America's Foreign Policy Toolkit: Key Institutions and Processes

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Charles A. Stevenson

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  • Front Matter
  • Back Matter
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  • Dedication

    For Sue

    Copyright

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    Tables, Figures, and Boxes

    Tables
    • 1.1 Independence From Tyranny
    • 1.2 Problems Under the Articles of Confederation and Solutions in the Constitution
    • 1.3 Separated Institutions Sharing Powers Over National Security
    • 2.1 U.S. Diplomatic and Consular Missions, 1790–1950
    • 2.2 U.S. Active Duty Military Personnel, 1789–1950
    • 3.1 The Presidential Toolkit Brief
    • 4.1 The Congressional Toolkit Brief
    • 4.2 Congressional Authorizations of the Use of Force, 1798–2011
    • 5.1 The Budget Toolkit Brief
    • 6.1 The Diplomatic Instrument Brief
    • 6.2 Department of State Personnel and Foreign Missions, 1950–2010
    • 7.1 The Economic Instruments Brief
    • 7.2 U.S. Net Economic Engagement With Developing Countries, 2009
    • 7.3 Key Institutions in U.S. Economic Foreign Policy
    • 7.4 Top Recipients of U.S. Foreign Assistance, 1980–2010
    • 8.1 The Military Instrument Brief
    • 8.2 Major U.S. Military Operations and U.S. Battle Deaths, 1775–2011
    • 8.3 U.S. Armed Forces, 1950–2010
    • 9.1 The Secret Intelligence Instrument Brief
    • 10.1 The Homeland Security Instrument Brief
    • 11.1 International Institutions as U.S. Instruments Brief
    • 11.2 Major United Nations Military Operations, 1948–2011
    • 11.3 Membership of Asian Regional Organizations
    • 11.4 G-8 and G-20 Members With 2010 Gross Domestic Product in Billions
    • 12.1 External Influences on Uses of the Toolkit
    Figures
    • 3.1 Average Size of the National Security Council Staff, 1961–2008
    • 3.2 National Security Staff Organizational Chart
    • 5.1 The Budget: Where the Money Comes From and Where It Goes
    • 6.1 U.S. Department of State Organizational Chart
    • 6.2 Funding for International Affairs, 1950–2010
    • 8.1 U.S. Department of Defense Organizational Chart
    • 8.2 U.S. Defense Spending, 1960–2012
    • 9.1 Intelligence Community Organizational Chart
    • 10.1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security Organizational Chart
    Boxes
    • 1.1 Threats to America in 1786
    • 3.1 Inside View: Henry Kissinger on How Presidents Decide
    • 3.2 The White House Situation Room
    • 3.3 Who Makes Foreign Policy: The Special Role of the Vice President
    • 3.4 Inside View: Keep Memos to the President Short
    • 3.5 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Crisis Day at the National Security Center
    • 4.1 Who Makes Foreign Policy: George Washington Gives Up on Advice and Consent
    • 4.2 Inside View: Senators Are Human; Not All Are Trustworthy
    • 4.3 Additional Examples of Congressional Impact on National Security
    • 5.1 Inside View: The Office of Management and Budget Micromanages the Pentagon
    • 5.2 Inside View: Budgetary Cooperation
    • 6.1 Secretary of State … and President?
    • 6.2 Who Makes Foreign Policy: The Busy Secretary of State
    • 6.3 Who Makes Foreign Policy: A Day in the Life of the State Department
    • 6.4 Inside View: The State Department Outnumbered
    • 6.5 Inside View: The Clearance Process
    • 7.1 Inside View: Treasury Versus State During the Asian Financial Crisis
    • 8.1 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Types of Military Operations
    • 8.2 Secretary of Defense: A Hard Job to Keep
    • 8.3 Who Makes Foreign Policy: The Very Busy Secretary of Defense and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff
    • 8.4 Inside View: Joint Chiefs of Staff Meet in the Kitchen
    • 8.5 Inside View: Rumsfeld's Assertive Style
    • 9.1 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Examining the President's Daily Brief, April 1, 1968
    • 9.2 Inside View: The President's Daily Intelligence Briefing
    • 9.3 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Key Judgments From a National Intelligence Estimate, Saddam Hussein, June 18, 1992
    • 9.4 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Presidential Finding for Covert Action: Nicaragua, September 19, 1983
    • 11.1 International Instruments and Entities 12.1 A Long History of Leaking
    • 12.2 How Foreign Policy Is Made: Why the American Israel Public Affairs Committee Is So Effective
    • 12.3 Inside View: Fund-Raising by Lobbyists 13.1 Bureaucratic Power Ladder

    Preface

    I'm not much of a handyman, but I recognize the value of having just the right tool for a particular task. I also know, from embarrassing experiences, the wisdom of carpenters, who say, “Measure twice; cut once.” To do a job right, you need the right tool and the knowledge of how to use it.

    I have a heavy, cast-iron, 14-inch adjustable wrench that is ideal for plumbing work but not much else. I have an ingenious right-angle screwdriver that can reach where a long stem won't fit and where I can't even see the screw, such as on curtain rods. I also have a Leatherman multi-tool that can do almost anything except pound nails. I used to live in a small town that had a tool library, where I could borrow that rarely needed item like a wood plane or floor sander.

    The U.S. government has its own tool library for foreign policy activities. And, policy makers would do well to heed the advice about picking the right tool and calculating twice before using it. America has the State Department for diplomacy, the Defense Department for military activities, the Treasury Department and numerous other organizations for foreign economic policy, and the intelligence community for spying, analyses, and covert actions. The president and Congress get to decide how much to spend on these tools, which types and how many to buy, how to keep them well oiled and sharpened, and when and where to use them. America's Foreign Policy Toolkit: Key Institutions and Processes is about those tools and the processes for using them.

    The Purpose of This Book

    The book's title refers to foreign policy, a commonplace term, but its subject is more accurately national security in the broadest sense of that term. U.S. officials now recognize that America's survival and success in the world require dealing with nontraditional issues like climate change, environmental degradation, disease, and human rights along with the traditional topics of defense, trade, and diplomacy. This requires the exercise of numerous instruments from a broad reach of agencies, from the Department of State to the Department of Agriculture but does not always result in a consistent policy.

    In the course of my professional life, I have had the opportunity to work, at least for a time, in several of the institutions described in this book—the U.S. Senate, Department of State, Department of the Treasury, and the Department of the Navy. I have also worked closely with people in the White House and National Security Council (NSC), the Office of the Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the U.S. House of Representatives. More recently, I spent two years on the Project on National Security Reform, studying ways to improve the structures and processes of the U.S. government for more effective policy development and execution. From these experiences, I learned that, while officials understand their own agencies quite well, they often do not appreciate the strengths and weaknesses or quirks and capabilities of other institutions. I wrote this book to give students, analysts, and practitioners a better sense of how the different agencies think and operate, the pressures they respond to, and when and how they work together. I also wanted to show how the different institutions can be integrated into a coherent policy and yet why it is so hard to maintain a consistent foreign policy strategy.

    For many years I was director of the core course on “The Interagency Process” at the National War College. My students—colonels and navy captains, foreign service officers, and career civilians—had two decades' worth of professional experience in their home institutions and knew very well how to plan military operations, run an embassy, or analyze foreign threats. But, they often weren't really sure what the other government institutions did or could do. Believing quite properly that all the instruments of national power should be coordinated as part of a national security strategy, the military officers would say, “We need to do some diplomacy and do some economics.”

