100 Americans Making Constitutional History: A Biographical History
Publication Year: 2004
100 Americans Making Constitutional History: A Biographical History presents 100 profiles of the key people behind some of the most important U.S. Supreme Court cases. Edited by Melvin I. Urofsky, a respected constitutional historian, each 2,000-word profile delves into the social and political context behind landmark Court decisions. For example, while a case like Brown v. Board of Education is about an important idea—the equal protection of the law—at its heart it is the story of a little girl, Linda Brown, who wanted to go to a decent school near her home. The outcome is accessible and objective “stories” about the individuals—heroes and scoundrels—who fought their way to constitutional history.
- Front Matter
- Back Matter
- Subject Index
- Profiles of the Litigants
- Jacob Abrams
- Free Speech
- “The Only Just War is the Social Revolution”
- Allan Paul Bakke
- The Problem of Affirmative Action
- “More than Anything Else in the World I Want to Study Medicine”
- Daisy Bates
- The Fight for Civil Rights in Arkansas
- “The Right of Peaceable Assembly … Lie[s] at the Foundation of Government”
- Robert Mack Bell
- A Civil Rights Success Story
- “I Also [Knew] that I … was Not Going to Get up and Leave”
- Berea College
- The Education of African Americans
- “They must not Remain a Nation of Bootblacks and Stevedores”
- William Bingham
- The Fruits of Enterprise
- “The Record, in the Present Case, was Defective”
- Sherman Booth
- The Fight against Slavery
- “Whether we will be Men or Barbarians and Brutes”
- Elias C. Boudinot
- Cherokee Tobacco Enterprises
- “The Most Intelligent Indian in North America”
- Myra Bradwell
- Women in the Legal Profession
- “To Fulfill the Noble and Benign Offices of Wife and Mother”
- Harry Bridges
- Free Speech and Union Rights
- “We [will] not Allow State Courts to Override the Majority Vote of Members”
- Linda Brown
- The Fight for Educational Equality
- “When School Started we would Go these Opposite Directions”
- Porter L. Brown
- The Farmer who Stood up to the State
- “The Program is … simply a Means of Controlling the Supply of Raisins”
- Carrie Buck
- The Eugenics Movement in America
- “Three Generations of Imbeciles are Enough”
- Drew Caminetti and Maury Diggs
- Love and the Mann Act
- “For any other Immoral Purpose”
- Jagdish Chadha
- Tortuous Path to Citizenship
- “Law Students will all Study my Case”
- Walter Chaplinsky
- The Freedom to Proselytize
- “These Include the Lewd and Obscene … Insulting or ‘Fighting Words’”
- Joseph Cinque
- The Thirty “Amistads”
- “Cinque and Grabeau shall not Sigh for Africa in Vain”
- Nancy Cruzan
- The Right to Die
- “Evidence Regarding the Patient's Intent”
- James Dale
- His Ousting from the Boy Scouts
- “Never had any Plan … to Make Homosexuality an Issue”
- Eugene Debs
- Homegrown Radicalism
- “A Gatling Gun on Paper”
- Eugene Dennis
- The Red Scare and the American Communist Party Conspiracy
- “Moscow Puppet and Defender of Political Speech”
- Joshua DeShaney
- The Limits of the Law
- “They Stood by and Did Nothing”
- Steven Engel and Lawrence Roth
- School Prayer
- “The Supreme Court has Held that God is Unconstitutional”
- Susan Epperson
- The Battle over Evolution
- “She's Too Pretty to Come from a Monkey”
- Robinson Everett
- Racial Redistricting in North Carolina
- “If you Drove Down the Interstate with Both Doors Open …”
- A. Ernest Fitzgerald
- Blowing the Whistle on Waste in the Pentagon
- “Loyalty is the Name of the Game”
- Curt Flood
- Major League Baseball
- “I do not Feel that I am a Piece of Property”
- Larry Flynt
- Freedom of the Press
- “The First Amendment has Become an Obsession with Me”
- Fong Yue Ting
- The Chinese Campaign for Civil Rights
- “It is a Cruel Law. It is a Bad Law.”
- Willie Francis
- The Failed Electric Chair
- “I'm Wearing my Sunday Pants … to the Chair”
- Leo Frank
- The Tragic Victim of Due Process
- “Mob Law does not Become due Process of Law”
- Sharron Frontiero
- The Struggle for Gender Equality
- “Man is no Longer the Sole Breadwinner of the Family”
- Robert Fulton
- The Steamboat Monopoly
- “A Full and Equal Right to Navigate”
- William Furman
- The (Temporary) Abolition of the Death Penalty
- “The Gun Went Off and I Didn't Know Nothing about no Murder …”
- Myra Clark Gaines
- The New Orleans Claimant
- “The True-Life Romance of the American Courts”
- Elmer Gertz
- The Definition of Libel
- “Somebody Ought to Call a Halt to that Kind of Thing”
- Clarence Earl Gideon
- The Right to Counsel
- “I Requested the Court to Appoint me an Attorney and the Court Refused”
- Benjamin Gitlow
- Radical Leader to Fallen-Away Communist
- “To Yield to Communism is to Permit the Abrogation of our Liberties”
- Lillian Gobitas
- Freedom of Religion
- “Jehovah will Provide”
- Emma Goldman
- Perils of an American Radical
- “Wholly Wanting in Merit”
- Estelle Griswold
- The Right to Privacy
- “The Sacred Precincts of the Marital Bedrooms”
- Morton Halperin
- The Invasion of Family Privacy
- “A Scandal would be Most Helpful Here”
- Michael Hardwick
- The Battle for Gay Rights
- “What are you Doing in My Bedroom?”
- Hugh Hefner
- The Right to Sexual Expression
- “I Only Read the Articles”
- James Hill
- Privacy and the Press
- “Now they Can See the Story Re-Enacted in Hayes’ Broadway play”
- Gordon Hirabayashi
- Japanese American Internment
- “Ancestry is not a Crime”
- Jane E. Hodgson
- The Fight for Legal Abortion
- “I Never Believed that Abortion Laws Would Change in My Lifetime”
- Ann Hopkins
- Making Partner the Hard Way
- “Walk More Femininely, Talk More Femininely … and Wear Jewelry”
- Ishmael Jaffree
- A Passion for Nonconformity
- “Free to Examine, to Explore, … to be Exposed to Different Philosophies”
- Gregory Lee Johnson
- The Flag Burning Controversy
- “I am Still a Revolutionary”
- Paul E. Johnson
- Affirmative Action
- “No One Else. … was Anywhere Near as Qualified as I Was”
- Paula Jones
- The Trial of a President
- “You are Smart. Let's Keep this Between Ourselves.”
