christians, was “Would you call yourself a born-again Christian, that is, have you personally had a conversion experience related to Jesus Christ?” This question was not asked in the 2004 ANES survey. 25. Lyman A. Kellstedt, “An Agenda for Future Research,” in Rediscovering the Religious Factor in American Politics, ed. David C. Leege and Lyman A. Kellstedt (Armonk, N.Y.: M. E. Sharpe, 1993), 293–299. 26. Morris P. Fiorina, with Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized America, 2nd ed. (New York: Pearson/Longman, 2006), 134. 27. We do not report the results for church attendance because it is already included in our measure of religious commitment. 28. Robert Axelrod, “Where the Votes Come From: An Analysis of Electoral Coalitions, American Political Science Review 66 (March 1972): 11–20. Axelrod updates his results through the 1984 elections. For his most recent estimate, including results from 1952 to 1980, see Robert Axelrod, “Presidential Coalitions in 1984,” American Political Science Review 80 (March 1986): 281–284. Using Axelrod's categories, Nelson W. Polsby estimates the social composition of the Democratic and Republican presidential coalitions between 1952 and 2000. See Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 11th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2004), 32. For an update through 2004, see Nelson W. Polsby, Aaron Wildavsky, with David A. Hopkins, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures in American Politics, 12th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2008), 28. 29. John R. Petrocik, Party Coalitions: Realignment and the Decline of the New Deal Party System (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1981). 30. Harold W. Stanley, William T. Bianco, and Richard G. Niemi, “Partisanship and Group Support over Time: A Multivariate Analysis,” American Political Science Review 80 (September 1986): 969–976. Stanley and his colleagues assess the independent contribution that group membership makes toward Democratic loyalties after controls are introduced for membership in other pro-Democratic groups. For an update and an extension through 2004, see Harold W. Stanley and Richard G. Niemi, “Partisanship, Party Coalitions, and Group Support, 1952–2004,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 36 (June 2006): 172–188. For an alternative approach, see Robert S. Erikson, Thomas D. Lancaster, and David W. Romero, “Group Components of the Presidential Vote, 1952–1984,” Journal of Politics 51 (May 1989): 337–346. 31. For a discussion of the contribution of the working class to the Democratic presidential coalition, see Paul R. Abramson, Generational Change in American Politics (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975). 32. See Axelrod, “Where the Votes Come From.” 33. The NORC survey, based on 2,564 civilians, used a quota sample that does not follow the probability procedures used by the University of Michigan Survey Research Center. Following the procedures used at the time, southern blacks were not sampled. Because the NORC survey overrepresented upper-income groups and the middle and upper-middle classes, it cannot be used to estimate the contribution of social groups to the Democratic and Republican presidential coalitions. 34. Abramson, Generational Change in American Politics, 65–68. 35. As Figure 5-1 shows, Clinton did win a majority of the white major-party vote in 1992 and 1996. 36. Racial voting, as well as our other measures of social cleavage, is affected by including Wallace voters with Nixon voters in 1968, Anderson voters with Reagan voters in 1980, Perot voters with Bush voters in 1992, and Perot voters with Dole voters in 1996. For the effects of including these independent or third-party candidates, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections, 102, 104–106, 108, and 111. 37. The statements about low turnout in 1996 are true regardless of whether one measures turnout based on the voting-age population or the voting-eligible population. Turnout among the voting-eligible population fell about nine percentage points between 1960 and 1996. 38. As we explain in Chapter 3, we consider the South to include the eleven states of the old Confederacy, although in our analysis of ANES surveys we classify Tennessee as a border state. Because we cannot use this definition with either the 1944 NORC survey or the 1948 University of Michigan Survey Research Center survey, we have not included these years in our analysis of regional differences among the white electorate. 39. Of course, Bush lived in Texas, also a southern state. 40. Cheney had served as the U.S. representative from Wyoming from 1979 to 1989. When he became the chief executive officer of Halliburton in 1995, he established his residence in Texas. Being a resident of Texas would have complicated running on the same ticket as Bush because the Twelfth Amendment specifies that electors “vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves.” 41. See, for example, Chapter 3 where we compare Kennedy's black support in the South in 1960 with Carter's in 1976. 42. Todd and Gawiser, How Obama Won, 58, 81, 93. 43. Officially known as the Labor-Management Relations Act, this legislation, passed in 1947, qualified or amended much of the National Labor Relations Act of 1935 (known as the Wagner Act). Union leaders argued that the Taft-Hartley Act placed unwarranted restrictions on organized labor. This act was passed by the Republican-controlled Eightieth Congress, vetoed by Truman, and passed over his veto. 44. According to the 2008 pool poll, Obama received 53 percent of the vote. Members of union households made up 21 percent of the electorate, and 50 percent voted for Obama. These numbers thus suggest that 23 percent of Obama's vote came from members of union households. Even if one takes into account that not all these union voters were white, these numbers suggest that about one in five of Obama's votes came from union households. 45. See Robert R. Alford, Party and Society: The Anglo-American Democracies (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1963); Seymour Martin Lipset, Political Man: The Social Bases of Politics, exp. ed. (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981); and Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization. 46. The variation in class voting is smaller if one focuses on class differences in the congressional vote, but the data clearly show a decline in class voting between 1952 and 2004. See Dalton, Citizen Politics, 5th ed., 148. 47. Readers should bear in mind that in 2000 (and 2004) there was no measure of the head of household's occupation or of the spouse's occupation, but our analysis of the 1996 data suggests that this limitation probably does not account for the negative level of class voting in the 2000 contest. Bartels discusses our attempts to maintain comparability in measuring social class in the face of changing survey measurement in Unequal Democracy, 70–71. 48. As we point out in Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, when we define social class according to the respondent's own occupation, the overall size of the working class falls and the overall size of the middle class grows. Because the relatively small size of the working class in 2000 and 2004 results mainly from a redefinition of the way our measure of social class is constructed, we assumed that the sizes of the working and the middle class in 2000 and 2004 were the same as they were in the 1996 ANES. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, chap. 4, 313n26. 49. See Mark N. Franklin, “The Decline of Cleavage Politics,” in Electoral Change: Responses to Evolving Social and Attitudinal Structures in Western Countries, ed. Mark N. Franklin, Thomas T. Mackie, and Henry Valen, with others (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 383–405. See also Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization, 237–266. 50. Jeff Manza and Clem Brooks, Social Cleavages and Political Change: Voter Alignments and U.S. Party Coalitions (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999). 51. Exit polls conducted between 1972 and 2008 show the same pattern. In all ten elections, Jews have been more likely to vote Democratic than white Catholics, and white Catholics have been more likely to vote Democratic than white Protestants. See “Election Results 2008,” http://nytimes.com. 52. For a discussion of the impact of religion on the 1960 election, see Philip E. Converse, “Religion and Politics: The 1960 Election,” in Elections and the Political Order, ed. Angus Campbell et al. (New York: Wiley, 1967), 96–124. 53. According to the 2009 Statistical Abstract of the United States, as of 2007, 2.2 percent of the U.S. population was Jewish, and according to the Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, only 1.7 percent was. The Statistical Abstract results are based mainly on information provided by Jewish organizations, whereas the Pew results are based on a representative survey of 35,000 Americans. The Pew survey is presented in Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, U.S. Religious Landscape Survey: Religious Affiliation, Diverse and Dynamic (Washington, D.C.: Pew Forum on Religion and Public Life, 2008), 12. For the Statistical Abstract, see U.S. Census Bureau, The 2009 Statistical Abstract of the United States: The National Data Book,http://www.census/compedia/statab, table 76. 54. States are listed in descending order according to their estimated number of Jews. 55. Since 1860, the Democrats have won the presidency only twice without winning New York: 1916, when Woodrow Wilson narrowly defeated Charles Evans Hughes by a margin of twenty-three electoral votes, and 1948, when Harry Truman defeated Thomas Dewey. Dewey, the governor of New York, won 46.0 percent of the popular vote in his home state, and Truman won 45.0 percent. Henry A. Wallace, the Progressive candidate in 1948, won 8.2 percent of the New York vote, substantially better than his share in any other state. 56. Robert Huckfeldt and Carol Weitzel Kohfeld provide strong evidence that Democratic appeals to blacks weakened the party's support among working-class whites. See their Race and the Decline of Class in American Politics (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1989). 57. For evidence on this point, see Paul R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983), 65–68. 58. Edward G. Carmines and James A. Stimson, Issue Evolution: Race and the Transformation of American Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1999). For a critique of their thesis, see Alan I. Abramowitz, “Issue Evolution Reconsidered: Racial Attitudes and Partisanship among the American Electorate,” American Journal of Political Science 38 (February 1994): 1–24. 59. This is not to argue that abortion is necessarily an issue that works against the Democrats. For example, in his study of the 1992 presidential election Alan Abramowitz argues that abortion was the most important issue influencing voters and that Clinton was the beneficiary. See Alan I. Abramowitz, “It's Abortion, Stupid: Policy Voting in the 1992 Presidential Election,” Journal of Politics 57 (February 1995): 176–186. 60. James W. Ceaser and Andrew E. Busch, Upside Down and Inside Out: The 1992 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1993), 168–171. 6. Candidates, Issues, and the Vote 1. This set of attitudes was first formulated and tested extensively in Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), using data from what are now called the American National Election Studies (ANES) surveys. The authors based their conclusions primarily on data from a survey of the 1956 presidential election, a rematch between Democrat Adlai Stevenson and Republican (and this time the incumbent) Dwight Eisenhower. Recently, Michael S. Lewis-Beck, William G. Jacoby, Helmut Norpoth, and Herbert F. Weisberg applied similar methods to data from 2000 and 2004. See their The American Voter Revisited (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2008). 2. See, for example, Wendy M. Rahn et al., “A Social-Cognitive Model of Candidate Appraisal,” in Information and Democratic Processes, ed. John A. Ferejohn and James H. Kuklinski (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 136–159, and sources cited therein. 3. For the most extensive explication of the theory and tests in various electoral settings, see Gary W. Cox, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1997). For an examination in the American context, see Paul R. Abramson et al., “Third-Party and Independent Candidates in American Politics: Wallace, Anderson, and Perot,” Political Science Quarterly 110 (Fall 1995): 349–367. 