    What did that mean? Send a foreign service officer to a reception or to talk tough to a foreign minister? Send somebody with bags of money that could be given or withheld from a foreign official depending on his or her response to the courier's demands? Those notions were vague and different from how those tools are in fact used.

    My course, and this book, are designed to tell students and practitioners what's in America's foreign policy toolkit and how the instruments work. The focus is on institutions and processes rather than the substance of foreign policy, but there is ample evidence that process can affect substance: Who sits at the table and what they are best at doing matters greatly.

    Besides rounding up the usual suspects—in the White House, the State Department, the Pentagon, and the intelligence community—I wanted to make sure that this book also explains the role of Congress, the crucial budget process, the diverse but increasingly important tools of foreign economic policy, the role of outsiders, and more recently, the role of the organizations concerned with homeland security.

    I have continued to find this framework a useful way to teach my current students at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies of Johns Hopkins University.

    Organization of the Book

    America's Foreign Policy Toolkit is organized into three parts: Assembling the Tools, Using the Tools, and Constraints and Limitations on the United States Toolkit. This design allows students to build their understanding of how U.S. foreign policy developed, the tools available today to make policy, and the limitations that exist between what policy makers may want to do and what they're actually able to achieve. Each chapter discusses a discrete tool for foreign policy, including its legal authorities, capabilities, and organizational culture. While the focus is on how the president might choose to use the instrument, I include analysis of the often-ignored role of Congress in writing laws and voting funds that affect its use. Important factors outside the current structure of government that constrain or push how the tools are used are also examined. These include the power of public opinion, the media, and interest groups.

    Case studies in most chapters allow readers to connect the theory of the toolkit with real-world examples focused primarily on events since the end of the Cold War. Most chapters have additional sidebars, such as Who Makes Foreign Policy, describing the key leaders of the institutions; How Foreign Policy Is Made, spotlighting key activities; and Inside View, providing quotes from practitioners who know these foreign policy tools intimately. Data in tables and figures also complement the discussion.

    Acknowledgments

    I would like to thank Patrick Altdorfer, University of Pittsburgh; David Bearce, University of Colorado; and Yoav Gortzak, University of Washington-Tacoma, for their helpful feedback on the proposal for this book. My thanks also to reviewers Gary Donato, Bentley University; David Forsythe, University of Nebraska; and Richard Nolan, University of Florida. Their thoughtful comments on the manuscript were of great assistance in crafting the final product.

    I especially wish to thank Kay King and Gordon Adams for encouraging me to develop this book proposal, as well as several of my colleagues at the National War College, who helped to shape this framework for teaching national security strategy: Ron Tammen, Janet Breslin Smith, Mike Mazarr, and David Auerswald. I am also grateful for the opportunity to broaden and deepen my knowledge of the executive branch while working with Jim Locher and Chris Lamb at PNSR. Most of all, I am indebted to my students over the years at the National War College and SAIS for helping me to understand what we all really need to know about foreign policy institutions and processes.

    I am also grateful for the encouragement and guidance from acquisitions editor Elise Frasier and development editor Nancy Matuszak at CQ Press, as well as from production editor Astrid Virding.

    Last but not least, I want to thank—and dedicate this volume to—the person who endured my long hours and many months at the computer, away from yard work and other household tasks, and my middle-of-the-night inspirations and still provided love, suggestions, and support—my wife Sue. I hope I proved that the boxes of books filling the basement still could be put to good use.

    About the Author

    Dr. Charles A. Stevenson teaches courses in American foreign policy at the Nitze School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS), Johns Hopkins University. Previously, he was a longtime professor at the National War College, where he was director of the core course on the interagency process for national security policy. He has executive branch experience, including service on the secretary of state's policy planning staff, and served for 22 years as a Senate staffer on defense and foreign policy. He is the author of a study of the congressional role in major military operations, Congress at War (2007); a historical survey of U.S. civil-military relations, Warriors and Politicians (2006); and a comparative analysis of U.S. secretaries of defense, SecDef (2006). He was a member of the Project on National Security Reform (PNSR) and headed its working group on Congress. He has an AB and PhD from Harvard.

  • Notes

    1. Jack Anderson, Peace, War & Politics: An Eyewitness Account (New York: Forge Books, 1999), 134.

    2. Bob Woodward, Bush at War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2002), 38; The 9/11 Commission Report (New York: W. W. Norton, 2004), 330.

    3. Donald Rumsfeld, Known and Unknown: A Memoir (New York: Sentinel, 2011), 346; Hugh Shelton, Without Hesitation (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2010), 440.

    4. The 9/11 Commission Report, 333, http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf

    5. Public Law 107–40.

    6. Public Law 107–56.

    7. Charles A. Stevenson, Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict since 1789 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 18.

    8. Public Law 107–296.

    9. Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis, Second Edition, (New York: Longman, 1999), 6, 300–301.

    1. George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 53.

    2. Christopher Collier and James Lincoln Collier, Decision in Philadelphia (New York: Ballantine Books, 1986), 348.

    3. Quoted in Richard B. Morris, The Forging of the Union, 1781–1789 (New York: Harper & Row, 1987), 266.

    4. Morris, 130–132, 154–159; Frederick W. Marks, III, Independence on Trial: Foreign Affairs and the Making of the Constitution (Baton Rouge, LA: State University Press, 1973), 59.

    5. Marks 111, 113; Morris, 209.

    6. Marks, 16; Journal of Continental Congress, June 21, 1786; October 30, 1786; and July 18, 1787.

    7. Marks, 37–44, 49.

    8. Journal of the Continental Congress, February 8, 1786.

    9. Journal of the Continental Congress, October 18, 1786.

    10. Quoted in Morris, 266.

    11. Address of the Annapolis Convention, September 1786.

    12. Marks, xvii–xix, citing Forrest McDonald, Page Smith, James MacGregor Burns, and Merrill Jensen.

    13. Herring, 49.

    14. Marks, 170, 142–145; Richard H. Kohn, ed., The United States Military Under the Constitution, 1789–1989 (New York University Press, 1991), 63–71.

    15. Collier & Collier, 103–4; Richard Beeman, Plain, Honest Men: The Making of the American Constitution (New York: Random House, 2009), 67.

    16. Collier & Collier, 114–115.

    17. Collier & Collier, 198–200.

    18. David O. Stewart, The Summer of 1787: The Men Who Invented the Constitution (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2007), 103–104.

    19. The original allocation of seats in the House of Representatives gave Southern states 45% of the seats and Northern states 55%. After the first census in 1790, along with the addition of Vermont and Kentucky, Southern states had 46.5% using the three-fifths ratio. The actual house apportionment was 44.8%. If only free inhabitants had been counted, the Southern percentage would have dropped to 41.0%. If slaves had been counted wholly, the figure would have been 49.9%. George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders' Union (University of Chicago Press, 2010), 121.

    20. Farrand's Records of the Federal Convention, vol. 1, 24–26, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwfr.html

    21. Collier & Collier, 121, 123.

    22. Collier & Collier, 316, 322–323.

    23. Federalist 51, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_51.html

    24. Quoted in Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992), ix.

    25. Quoted in Collier & Collier, 340–341.

    26. Beeman, 373–376.

    27. Pauline Maier, Ratification: The People Debate the Constitution, 1787–1788 (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2010), 124; Marks, 197.