- Jo Carol LaFleur
- Equal Rights for Women in the Workplace
- “You're a Good Teacher, But You've Got to Take this Leave”
- Dietrich Loewe
- The Labor Trust
- “I Knew that all the Employees were Satisfied”
- Lone Wolf
- The Theft of Indian Land
- “Full Power … over Indian Affairs”
- The Lovings
- Living as Man and Wife
- “It is Just Unfair that I can't Live with Her in Virginia”
- Martin Luther
- Popular Sovereignty
- “If you've Found him, you May Kill Him”
- Douglas Clyde Macintosh
- Selective Conscientious Objection
- “I do not Undertake to Support ‘My Country, Right or Wrong’”
- William Marbury
- Futile Quest
- “It is … the Province … of the Judicial Department to Say what the Law is”
- John Marshall
- The Disposition of Lord Fairfax's Lands
- “The Absolute Right of Decision, in the Last Resort, Must Rest Somewhere”
- Norma McCorvey
- Reproductive Freedom
- “Other Women will Not have to go Through what I did”
- James William McCulloh
- The Second Bank of the United States
- “The Bank was Saved, and the People were Ruined”
- Lambdin P. Milligan
- Constitutional Rights in Wartime
- “No Doctrine, Involving More Pernicious Consequences, was Ever Invented”
- Virginia Minor
- Women's Fight for Suffrage
- “Every Right and Privilege to Which Every other Citizen is Entitled”
- Ernesto Miranda
- The Man behind the Warnings
- “You have the Right to Remain Silent”
- David Neagle
- Trigger Man for a Tragedy
- “I Hope your Wife does not Intend to Make Trouble”
- Jay Near
- Freedom of the Press
- “Stories of Crime, Bloodshed, or Tales of Lust”
- Leo Nebbia
- Protest against Price-Fixing
- “This Robbery Must Stop Soon or Reform will be too Late”
- Lawrence A. Nixon
- The All-White Primary
- “In no Event shall a Negro be Eligible”
- Richard M. Nixon
- The Watergate Tapes
- “No One on [my] Staff … was Involved in this Very Bizarre Incident”
- Clarence Norris
- Racism in the Depression South
- “If there is a God He forgot about Me”
- Thomas M. Patterson
- Criticism of the Courts
- “A Direct Assault upon the Freedom of the Press”
- Ernesto Pichardo
- The Practice of Santeria
- “Government may not Enact Laws that Suppress Religious Belief”
- Homer Plessy
- Validation of Jim Crow
- “Laws Designed to Debase and Distinguish Against the Inferior Race”
- Adam Clayton Powell Jr.
- A Defiant and Flawed Hero
- “Mr. Civil Rights”
- Cecil Roy Price
- Mississippi “Justice” in the 1960s
- “I Gave them All what I thought they Deserved”
- Timothy E. Quill
- Physician-Assisted Suicide
- “There's an Elephant in the Room”
- Kim Rawlinson
- Job Discrimination
- “Physical Standards for Prison Guards are Irrelevant”
- Sally Reed
- Women's Rights before the Law
- “I Just Felt a Woman should have the Privilege of Asking”
- George Reynolds
- The Mormon Claim for Plural Marriage
- “Freedom of Religious Opinion But Not the Exercise of that Opinion is Twaddle”
- Demetrio Rodriguez
- The Battle over School Funding
- “We didn't have the Education”
- Ethel and Julius Rosenberg
- Atomic Espionage
- “I Consider your Crime Worse than Murder”
- Dred Scott
- Fight for Freedom from Slavery
- “A Subordinate and Inferior Class of Beings”
- Mack Claude Screws
- Justice in Baker County
- “Under Color of Law”
- Daniel Seeger
- The Meaning of Pacifism
- “A Religious Faith in a Purely Ethical Creed”
- Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher
- The Fight for Equal Education
- “Headstrong and Smart-Mouthed”
- Al Smith
- The Free Exercise of Religion
- “I was Only Going to Church”
- L. B. Sullivan
- Alabama in the 1960s
- “A Famous Racist and Hater of Black People”
- Darius and Vera Swann
- The Desegregation of Southern Schools
- “Mama, you Put Me in the Wrong School!”
- Mary Beth Tinker
- Free Speech for Students
- “Well, that's My Mom”
- Pat Tornillo
- Freedom of the Press
- “Anyone could Silence the Press by Becoming a Candidate”
- Clement L. Vallandingham
- Political Opposition in the Civil War
- “Declaring Sympathies with the Enemy will no Longer be Tolerated”
- William Warley
- A Leader Ahead of his Time
- “All Other Cases will Hinge on Louisville”
- Henry Wheaton and Richard Peters
- “Owning” the Law
- “A Curious Case in the History of Judicature”
- Charlotte Anita Whitney
- Free Speech for Radicals
- “If Belief in Self-Expression … is Criminal, then I am a Criminal”
- Peg-Leg Williams
- Emigrant Agent
- “A Man in this Country has the Right to go where he Pleases”
- Samuel Worcester
- The Fight for Cherokee Rights
- “I am Under no Moral Obligation to Remove”
- Tomoyuki Yamashita
- War Crimes Trials
- “Brutal Atrocities and other High Crimes”
- Yick Wo
- Racial Discrimination in the Dai Fou
- “The Very Idea [is] Intolerable in any Country 184 where Freedom Prevails”
- Jonas Yoder
- The Preservation of Amish Culture
- “To Perform Acts … at Odds with … their Religious Beliefs”
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
One hundred Americans making constitutional history : a biographical history / Melvin I. Urofsky, editor.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 1-56802-799-0 (alk. paper)
1. Constitutional law—United States—Cases. 2. Parties to actions—United States—Biography. 3. United States. Supreme Court. I. Title: 100 Americans making constitutional history. II. Urofsky, Melvin I. III. Title.
For my granddaughter, Chloe Anna Urofsky, who spreads sunshine wherever she goes[Page vi]
Elizabeth Urban Alexander is an assistant professor of history at Texas Wesleyan University, where she teaches women's history and nineteenth-century social and cultural history. Her book, Notorious Woman: The Celebrated Case of Myra Clark Gaines (2001), won the 2002 David J. Langum Prize for Legal History/Biography and the Willie Lee Rose Prize for the best book in southern history by a woman, presented by the Southern Association for Women Historians.
Enoch W. Baker is an adjunct lecturer in American history at Wayne State University and at the University of Michigan, Dearborn. His specialty is legal and constitutional history. He is currently working on a study of church and state relations in the early American Republic.
Howard Ball is professor emeritus of political science at the University of Vermont, where he is also University Scholar. In spring 2003, he was Distinguished Fulbright Lecturer at the School of Law at Sofia University, Sofia, Bulgaria. He has taught at Hofstra University, Mississippi State University, the University of Utah, and the University of Vermont, where he was also the dean of arts and sciences. Ball is the author of more than two dozen books, including A Defiant Life: Thurgood Marshall and the Persistence of Racism in America (1999). His next book, Murder in Mississippi, is about the murders of three civil rights workers, Michael Schwerner, Andrew Goodman, and James Earl Chaney.