4. These elections are discussed in Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983); Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995); Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999); and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003). 5. We reproduce the feeling thermometer in Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed., 166; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections, 117; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 123. 6. See Abramson et al., “Third-Party and Independent Candidates.” 7. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, Table 6-1, 125–126. 8. The ANES survey also asks about respondents’ emotional reactions to each candidate, specifically whether the candidate ever made them feel angry, proud, afraid, or hopeful. There is little difference between McCain and Obama on these measures, with respondents mostly reporting no. There is one exception for each candidate, however. A slight majority said that McCain made them feel proud (with choices, then, of rarely, occasionally, fairly often, or very often), and a majority said that Obama made them feel hopeful. These characterizations seem reasonable in view of McCain's hero status and Obama's strengths. All of these reactions are also clearly related to the vote, as one would expect. 9. For an analysis of how the candidates’ campaign strategies in 1996, 2000, and 2004 shaped the voters’ decisions, and in turn were shaped by the concerns of the voters, see John H. Aldrich and Thomas Weko, “The Presidency and the Election Campaign: Framing the Choice in 1996,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 6th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2000); John H. Aldrich and John D. Griffin, “The Presidency and the Campaign: Creating Voter Priorities in the 2000 Election,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 7th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003); and John H. Aldrich, John D. Griffin, and Jill Rickershauser, “The Presidency and the Election Campaign: Altering Voters’ Priorities in the 2004 Election,” in The Presidency and the Political System, 8th ed., ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2006). 10. If they named more than one problem, they were asked which problem was the most important. In 2004 respondents were asked, “What do you think has been the most important issue facing the United States over the last four years?” 11. These measures were first used in the ANES survey of the 1968 election. And they were used extensively in presidential election surveys beginning in 1972. The issue measures used in Chapter 7 were also used extensively beginning in the 1970s. Therefore in this and the next two chapters, we limit our attention to the last ten elections. 12. The 2008 ANES survey included two versions of most of these questions. Half of the sample was randomly selected to respond to these seven-point issue scales with the wording used in prior elections, and the other half was given questions about the same issues but with different wording. We base our analyses in this chapter (and subsequent chapters) on the questions with the traditional wording in order to make comparisons with earlier elections. 13. The median is based on the assumption that respondents can be ranked from most conservative to most liberal. The number of respondents who are more liberal than the median (or who see a candidate as more liberal than the median) is equal to the number who are more conservative (or see the candidate as more conservative) than the median. Because there are only seven points on these scales and because many respondents will choose any given point, the median is computed using a procedure that derives a median for grouped data. As we pointed out in note 12, we restrict our analyses to those respondents who received the traditional wording of the various issue scales. The aid to blacks scale was posed with traditional wording to the entire sample. With one exception, we use responses to this scale only from the random half-sample that received the traditional wording for all issue scales. The exception is in the calculation of the median placements on the aid to blacks scale. For this single set of calculations, we use the responses for the entire sample to provide the best information for estimating the median placements. 14. We draw self-placement as being at the left-most (or “1”) scale position in Figure 6-2. Technically, the distribution of responses is so skewed to the left that the median placement as formally calculated is to the left of even that position. This degree of skewness reflects how much society had changed since that question was introduced in the 1970s, when responses were not that dramatically skewed to the liberal end of the scale. This sort of change is one of the reasons that the ANES began using new question wording for half the sample in 2008. 15. Morris P. Fiorina, with Samuel J. Abrams and Jeremy C. Pope, Culture War? The Myth of a Polarized Electorate (New York: Pearson, Longman, 2005). 16. Campbell et al., American Voter, 168–187. 17. In most years, including 2008, the ANES encouraged respondents to reveal the absence of an issue position. It did so by adding to the issue scale question the wording “or haven't you thought much about it?” This prompt is designed to remove feelings of social pressure to appear well informed, even if the respondent is not. However, the data show that it did not elicit much selection of the no opinion option. Recall that we employ the issues asked using the traditional wording, so that the following analyses are restricted to the randomly selected half-sample that received the traditional wording. 18. Before 1996 the ANES interviewers did not ask those who failed to place themselves on an issue scale where they thought the candidates stood. Since then, they ask respondents who did not place themselves on an issue where the candidates stood. Therefore, before 1996 those who failed to meet the first criterion were not able to meet any of the remaining ones. Although some people who express no preference on an issue might know the positions of one or both candidates, it is difficult to see how they could vote based on those perceptions if they had no opinion of their own. 19. To maintain comparability with previous election surveys, for 1996, 2000, 2004, and 2008 we have excluded respondents who did not place themselves on an issue scale from columns II, III, and IV of Table 6-4. Because we do not know the preferences of these respondents on the issue, we have no way to measure the ways in which their issue preferences may have affected their votes. 20. For details, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, Table 6-3, 130; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), Table 6-2, 174; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), Table 6-2, 165; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, Table 6-6, 186; Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections, Table 6-6, 135; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, Table 6-4, 137. 21. Although this is evidence that most people claim to have issue preferences, it does not demonstrate that they do. For example, evidence indicates that some use the midpoint of the scale (point 4) as a means of answering the question even if they have ill-formed preferences. See John H. Aldrich et al., “The Measurement of Public Opinion about Public Policy: A Report on Some New Issue Question Formats,” American Journal of Political Science 26 (May 1982): 391–414. 22. Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981). 23. We use “apparent issue voting” to emphasize several points. First, voting involves too many factors to infer that closeness to a candidate on any one issue was the cause of the voter's choice. The issue similarity may have been purely coincidental, or it may have been only one of many reasons the voter supported that candidate. Second, we use the median perception of the candidates’ positions rather than the voter's own perception. Third, the relationship between issues and the vote may be caused by rationalization. Voters may have decided to support a candidate for other reasons and also may have altered their own issue preferences or misperceived the positions of the candidates to align themselves more closely with their already favored candidate. See Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting,” American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972): 450–458. 24. Many individuals, of course, placed the candidates at different positions than did the public on average. The use of average perceptions, however, reduces the effect of individuals rationalizing their perceptions of candidates to be consistent with their own vote rather than voting for the candidate whose views are actually closer to their own. 25. They also received a score of 0 if they answered 5 (which was transposed to 3) on the government spending/services scale. 26. This procedure counts every issue as equal in importance. It also assumes that what matters is that the voter is closer to the candidate on an issue; it does not consider how much closer the voter is to one candidate or the other. 27. Scores of +5, +6, and +7 were designated strongly Republican, while similarly negative scores were designated strongly Democratic. Scores of +3 and +4 were designated moderately Republican, −3 and −4 moderately Democratic. Scores of +1 and +2 were slightly Republican, −1 and −2 slightly Democratic. A score of 0 was designated neutral. Three respondents who did not have an opinion on any of the seven issues were excluded from the analysis. 28. This is an oddity that appears to be attributable to the fact that our balance of issue measure counts only whether the respondent is closer to a candidate but does not consider by how much. 29. Note, however, that there are limits to the amount of projection given that so many respondents agreed on at least the ordinal location of the two candidates. “Persuasion,” locating oneself close to where a favored candidate stands (especially when it is not “genuine” persuasion but simply rationalization of the vote choice), is another source of limits on the extent of prospective voting. 7. Presidential Performance and Candidate Choice 1. By “war” we mean the wars in Afghanistan, Iraq, and against terrorism. For an analysis of the role of these issues in 2004, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), chap. 7. 2. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), chap. 7. 3. Bush became the first sitting vice president to be elected president since Democratic vice president Martin Van Buren was elected in 1836. As Nelson W. Polsby and Aaron Wildavsky point out, a sitting vice president may have many of the disadvantages of being an incumbent without the advantages of actually being president. See Polsby and Wildavsky, Presidential Elections: Strategies and Structures of American Politics, 11th ed. (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), 78–85. 4. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 203–208. 5. V. O. Key Jr., Politics, Parties, and Pressure Groups, 5th ed. (New York: Crowell, 1964), 568. Key's theory of retrospective voting is most fully developed in The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). 6. Anthony Downs, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957). 7. Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), 83. Two recent papers by Christopher H. Achen and Larry M. Bartels argue that the U.S. electorate is too ignorant to make informed decisions consistent with the assumptions of retrospective voting theorists. See Achen and Bartels, “Blind Retrospection: Electoral Responses to Drought, Flu, and Shark Attacks” (unpublished manuscript, Princeton University, January 2004); and Achen and Bartels, “Musical Chairs: Pocketbook Voting and the Limits of Democratic Accountability” (paper prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, September 1–5, 2004). 8. See Benjamin I. Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). He argues that “party cleavages” distinguish the party at the candidate and mass levels. 9. Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Throwing the Rascals Out: Policy and Performance Evaluations of Presidential Candidates, 1952–1980,” American Political Science Review 79 (June 1985): 359–372. 