    28. Beeman, 386–90.

    29. Beeman, 391–392; Maier, 459.

    30. Beeman, 394.

    31. Beeman, 395–400.

    32. Beeman, 400–403.

    33. Maier, 429, 433.

    34. Quoted in David P. Currie, The Constitution in Congress: The Federalist Period, 1789–1801 (University of Chicago Press, 1997), 4n.

    35. Maier, 446.

    36. Maier, 446.

    37. Statutes at Large, I Stat. 119, http://memory.loc.gov/ammem/amlaw/lwsl.html; Richard H. Kohn, Eagle and Sword (New York: Free Press, 1975), 108, 126.

    38. Currie, 42.

    1. Charles A. Stevenson, Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 1.

    2. Fred I. Greenstein, “The Policy-Driven Leadership of James K. Polk: Making the Most of a Weak Presidency,” Presidential Studies Quarterly, vol. 40, no. 4, December 2010, 725.

    3. Charles A. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: U.S. Civil–Military Relations Under Stress (London: Rutledge, 2006), 31.

    4. Leonard D. White, The Federalists: A Study in Administrative History, 1789–1801 (New York: Free Press, 1948), 103, 106.

    5. White, Federalists, 210–236.

    6. White, Federalists, 61–63; George C. Herring, From Colony to Superpower: U.S. Foreign Relations Since 1776 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008), 77–79; Gordon S. Wood, Empire of Liberty (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 196–199.

    7. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 32–34, 36–37.

    8. Stevenson, Warriors, 79–92.

    9. Stevenson, Warriors, 88–92.

    10. Leonard D. White, The Jeffersonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1801–1829 (New York: Free Press, 1951), 4, 213; Wood, 292.

    11. White, Jeffersonians, 35, 48, 52.

    12. Stevenson, Congress, 16.

    13. White, Jeffersonians, 30–31, 36–37; Stevenson, Congress, 38.

    14. White, Jeffersonians, 248.

    15. Herring, 134, 144–151.

    16. Herring, 138; 74. William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of State Historical Office, 1961), 74.

    17. Herring, 139–143, 155–157.

    18. White, Jeffersonians, 94, 99.

    19. Herring, 178–183.

    20. Kinley J. Brauer, “1821–1860: Economics and the Diplomacy of American Expansionism,” in William H. Becker and Samuel F. Wells, Jr., eds., Economics and World Power: An Assessment of American Diplomacy since 1789 (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 56–60, 82–83.

    21. Herring, 182–183.

    22. Herring, 164, 169; Russell F. Weigley, History of the United States Army, Enlarged Edition (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984), 161–162.

    23. Greenstein, 725.

    24. Herring, 191–192.

    25. Herring, 198–201.

    26. Leonard D. White, The Jacksonians: A Study in Administrative History, 1829–1861 (New York: Free Press, 1954), 53–54, 63–65.

    27. Henry Bartholomew Cox, War, Foreign Affairs, and Constitutional Power, 1829–1901 (Cambridge, MA: Ballinger, 1984), 147–148; Herring, 201–205.

    28. White, Jacksonians, 69, 92; Greenstein, 731.

    29. Herring, 214–221; Brauer, 104–112.

    30. Herring, 210–213, 221; Stevenson, Congress, 20.

    31. Herring, 228–230, 236–237.

    32. Herring, 240–245.

    33. See Stevenson, Warriors, 230–251.

    34. W. Stull Holt, Treaties Defeated by the Senate (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1933), 122–124, 139.

    35. Leonard D. White, The Republican Era: A Study in Administrative History, 1869–1901 (New York: Free Press, 1958), 49.

    36. Holt, 142–145, 148.

    37. David M. Pletcher, “1861–1898: Economic Growth and Diplomatic Adjustment,” in Becker & Wells, 120–124, 136, 146.

    38. White, Republican Era, 158–160.

    39. Herring, 308.

    40. Herring, 310.

    41. Herring, 328; Stevenson, Congress, 13–14, 36–37.

    42. Herring, 317; White, Republican Era, 147–148.

    43. Herring, 316–320.

    44. Holt, 165–177.

    45. Herring, 321–325, 332, 364.

    46. Stevenson, Warriors, 141; Herring, 367–372.

    47. Herring, 345–346; Warren Frederick Ilchman, Professional Diplomacy in the United States, 1779–1939 (University of Chicago Press, 1961), 3; Barnes, 154.

    48. Stevenson, Warriors, 143–146, 148.

    49. Stevenson, Warriors, 149–150.

    50. Herring, 372–374.

    51. Herring, 358.

    52. Herring, 351–352, 356.

    53. Herring, 382.

    54. Herring, 381, 386, 388–389, 395–396.

    55. Herring, 399–401; William H. Becker, “1899–1920: America Adjusts to World Power,” in Becker & Wells, 209.

    56. Herring, 404–405; Weigley, 348; Hagan, 253.

    57. Stevenson, Congress, 40, 48.

    58. Ernest R. May, The Ultimate Decision: The President as Commander in Chief (New York: George Braziller, 1960), 117; Herring, 417–431.

    59. Herring, 429–434.

    60. Herring, 436.

    61. Stevenson, Congress, 69; Herring, 439, 452.

    62. Herring, 453–455, 489.

    63. Richard B. Morris, ed., Encyclopedia of American History (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1953), 322–324; Herring, 504–505.

    64. Herring, 470–474, 487; Melvyn P. Leffler, “1921–1932: Expansionist Impulses and Domestic Constraints,” in Becker & Wells, 254.

    65. Becker, in Becker & Wells, 213; Herring, 443.

    66. Stevenson, Warriors, 96.

    67. Ernest R. May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly, vol. 70, no. 2 (June 1955), 166–173.

    68. May, Political Science Quarterly, 172–175; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947–48), 495.

    69. See Stevenson, Warriors, 99–108.

    70. Stevenson, Warriors, 93, 108–112; Herring, 526, 533–534.

    71. Herring, 556–559.

    1. Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2006), 226–227.

    2. Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, Public Law 87–195, sect. 620G and sect. 602.

    3. Public Law 105–277, sect. 103.

    4. 1 Statutes at Large 96, 561.

    5. Public Law 104–201, sect. 1411.

    6. Richard E. Neustadt, Presidential Power and the Modern Presidents, Revised Edition (New York: Free Press, 1991).

    7. See John Yoo memo at http://www.justice.gov/olc/warpowers925.htm

    8. Theodore Sorensen, Decision-Making in the White House (New York: Columbia University Press, 1964), 44.

    9. Alexander L. George, Presidential Decision-Making in Foreign Policy: The Effective Use of Information and Advice (New York: Westview, 1980).

    10. Thomas Preston, The President and His Inner Circle (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001).

    11. Gordon M. Goldstein, Lessons in Disaster: McGeorge Bundy and the Path to War in Vietnam (New York: Henry Holt, 2008), 207.

    12. Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1947–48), 495.

    13. Mark A. Stoler, Allies and Adversaries (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2000), 103.

    14. See Charles A. Stevenson, “Underlying Assumptions of the National Security Act of 1947,” Joint Forces Quarterly, 48 (1st quarter 2008), 129–133.

    15. Public Law 80–253, sect. 101(a).

    16. Ivo M. Saalder and I. M. Destler, In the Shadow of the Oval Office (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009), 70; David Auerswald, “The Evolution of the NSC Process,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 40; David Rothkopf, Running the World (Public Affairs, 2005), 267; John P. Burke, Honest Broker? (College Station: Texas A&M University Press, 2009), 347.