David E. Bernstein is a professor at the George Mason University School of Law. He is the author of Only One Place of Redress: African Americans, Labor Regulations, and the Courts from Reconstruction to the New Deal (2001) and many articles on legal history, with a focus on the intersection of constitutional law, economic regulations, and the rights of minorities during the Lochner era. Professor Bernstein is also the author of You Can't Say That! The Growing Threat to Civil Liberties from Antidiscrimination Laws (2003).
David J. Bodenhamer is professor of history and executive director of the Polis Center at Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis. An expert in American constitutional and legal history, he is author or editor of six books, including Fair Trial: Rights of the Accused in American History (1992) and, with James W. Ely Jr., The Bill of Rights in Modern America: After 200 Years (1993), and more than twenty-five journal articles and book chapters. He is currently completing, with Chief Justice Randall Shepard of the Indiana Supreme Court, a volume of essays on Indiana legal history to be published in 2004–05.
Blue Clark (Muscogee/Creek) is David Pendleton Distinguished Professor of American Indian Studies and a professor of law at Oklahoma City University. He is the author of Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: Treaty Rights and Indian Law at the End of the Nineteenth Century (1999).
B. Keith Crew is professor of sociology and criminology at the University of Northern Iowa, where he also heads the Department of Sociology, Anthropology, and Criminology. He has published research on interpersonal violence, drug use, and the sociology of law, especially punishment and sentencing.
Clare Cushman has been director of publications at the Supreme Court Historical Society and managing editor of the Journal of Supreme Court History since 1990. She is the editor and principal writer of two books: The Supreme Court Justices: Illustrated Biographies (1995) and Supreme Court Decisions and Women's Rights: Milestones to Equality (2000).
Lyle Denniston is the Supreme Court correspondent for the Boston Globe. He is the senior reporter in the Court's press corps and, having covered the Court since 1958, has reported on one-quarter of all the justices on the Court. He was with the Washington Star and the Wall Street Journal and retired from the Baltimore Sun in 2001. He is the author of The Reporter and the Law: Techniques of Covering the Courts (1992). Denniston has a master's degree in political science and history from Georgetown University and has taught American constitutional history at the undergraduate college level and legal process theory at the law school level.
Bruce J. Dierenfield is Peter Canisius Distinguished Teaching Professor of History at Canisius College in Buffalo, New York, and the author of Keeper of the Rules: Congressman Howard W. Smith of Virginia (1987), The Civil Rights Movement (2003), and the forthcoming “A Godless Nation”? The School Prayer Case of Engel v. Vitale.[Page xvi]
Francene M. Engel received a Ph.D. in political science from the University of Southern California in 2000. She has taught courses on American constitutional law and gender discrimination at Baylor University, University of Michigan, University of Southern California, and Whittier College. Her research interests are in the area of American constitutional development.
Daniel R. Ernst is the author of Lawyers Against Labor (1995), for which he received the Littleton Griswold Award of the American Historical Association, and a coeditor of Total War and the Law (2002). In 1996 he was a Fulbright Research Scholar at the National Library of New Zealand, and in 1998 he was the Jack and Margaret Sweet Visiting Professor of History at Michigan State University. He received a fellowship from John Simon Guggenheim Memorial Foundation in 2003–2004 to study the American legal profession and the administrative state.
Paul Finkelman is the Chapman Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Tulsa College of Law. He is the author or coauthor of more than fifteen books, including An Imperfect Union: Slavery, Federalism, and Comity (1981, 2000); Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (2d ed., 2001); and is the coauthor, with Melvin I. Urofsky, of A March of Liberty: A Constitutional History of the United States (rev. ed., 2002).
Ronald B. Flowers, John F. Weatherly Professor of Religion Emeritus, taught for thirty-seven years at Texas Christian University. His principal teaching field was the history of religion in America, and the bulk of his research and writing was in American church-state relationships. He serves on the editorial council of the Journal of Church and State and the Board of Americans United for Separation of Church and State.
Julia Frank is an associate professor of psychiatry and behavioral sciences at the George Washington University School of Medicine. She is also the director of medical student education for her department. Her interest in eugenics, like that of many people, stems from curiosity about her own family history.
Robert Justin Goldstein is professor of political science at Oakland University, Rochester, Michigan. He is the author of four books on the flag desecration controversy, as well as Political Repression in Modern America (2001), Political Repression in Nineteenth-Century Europe (1983), and Censorship of Political Caricature in Nineteenth-Century France (1989).
Sarah Barringer Gordon, professor of law and history at the University of Pennsylvania, specializes in the legal history of religion. She is the author of The Mormon Question: Polygamy and Constitutional Conflict in Nineteenth-Century America (2002). She has also published articles on blasphemy, woman suffrage, infanticide, and law and literature. Currently, she is at work on a book about litigation by religious groups in the twentieth century, tentatively titled The Constitution of Faith.
Robert P. Green Jr. is Alumni Distinguished Professor of Education at Clemson University, Clemson, South Carolina, where he teaches courses in the historical and social foundations of education. He is the author of a number of essays on desegregation in American schools and the editor of Equal Protection and the African American Constitutional Experience: A Documentary History (2000). He is currently working on a documentary history of the civil rights movement.
Bradley D. Hays is a doctoral candidate in the Government and Politics Department at the University of Maryland, College Park. He is currently writing his dissertation, which explores how political parties use the courts as a way of maintaining their national coalitions.
Wayne Hobson is a professor of American studies and director of the honors program at California State University, Fullerton. He has written on the history of the American legal profession and on famous criminal trials as cultural documents, including essays on Eugene Debs and on the Lizzie Borden, Sacco and Vanzetti, and O. J. Simpson cases. His current interests focus on public memory studies.
Adam Hoffman is a doctoral candidate in political science at the University of Maryland, College Park. He has published in the Journal of Politics and holds a J.D. from Albany Law School and a master's degree in political science from the University of New Mexico. His research interests include campaign finance and legislative behavior.
Timothy S. Huebner is associate professor of history at Rhodes College in Memphis, Tennessee. He is the author of The Southern Judicial Tradition: State Judges and Sectional Distinctiveness, 1790–1890 (1999) and The Taney Court: Justices, Rulings, and Legacy (2003), as well as numerous scholarly articles on the constitutional and legal history of the American South. He also serves as director of the Rhodes Institute for Regional Studies.
Peter Irons is professor of political science and director of the Earl Warren Bill of Rights Project at the University of California, San Diego. He has published eleven books on the Supreme Court and constitutional litigation. He is a graduate of Harvard Law School and a member of the Supreme Court Bar.