10. Note that this question differs from the one the ANES has asked in earlier elections. As we point out in Chapter 6 (note 12), respondents were asked a different question to determine what they thought the most important problem was. 11. Each respondent assesses government performance on the problem he or she considers the most important. In the seven surveys from 1976 to 2000, respondents were asked, “How good a job is the government doing in dealing with this problem—a good job, only fair, or a poor job?” In 1972 respondents were asked a different but related question (see the note to Table A7-1 in the appendix). In 2004 respondents were asked another question (see Chapter 6, note 10), and were given four options for assessing the government's performance: “very good job,” “good job,” “bad job,” and “very bad job.” 12. Negative evaluations are not surprising. After all, if one thinks the government has been doing a good job tackling the problem, then it probably would not be one's major concern. This reasoning seems to underlie the very low proportion of respondents in every survey who thought the government was doing a good job of addressing their most important concern. And yet an “issue” may not have the same connotations as a problem. 13. See Gerald H. Kramer, “Short-Term Fluctuations in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896–1964,” American Political Science Review 65 (March 1971): 131–143; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting; M. Stephen Weatherford, “Economic Conditions and Electoral Outcomes: Class Differences in the Political Response to Recession,” American Journal of Political Science 22 (November 1978): 917–938; D. Roderick Kiewiet and Douglas Rivers, “A Retrospective on Retrospective Voting,” Political Behavior 6, no. 4 (1984): 369–393; D. Roderick Kiewiet, Macroeconomics and Micropolitics: The Electoral Effects of Economic Issues (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983); Michael S. Lewis-Beck, Economics and Elections: The Major Western Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988); Alberto Alesina, John Londregan, and Howard Rosenthal, A Model of the Political Economy of the United States (Cambridge, Mass.: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1991); Michael B. MacKuen, Robert S. Erikson, and James A. Stimson, “Peasants or Bankers? The American Electorate and the U.S. Economy,” American Political Science Review 86 (September 1992): 597–611; and Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, The Macro Polity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 14. John E. Mueller, War, Presidents, and Public Opinion (New York: Wiley, 1973); Edward R. Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978). For a perceptive critique of the business cycle formulation, see James E. Alt and K. Alec Chrystal, Political Economics (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1983). 15. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, chap. 7, 172–176, esp. Table 7-6, 174. 16. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting. 17. ANES first used the approval question in 1970. In the 1984 and 1988 surveys, this question was asked in both the pre-election and the postelection waves of the survey. Because attitudes held by the public before the election are what count in influencing its choices, we use the first question. In both surveys, approval of Reagan's performance was more positive in the postelection interview: 66 percent approved of his performance in 1984, and 68 percent approved in 1988. 18. A summary measure of retrospective evaluations could not be constructed using either the 1972 or the 2004 ANES data. We were able to construct an alternative measure for 2004. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, chap. 7, Tables 7-9 and 7-10, 178–180, and 371n18. For procedures we used to construct this measure between 1976 and 2000, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, chap. 7, 328n13. A combined index of retrospective evaluations was created to allow an overall assessment of retrospective voting in 2008. To construct the summary measure of retrospective evaluations, we used the following procedures. First, we awarded respondents four points if they approved of the president's performance, two if they had no opinion, and zero if they disapproved. Second, respondents received four points if they thought the government had done a very good job in the last four years, three if they thought the government had done a good job, one if they thought the government had done a bad job, zero if they said it had done a very bad job, and two if they had no opinion. Finally, respondents received four points if they thought Republicans would do a better job handling the most important problem, zero points if they thought the Democrats would do a better job, and two points if they thought there was no difference between the parties, neither party would do well, both parties would do the same, another party would do the better job, or they had no opinion. For all three questions, “don't know” and “not ascertained” responses were scored as two, but respondents with more than one such response were excluded from the analysis. Scores on our measure were the sum of the individual values for the three questions, and thus ranged from a low of zero (strongly against the incumbent's party) to twelve (strongly for the incumbent's party). These values were then grouped to create a seven-point scale corresponding to the seven categories in Table 7-9. 19. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 158–159, for data on our (different) summary measure from 1972 to 1996, and see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 164–165, for this measure in the 2000 election. 20. The characterization of earlier elections is taken from Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 164. 21. For data from the 1976 and 1980 elections, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), Table 7-8, 155–157; from the 1984 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), Table 7-8, 203–204; from the 1988 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1988 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1991), Table 7-7, 195–198; from the 1996 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections, 159–161; from the 2000 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, 165–166; and from the 2004 election, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, 178–180. The small number of seven-point issue scales included in the ANES survey precluded performing this analysis with 1992 data. 8. Party Loyalties, Policy Preferences, and the Vote 1. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). For a recent statement of the “standard” view of party identification, see Warren E. Miller, “Party Identification, Realignment, and Party Voting: Back to the Basics,” American Political Science Review 85 (June 1991): 557–568; and Warren E. Miller and J. Merrill Shanks, The New American Voter (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1996), 117–183. 2. Campbell, American Voter, 121. See also Morris P. Fiorina, Retrospective Voting in American National Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1981), 85–86. 3. For the full wording of the party identification questions, see Chapter 4, note 74. 4. Most “apoliticals” in this period were African Americans living in the South. Because they were disenfranchised, questions about their party loyalties were essentially meaningless to them. For the most detailed discussion of how the American National Election Studies creates its summary measure of party identification, see Arthur H. Miller and Martin P. Wattenberg, “Measuring Party Identification: Independent or No Partisan Preference?” American Journal of Political Science 27 (February 1983): 106–121. 5. For evidence of the relatively high level of partisan stability among individuals from 1965 to 1982, see M. Kent Jennings and Gregory B. Markus, “Partisan Orientations over the Long Haul: Results from the Three-Wave Political Socialization Panel Study,” American Political Science Review 78 (December 1984): 1000–1018. For analyses from 1965 to 1997, see Laura Stoker and M. Kent Jennings, “Of Time and the Development of Partisan Polarization,” American Journal of Political Science 52 (July 2008): 619–635. 6. V. O. Key Jr., The Responsible Electorate: Rationality in Presidential Voting, 1936–1960 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1966). 7. Morris P. Fiorina, “An Outline for a Model of Party Choice,” American Journal of Political Science 21 (August 1977): 601–625; Fiorina, Retrospective Voting, 65–83. 8. Benjamin I. Page provides evidence of this. See Page, Choices and Echoes in Presidential Elections: Rational Man and Electoral Democracy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978). Anthony Downs, in An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York: Harper and Row, 1957), develops a theoretical logic for such consistency in party stances on issues and ideology over time. For more recent theoretical and empirical development, see John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995). 9. Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, The Macro Polity (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 10. Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, Partisan Hearts and Minds: Political Parties and the Social Identities of Voters (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2002). 11. See, for example, Donald Green, Bradley Palmquist, and Eric Schickler, “Macropartisanship: A Replication and Critique,” American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998): 883–899; and Robert S. Erikson, Michael B. MacKuen, and James A. Stimson, “What Moves Macropartisanship? A Reply to Green, Palmquist, and Schickler,” American Political Science Review 92 (December 1998): 901–912. 12. In Chapter 4 we noted that in 2008 the ANES survey included a question wording experiment. As we showed there, the experimental differences were sufficiently slight that we combine the two wordings to create a single measure of partisanship for the entire sample. 13. There is some controversy about how to classify these independent leaners. Some argue that they are mainly “hidden” partisans who should be considered identifiers. For the strongest statement of this position, see Bruce E. Keith et al., The Myth of the Independent Voter (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). In our view, however, the evidence on the proper classification of independent leaners is mixed. On balance, the evidence suggests that they are more partisan than independents with no partisan leanings, but less partisan than weak partisans. See Paul R. Abramson, Political Attitudes in America: Formation and Change (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1983), 80–81, 95–96. For an excellent discussion of this question, see Herbert B. Asher, “Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s: An Examination of Some Old and New Problem Areas,” in Political Science: The State of the Discipline, ed. Ada W. Finifter (Washington, D.C.: American Political Science Association, 1983), 357–360. 14. See, for example, Martin P. Wattenberg, The Decline of American Political Parties, 1952–1996 (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1998). 15. Gary C. Jacobson, “The 2008 Presidential and Congressional Elections: Anti-Bush Referendum and Prospects for a Democratic Majority,” Political Science Quarterly 124 (Spring 2009): 1–20; and Jacobson, “The Effects of the George W. Bush Presidency on Partisan Attitudes,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (June 2009): 172–209. 16. See Paul R. Abramson and Charles W. Ostrom Jr., “Macropartisanship: An Empirical Reassessment,” American Political Science Review 86 (March 1991): 181–192; and Abramson and Ostrom, “Question Wording and Partisanship: Change and Continuity in Party Loyalties During the 1992 Election Campaign,” Public Opinion Quarterly 58 (Spring 1994): 21–48. 17. These surveys were conducted annually between 1972 and 1978, in 1980, annually between 1982 and 1991, in 1993, and in every even-numbered year between 1994 and 2008. The surveys conducted between 1972 and 2002 were conducted in February, March, and April. The 2004 survey was conducted from September through December, the 2006 survey from March through August, and the 2008 survey from April through November. 18. See “Latest New York Times/CBS News Poll,” http://documents.nytimes.com/latest-new-york-times-cbs-news-poll#p-19. The most recent poll is based on 905 respondents. These polls do not measure the strength of party attachments among Republicans or Democrats, but they do ask independents to which party they feel closer. We are discussing the results reported on this Web site. Those results do not allow us to determine the “leanings” of independents. 19. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 186–192. 20. The ANES did not conduct a congressional election survey in 2006. 