    17. Saalder & Destler, 68.

    18. Auerswald, 35.

    19. See Burke, Honest Broker?

    20. Saalder & Destler, 70.

    21. Rothkopf, 407.

    22. Memorandum from James L. Jones, “The 21st Century Interagency Process,” March 18, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/nsc031909.pdf

    23. Auerswald, 33.

    24. Rothkopf, 405.

    25. This section is based on http://www.ndu.edu/icaf/outreach/publications/nspp/docs/icaf-nsc-policy-process-report-10-2010.pdf, 35–45.

    26. Morton H. Halperin et al., Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2006), 131.

    27. George Tenet, At the Center of the Storm (New York: HarperCollins, 2007), 449–475.

    28. Saalder & Destler, 218.

    29. See Peter Feaver and William Inboden, “A Strategic Planning Cell on National Security at the White House,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2009), 98–112.

    1. Cecil V. Crabb, Jr., and Pat M. Holt, Invitation to Struggle (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 1992), 242, 187.

    2. Rebecca K. C. Hersman, Friends and Foes (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2000), 67–70.

    3. Crabb & Holt, 237–238; Patrick J. Haney, “Why Do We Still Have an Embargo of Cuba?” in Ralph G. Carter, Contemporary Cases in U.S. Foreign Policy: From Terrorism to Trade, Fourth Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2011), 340.

    4. Michael John Garcia and R. Chuck Mason, “Congressional Oversight and Related Issues Concerning International Security Agreements Concluded by the United States,” CRS Report for Congress, October 1, 2009, 3.

    5. Glen S. Krutz and Jeffrey S. Peake, Treaty Politics and the Rise of Executive Agreements (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2009), 71–73.

    6. U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Treaty With Russia on Measures for Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (The New START Treaty), Executive Report, 111th Cong., 2d sess., October 1, 2010, Exec. Rept. 111–6.

    7. Lee H. Hamilton with Jordan Tama, A Creative Tension: The Foreign Policy Roles of the President and Congress (Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2002), 56.

    8. See Thomas E. Mann and Norman J. Ornstein, The Broken Branch: How Congress Is Failing America and How to Get It Back on Track (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006); David Epstein and Sharyn O'Halloran, Delegating Powers: A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making Under Separate Powers (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999).

    9. Gerald Felix Warburg, “Congress; Checking Presidential Power,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 230–234.

    10. Hamilton, 7.

    11. Hamilton, 60.

    12. Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 1 (New York: Vintage Books, 1945), 243.

    13. David R. Mayhew, “Actions in the Public Sphere,” in Paul J. Quirk and Sarah A. Binder, The Legislative Branch (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 71.

    14. James M. Lindsay, Congress and the Politics of U.S. Foreign Policy (Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1994), 4.

    15. Quoted in Stephen R. Weissman, A Culture of Deference (New York: Basic Books, 1995), 14.

    16. Quoted in Weissman, 12.

    17. Weissman, 14.

    18. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 4 (August 1998), 395–417.

    19. Ralph G. Carter and James M. Scott, Choosing to Lead: Understanding Congressional Foreign Policy Entrepreneurs (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2009), 27, 224–225.

    20. See Charles A. Stevenson, Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 11–33.

    21. Hamilton, 64.

    22. David P. Auerswald and Peter F. Cowhey, “Ballotbox Diplomacy: The War Powers Resolution and the Use of Force,” International Studies Quarterly, vol. 41 (1997), 507.

    23. Stevenson, Congress at War, 54–55.

    24. Stevenson, Congress at War, 4.

    25. Crabb & Holt, ix.

    1. John Quincy Adams Memoirs, vol. vii (Philadelphia, PA: Lippincott, 1875), 359.

    2. Shelley Lynne Tomkin, Inside OMB (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1998), 55, 62.

    3. Gordon Adams, “The Office of Management and Budget: The President's Policy Tool,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 58. For a comprehensive look at budgeting for defense, international affairs, and homeland security, see Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security (New York: Routledge, 2009).

    4. Adams, 56, 63–64; Tomkin, 118–137.

    5. Tomkin, 121–125.

    6. See “How Government Plays the Budget Game,” National Journal, September 30, 2002.

    7. Adams, 76.

    8. Louis Fisher, Presidential Spending Power (Princeton University Press, 1975), 238; William C. Banks and Peter Raven-Hansen, National Security Law and the Power of the Purse (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 71–72.

    9. Public Law 112–81, sect. 1207.

    10. The HELP Commission Report on Foreign Assistance Reform, Beyond Assistance, December 2007, 30.

    11. Fisher, 204–207.

    12. See http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/pentagons-black-budget-grows-to-more-than-50-billion/. For more on secret spending, see Banks & Raven-Hansen, 51–52, 100–105.

    1. Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., A Thousand Days: John F. Kennedy in the White House (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1965), 406.

    2. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–76, vol. II (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office), 768.

    3. U.S. Statutes, I, 28–29; 22 U.S. Code 2656.

    4. Leonard D. White, The Federalists (New York: Free Press, 1948), 136.

    5. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), The Embassy of the Future (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 47.

    6. Edward Peck, “Chief of Mission Authority: A Powerful but Underused Tool,” Foreign Service Journal, December 2007, 30; Robert B. Oakley and Michael Casey, Jr., “The Country Team: Restructuring America's First Line of Engagement,” JFQ, 47 (4th quarter 2007), 150.

    7. Oakley & Casey, 150.

    8. Oakley & Casey, 146.

    9. See U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “Iraq: The Transition From a Military Mission to a Civilian-Led Effort,” Committee Print, S. Prt. 112–3, January 31, 2011, 7; Karen DeYoung, “U.S. Evaluating Size of Baghdad Embassy, Officials Say,” Washington Post, February 17, 2012.

    10. Marc Grossman, “The State Department: Culture as Interagency Destiny?” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 80.

    11. Advisory Committee on Transformational Diplomacy, Final Report of the State Department in 2025 Working Group, U.S. Department of State, 2008, 28.

    12. Frederick C. Smith and Franklin C. Miller, “The Office of Secretary of Defense: Civilian Masters?” in George & Rishikof, 109.

    13. Data from American Foreign Service Association.

    14. William Barnes and John Heath Morgan, The Foreign Service of the United States (Washington, DC: Department of State, 1961), 207.

    15. Harry W. Kopp and Charles A. Gillespie, Career Diplomacy: Life and Work in the U.S. Foreign Service (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 20.

    16. “A More Representative Foreign Service,” Association for Diplomatic Studies and Training, http://www.usdiplomacy.org

    17. Grossman, 83.

    18. Henry A. Kissinger, Years of Upheaval (New York: Little, Brown, 1982), 442–443.

    19. Alexander M. Haig, Jr., Caveat: Realism, Reagan, and Foreign Policy (New York: Scribner, 1984), 27; James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War, and Peace, 1989–1992 (New York: G.P. Putnam's Sons, 1995), 31.

    20. Col. Rickey L. Rife, “Defense Is From Mars, State Is From Venus,” Army War College, 1998.

    21. Rife, “Defense Is From Mars, State Is From Venus.”

    22. Jim Hoagland, “Fighting Iran—With Patience,” Washington Post, February 25, 2007.

    23. Project on National Security Reform, “Ensuring Security in an Unpredictable World, Preliminary Findings,” July 2008, 36–37.