John W. Johnson has been professor of history at the University of Northern Iowa since 1988. He is the author of The Struggle for Student Rights: Tinker v. Des Moines and the 1960s (1997), Insuring Against Disaster: The Nuclear Industry on Trial (1986), and American Legal Culture, 1908–1940 (1981). His two-volume edited work, Historic U.S. Court Cases: An Encyclopedia (2001), received the 2002 Thomas Jefferson Award from the Society for History in the Federal Government for the best reference volume on the federal government published in the 2000–2001 biennium.[Page xvii]
Craig Joyce is Law Foundation Professor and co-director, Institute for Intellectual Property and Information Law, at the University of Houston Law Center, lead author of Copyright Law (6th ed., 2003), and editor of The Majesty of the Law: Reflections of a Supreme Court Justice, by Sandra Day O'Connor (2003).
Paul Kens is a professor of political science and history at Texas State University-San Marcos. He is the author of Justice Stephen Field: Shaping Liberty from the Gold Rush to the Gilded Age (1997) and Lochner v. New York: Economic Regulation on Trial (1998).
Mark R. Killenbeck is the Wylie H. Davis Distinguished Professor of Law at the University of Arkansas, Fayetteville. He teaches constitutional law and legal history and has written widely on American constitutional history with a special emphasis on questions regarding federal-state relations during the nation's first fifty years. He is currently completing a study on M'Culloch v. Maryland.
David J. Langum is professor of law at the Cumberland Law School of Samford University. He has published extensively in the areas of western history, biography, and the legal history of sexuality. His six books have garnered several book prizes, and he is the founder of the Langum Prize in Legal History, awarded annually to the best work of American legal history, accessible to the educated public and published by a university press. His latest book is William M. Kunstler: The Most Hated Lawyer in America (1999).
David W. Levy is the Irene and Julian Rothbaum Professor of American history at the University of Oklahoma. His special interest is American intellectual history. He is the author of Herbert Croly of the New Republic (1985), The Debate over Vietnam (1991, 1995), and numerous articles in popular, scholarly, and legal journals. He is the coeditor of seven volumes of the letters of Louis D. Brandeis and of FDR's Fireside Chats (1995). He is currently at work on a three-volume history of the University of Oklahoma.
Carolyn Long is an associate professor in the Department of Political Science and director of the Program in Public Affairs at Washington State University, Vancouver. In addition to her book on Employment Division v. Smith, she has written a number of articles and book chapters on civil liberties issues. She is currently working on a book on Mapp v. Ohio and the exclusionary rule.
Jonathan Lurie has been a professor of legal history at Rutgers University for more than thirty-four years. He is the author of a multivolume history of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces and the coauthor of a major history of the Slaughterhouse Cases (2003).
Thomas C. Mackey is an associate professor of history at the University of Louisville. He received a Ph.D. from Rice University in 1984 and joined the History Department of the University of Louisville in 1991. He currently serves as chair of the department. His latest book, Pornography on Trial: A Handbook with Cases, Laws, and Documents, was published in 2003.
Robert F. Martin received a B.A. in history from Wofford College in Spartanburg, South Carolina, and a M.A. and Ph.D. from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He is currently a professor in the Department of History at the University of Northern Iowa, offering courses in the South in U.S. history; the gilded age and progressive era United States; and American social history.
Patricia Hagler Minter is associate professor of history at Western Kentucky University and associate director of the university honors program. She received a Ph.D at the University of Virginia and is currently completing a study of the origins of segregated transit law in the South.
David M. O'Brien is Spicer Professor of Politics at the University of Virginia. He was a judicial fellow at the Supreme Court of the United States and has held Fulbright awards at Oxford University, the University of Bologna, and in Japan. Among his books are Storm Center: The Supreme Court in American Politics (6th ed., 2003) and To Dream of Dreams: Religious Freedom and Constitutional Politics in Postwar Japan (1996).
Ellen Holmes Pearson holds a Ph.D. in colonial British American history from Johns Hopkins University. She is an assistant professor of history at the University of North Carolina, Asheville. Her research interests include early American cultural history and American legal culture, and she is currently completing a manuscript about early American legal educators and the creation of American identities.
Shawn Francis Peters is a freelance writer living in Madison, Wisconsin. His Judging Jehovah's Witnesses (2000) won the Scribes Award and was a finalist for the Silver Gavel Award. His latest book is The Yoder Case (2003).
Richard M. Pious is Adolph and Effie Ochs Professor of American Studies at Barnard College and professor of political science in the Graduate School of Columbia University. He is the author of The American Presidency (1979) and The Presidency (1996), and coauthor of The Oxford Guide to United States Government (2001). He is currently doing research on antiterrorism decisions of the George W. Bush administration.
Richard Polenberg is Goldwin Smith Professor of American History at Cornell University, where he has taught since 1966. In 1988–1989 he served as Fulbright Visiting Professor at the Hebrew University in Jerusalem. He is the author of The World of Benjamin Cardozo: Personal Values and the Judicial Process (1997) and editor of In the Matter of J. Robert Oppenheimer: The Security Clearance Hearing(2002).[Page xviii]
Lucas A. Powe Jr. holds the Anne Green Regents Chair at the University of Texas, where he teaches in the law school and the Government Department. He is the author of several books, most recently The Warren Court and American Politics (2000).
Linda Przybyszewski is the author of The Republic According to John Marshall Harlan (1999) and the editor of Some Memories of a Long Life, 1854–1911 by Malvina Shanklin Harlan (2002). She teaches history at the University of Cincinnati, where she was awarded the Edith C. Alexander Award for Distinguished Teaching in 2001. She has received fellowships from Princeton University, the Virginia Foundation for the Humanities, and Columbia University.
Peter G. Renstrom is professor of political science at Western Michigan University, and the editor of the fourteen-volume Supreme Court Handbook Series. He has two forthcoming monographs in that series, one on the Stone Court (1941–1945) and the other on the Taft Court (1921–1930).
Harvey Rishikof is visiting professor of law and national security at the National War College. Formerly he was professor of law, Roger Williams University School of Law, and a former law clerk to the Honorable Leonard I. Garth, Third Circuit.
Greg Russell is chair of the Department of Political Science at the University of Oklahoma. He is the author of Hans J. Morgenthau and the Ethics of American Statecraft (1990) and John Quincy Adams and the Public Virtues of Diplomacy (1995). He has published a wide variety of articles on the American foreign policy tradition and international political theory. He received a Ph.D. from Louisiana State University in 1987.
Lucy E. Salyer is an associate professor in the History Department of the University of New Hampshire and specializes in the social and legal history of immigration and citizenship in the United States after the Civil War. Her book, Laws Harsh as Tigers: Chinese Immigrants and the Shaping of Modern Immigration Law (1995), received the Theodore Saloutos Memorial Prize from the Immigration History Society. She is currently working on a socio-legal history of citizenship policies in the United States between 1898 and 1952.
James Z. Schwartz recently completed a doctorate in history at Wayne State University, after working for more than a decade as a journalist.