21. For evidence on the decline of Republican Party loyalties among older blacks between 1962 and 1964, see Paul R. Abramson, Generational Change in American Politics (Lexington, Mass.: D. C. Heath, 1975), 65–69. 22. For the results of the white vote by party identification for the three leading candidates in 1968, 1980, 1992, and 1996, see Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 186–187. Among blacks there is virtually no relationship between party identification and the vote. Even the small number of blacks who identify as Republicans usually either do not vote or vote for the Democratic presidential candidate. 23. In fact, among the 125 white pure independents who voted in 1992, 37 percent voted for Clinton, 41 percent for Ross Perot, and 22 percent for Bob Dole. 24. See also Larry M. Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996,” American Journal of Political Science 44 (January 2000): 35–50. 25. Bernard R. Berelson, Paul F. Lazarsfeld, and William N. McPhee, Voting: A Study of Opinion Formation in a Presidential Campaign (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1954), 215–233. The extent to which voters’ perceptions were affected, however, varied from issue to issue. 26. See Richard A. Brody and Benjamin I. Page, “Comment: The Assessment of Policy Voting,” American Political Science Review 66 (June 1972): 450–458; Page and Brody, “Policy Voting and the Electoral Process: The Vietnam War Issue,” American Political Science Review 66 (September 1972): 979–995; and Fiorina, “Outline for a Model of Party Choice.” 27. As we point out in Chapter 7, the ANES has asked the standard presidential approval question since 1970. 28. The question measuring approval of the president's handling of economic policy was not asked in ANES surveys before 1984. In our study of these earlier elections, an alternative measure of economic retrospective evaluations was created and shown to be almost as strongly related to party identification. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1984 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1987), Table 8-6, 221. We also found nearly as strong a relationship between partisanship and perceptions of which party would better handle the economy in the data from 1972, 1976, and 1980 as from later surveys reported here. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 170, Table 8-6, 173. 29. For a description of this measure, see Chapter 6. Because this measure uses the median placement of the candidates on the issue scales in the full sample, much of the projection effect is eliminated. For the relationship between party identification and the balance of issues measure in 1972, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, Table 8-5, 171. 30. This earlier measure and its relationship with partisan identification are reported in Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2003), Table 8-7, 185–186, discussed on 184–189, and in Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, Table 8-7, 202, discussed on 201–203. 31. As we saw in Chapter 7, that conclusion applies to those individual components of the measure that are the same as in earlier surveys. 32. As in Chapter 7, we cannot directly compare the results for 2008 with those for earlier elections, except in very general terms. For an interpretation and the data over the previous seven elections, see Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2000 and 2002 Elections, Table 8-8, 187–188, discussed on 189; and Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections, Table 8-8, 203, discussed on 203–204. 33. See, for example, Aldrich, Why Parties? 34. Two important articles assess some of these relationships: Gregory B. Markus and Philip E. Converse, “A Dynamic Simultaneous Equation Model of Electoral Choice,” American Political Science Review 73 (December 1979): 1055–1070; and Benjamin I. Page and Calvin C. Jones, “Reciprocal Effects of Policy Preferences, Party Loyalties and the Vote,” American Political Science Review 73 (December 1979): 1071–1089. For a brief discussion of these articles, see Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, Controversies in Voting Behavior, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1984), 89–95. For an excellent discussion of complex models of voting behavior and the role of party identification in these models, see Asher, “Voting Behavior Research in the 1980s,” 341–354. For another excellent introduction to some of these issues, see Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg, “Is Party Identification Stable?” in Controversies in Voting Behavior, 3rd ed., ed. Richard G. Niemi and Herbert F. Weisberg (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 268–283. Introduction to Part III 1. Between 1952 and 1988, seventeen states switched their gubernatorial elections from presidential election years to nonpresidential election years. Steven J. Rosenstone and John Mark Hansen estimate that in 1952 nearly half the electorate lived in states in which there was a competitive gubernatorial election. In the 1988 presidential election, according to their estimates, only 12 percent of the population lived in states in which there was a competitive gubernatorial election. See Rosenstone and Hansen, Mobilization, Participation, and Democracy in America (New York: Macmillan, 1993), 183. In all eleven states that held gubernatorial elections in 2008, both major parties ran candidates, although in some of these contests there was relatively little competition between the two major parties. According to our estimates, 12 percent of the population lived in those states in 2008. Rosenstone and Hansen argue that this change in scheduling of elections is a major factor contributing to the decline in turnout in presidential elections. 2. For a discussion of state elections in 2008, see James W. Ceaser, Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney Jr., Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 181–183. 3. In September 2009, the governor of Massachusetts appointed Paul G. Kirk Jr. to fill Kennedy's seat until a special election could be held in January 2010. 4. In fact, the one exception was the 1934 midterm election in which the Democrats gained an additional nine seats. 5. The Republicans won control of the House in eight consecutive elections from 1894 to 1908, far short of the Democratic winning streak. 6. Although widely attributed to O'Neill, this statement actually appeared as early as July 1932. See Fred R. Shapiro, The Yale Book of Quotations (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 2006), 566. 7. As noted, in August 2009 the Democrats temporarily lost that sixty-vote advantage when Democratic senator Edward Kennedy died. 8. The American National Election Studies did not conduct a midterm survey in 2006. 9. Philip E. Converse, The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976), 43–63. 9. Candidates and Outcomes in 2008 1. The last Democratic gain in the Senate was not confirmed until June 30, 2009, when the Minnesota Supreme Court unanimously ruled that Al Franken had defeated the incumbent Republican, Norm Coleman. Coleman had led by a slight margin in reported voting on election night, but during recounting over subsequent weeks Franken took a narrow lead. Coleman and his party fought the recount decisions in a series of lawsuits, but they were unsuccessful. 2. One independent is Bernard Sanders of Vermont, who was elected as an independent to the House from 1990 to 2004. Sanders had previously served as mayor of Burlington, Vermont, running as a socialist. However, throughout his House service he caucused with the Democrats, and he continued that course after his election to the Senate in 2006. The second independent is Joseph Lieberman of Connecticut. After being elected to three terms in the Senate as a Democrat, he was defeated in the Democratic primary in 2006. He then ran and won as an independent, but he continued to caucus with the Democrats (and retained his committee chairmanship). For convenience in presenting results, we count both senators as Democrats throughout this chapter. 3. Incumbents is used here only for elected incumbents. This includes all members of the House because the only way to become a representative is by election. In the Senate, however, vacancies may be filled by appointment. We do not count appointed senators as incumbents. In 2008 the only appointed senators who ran for election were John Barasso of Wyoming and Roger Wicker of Mississippi. Barasso was appointed in June 2007 and Wicker in December 2007. 4. The scandal involved the House Bank in which many members deposited their paychecks. The bank had a policy of honoring the checks of members, even if they did not have sufficient funds in their accounts to cover them. During 1991, the public learned about this practice and that hundreds of members had written thousands of these “overdrafts.” Many of the members who had written the most overdrafts retired or were defeated in the primary or the general election. For more details, see Gary C. Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 7th ed. (New York: Addison Wesley Longman, 2009), 175–181. 5. The Republicans won control of the House in eight consecutive elections from 1894 to 1908, far short of the Democrats’ series of successes. 6. The regional breakdowns used in this chapter are as follows: East: Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, and Vermont; Midwest: Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, Minnesota, Nebraska, North Dakota, Ohio, South Dakota, and Wisconsin; West: Alaska, Arizona, California, Colorado, Hawaii, Idaho, Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, Utah, Washington, and Wyoming; South: Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Louisiana, Mississippi, North Carolina, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, and Virginia; border: Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, Oklahoma, and West Virginia. This classification differs somewhat from the one used in earlier chapters (and in Chapter 10), but it is commonly used for congressional analysis. 7. Over the years, changes in the southern electorate have also made southern Democratic constituencies more like northern Democratic constituencies and less like Republican constituencies, North or South. These changes also appear to have enhanced the homogeneity of preferences within the partisan delegations in Congress. See David W. Rohde, “Electoral Forces, Political Agendas, and Partisanship in the House and Senate,” in The Postreform Congress, ed. Roger H. Davidson (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 27–47. 8. On the importance of party records electorally, see Gary W. Cox and Mathew D. McCubbins, Legislative Leviathan: Party Government in the House (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 110–120. 9. Quoted in William Schneider, “The Toxic GOP Label,” National Journal, May 24, 2008, 68. 10. Quoted in Ken Dilanian, “After Losses, Republicans Fear Public Has Lost Confidence in Party,” USA Today, May 15, 2008, 6A. 11. Aaron Blake, “Republicans Look for New Message, No Sugar Coating after Latest Defeat,” The Hill, May 15, 2008, 14. 12. Dilanian, “After Losses,” 6A. 13. “GOP Looks for Ways to Regroup after Losses,” http://cqpolitics.com, May 6, 2008. 14. See Brian Friel, “Spending Split,” National Journal, May 31, 2008, 38–39. 15. Quoted in Adam Nagourney and Carl Hulse, “Election Losses for Republicans Stir Fall Fears,” New York Times, May 15, 2008, A26. 16. “House G.O.P. Adopts Change Theme,” thecaucusblogs.http://nytimes.com, May 12, 2008. 17. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1996 and 1998 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1999), 207–212. 18. These polling data were taken from http://pollingreport.com, June 22, 2009. 19. For a discussion of the bigger role played by the national party organizations in congressional elections over the last three decades, see Paul S. Herrnson, Congressional Elections, 5th. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2008), chap. 4. 20. Jared Allen, “House Chairmen Respond to Speaker Pelosi's Call for Cash,” The Hill, October 22, 2008, 3. 21. See “PACs Put House Democrats on Top for First Time Since 1994,” http://cqpolitics.com, November 18, 2008. 22. Raymond Hernandez, “National G.O.P. Ending Aid to Most New York Races,” New York Times, October 31, 2008, A24. 23. The Hill, November 15, 2007, 15. 24. The ratings were taken from various issues of The Cook Political Report. Competitive races are those Cook classified as those only leaning toward the incumbent party, toss-ups, or those tilted toward the other party. 25. Richard F. Fenno Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978). For a discussion of how relationships between representatives and constituents have changed over time, see Fenno, Congress at the Grassroots (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000). 