    24. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) Report, A Steep Hill: Congress and U.S. Efforts to Strengthen Fragile States, March 2008, 23.

    25. Figures based on congressional action in annual budget resolutions as reported in CQ Almanacs.

    26. Charles Flickner, “Removing Impediments to an Effective Partnership With Congress,” in Lael Brainard, ed., Security by Other Means (Washington, DC: Brookings, 2007), 242; CSIS Report, A Steep Hill, app. G, 85.

    1. Stephen D. Cohen, The Making of United States International Economic Policy, Fifth Edition (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2000), 263.

    2. David A. Baldwin, Economic Statecraft (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1985), 41–42.

    3. Lael Brainard, Security by Other Means (Washington, DC: CSIS & Brookings, 2007), 18.

    4. The Fed is legally independent of the Treasury Department, though they try to harmonize their operations. Decentralization is built into the system, with 5 of the 12 members of the Fed's key open market committee chosen by regional banks dominated by local banking interests.

    5. Cohen, 5.

    6. Commerce Department figures; Benn Steil and Robert E. Litan, Financial Statecraft (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2006), 3.

    7. Joan E. Spero and Jeffrey A. Hart, The Politics of International Economic Relations, Sixth Edition (New York: Thomson/Wadsworth, 2003), 387–388.

    8. Index of Global Philanthropy and Remittances 2010, http://www.hudson.org/files/pdf_upload/Index_of_Global_Philanthropy_and_Remittances_2010

    9. See http://KeithHennessey.com, “Roles of the President's White House Economic Advisors,” August 8, 2010.

    10. Brian Katz, “International Trade and Economic Policy, Planning and Strategy in the USG: The National Economic Council (NEC),” paper for the Project on National Security Reform, 2008.

    11. George Thomas Kurian, ed., A Historical Guide to the U.S. Government (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 235–241.

    12. Cohen, 47.

    13. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security (New York: Routledge, 2010), 55.

    14. Department of Commerce homepage, http://www.commerce.gov/about-department-commerce

    15. Cohen, 55–57.

    16. Cohen, 12.

    17. Steven Radelet, “Strengthening U.S. Development Assistance,” in Brainard, 94.

    18. Adams & Williams, 86–90.

    19. Adams & Williams, 64.

    20. Adams & Williams, 90–92.

    21. Adams & Williams, 62–64.

    22. Gary Clyde Hufbauer et al., Economic Sanctions Reconsidered, Third Edition (Washington, DC: Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009), 148–154.

    23. Steil & Litan, 27.

    24. Vivian C. Jones et al., “Trade Preferences: Economic Issues and Policy Options,” CRS Report for Congress, September 24, 2010.

    25. William H. Cooper, “Free Trade Agreements: Impact on U.S. Trade and Implications for U.S. Trade Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, February 23, 2010.

    26. Vivian C. Jones, “Trade Remedies: A Primer,” CRS Report for Congress, July 30, 2008.

    27. Radelet in Brainard, 94.

    28. Gerald F. Hyman, “A Cabinet-Level Development Agency: Right Problem, Wrong Solution,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), January 2009, 2.

    29. Brainard, 33.

    30. For QDDR, see http://www.state.gov/s/dmr/qddr/index.htm

    31. Brainard, 5.

    32. Curt Tarnoff et al., “Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy,” CRS Report for Congress, February 10, 2009.

    33. Public Law 112–81, sect. 1207.

    34. Adams & Williams, 67–77.

    35. Adams & Williams, 46–49.

    36. Adams & Williams, 86–90.

    37. Spero & Hart, 14–24.

    38. Steil & Litan, 3.

    39. Steil & Litan, 32–41.

    40. Steil & Litan, 64–66.

    41. Spero & Hart, 148.

    42. James K. Jackson, “U.S. Direct Investment Abroad: Trends and Current Issues,” CRS Report for Congress, February 1, 2011.

    43. James K. Jackson, “Foreign Direct Investment in the United States: An Economic Analysis,” CRS Report for Congress, February 1, 2011; Michael V. Seitzinger, “Foreign Investment in the United States: Major Federal Statutory Restrictions,” CRS Report for Congress, January 26, 2009.

    44. James K. Jackson, “The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS),” CRS Report for Congress, February 4, 2010; CFIUS Report to Congress, November, 2010.

    45. Edward M. Graham and David M. Marchick, U.S. National Security and Foreign Direct Investment (Washington, DC: Institute for International Economics, May 2006), 128–141.

    46. See Graham & Marchick, 95–121.

    1. Dana Priest, The Mission (New York: W. W. Norton, 2003), 14.

    2. Oral history interview, Historical Office of the Secretary of Defense, May 18, 2001, 9.

    3. Joint publication 3–0, Joint Operations, 22 March 2010, I-2.

    4. Joint Publication 1, Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States, 20 March 2009, xi.

    5. Joint Publication 1, x.

    6. Carl von Clausewitz, Michael Howard, and Peter Paret, eds., On War (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1982), 87.

    7. Michael Meese and Isaiah Wilson III, “The Military: Forging a Joint Warrior Culture,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 125.

    8. Charles A. Stevenson, Congress at War: The Politics of Conflict Since 1789 (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 38.

    9. Kenneth J. Hagan, This People's Navy (New York: Free Press, 1991), 194–195, 208–209; John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Military History (Oxford University Press, 1999), 488–489.

    10. Charles A. Stevenson, SecDef: The Nearly Impossible Job of Secretary of Defense (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2006), 7.

    11. See Charles A. Stevenson, Warriors and Politicians: U.S. Civil–Military Relations Under Stress (New York: Routledge, 2006), 205–209.

    12. Bradley Graham, By His Own Rules (New York: Public Affairs, 2009), 216.

    13. 2010 U.S. Census; Population Representation in the Military Services, Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute (DEOMI), Fiscal Year 2008 Report.

    14. Population Representation in the Military Services, Fiscal Year 2008 Report.

    15. Harvey M. Sapolsky et al., U.S. Defense Politics (New York: Routledge, 2009), 31.

    16. Lawrence Kapp, “Reserve Component Personnel Issues: Questions and Answers,” CRS Report for Congress, February 10, 2009; Michael Waterhouse and JoAnne O'Bryant, “National Guard Personnel and Deployments: Fact Sheet,” CRS Report for Congress, January 17, 2008.

    17. Col. Rickey L. Rife, “Defense Is From Mars, State Is From Venus,” Army War College, 1998.

    18. Meese & Wilson, 127–130.

    19. Frederick C. Smith and Franklin C. Miller, “The Office of the Secretary of Defense: Civilian Masters?” in George & Rishikof, 109–111.

    20. DOD FY 2011 Budget Presentation, 7–11.

    21. Stevenson, SecDef, 190.

    22. R. Chuck Mason, “Securing America's Borders: The Role of the Military,” CRS Report for Congress, June 16, 2010.

    23. See Charles A. Stevenson, Congress at War (Washington, DC: Potomac Books, 2007), 4.

    24. Walter Pincus, “The Pentagon's New View of Warfare,” Washington Post, February 6, 2012.

    25. Richard A. Best, Jr., and Andrew Feickert, “Special Operations Forces (SOF) and CIA Paramilitary Operations: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, August 3, 2009.

    26. U.S. Statistical Abstract, 2011, 338.

    27. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security (New York: Routledge, 2010), 86–90.