Rodney A. Smolla is dean of the University of Richmond, T. C. Williams School of Law. His book Free Speech in an Open Society (1992) won the William O. Douglas Award as the year's best monograph on freedom of expression. His book Suing the Press: Libel, the Media, and Power (1986) won the ABA Silver Gavel Award Certificate of Merit. He is the author of several treatises on free speech and constitutional rights. Deliberate Intent (1999) describes his involvement in the notorious hit man case, in which he successfully represented the families of three murder victims in a suit against the publisher of a murder instruction manual used by a hit man for instructions in carrying out the murders.
George Thomas teaches constitutional law and theory at the University of Oklahoma. His work has appeared in Presidential Studies Quarterly, Polity, and Review of Politics.
Melvin I. Urofsky is professor emeritus of history and director of the doctoral program in public policy at Virginia Commonwealth University and the editor of the Journal of Supreme Court History. He is the author of biographies of Justices Louis D. Brandeis and Felix Frankfurter. He and Paul Finkelman are coauthors of the two-volume A March of Liberty: American Constitutional and Legal Development (2002).
Sandra F. Vanburkleo is associate professor of history and adjunct professor of law at Wayne State University, Detroit. She is the author of “Belonging to the World”: Women's Rights and American Constitutional Culture (2001) and, with Kermit Hall and Robert Kaczorowski, editor of Constitutionalism and American Culture: Writing the New Constitutional History (2001). She is completing a study of the emergence of “modern” conceptions of citizenship in the Pacific Northwest between 1879 and 1912.
James F. Van Orden graduated from Franklin & Marshall College in 2001 and has a master's degree in environmental management from the Nicholas School of the Environment and Earth Sciences at Duke University. He is currently a law student at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill.
Christopher Waldrep is Jamie and Phyllis Pasker Professor of History at San Francisco State University. He is the author, most recently, of The Many Faces of Judge Lynch: Extralegal Violence and Punishment in America (2002).
Peter Wallenstein has taught history at Sarah Lawrence College, the University of Toronto, the University of Maryland (on U.S. military bases in Japan, Korea, and Guam), and Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University. His books include From Slave South to New South: Public Policy in Nineteenth-Century Georgia (1987) and Blue Laws and Black Codes: Conflict, Courts, and Change in Twentieth-Century Virginia (2004).
Natalie Wexler is a writer and legal historian in Washington, D.C. From 1987 to 1994, she was an associate editor of The Documentary History of the Supreme Court of the United States, 1789–1800. She was also a contributing writer for Supreme Court Decisions and Women's Rights: Milestones to Equality(2001).
Jason E. Whitehead is a doctoral candidate at the University of Southern California, in the Department of Political Science. He [Page xix]holds a J.D. from Willamette University in Salem, Oregon, and he is a member of the Oregon bar. He has worked for the Antitrust Unit of the Oregon Department of Justice and has clerked for judges on both the U.S. District Court in Los Angeles and the Oregon Court of Appeals. He has published journal articles on critical legal theory, jurisprudence, criminal procedure, and antitrust law.
William M. Wiecek is Congdon Professor of Public Law and professor of history at Syracuse University. He is the author of The Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: Law and Ideology in America, 1886–1937 (1998).
David E. Wilkins (Lumbee) is professor of American Indian Studies at the University of Minnesota. His research interests include federal Indian policy and law, comparative indigenous peoples, tribal government, and tribal-state relations. He is the author of several books, including The United States Supreme Court and American Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Masking of Justice (1998), and his articles have appeared in journals of law, history, and ethnic studies.
Victoria Saker Woeste is senior research fellow at the American Bar Foundation in Chicago, where she specializes in twentieth-century U.S. legal history. Her book, The Farmer's Benevolent Trust: Law and Agricultural Cooperation in Industrial America, 1865–1945 (1998), is a study of public policy, economic regulation, and the jurisprudence of foodstuffs. She is currently finishing a book on anti-Semitism, the legal profession, and the Henry Ford libel lawsuits during the 1920s.
Michael Allan Wolf holds the Richard E. Nelson Chair in Local Government Law at the Levin College of Law, University of Florida. A lawyer and historian, his many publications include books and articles on legal and constitutional history and property, environmental, land-use, and urban redevelopment law.
Tinsley E. Yarbrough is Distinguished Research Professor of Political Science at East Carolina University. His books include The Rehnquist Court and the Constitution (2000) and biographies of Justices Hugo L. Black, John Marshall Harlan I, and John Marshall Harlan II and federal district judges Frank M. Johnson and J. Waties Waring.
Charles L. Zelden is an associate professor of history at Nova Southeastern University in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida, and the author of Voting Rights on Trial (2002) and the forthcoming A Free and Open Ballot: Smith v. Allwright and the Demise of the Texas All-White Primary.[Page xx]
In the 1981 movie about the U.S. Supreme Court, First Monday in October, screenwriters Jerome Lawrence and Robert E. Lee have the liberal justice, Daniel Snow, chide the newest member of the Supreme Court, the conservative Ruth Loomis, for failing to recognize that the cases that come before the nation's highest tribunal are not just about abstract questions of law. When she tells him that the Court “does not try men; we put their trials on trial,” he says that is the problem. Cases involve people—real people—but the Court never hears their voices. “We are constantly examining the witness who isn't there. All we ever get to see are lawyers. Cold records. Cold briefs. Where is the human being? Where is the pain?”
In the essays that follow, the reader will meet some of the men and women whose cases eventually made their way to the highest court in the land. They are real people, and in many instances their pain was also real. They are a mixed group, and, if there are few saints, there are plenty of sinners. They come from all walks of life and all parts of the country; some are rich and many are poor. They are white, black, brown, red, and yellow. A disproportionate number are women, minorities, and aliens, for whom the law provided the only means they had to redress injustices. They are, nevertheless, a cross section of this nation, and it is important to keep that in mind. The law they helped to make is the law for all of us, and, as such, it matters that the decisions arose from the legal problems and grievances of so varied a population.
Although the Constitution was drafted by a small group of white, predominantly well-to-do males, it is the organic law by which all of us live. In the 215 years since the thirteen original states ratified the Constitution (and, shortly thereafter, the Bill of Rights), the people have seen fit to amend it only twenty-seven times, almost always to reflect significant social changes. The Civil War amendments freed the slaves, promised them the equal protection of the law, and granted them suffrage. The Seventeenth Amendment gave the people, rather than state legislatures, the ability to choose their U.S. senators. Additional amendments gave women and young adults the right to vote. There was the noble experiment of Prohibition and its repeal, as well as some technical amendments dealing with elections and presidential succession.
Real change, however, has come, not from the amendments, but through the decisions of the Supreme Court, from men—and more recently women—who are not elected by the people and who enjoy life tenure in office. It is the duty of the justices to interpret the words of the Constitution and give them meaning in the real world of constant change. The Commerce Clause, for example, has been explicated to give Congress the power to regulate railroads and motor carriers, radio and television, and even to require restaurants and hotels to serve people of all races. The justices have taken the noble expressions of the First Amendment to ensure religious liberty for marginal and often despised religious groups and to protect political protesters, even those who burn the American flag.