26. For example, an analysis of Senate races in 1988 indicated that both the political quality of the previous office held and the challenger's political skills had an independent effect on the outcome of the race. See Peverill Squire, “Challenger Quality and Voting Behavior in U.S. Senate Elections,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 17 (May 1992): 247–263. For systematic evidence on the impact of candidate quality in House races, see Gary C. Jacobson, The Electoral Origins of Divided Government: Competition in U.S. House Elections, 1946–1988 (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1990), chap. 4. 27. Al Franken was an entertainment celebrity, which can bring some of the same electoral benefits to a candidate as previous office experience. See David T. Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts: Political Amateurs in the United States Congress (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1990). 28. Data on earlier years are taken from our studies of previous national elections. 29. The figures in this paragraph include races in which only one of the parties fielded a candidate as well as contests in which both did. 30. See Jacobson, Electoral Origins of Divided Government; Jon R. Bond, Cary Covington, and Richard Fleisher, “Explaining Challenger Quality in Congressional Elections,” Journal of Politics 47 (May 1985): 510–529; and David W. Rohde, “Risk-Bearing and Progressive Ambition: The Case of Members of the U.S. House of Representatives,” American Journal of Political Science 23 (February 1979): 1–26. 31. L. Sandy Maisel and Walter J. Stone, “Determinants of Candidate Emergence in U.S. House Elections: An Exploratory Study,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22 (February 1997): 79–96. 32. See Peverill Squire, “Preemptive Fund-raising and Challenger Profile in Senate Elections,” Journal of Politics 53 (November 1991): 1150–1164; and Jay Goodliffe, “The Effect of War Chests on Challenger Entry in U.S. House Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (October 2001): 1087–1108. 33. Jeffrey S. Banks and D. Roderick Kiewiet, “Explaining Patterns of Candidate Competition in Congressional Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 33 (November 1989): 997–1015. 34. Canon, Actors, Athletes, and Astronauts. 35. See Kenneth J. Cooper, “Riding High Name Recognition to Hill,” Washington Post, December 24, 1992, A4. 36. See Thomas E. Mann and Raymond E. Wolfinger, “Candidates and Parties in Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 74 (September 1980): 617–632. 37. See David R. Mayhew, “Congressional Elections: The Case of the Vanishing Marginals,” Polity 6 (Spring 1974): 295–317; Robert S. Erikson, “Malapportionment, Gerrymandering, and Party Fortunes in Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 66 (December 1972): 1234–1245; and Warren Lee Kostroski, “Party and Incumbency in Postwar Senate Elections: Trends, Patterns, and Models,” American Political Science Review 67 (December 1973): 1213–1234. 38. Edward R. Tufte, “Communication,” American Political Science Review 68 (March 1974): 211–213. The communication involved a discussion of Tufte's earlier article “The Relationship between Seats and Votes in Two-Party Systems,” American Political Science Review 67 (June 1973): 540–554. 39. See John A. Ferejohn, “On the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 71 (March 1977): 166–176; Albert D. Cover, “One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 21 (August 1977): 523–541; and Albert D. Cover and David R. Mayhew, “Congressional Dynamics and the Decline of Competition in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 2nd ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1981), 62–82. 40. Morris P. Fiorina, Congress: Keystone of the Washington Establishment, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1989), esp. chaps. 4–6. 41. See several conflicting arguments and conclusions in the following articles published in the American Journal of Political Science 25 (August 1981): John R. Johannes and John C. McAdams, “The Congressional Incumbency Effect: Is It Casework, Policy Compatibility, or Something Else? An Examination of the 1978 Election” (512–542); Morris P. Fiorina, “Some Problems in Studying the Effects of Resource Allocation in Congressional Elections” (543–567); Diana Evans Yiannakis, “The Grateful Electorate: Casework and Congressional Elections” (568–580); and McAdams and Johannes, “Does Casework Matter? A Reply to Professor Fiorina” (581–604). See also John R. Johannes, To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1984), esp. chap. 8; and Albert D. Cover and Bruce S. Brumberg, “Baby Books and Ballots: The Impact of Congressional Mail on Constituent Opinion,” American Political Science Review 76 (June 1982): 347–359. The evidence in Cover and Brumberg for a positive electoral effect is quite strong, but the result may be applicable only to limited circumstances. 42. Ferejohn, “On the Decline of Competition,” 174. 43. Cover, “One Good Term,” 535. 44. More recent research shows that the link between party identification and voting has strengthened again. See Larry M. Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996,” American Journal of Political Science 44 (January 2000): 35–50. 45. For an excellent analysis of the growth of and reasons for anti-Congress sentiment, see John R. Hibbing and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse, Congress as Public Enemy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 46. However, we note again that these results ignore races that do not have candidates from both major parties. There was a sharp increase in these races in 1998: ninety-four, compared with only seventeen in 1996 and fifty-two in 1994. The number was almost as large in 2000: eighty-one. 47. For an analysis that indicates that the variations in incumbents’ vote percentages have few implications for incumbent safety, see Jeffrey M. Stonecash, Reassessing the Incumbency Effect (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 48. The body of literature on this subject is now quite large. Some salient early examples, in addition to those cited later, are Gary C. Jacobson, Money in Congressional Elections (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1980); Jacobson, “Parties and PACs in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 4th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1989), 117–152; Jacobson and Samuel Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections, 2nd ed. (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983); and John A. Ferejohn and Morris P. Fiorina, “Incumbency and Realignment in Congressional Elections,” in The New Direction in American Politics, ed. John E. Chubb and Paul E. Peterson (Washington, D.C.: Brookings, 1985), 91–115. 49. See Jacobson, Electoral Origins of Divided Government, 63–65. 50. See Jacobson and Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections. 51. Evidence indicates that challenger spending strongly influences public visibility and that substantial amounts can significantly reduce the recognition gap between the challenger and the incumbent. See Jacobson, Politics of Congressional Elections, 134. 52. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 229–241, and the earlier work cited there. 53. See Jacobson, Electoral Origins of Divided Government, 54–55, and the work cited in note 51. 54. Donald Philip Green and Jonathan S. Krasno, “Salvation for the Spendthrift Incumbent: Reestimating the Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 32 (November 1988): 884–907. 55. Gary C. Jacobson, “The Effects of Campaign Spending in House Elections: New Evidence for Old Arguments,” American Journal of Political Science 34 (May 1990): 334–362. Green and Kranno's response can be found in the same issue on pages 363–372. 56. Alan I. Abramowitz, “Explaining Senate Election Outcomes,” American Political Science Review 82 (June 1988): 385–403; Alan Gerber, “Estimating the Effect of Campaign Spending on Senate Election Outcomes Using Instrumental Variables,” American Political Science Review 92 (June 1998): 401–411. 57. Gary C. Jacobson, “Campaign Spending and Voter Awareness of Congressional Candidates” (paper presented at the annual meeting of the Public Choice Society, New Orleans, May 11–13, 1977), 16. 58. Chuck McCutcheon and Christina L. Lyons, eds., CQ's Politics in America 2010 (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 1167. 59. The exception was the defeat of Democratic representative William Jefferson of Louisiana, who was under indictment. 60. Challengers were categorized as having strong experience if they had been elected U.S. representative, to statewide office, to the state legislature, or to countywide or citywide office (for example, mayor, prosecutor, and so on). 61. Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 202–203. See also Paul Gronke, The Electorate, the Campaign, and the Office: A Unified Approach to Senate and House Elections (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2001). 62. Other Democratic Senate winners in 2000 who spent millions of their own money were Maria Cantwell of Washington and Mark Dayton of Minnesota. 63. Quoted in Angela Herrin, “Big Outside Money Backfired in GOP Loss of Senate to Dems,” Washington Post, November 6, 1986, A46. 64. See David W. Rohde, Parties and Leaders in the Postreform House (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991), esp. chap. 3; and Rohde, “Electoral Forces, Political Agendas, and Partisanship,” 27–47. 65. For discussions of the ideological changes in the House and Senate over the last four decades, see John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “The Logic of Conditional Party Government: Revisiting the Electoral Connection,” in Congress Reconsidered, 7th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2001), 269–292; Gary C. Jacobson, “The Congress: The Structural Basis of Republican Success,” in The Elections of 2004, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 163–186; and Sean Theriault, Party Polarization in Congress (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2008). 66. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1992 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1995), 339–342; and John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “The Transition to Republican Rule in the House: Implications for Theories of Congressional Politics,” Political Science Quarterly 112 (Winter 1997–1998): 541–567. 67. See John H. Aldrich and David W. Rohde, “Congressional Committees in a Continuing Partisan Era,” in Congress Reconsidered, 9th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 235. 68. Tory Newmyer and Paul Singer, “Dingell Waxman Brouhaha Awaits,” Roll Call, November 6, 2008, 1. 69. John M. Broder, “Waxman Advances in Struggle to Wrest Energy Committee Reins from Dingell,” New York Times, November 20, 2008, A24. 70. See Richard Cohen, “Pelosi's Shift,” National Journal, June 6, 2009, 31–34. 71. Edward Epstein, “Pelosi's Action Plan for Party Unity,” CQ Weekly, March 30, 2009, 706–707. 72. Greg Giroux, “Split Districts of ‘08 Key to GOP Rebound Hopes,” CQ Weekly, March 23, 2009, 659. 73. For discussions of the role of filibusters in recent Congresses, see Barbara Sinclair, “The New World of U.S. Senators,” in Dodd and Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered, 9th ed., 1–22; and Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, “Is Congress Still the Broken Branch?” in Dodd and Oppenheimer, Congress Reconsidered, 9th ed., 53–69. 74. Paul Cain and Shailagh Murray, “Democrats Allow Lieberman to Retain Key Chairmanship,” http://washingtonpost.com, November 19, 2009. 75. “Less” is the operative word here. Despite its different rules, parties still can be consequential in the Senate. See Nathan W. Monroe, Jason M. Roberts, and David W. Rohde, eds., Why Not Parties? (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2008). 76. See Roll Call, November 20, 2008, 1. 77. http://caffertyfile.blogs.cnn.com/category/barack-obama, January 19, 2009. 78. The Hill, January 21, 2009, 4. 79. Emily Pierce, “Reid Gets Spoils of 100th Day,” Roll Call, April 29, 2009, 28. 80. See New York Times, April 16, 2009, A14. 81. Bart Jansen and Kathleen Hunter, “Sen. Specter Switches to Democratic Party,” CQ Weekly, May 4, 2009, 1038. 82. See Carl Hulse and Adam Nagourney, “Specter Switches Parties; More Heft for Democrats,” New York Times, April 29, 2009, A1. 83. The support of the GOP members came at a price, including reducing the amount of the stimulus plan by over100 billion. See Roll Call, February 17, 2009, 1.