    28. Smith & Miller, 111–113.

    29. David Rothkopf, Running the World (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 419.

    1. James B. Steinberg, “The Policymaker's Perspective: Transparency and Partnership,” in Roger Z. George and James B. Bruce, eds., Analyzing Intelligence (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2008), 83.

    2. William J. Daugherty, “The Role of Covert Action,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., Handbook of Intelligence Studies (New York: Routledge, 2007), 279.

    3. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America (New York: Little, Brown, 2011), 18.

    4. Robert M. Gates, From the Shadows (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1996), 33.

    5. I Statutes at Large, 128–129, July 1, 1790. A similar provision allowing secret expenditures is still on the books (31 USC 3526 [e]).

    6. Godfrey Hodgson, The Colonel: The Life and Wars of Henry Stimson, 1867–1950 (New York: Knopf, 1990), 203.

    7. Priest & Arkin, 100, 103. Their figure for the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) staff also includes personnel attached to the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC).

    8. Public Law 108–458, sect. 1018, of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004.

    9. Thomas Fingar, “Office of the Director of National Intelligence: Promising Start Despite Ambiguity, Ambivalence, and Animosity,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 139, 149; Richard A. Best, Jr., “Intelligence Reform After Five Years: The Role of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI),” CRS Report for Congress, June 22, 2010.

    10. Priest & Arkin, 97.

    11. Fingar, 142.

    12. Fingar, 148.

    13. Roger Z. George, “Central Intelligence Agency: The President's Own,” in George & Rishikof, 158.

    14. Gates, 563–564.

    15. Richard A. Clarke, Against All Enemies (New York: Free Press, 2004), 277; George, 161.

    16. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security (New York: Routledge, 2010), 123.

    17. George, 160.

    18. Quoted in George, 159.

    19. George, 164; Walter Pincus and Dana Priest, “Some Iraq Analysts Felt Pressure From Cheney Visits,” Washington Post, June 5, 2003.

    20. Adams & Williams, 124.

    21. Adams & Williams, 123. Another recent source says NSA has “35,000+” personnel. Matthew Aid, Intel Wars: The Secret History of the Fight Against Terror (New York: Bloomsbury Press, 2012), 44, also has higher figures for other parts of the IC: CIA, 25,000; NRO, 4,500; NGIA, 16,000.

    22. Adams & Williams, 124–125.

    23. Adams & Williams, 125–126.

    24. Adams & Williams, 127–128.

    25. Adams & Williams, 126–129.

    26. Greg Miller, “27% of U.S. Spy Work Is Outsourced,” Los Angeles Times, August 28, 2008. Priest & Arkin, 181, say the figure is 29% of the workforce in the IC are contractors.

    27. Mark M. Lowenthal, Intelligence: From Secrets to Policy, Fourth Edition, (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2009), 66.

    28. Lowenthal, 82–107.

    29. Priest & Arkin, 77.

    30. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 35 Intelligence Requirements, March 2, 1995, http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd35.htm

    31. Paul R. Pillar, “Adapting Intelligence to Changing Issues,” in Johnson, Handbook, 151–152; Lowenthal, 59, 73–74.

    32. See Paul R. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011) and Joshua Rovner, Fixing the Facts (New York: Cornell University Press, 2011).

    33. Quoted in Lowenthal, 111.

    34. Lowenthal, 186.

    35. Lowenthal, 120–121, 125–126.

    36. Gates, 56.

    37. Pillar, Intelligence and U.S. Foreign Policy, 139.

    38. Lowenthal, 63.

    39. George, 163, 159; Walter Pincus, “Measuring a President's Approach on Foreign Policy,” Washington Post, January 17, 2012.

    40. Priest & Arkin, 80, 81.

    41. Pillar, 200.

    42. George, 160.

    43. Quoted in William J. Daugherty, Executive Secrets (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2006) 13.

    44. Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 14.

    45. Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 71–89; Daugherty, Handbook, 280–283, 291.

    46. Jeffrey T. Richelson, The U.S. Intelligence Community, Fifth Edition, (New York: Westview, 2008), 420–424; Yochi Dreazen and Marc Ambinder, “CIA Deploys to Libya as White House Authorizes Direct Assistance to Rebels,” National Journal, March 30, 2011.

    47. Jennifer D. Kibbe, “Covert Action, Pentagon Style,” in Loch K. Johnson, ed., The Oxford Handbook of National Security Intelligence (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 571, 576.

    48. Public Law 102–88.

    49. Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 101–107.

    50. Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 34.

    51. Gates, 567–568.

    52. Steinberg, 83–84.

    53. John McLaughlin, “Serving the National Policymaker,” in George & Bruce, 72.

    54. Mark M. Lowenthal, “The Policymaker–Intelligence Relationship, in Johnson, Oxford Handbook, 439–440.

    55. McLaughlin, 74–78.

    56. David Ignatius, “Obama's Intelligence Retooling,” Washington Post, June 9, 2010; Josh Gerstein, “Panel Found ‘Distracted’ DNI,” Politico, June 2, 2010.

    57. Pillar, 5.

    58. Quotations are in David M. Barrett, The CIA and Congress (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2005), 3, and Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 92.

    59. Barrett, 458–460, 102–112.

    60. Loch K, Johnson, “A Shock Theory of Congressional Accountability for Intelligence,” in Johnson, Handbook, 343.

    61. Daugherty, Executive Secrets, 95; L. Britt Snider, The Agency and the Hill, CIA Center for the Study of Intelligence, http://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/books-and-monographs/agency-and-the-hill/index.html

    1. Hart-Rudman Commission, New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, September 15, 1999, i–vii.

    2. Tom Ridge, The Test of Our Times (New York: St. Martin's Press, 2009), 277.

    3. Richard H. Ward, Kathleen L. Kiernan, and Daniel Mabrey, Homeland Security: An Introduction (LexisNexis, 2006), 11.

    4. Donald F. Kettl, System Under Stress: Homeland Security and American Politics, Second Edition (Washington, DC: CQ Press, 2007), 106–107; Ward et al., 246.

    5. Kettl, 54–55.

    6. Public Law 107–296, sect. 101.

    7. Gordon Adams and Cindy Williams, Buying National Security (Routledge, 2010), 141–143; Office of Management and Budget, 2012 Budget, Analytical Perspectives, 403–410.

    8. Ward et al., 110–111.

    9. Department of Homeland Security, 2012 Budget in Brief, 95–97, http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/assets/budget-bib-fy2012.pdf

    10. See http://www.nctc.gov/about_us/about_nctc.html

    11. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Toward Integrating Complex National Missions Lessons From the National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, February 2010, http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf

    12. Mark A. Randol, “The Department of Homeland Security Intelligence Enterprise: Operational Overview and Oversight Challenges for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, March 19, 2010.

    13. Government Accountability Office, “High-Risk Series: An Update,” Report to Congressional Committees, February 2011, 91–110, http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf

    14. A list of the various sector plans can be found at http://www.dhs.gov/files/programs/gc_1179866197607.shtm

    15. Ward et al., 118.

    16. McAfee/CSIS Report, In the Dark: Crucial Industries Confront Cyberattacks, April 2011, http://www.mcafee.com/us/resources/reports/rp-critical-infrastructure-protection.pdf

    17. Center for a New American Security, “America's Cyber Future: Security and Prosperity in the Information Age,” vol. 1, June 2011, http://www.cnas.org/files/documents/publications/CNAS_Cyber_Volume0I_0.pdf

    18. See White House Fact Sheet: “The Administration's Cybersecurity Accomplishments,” May 12, 2011.

    19. Dana Priest and William M. Arkin, Top Secret America (Little, Brown, 2011), 88.

    20. Siobahn Gorman, “Chamber Critical of White House Cybersecurity Plan,” Wall Street Journal, May 26, 2011.

    21. Gary M. Shiffman and Jonathan Hoffman, “The Department of Homeland Security: Chief of Coordination,” in Roger Z. George and Harvey Rishikof, eds., The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 216.