But the Court, although it can choose which cases to decide from the thousands presented to it each year, cannot originate cases. The justices make up the Court's docket from cases already decided in the lower federal and state courts and then filed on appeal. To take one famous example, even though a majority of the Court appeared ready to reverse the separate-but-equal doctrine, which justified racial segregation, the justices could not do so on their own. They needed Linda Brown and her father to challenge the racially segregated schools in Topeka, Kansas, and for the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People to bring that case up on appeal, to reach the decision in Brown v. Board of Education (1954).
Although the expression “I'll take it all the way up to the Supreme Court” is a cliché in our popular lexicon, in fact, getting a case to the Court is extremely difficult. Except for a few rare types of cases, a suit is originally decided in either a federal district court or in a state court, and the losing party, if tenacious enough, files an appeal. Although the first level of review is often a matter of right—that is, nearly every losing party can get his or her case reviewed in the lowest appellate court—after that, review in higher appellate courts is a matter of judicial discretion. If the judges on an appellate court believe the decision has been rightly decided, they may choose not to grant review. The higher the level of appellate court, the more the judges allocate their time to cases that present new or important questions of law.
Thousands of petitions for certiorari are filed with the clerk of the Supreme Court each year, but the justices accept for review (“grant cert”) less than a hundred on which they will receive full briefing and hear oral argument. The Court must take certain cases in which the Constitution assigns it original jurisdiction, such as suits between states, and in these cases, the Supreme Court is the trial court. The Court will also normally [Page xxii]take cases when a difference of interpretation exists between two circuits—the intermediate-level federal courts of review—so that the same interpretation of law applies throughout the country. And in certain instances, when Congress knows that a law it has passed raises important constitutional questions, it may direct the Court to take it directly on appeal from the trial court, as it did in the McCain-Feingold Campaign Finance Reform Act of 2002. Beyond that, what the Court hears is completely a matter of discretion, and the Court exercises its discretion not only to determine law, but also to make the law acceptable.
Alexander Hamilton, in Federalist No. 78, called the judiciary “the least dangerous” branch of government, because it had neither the power of the purse (as does Congress) or the sword (as does the executive). In a nation governed by laws, not people, the Court's ultimate power depends on its moral capital, which it husbands carefully. Although the Court is not “political” in a partisan sense, it is political in that the judiciary is one of the three branches of government, and governing is political. Mr. Dooley, the character created by Peter Finley Dunne, that great satirist of a century ago, declared that the courts follow the election returns. Mr. Dooley might have exaggerated a bit, but the justices are certainly sensitive to public opinion. Changing views on racial persecution and the cold war clearly influenced the civil rights decisions of the Vinson and Warren Courts. The women's movement translated into the Burger Court's decisions that gave women equal rights before the law. Certainly the growing acceptance of gays and lesbians contributed to the Rehnquist Court's decision in Lawrence v. Texas (2003), which struck down state laws that prohibited sexual relations between consenting adults, even of the same sex.
To make these decisions, to keep the words of the Constitution relevant to the needs of contemporary society, the Court needs cases, and only litigants can make cases. The stories that follow are about one hundred of those litigants, but the list could easily have run to two hundred or five hundred, for each case and each litigant has a different story to tell. I chose these stories not in an attempt to be all-inclusive, but to provide a representative cross section. We have men and women, rich and poor, native-born and alien, and people of color. There is even one corporate litigant—Berea College. The essays also illustrate the wide range of issues the Supreme Court has handled—matters of interstate commerce, war and insurrections, protective labor legislation, civil rights, rights of the accused, freedom of speech and the press, the electoral process, and more. In addition, they span the entire range of the Court's history, from the 1790s to the present.
The stories matter because, if we forget about the people and circumstances involved in the cases, then the cases themselves become abstractions—important abstractions, perhaps, but abstractions nonetheless. Brown v. Board of Education is about a weighty idea—the equal protection of the law—but at its heart it is the story of a little girl who wanted to go to a decent school near her home. The Japanese relocation program remains a great blot on the nation's civil liberties record, one in which the Court concurred, but the cases are just words without knowing about the bravery of Gordon Hirabayashi. Clarence Earl Gideon may not be the type of person we would invite home for dinner, but without his tenacity, our nation's criminal procedure would not live up to the high standards set out in the Bill of Rights.
Some of the litigants you are about to meet are noble—one might even say they are heroes of American history. Myra Bradwell, Joseph Cinque, Elmer Gertz, Lillian Gobitas, and many of the others are good people, brave people, who risked a great deal to stand up for the principles of civil rights and liberties in which they believed. Others, like Gregory Lee Johnson, James McCulloh, Lambdin Milligan, and Ernesto Miranda, are remembered not for the vile deeds they committed but for the great principles of law their cases engendered. Some, like William Marbury and L. B. Sullivan, lost their cases, but, by pursuing their claims in the judicial system, they gave the Supreme Court an opportunity to decide significant questions of law.
Like the judiciary, teachers and students too often study the cases as abstract questions of law, but these are real cases about real people with real interests at stake. In my own classes in constitutional history, I try to tell stories about the people involved in the cases, for no other reason than to show my students that, no matter how great the particular case may be or what constitutional principle is articulated, there is also a human being involved. The articles in this book will, I hope, help teachers and students see the human faces involved.Acknowledgments
The idea for this book began in conversations with Christopher Anzalone, then an acquisitions editor at CQ Press. His successor, Douglas Goldenberg-Hart, was enormously helpful in seeing it through to completion. I also want to thank others at CQ Press for their assistance in turning the manuscript into the book you hold in your hands. Carolyn Goldinger did her usual excellent job of copyediting the writing of dozens of contributors. Talia Greenberg and Grace Hill took care of the photo research, and Daphne Levitas and Paul Pressau made sure that all of our efforts went through the production stage as painlessly as possible. To all of them I owe many thanks. Finally, I thank all of the contributors. I hope they had as much fun writing their essays as I did mine.
Constitution of the United States[Page 221]
We the People of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.Article I
Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.
Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.
No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.
[Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons.]1 The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one, Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.
When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.
The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.
Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, [chosen by the Legislature thereof,]2 for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.
Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; [and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the Recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.]3
No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.
The Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.
The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.
The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.
Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.
The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall [be on the first Monday in December],4 unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.[Page 222]
Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day, and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.
Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.
Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.
Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.
Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.
No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.
Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.
Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.
Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.
Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;
To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;
To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;
To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;
To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;
To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;
To establish Post Offices and post Roads;
To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;
To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;
To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;
To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;
To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;
To provide and maintain a Navy;
To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;
To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;
To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatso-ever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And
To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.[Page 223]
Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.
The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.
No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.
No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.5
No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.
No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another; nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear, or pay Duties in another.
No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.
No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.
Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing it's inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.
No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.Article II
Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows
Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.
[The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the list the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice President.]6
The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.
No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.
In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,7 the Same shall devolve on the Vice President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.
The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be encreased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.
Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—“I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of [Page 224]the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States.”
Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.