84. The Republican was Wayne Gilchrist and the Democrat was Albert Wynn.

85. Roll Call, April 29, 2009, 19.

86. Hulse and Nagourney, “Specter Switches Parties,” A3.

87. The most recent line of research on these questions was launched by the publication of David R. Mayhew's Divided We Govern (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1991). Mayhew contended that divided government was not less likely to produce major legislation. For a discussion of the research following on Mayhew's analysis, see David W. Rohde and Meredith Barthelemy, “The President and Congressional Parties in an Era of Polarization,” in Oxford Handbook of the American Presidency, ed. George C. Edwards III and William G. Howell (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 289–310.

88. New York Times, November 24, 2009, A17.

89. Washington Post, January 24, 2009, A4; New York Times, January 28, 2009, A17.

90. Dana Milbank, “Agitated? Irritable? Hostile? Aggressive? Impulsive? Restless?” Washington Post, May 15, 2009, A3.

91. The Hill, March 25, 2009, 1.

92. Roll Call, April 6, 2009, 1; New York Times, March 31, 2009, A17.

93. David Clarke and Paul M. Krawzak, “Both Chambers Float Budget Plans,” CQ Weekly, March 30, 2009, 725.

94. John Rogin, “Conferees Reach Deal on Supplemental,” CQ Weekly, June 15, 2009, 1380.

95. New York Times, May 21, 2009, A16.

96. Eleven were signed by the president. The twelfth, the budget resolution, does not require a presidential signature.

97. Carl Hulse, “House Rebukes Wilson for Shouting ‘You Lie,’” New York Times, September 15, 2009, http://www.nytimes.com/2000/09/16/us/politics.

98. Earlier research indicated that for these purposes voters may tend to regard a president whose predecessor either died or resigned from office as a continuation of the first president's administration. Therefore, these data are organized by term of administration rather than term of president. See Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed., 252–253.

99. Edward R. Tufte, “Determinants of the Outcomes of Midterm Congressional Elections,” American Political Science Review 69 (September 1975): 812–826; Tufte, Political Control of the Economy (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978); Jacobson and Kernell, Strategy and Choice in Congressional Elections.

100. The Jacobson-Kernell hypothesis was challenged by Richard Born in “Strategic Politicians and Unresponsive Voters,” American Political Science Review 80 (June 1986): 599–612. Born argued that economic and approval data at the time of the election were more closely related to outcomes than were parallel data from earlier in the year. Jacobson, however, offered renewed support for the hypothesis in an analysis of both district-level and aggregate data. See Gary C. Jacobson, “Strategic Politicians and the Dynamics of House Elections, 1946–86,” American Political Science Review 83 (September 1989): 773–793.

101. Alan I. Abramowitz, Albert D. Cover, and Helmut Norpoth, “The President's Party in Midterm Elections: Going from Bad to Worse,” American Journal of Political Science 30 (August 1986): 562–576.

102. Bruce I. Oppenheimer, James A. Stimson, and Richard W. Waterman, “Interpreting U.S. Congressional Elections: The Exposure Thesis,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 11 (May 1986): 228.

103. Robin F. Marra and Charles W. Ostrom Jr., “Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives 1950–86,” American Journal of Political Science 33 (August 1989): 541–569.

104. Brian Newman and Charles W. Ostrom Jr., “Explaining Seat Changes in the U.S. House of Representatives, 1950–1998,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 28 (2002): 383–405.

105. This is why the president's party gained seats in the midterms of 1998 and 2002. In addition, evidence indicates that divided government may also reduce the vulnerability of the president's party in midterms. See Stephen P. Nicholson and Gary M. Segura, “Midterm Elections and Divided Government: An Information-Driven Theory of Electoral Volatility,” Political Research Quarterly 52 (September 1999): 609–629.

106. These data were taken from http://pollingreport.com.

107. Ibid.

108. In eight states (Arizona, California, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Maine, New Jersey, and Washington), congressional redistricting is not carried out by state legislatures, but is controlled or strongly influenced by independent bipartisan commissions. Seven other states (Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, and Wyoming) have only one House seat and so do not experience redistricting.