    22. Shiffman & Hoffman, 209.

    23. Statement for the Record, The Honorable Janet Napolitano, Secretary, U.S. Department of Homeland Security, Before the U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, February 17, 2011.

    24. Ward et al., 142.

    25. Ward et al., 234.

    26. Kettl, 79; Shiffman & Hoffman, 217.

    27. Shiffman & Hoffman, 204, 219.

    28. Michael A. Sheehan, Crush the Cell: How to Defeat Terrorism Without Terrorizing Ourselves (New York: Crown, 2008), 7.

    29. John Mueller and Mark G. Stewart, “Terror, Security, and Money: Balancing the Risks, Benefits, and Costs of Homeland Security,” paper prepared for Annual Convention of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL, April 1, 2011.

    30. Public Law 107–296, sect. 903.

    31. Statement by the president on the White House Organization for Homeland Security and Counterterrorism, May 26, 2009.

    32. See GAO report at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11278.pdf

    33. Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), Forging a New Shield Executive Summary, December 2008, 486.

    34. See agency rankings at http://bestplacestowork.org/BPTW/rankings/ overall/large

    35. James A. Thomson, “DHS AWOL?” RAND Review, Spring 2007.

    36. Stephen Flynn, “Recalibrating Homeland Security,” Foreign Affairs, May–June 2011, 130–140.

    37. Paul Rosenzweig, Jena Baker McNeill, and James Jay Califano, “Stopping the Chaos: A Proposal for Reorganization of Congressional Oversight of the Department of Homeland Security,” Web-Memo by the Heritage Foundation, November 4, 2010.

    38. Timothy Balunis, Jr., and William Hemphill, “Escaping the Entanglement: Reversing Jurisdictional Fragmentation Over the Department of Homeland Security,” Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, vol. 6, is. 1 (2009), art. 58.

    39. See DHS list at http://www.dhs.gov/files/international/counterterrorism.shtm

    40. Presidential Policy Directive (PPD) 8, “National Preparedness,” March 30, 2011.

    41. Napolitano testimony, February 17, 2011.

    1. George W. Bush, The National Security Strategy of the United States, September 2002.

    2. Barack Obama, The National Security Strategy of the United States, May 2010.

    3. For more on these activities, see Paul B. Stares and Micah Zenko, “Partners in Preventive Action: The United States and International Institutions,” Council on Foreign Relations, September 2011.

    4. Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, International Organizations, Second Edition (Boulder, CO: Kynne Rienner, 2010), 17, 26.

    5. Karns & Mingst, 274–279.

    6. Linda Fasulop, An Insider's Guide to the UN, Second Edition, (New Haven CT: Yale University Press, 2009), 96; the State Department voting report can be found at http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/139481.pdf

    7. J. Samuel Barkin, International Organizations (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 59.

    8. Karns & Mingst, 111.

    9. Karns & Mingst, 312–315.

    10. Karns & Mingst, 329, 331; Fasulo, 114–118; Marjorie Ann Browne, “United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress,” CRS Report for Congress, August 13, 2010.

    11. Karns & Mingst, 319.

    12. Barkin, 72.

    13. Fasulo, 203–207.

    14. Ellen Hallams, The United States and NATO Since 9/11 (New York: Routledge, 2010), 58.

    15. International Institute for Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 2010: The Annual Review of World Affairs (London: Routledge, 2010), 77–80.

    16. Karns & Mingst, 182–183.

    17. Karns & Mingst, 189–190.

    18. Karns & Mingst, 198.

    19. Karns & Mingst, 200–201.

    20. Barkin, 95.

    21. Karns & Mingst, 403.

    22. Karns & Mingst, 403–405; Barkin, 106.

    23. James Raymond Vreeland, The International Monetary Fund (London: Routledge, 2007), 41–44.

    24. 2009 Report to Congress by the National Advisory Council on International Monetary and Financial Policies, U.S. Treasury Department, August 5, 2010.

    25. Barkin, 91–93; Karns & Mingst, 415; Kent Jones, The Doha Blues (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010), 51.

    26. Raymond J. Ahearn and Ian F. Fergusson, “World Trade Organization (WTO): Issues in the Debate on Continued U.S. Participation,” CRS Report for Congress, June 16, 2010.

    27. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, “Does the United States Support International Tribunals? The Case of the Multilateral Trade System,” in Cesare P. R. Romano, ed., The Sword and the Scales: The United States and International Courts and Tribunals (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 354.

    28. Romano, xiii.

    29. John R. Crook, “The U.S. and International Claims and Compensation Bodies,” in Romano, 297–321.

    30. Sean D. Murphy, “The United States and the International Court of Justice: Coping With Antinomies,” in Romano, 65–66.

    31. Murphy, 78, 66–67; Romano, 429–430.

    32. Steven Kull and Clay Ramsay, “American Public Opinion on International Courts and Tribunals,” in Romano, 12–29.

    33. John P. Cerone, “U.S. Attitudes Toward International Criminal Courts and Tribunals,” in Romano, 150–156.

    34. Cerone, 182.

    35. Romano, 423.

    36. Karns & Mingst, 222, 235.

    1. Thomas Knecht, Paying Attention to Foreign Affairs: How Public Opinion Affects Presidential Decision Making (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2010), 3.

    2. Quoted in Timothy E. Cook, Governing With the News: The News Media as a Political Institution (University of Chicago Press, 1998), 131, and dated May 12, 1992.

    3. Quoted in Gary J. Andres, Lobbying Reconsidered (New York: Pearson Longman, 2009), 192.

    4. Knecht, 9.

    5. Knecht, 205.

    6. Douglas C. Foyle, Counting the Public In: Presidents, Public Opinion, and Foreign Policy (Columbia University Press, 1999), 267–268.

    7. Foyle, 268.

    8. Steven W. Hook, U.S. Foreign Policy: The Paradox of World Power, Third Edition (CQ Press, 2010), 214.

    9. See http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/articles/brunitedstatescanadara/238.php?nid=&id=&pnt=238 and http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2007/09/12/opinion/pollpositions/main3253552.shtml

    10. First examples at http://www.publicagenda.org; Liberia examples in George F. Bishop, The Illusion of Public Opinion (Rowman & Littlefield, 2005), xiii–xiv.

    11. Yankelovich's views are discussed in Jim Willis, The Media Effect (Praeger, 2007), 63.

    12. See report at http://www.cfr.org/thinktank/iigg/pop/about.html

    13. Bruce W. Jentleson and Rebecca L. Britton, “Still Pretty Prudent,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, vol. 42, no. 4 (August 1998), 395–417.

    14. Wolfowitz quote cited in USA Today, May 30, 2003; Shoon Kathleen Murray and Christopher Spinosa, “The Post-9/11 Shift in Public Opinion: How Long Will It Last?” in Eugene R. Wittkopf and James M. McCormick, eds., The Domestic Sources of American Foreign Policy, Fourth Edition (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield 2004), 103, 105; Hook, 230.