He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.
The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.
Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.
Section 4. The President, Vice President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.Article III
Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.
Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;8—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.8
In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.
Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort. No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.
The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.Article IV
Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.
Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.
A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.
[No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.]9
Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new State shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.
The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this [Page 225]Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.
Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.Article V
The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided [that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and]10 that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.Article VI
All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.Article VII
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.
Done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth. IN WITNESS whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,President and deputy from Virginia,
[The language of the original Constitution, not including the Amendments, was adopted by a convention of the states on September 17, 1787, and was subsequently ratified by the states on the following dates: Delaware, December 7, 1787; Pennsylvania, December 12, 1787; New Jersey, December 18, 1787; Georgia, January 2, 1788; Connecticut, January 9, 1788; Massachusetts, February 6, 1788; Maryland, April 28, 1788; South Carolina, May 23, 1788; New Hampshire, June 21, 1788.
Ratification was completed on June 21, 1788.
The Constitution subsequently was ratified by Virginia, June 25, 1788; New York, July 26, 1788; North Carolina, November 21, 1789; Rhode Island, May 29, 1790; and Vermont, January 10, 1791.]AmendmentsAmendment I
(First ten amendments ratified December 15, 1791.)
Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.Amendment II
A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.Amendment III
No Soldier shall, in time of peace be quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a manner to be prescribed by law.Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.Amendment V
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in actual service in time of War or public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.[Page 226]Amendment VI
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.Amendment VII
In Suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury, shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according to the rules of the common law.Amendment VIII
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.Amendment IX
The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people.Amendment X
The powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.Amendment XI (Ratified February 7, 1795)
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.Amendment XII (Ratified June 15, 1804)
The Electors shall meet in their respective states and vote by ballot for President and Vice-President, one of whom, at least, shall not be an inhabitant of the same state with themselves; they shall name in their ballots the person voted for as President, and in distinct ballots the person voted for as Vice-President, and they shall make distinct lists of all persons voted for as President, and of all persons voted for as Vice-President, and of the number of votes for each, which lists they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the seat of the government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate;—The President of the Senate shall, in the presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the certificates and the votes shall then be counted;—The person having the greatest number of votes for President, shall be the President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed; and if no person have such majority, then from the persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the President. But in choosing the President, the votes shall be taken by states, the representation from each state having one vote; a quorum for this purpose shall consist of a member or members from two-thirds of the states, and a majority of all the states shall be necessary to a choice. [And if the House of Representatives shall not choose a President whenever the right of choice shall devolve upon them, before the fourth day of March next following, then the Vice-President shall act as President, as in the case of the death or other constitutional disability of the President.—]11 The person having the greatest number of votes as Vice-President, shall be the Vice-President, if such number be a majority of the whole number of Electors appointed, and if no person have a majority, then from the two highest numbers on the list, the Senate shall choose the Vice-President; a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number of Senators, and a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice. But no person constitutionally ineligible to the office of President shall be eligible to that of Vice-President of the United States.Amendment XIII (Ratified December 6, 1865)
Section 1. Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction.
Section 2. Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XIV (Ratified July 9, 1868)
Section 1. All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.
Section 2. Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice President of the United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age,12 and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State.
Section 3. No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or elector of President and Vice President, or hold [Page 227]any office, civil or military, under the United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such disability.
Section 4. The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slave; but all such debts, obligations and claims shall be held illegal and void.
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article.Amendment XV (Ratified February 3, 1870)
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XVI (Ratified February 3, 1913)
The Congress shall have power to lay and collect taxes on incomes, from whatever source derived, without apportionment among the several States, and without regard to any census or enumeration.Amendment XVII (Ratified April 8, 1913)
The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, elected by the people thereof, for six years; and each Senator shall have one vote. The electors in each State shall have the qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State legislatures.
When vacancies happen in the representation of any State in the Senate, the executive authority of such State shall issue writs of election to fill such vacancies: Provided, That the legislature of any State may empower the executive thereof to make temporary appointments until the people fill the vacancies by election as the legislature may direct.
This amendment shall not be so construed as to affect the election or term of any Senator chosen before it becomes valid as part of the Constitution.[Amendment XVIII (Ratified January 16, 1919)
Section 1. After one year from the ratification of this article the manufacture, sale, or transportation of intoxicating liquors within, the importation thereof into, or the exportation thereof from the United States and all territory subject to the jurisdiction thereof for beverage purposes is hereby prohibited.
Section 2. The Congress and the several States shall have concurrent power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.]13Amendment XIX (Ratified August 18, 1920)
The right of citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of sex.
Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XX (Ratified January 23, 1933)
Section 1. The terms of the President and Vice President shall end at noon on the 20th day of January, and the terms of Senators and Representatives at noon on the 3d day of January, of the years in which such terms would have ended if this article had not been ratified; and the terms of their successors shall then begin.
Section 2. The Congress shall assemble at least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless they shall by law appoint a different day.
Section 3.14 If, at the time fixed for the beginning of the term of the President, the President elect shall have died, the Vice President elect shall become President. If a President shall not have been chosen before the time fixed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have qualified; and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualified, declaring who shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice President shall have qualified.
Section 4. The Congress may by law provide for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the House of Representatives may choose a President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them, and for the case of the death of any of the persons from whom the Senate may choose a Vice President whenever the right of choice shall have devolved upon them.
Section 5. Sections 1 and 2 shall take effect on the 15th day of October following the ratification of this article.
Section 6. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission.Amendment XXI (Ratified December 5, 1933)
Section 1. The eighteenth article of amendment to the Constitution of the United States is hereby repealed.[Page 228]
Section 2. The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby prohibited.
Section 3. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by conventions in the several States, as provided in the Constitution, within seven years from the date of the submission hereof to the States by the Congress.Amendment XXII (Ratified February 27, 1951)
Section 1. No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this Article shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this Article was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within which this Article becomes operative from holding the office of President or acting as President during the remainder of such term.
Section 2. This article shall be inoperative unless it shall have been ratified as an amendment to the Constitution by the legislatures of three-fourths of the several States within seven years from the date of its submission to the States by the Congress.Amendment XXIII (Ratified March 29, 1961)
Section 1. The District constituting the seat of Government of the United States shall appoint in such manner as the Congress may direct:
A number of electors of President and Vice President equal to the whole number of Senators and Representatives in Congress to which the District would be entitled if it were a State, but in no event more than the least populous State; they shall be in addition to those appointed by the States, but they shall be considered, for the purposes of the election of President and Vice President, to be electors appointed by a State; and they shall meet in the District and perform such duties as provided by the twelfth article of amendment.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XXIV (Ratified January 23, 1964)
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States to vote in any primary or other election for President or Vice President, for electors for President or Vice President, or for Senator or Representative in Congress, shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or any State by reason of failure to pay any poll tax or other tax.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XXV (Ratified February 10, 1967)
Section 1. In case of the removal of the President from office or of his death or resignation, the Vice President shall become President.