109. The Rothenberg Political Report, May 15, 2009.

110. The eleven are Florida, Georgia, Illinois, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, and Virginia.

111. Roll Call, April 28, 2009, 11.

112. Shira Toeplitz, “Ohio's Limits Tip Races,” Roll Call, November 20, 2008, 13.

113. USA Today, May 4, 2009, 4A.

114. Washington Post, March 10, 2009, A2.

115. Damien Cave, “Ruling Prompts a Mixed Response,” New York Times, June 23, 2009, A16.

116. Adam Liptak, “Case Could Overturn Rules on Campaign Spending,” New York Times, June 30, 2009, A12.

117. Washington Post, May 14, 2009, A19.

118. The Hill, May 19, 2009, 6.

119. See “When People Stop Moving, So Do Congressional Seats,” http://online.wsj.com, February 5, 2009.

10. The Congressional Electorate in 2008

1. As we saw in Chapter 5, the 2008 ANES survey results show a very small overreport of the Democratic share of the presidential vote. There is, however, a small pro-Republican bias in the House vote. According to the 2008 ANES survey, the Democrats received 54 percent of the major-party vote; official results show that the Democrats received 55.5 percent of the actual national two-party vote. (The national results were taken from http://thegreenpapers.com/G08/House-VoteByParty.phtml.) To simplify presentation of the data, we have eliminated from consideration votes for minor-party candidates in all the tables in this chapter. Furthermore, to ensure that our study of choice is meaningful, in all tables except 10–1 and 10–2 we include only voters who lived in congressional districts in which both major parties ran candidates.

2. We confine our attention in this section to voting for the House because this group of voters is more directly comparable to the presidential electorate. We employ here the same definitions for social and demographic categories used in Chapters 4 and 5.

3. See Larry M. Bartels, “Partisanship and Voting Behavior, 1952–1996,” American Journal of Political Science 44 (January 2000): 35–50.

4. Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, rev. ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1983), 213–216.

5. Among liberal voters who did not see the Democratic House candidate as more liberal than the Republican candidate (N = 31), 76 percent voted Democratic; among conservative voters who did not see the Republican candidate as more conservative than the Democratic candidate (N = 53), 35 percent voted Republican.

6. Alan I. Abramowitz, “Choices and Echoes in the 1978 U.S. Senate Elections: A Research Note,” American Journal of Political Science 25 (February 1981): 112–118; and Abramowitz, “National Issues, Strategic Politicians, and Voting Behavior in the 1980 and 1982 Congressional Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (November 1984): 710–721.

7. Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 3rd ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1985), 91–116.

8. Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 6th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I. Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1993), 148–150.

9. Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 9th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009), 83–88.

10. Robert S. Erikson and Gerald C. Wright, “Voters, Candidates, and Issues in Congressional Elections,” in Congress Reconsidered, 8th ed., ed. Lawrence C. Dodd and Bruce I Oppenheimer (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 93–95. See also Stephen Ansolabehere, James M. Snyder Jr., and Charles Stewart III, “Candidate Positioning in U.S. House Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 45 (January 2001): 136–159.

11. For the wording of the ANES party identification questions, see Chapter 4, note 74.

12. Albert D. Cover, “One Good Term Deserves Another: The Advantage of Incumbency in Congressional Elections,” American Journal of Political Science 21 (August 1977): 523–541. Cover includes in his analysis not only strong and weak partisans, but also independents with partisan leanings.

13. The 2008 ANES survey may contain biases that inflate the percentage that reports voting for House incumbents. For a discussion of this problem in earlier years, see Robert B. Eubank and David John Gow, “The Pro-Incumbent Bias in the 1978 and 1980 Election Studies,” American Journal of Political Science 27 (February 1983): 122–139; and David John Gow and Robert B. Eubank, “The Pro-Incumbent Bias in the 1982 Election Study,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984): 224–230.

14. Richard F. Fenno Jr., “If, as Ralph Nader Says, Congress Is ‘The Broken Branch,’ How Come We Love Our Congressmen So Much?” in Congress in Change: Evolution and Reform, ed. Norman J. Ornstein (New York: Praeger, 1975), 277–287. This theme is expanded and analyzed in Richard F. Fenno Jr., Home Style: House Members in Their Districts (Boston: Little, Brown, 1978).

15. Abramson, Aldrich, and Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 1980 Elections, 220–221.

16. Opinion on this last point is not unanimous, however. See Richard Born, “Reassessing the Decline of Presidential Coattails: U.S. House Elections from 1952–80,” Journal of Politics 46 (February 1984): 60–79.

17. John A. Ferejohn and Randall L. Calvert, “Presidential Coattails in Historical Perspective,” American Journal of Political Science 28 (February 1984): 127–146.

18. Randall L. Calvert and John A. Ferejohn, “Coattail Voting in Recent Presidential Elections,” American Political Science Review 77 (June 1983): 407–419.

19. James E. Campbell and Joe A. Sumners, “Presidential Coattails in Senate Elections,” American Political Science Review 84 (June 1990): 513–524.

Introduction to Part IV

1. Some argue that the oracle did not have prophetic powers of her own, but that she did have the ability to pass on messages from Apollo. Christians suppressed the worship of pagan deities, and there is no longer an oracle to pass on messages.

2. Niccolò Machiavelli, The Prince, 2nd ed., trans. Harvey C. Mansfield Jr. (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998), 98.

3. In Palm Beach County, the Gore-Lieberman ticket appeared as the second set of candidates on the left-hand side of the ballot, but the punch hole for the Democratic ticket was the third one down. The second punch was for the Buchanan-Foster Reform Party ticket. Not only did 3,400 voters punch the Reform Party ticket, but an additional 19,000 voters punched more than two holes, and these “overvotes” were invalid. For convincing evidence that Bush's 537–vote victory in Florida resulted from the butterfly ballot, see Jonathan N. Wand et al., “The Butterfly Did It: The Aberrant Vote for Buchanan in Palm Beach County, Florida,” American Political Science Review 95 (December 2001): 793–810.

4. For an excellent discussion of American public opinion on these issues in light of the 9/11 terrorist attacks, see Darren W. Davis, Negative Liberty: Public Opinion and the Terrorist Attacks on America (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 2007).

5. Paul R. Abramson et al., “Fear in the Voting Booth: The 2004 Presidential Election,” Political Behavior 29 (June 2007): 197–220. See also Helmut Norpoth and Andrew H. Sidman, “Mission Accomplished: The Wartime Election of 2004,” Political Behavior 29 (June 2007): 175–195; and Herbert F. Weisberg and Dino P. Christenson, “Changing Horses in Wartime? The 2004 Presidential Election,” Political Behavior 29 (June 2007): 279–304.

6. New York Times/CBS News poll, September 9–13, 2005, http://www.nytimes.com/packages/khtml/2005/09/14/politics/2050915_POLL.html.

7. This number is from “The Iraq Body Count Data Base,” http://www.iraqbodycount.net/database.

8. All these results were found at http://www.pollingreport.com/iraq/htm.

9. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), chap. 11. See also Gary C. Jacobson, “Referendum: The 2006 Midterm Congressional Elections,” Political Science Quarterly 122 (Spring 2007): 1–24; and Gary C. Jacobson, A Divider, Not a Uniter: George W. Bush and the American People, The 2006 Election and Beyond (New York: Pearson Longman, 2008), 263–323.

10. Catherine Clifford, “CNN Foreclosures,” http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/13.

11. Price History, PRES08_WTA, http://iemweb.biz.uiowa.edu/pricehistory/PriceHistory_GetData.cfm.

12. Of course, this is not the same as who will win the election, although in forty-two of forty-five contests between 1828 and 2004 the popular vote winner was elected.

13. Trading activity was not actually conducted every day during this period. In addition to the closing price for each day (regardless of whether there were trades), the IEM contract history shows the high and low prices for each day on which trading occurred. Even looking at these high and low daily prices, we noted that the Republicans were never favored.

14. Based on the daily low price for the Democrats and the daily high price for the Republicans.

15. James W. Ceaser, Andrew E. Busch, and John J. Pitney Jr., Epic Journey: The 2008 Elections and American Politics (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009), 145–150.

16. One of these, Senate contender Al Franken, was not actually declared the winner by the Minnesota Supreme Court until June 30, 2009.

17. Neither the number of House seats nor the date of the election is constitutionally fixed. It seems unlikely that the date of the election (the first Tuesday after the first Monday in November) will be changed, but the number of House seats may increase marginally by 2010.

18. In addition to thirty-four races for a full six-year term, there will be races to fill the remaining four years of the term of Delaware's Joe Biden and the remaining two years of the term of New York's Hillary Clinton.

19. Even if Obama were to leave office, there would be no election to fill this presidency (see the Twenty-fifth Amendment for the rules for presidential succession). In France, a new election is held to select a new president for a full presidential term. This has happened twice—in 1969 when Charles de Gaulle resigned, and in 1974 when Georges Pompidou died in office.

20. Abraham Lincoln never considered postponing the 1864 election. As he explained, even if there were a constitutional way to cancel or to postpone them, “We cannot have free government without elections…. [I]f the rebellion could force us to forgo or to postpone a national election, it might fairly claim to have already conquered and ruined us.” Quoted in David Herbert Donald, Lincoln (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), 539.