    15. Foyle, 46–47.

    16. Peter D. Feaver and Christopher Gelpi, Choosing Your Battles (Princeton University Press, 2004), 103–105, 134–140, 185–186; Feaver document quoted in Hook, 229.

    17. Bob Woodward, State of Denial (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2006), 326.

    18. Foyle, 208.

    19. Knecht, 215.

    20. Quoted in Brandon Rottinghaus, “Presidential Leadership on Foreign Policy, Opinion Polling, and the Possible Limits of ‘Crafted Talk,’” Political Communication, 25 (2008), 139.

    21. A point made in the 1960s by Douglass Cater, who called the press “the fourth branch of government.” Cater is quoted and discussed in Cook, 1–2.

    22. Doris A. Graber, Mass Media and American Politics, Eighth Edition (CQ Press, 2010), 228–230.

    23. Graber, 305.

    24. Morton Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, Second Edition, (Brookings, 2006), 182–183.

    25. Richard T. Cooper and Faye Fiore, “In Politics, Leaking Stories Is a Fine Art,” Los Angeles Times, April 9, 2006.

    26. Halperin, 185–188.

    27. Graber, 307.

    28. Alex Mintz and Karl DeRouen, Jr., Understanding Foreign Policy Decision Making (Cambridge University Press, 2010), 161.

    29. Data are from Pew Center reports available at http://www.journalism.org

    30. Pew report for 2011 at http://stateofthemedia.org/2011/overview-2/

    31. Allan J. Cigler and Burdett A. Loomis, eds., Interest Group Politics, Eighth Edition (CQ Press, 2012), 3–4.

    32. David M. Paul and Rachel Anderson Paul, Ethnic Lobbies and U.S. Foreign Policy (Lynne Rienner, 2009), 14.

    33. Frank R. Baumgartner et al., Lobbying and Policy Change (University of Chicago Press, 2009), 239, 193.

    34. Within government, stakeholders are those agencies and offices that have some authorities or responsibilities related to the issue under review, such as all the entities related to policy toward, say, China or export of warplanes to Saudi Arabia. Outside of government, stakeholders are those who believe their interests are already affected, or likely to be affected, by a policy being considered.

    35. Paul & Paul, 24.

    36. Thomas Ambrosio, ed., Ethnic Identity Groups and U.S. Foreign Policy (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2002), 10.

    37. Quoted in Thomas, 151.

    38. Thomas, 152–153.

    39. Thomas, 177.

    40. Data at http://www.opensecrets.org

    41. Gerald Warburg, “Lobbyists: U.S. National Security and Special Interests,” in Roger Z. George & Harvey Rishikof, The National Security Enterprise: Navigating the Labyrinth (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2011), 270; Kim Eisler, “Hired Guns: The City's 50 Top Lobbyists,” Washingtonian Magazine, June 2007.

    42. Lobbying and campaign contribution data are available at http://www.opensecrets.org

    43. William D. Hartung, Prophets of War: Lockheed Martin and the Making of the Military Industrial Complex (New York: Nation Books, 2011), 29.

    44. Lobbying and campaign contribution data are available at http://www.opensecrets.org

    45. Thomas, 142–143; Anthony J. Nownes, Total Lobbying (Cambridge University Press, 2006), 28; Andres, 200.

    46. Quoted in Nicholas W. Allard, “Lobbying Is an Honorable Profession: The Right to Petition and the Competition to Be Right,” Stanford Law and Policy Review, vol. 19, 1 (2008), 48.

    47. Baumgartner et al., 193.

    48. Data at http://www.opensecrets.org

    49. Matthew R. Kambrod, Lobbying for Defense: An Insider's View (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 2008), 115; data at http://www.opensecrets.org

    50. Thomas, 148–149.

    51. James G. McGann, “The Global Go-To Think Tanks, 2010” The Think Tanks and Civil Societies Program, University of Pennsylvania; Ellen Laipson, “Think Tanks: Supporting Cast Players in the National Security Enterprise,” in Roger Z. George & Harvey Rishikof, 290–291.

    52. Eliot A. Cohen, “How Government Looks at Pundits” Wall Street Journal, January 23, 2009.

    53. Laipson, 289.

    54. Laipson, 293.

    1. Committee on Government Operations, U.S. Senate, “Organizing for National Security,” vol. 3, Staff Reports and Recommendations, 1961, 4.

    2. Hart–Rudman Commission, Road Map for National Security: Imperative for Change, March 15, 2001, xiii.

    3. Reorganization authority lapsed in 1984. President Obama requested a renewal in 2012 in order to restructure the trade-related organizations in the executive branch.

    4. Dean Acheson, Present at the Creation (New York: W. W. Norton, 1969), 243; Thomas D. Boettcher, First Call: The Making of the Modern U.S. Military, 1945–1953 (Boston: Little, Brown, 1992), 176.

    5. Acheson, 244–246.

    6. See “Organizing for National Security,” vol. 3; Cody M. Brown, The National Security Council, Project on National Security Reform (PNSR), 2008, 27.

    7. Murphy Commission, “Commission on the Organization of the Government for the Conduct of Foreign Policy,” Washington, 1975.

    8. The Tower Commission Report (Bantam Book and Times Books, 1987).

    9. Report of the National Defense Panel, Transforming Defense: National Security in the 21st Century, December 1997, i–vii.

    10. Hart-Rudman Commission, 2001; New World Coming: American Security in the 21st Century, September 15, 1999.

    11. Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Beyond Goldwater–Nichols, Phase 2 Report, July 2005, 1–8.

    12. CSIS, CSIS Commission on Smart Power, 2007, 61–69.

    13. PNSR, Forging a New Shield, November 2008, http://pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr%20forging%20a%20new%20shield.pdf

    14. See Peter Feaver and William Inboden, “A Strategic Planning Cell on National Security at the White House,” in Daniel W. Drezner, ed., Avoiding Trivia: The Role of Strategic Planning in American Foreign Policy (Brookings, 2009), 98–112.

    15. See PNSR report on this at http://www.pnsr.org/data/images/pnsr_the_power_of_people_report.pdf

    16. For a critique of DNI, see Amy Zegart, Spying Blind (Princeton University Press, 2007), and Richard A. Best, Jr., and Alfred Cumming, “Director of National Intelligence Statutory Authorities: Status and Proposals,” CRS Report for Congress, January 12, 2011, http://assets.opencrs.com/rpts/RL34231_20110112.pdf; for Department of Homeland Security (DHS), see Government Accountability Office (GAO) high risk report, http://www.gao.gov/highrisk/agency/dhs/; for National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC), see PNSR, Toward Integrating Complex National Missions: Lessons From the National Counterterrorism Center's Directorate of Strategic Operational Planning, February 2010, http://www.pnsr.org/data/files/pnsr_nctc_dsop_report.pdf

    17. A fuller description of these teams is at PNSR, Forging a New Shield, 442–459.

    18. Public Law 112–81, sect. 1207.

    19. See Andrew F. Krepinevich and Barry D. Watts, Regaining Strategic Competence, Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments, 2009, intro., chap. 4, and conc., http://www.csbaonline.org/4Publications/PubLibrary/R.20090901.Regaining_Strategi/R.20090901.Regaining_Strategi.pdf; Jones memo to NSC members is at http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/nsc031909.pdf

    20. See http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/ppd/nsc031909.pdf


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