11. The 2008 Elections and the Future of American Politics

1. Maurice Duverger, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern World, trans. Barbara North and Robert North (New York: Wiley, 1963), 308–309. In this book, we use the term majority to mean more than half the vote. But it is clear that for Duverger the term majorité signifies a plurality of the vote—that is, more votes than any other party received.

2. Mapai is the Hebrew acronym for Mifleget Poa'alei Eretz Yisrael (Party of Eretz Yisrael [Land of Israel] Workers), which was founded in 1930. In 1968 Mapai merged with two smaller parties and became the Alignment. That coalition then fell apart. In 2009 Labor ran on its own.

Israel, Italy, Sweden, and Japan are the four countries discussed in Uncommon Democracies: The One-Party Dominant Regimes, ed. T. J. Pempel (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). Other democracies that might have been classified as having, or having had, a dominant party are Chile, Colombia, Denmark, Iceland, India, Norway, and Venezuela. See also Alan Arian and Samuel H. Barnes, “The Dominant Party System: A Neglected Model of Democratic Stability,” Journal of Politics 36 (August 1974): 592–614.

3. Duverger, Political Parties, 312.

4. Duverger was vague about the reasons dominant parties tended to decline. He suggested that they become too bureaucratized to govern effectively and to respond to changing conditions. Although dominant parties clearly fell from power in Israel and Italy and have lost their dominance in Sweden and in Japan, a variety of reasons account for their decline.

5. Asher Arian, Politics in Israel: The Second Republic, 2nd ed. (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 124.

6. The election was held in February 2001, and there was no Knesset election. In March 2001, the Knesset abolished direct election of the prime minister.

7. For a discussion of the 2009 election, see Abraham Diskin, “The Likud,” Israel Affairs, forthcoming.

8. For an analysis of the gradual decline of the DC, see Sidney Tarrow, “Maintaining Hegemony in Italy: ‘The Softer They Rise, the Slower They Fall!’” in Pempel, Uncommon Democracies, 306–322. Tarrow could not foresee the rapid disintegration of the DC that would take place after Pempel's collection was published. For two more recent discussions, see Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, Italian Democracy: Adjustment under Duress (Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2005); and Martin J. Bull and James L. Newell, “Italy,” in Political Parties in the World, ed. Alan J. Day (London: John Harper, 2005), 330–341.

9. Martin J. Bull, personal communication, December 19, 2006.

10. Joseph A. LaPalombara, personal communication, December 9, 2006.

11. Martin J. Bull, personal communication, August 1, 2009.

12. “Sweden's Election: Reinfeldt Explained,” The Economist, September 23, 2006, 60.

13. The next general election is scheduled for September 19, 2010. The Social Democrats are currently led by Mona Sahlin.

14. “The Vote That Changed Japan,” The Economist, September 5, 2009, 13.

15. Maurice Duverger, Les partis politiques, 3rd ed. (Paris: Armand Colin, 1958). The English language translation we use appeared in 1963 (see note 1).

16. See, for example, Michael Nelson, “Constitutional Aspects of the Election,” in The Elections of 1988, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 1989), 161–201. See also Byron E. Shafer, “The Election of 2008 and the Structure of American Politics: Explaining a New Political Order,” Electoral Studies 8 (April 1989): 5–21.

17. By 1828 every state except Maryland and South Carolina was choosing its electors by popular vote. The first incumbent to be elected after that was Andrew Jackson in 1832.

18. The only closer margin was in 1916 when Woodrow Wilson defeated Charles Evans Hughes by a twenty-three-vote margin.

19. Gary C. Jacobson, “The Congress: The Structural Basis of Republican Success,” in The Elections of 2004, ed. Michael Nelson (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 166; and Gary C. Jacobson, “Polarized Politics and the 2004 Congressional and Presidential Elections,” Political Science Quarterly 120 (Summer 2005): 199–218.

20. In April 2009, Republican senator Arlen Specter switched parties, and on June 30, 2009, the Minnesota Supreme Court awarded the Minnesota Senate seat to the Democratic challenger, Al Franken, over the Republican incumbent, Norm Coleman.

21. John B. Judis and Ruy Teixeira, The Emerging Democratic Majority (New York: Scribner's, 2002).

22. Ibid. Teixeira, along with William Galston and Stanley B. Greenberg, edits The Democratic Strategist, which publishes material for interpreting American politics with the goal of helping to elect Democratic candidates. See http://www.thedemocraticstrategist.org.

23. For poll results measuring opinions about Afghanistan, see http://pollingreport.com/afghan.htm.

24. Gary C. Jacobson, “The Effects of the George W. Bush Presidency on Partisan Attitudes,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 39 (June 2009): 172–208.

25. NBC/Wall Street Journal Survey, Study #6095. The results are summarized in Laura Meckler, “Public Wary of Deficit, Economic Intervention,” Wall Street Journal, June 18, 2009, A1, A14.

26. Ibid., A1.

27. Quoted in E. J. Dionne Jr., “Brand on the Run,” Washington Post, May 16, 2008, A1.

28. Bill Moyers Journal, PBS, July 11, 2008, http://www.pbs.org/moyers/journal/07112008/transcript3.html.

29. The projections shown in Table 11-2 are for the entire resident population, although, obviously, it would be preferable to have projections for the voting-age population. Because the black and Hispanic populations are somewhat younger than the white population, the share of the white population may not decline as quickly as these projections predict, but not enough to make any substantive differences in our discussion.

30. We are highly skeptical of Samuel P. Huntington's widely discussed thesis that the growth of the Latino population poses a major threat to American “Anglo-Protestant” values. See Huntington, Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2004).

31. This was the same criterion used in identifying candidates for the 2008 presidential nominations. See Paul R. Abramson, John H. Aldrich, and David W. Rohde, Change and Continuity in the 2004 and 2006 Elections (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2007), 312–320. Put differently, a subjective probability of 0.005 means that the candidate appears to have a one in two hundred chance of winning.

32. Linda Meckler and Deborah Solomon, “Governor's Move Highlights GOP Divide,” Wall Street Journal, July 6, 2009, A3. Wendell Willkie was a forty-eight-year-old corporate lawyer who had never before run for public office.

33. See John H. Aldrich, “The Invisible Primary and Its Effect on Democratic Choice,” PS: Political Science and Politics 42 (January 2009): 33–38.

34. Arend Lijphart, Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study of Twenty-seven Democracies, 1945–1990 (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 1994), 160–162.

35. “The Mouse That Roared,” The Economist, September 30, 1995, 32.

36. A study that sent mail questionnaires to people who called Perot's toll-free telephone number between 1992 and 1996 concluded that Perot's 1992 candidacy had an important impact on the Republican Party by activating the electorate. See Ronald B. Rapoport and Walter J. Stone, Three's a Crowd: The Dynamics of Third Parties, Ross Perot and Republican Resurgence (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2005).

37. In 2008 the total vote for minor candidates crept up to 1.4 percent.

38. Under proportional representation, an environmentalist party may be successful with a relatively small share of the vote. For example, in the 1988 German Bundestag election, the Green Party won only 6.7 percent of the votes and 7.0 percent of the seats, but it became part of the governing coalition. In 2002 the Greens won 6.6 percent of the vote and captured 9.1 percent of the seats, once again becoming part of the governing coalition. In the 2005 election, the Greens won 8.3 percent of the seats, but they did not become part of the governing coalition formed by the two largest parties.

39. Joseph A. Schlesinger, Political Parties and the Winning of Office (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1991).

40. See John H. Aldrich, Why Parties? The Origin and Transformation of Political Parties in America (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995), 126–162.

41. We are grateful to Joseph A. Schlesinger for this insight.

42. Philip E. Converse, The Dynamics of Party Support: Cohort-Analyzing Party Identification (Beverley Hills, Calif.: Sage Publications, 1976).

43. Angus Campbell et al., The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960), 125.

(Readings preceded by an asterisk include materials on the 2008 elections.)

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Chapter 6: Candidates, Issues, and the Vote
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Chapter 7: Presidential Performance and Candidate Choice
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Chapter 8: Party Loyalties, Policy Preferences, and the Vote
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Chapter 9: Candidates and Outcomes in 2008
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*“Partisan Surge and Decline in Congressional Elections: The Case of 2008. In The American Elections of 2008, edited by and . Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2009, 79–97.
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*The Politics of Congressional Elections,
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Chapter 10: The Congressional Electorate in 2008
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Chapter 11: The 2008 Elections and the Future of American Politics
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*“The 2008 Presidential and Congressional Elections: Anti-Bush Referendum and Prospects for the Democratic Majority.”Political Research Quarterly124 (Spring 2009): 1–30. http://dx.doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-165X.2009.tb00640.x
*. “Presidential Election 2008: An Amazing Race, So What's Next? In The Year of Obama: How Barack Obama Won the White House, edited by . New York: Longman, 2010, 261–296.
*“The Meaning of the 2008 Elections.” In The Elections of 2008, edited by . Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2009, 187–204.
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