Section 2. Whenever there is a vacancy in the office of the Vice President, the President shall nominate a Vice President who shall take office upon confirmation by a majority vote of both Houses of Congress.
Section 3. Whenever the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that he is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, and until he transmits to them a written declaration to the contrary, such powers and duties shall be discharged by the Vice President as Acting President.
Section 4. Whenever the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall immediately assume the powers and duties of the office as Acting President.
Thereafter, when the President transmits to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives his written declaration that no inability exists, he shall resume the powers and duties of his office unless the Vice President and a majority of either the principal officers of the executive departments or of such other body as Congress may by law provide, transmit within four days to the President pro tempore of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives their written declaration that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office. Thereupon Congress shall decide the issue, assembling within forty-eight hours for that purpose if not in session. If the Congress, within twenty-one days after receipt of the latter written declaration, or, if Congress is not in session, within twenty-one days after Congress is required to assemble, determines by two-thirds vote of both Houses that the President is unable to discharge the powers and duties of his office, the Vice President shall continue to discharge the same as Acting President; otherwise, the President shall resume the powers and duties of his office.Amendment XXVI (Ratified July 1, 1971)
Section 1. The right of citizens of the United States, who are eighteen years of age or older, to vote shall not be denied or abridged by the United States or by any State on account of age.
Section 2. The Congress shall have power to enforce this article by appropriate legislation.Amendment XXVII (Ratified May 7, 1992)
No law varying the compensation for the services of the Senators and Representatives shall take effect, until an election of Representatives shall have intervened.[Page 229]source:The Constitution of the United States of America, as Amended. House Document No. 106–214. Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 2000.
1. The part in brackets was changed by section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment.
2. The part in brackets was changed by the first paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment.
3. The part in brackets was changed by the second paragraph of the Seventeenth Amendment.
4. The part in brackets was changed by section 2 of the Twentieth Amendment.
5. The Sixteenth Amendment gave Congress the power to tax incomes.
6. The material in brackets was superseded by the Twelfth Amendment.
7. This provision was affected by the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
8. These clauses were affected by the Eleventh Amendment.
9. This paragraph was superseded by the Thirteenth Amendment.
11. The part in brackets was superseded by section 3 of the Twentieth Amendment.
12. See the Nineteenth and Twenty-sixth Amendments.
13. This amendment was repealed by section 1 of the Twenty-first Amendment.
14. See the Twenty-fifth Amendment.
Thumbnail Sketch of the Supreme Court's History[Page 230][Page 231][Page 232]
Summaries of Litigants' Cases[Page 233]Affirmative ActionAllan Paul Bakke
Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 28, 1978. Powell announced the judgment of the Court; Stevens and Brennan filed separate opinions; Stevens was joined by Burger, Rehnquist, and Stewart; Brennan was joined by Marshall, White, and Blackmun.
A special state medical school admissions program under which a certain number of slots were set aside for minority group members, and white applicants were denied the opportunity to compete for them, violates Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act. Title VI forbids exclusion of anyone, because of race, from participation in a federally funded program.
Admissions programs that consider race as one of several factors involved in the decision to admit an applicant are not unconstitutional in and of themselves. “Government may take race into account when it acts not to demean or insult any racial group, but to remedy disadvantages cast on minorities by past racial prejudice, at least when appropriate findings have been made by judicial, legislative, or administrative bodies with competence to act in this area.”Paul E. Johnson
Johnson v. Transportation Agency of Santa Clara County, 480 U.S. 616, decided by a 6−3 vote, March 25, 1987. Brennan wrote the opinion; Rehnquist, Scalia, and White dissented.
The Court upheld an affirmative action plan adopted voluntarily by a county agency that resulted in the promotion of a woman over a man who had scored somewhat higher during the qualifying process. Affirmative action, carefully used, does not violate Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act or the Fourteenth Amendment.Capital PunishmentWillie Francis
Louisiana ex rel. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, decided by a 5−4 vote, January 13, 1947. Reed wrote the majority opinion; Burton, Douglas, Murphy, and Rutledge dissented.
Assuming without argument that the Eighth Amendment ban on cruel and unusual punishment applied to state as well as federal actions, the Court nevertheless held that this ban was not violated by the state's execution of a man whose first execution attempt failed because the electric chair did not work.William Furman
Furman v. Georgia, Jackson v. Georgia, Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 29, 1972. The Court's opinion was unsigned; each justice filed a separate opinion. Burger, Blackmun, Powell, and Rehnquist dissented.
The Court nullified all death penalty statutes in the United States. It held that the procedures the statutes provided for judges and juries to follow in deciding when and whether to impose a sentence of death upon a defendant left so much discretion to the judge and jury that the result was arbitrary, irrational, and deprived defendants of due process of law.Civil RightsFong Yue Ting
Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 U.S. 698, decided by a 6−3 vote, May 15, 1893. Gray wrote the Court's opinion; Brewer, Field, and Fuller dissented.
The Court ruled that a nation has an absolute right to expel any and all aliens. The power of international relations is in the hands of the federal government, not the states. The only government that foreign nations recognize is the federal government, not state governments. Therefore, aliens who do not become citizens are at the mercy of Congress, which may order them deported.Carrie Buck
Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, decided by an 8−1 vote, May 2, 1927. Holmes wrote the majority opinion; Butler dissented.
Virginia did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee when it sterilized, without her consent, a mentally defective mother.Mack Claude Screws
Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91, decided by a 5−4 vote, May 7, 1945. Douglas wrote the Court's opinion; Murphy dissented.
Sheriff Claude Screws and two of his deputies arrested Robert Hall, an African American, on the suspicion that he stole [Page 234]a tire. Hall was handcuffed and then beaten into unconsciousness. As a result of the injuries sustained he died soon after.
The federal government secured convictions that “under color of law” the sheriff and his deputies had deprived Hall of rights accorded by the Fourteenth Amendment. The circuit court of appeals affirmed the convictions. Although in disagreement regarding the constitutionality of the “color of law” charge, the Supreme Court reversed the convictions and ordered a new trial for the sheriff. Screws was acquitted at his second trial.Daisy Bates
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, decided by a unanimous vote, February 23, 1960. Stewart wrote the Court's opinion.
The Court held that a tax ordinance requiring any organization operating within the city to submit the names of all of its members to the city licensing office violated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment by infringing on the First Amendment right of free association, which was applied to the states by the Fourteenth Amendment.Robert Mack Bell
Bell v. Maryland, 378 U.S. 226, decided by a 6−3 vote, June 22, 1964. Brennan wrote the opinion; Black, Harlan II, and B. White dissented.
Prior to the Civil Rights Act of 1964, restaurants were considered private and, in the absence of any state law commanding desegregation, retained the right to grant or refuse service to anyone they chose. A protester sitting in at a lunch counter or in a restaurant therefore violated the owner's property rights and could be prosecuted for trespass or disturbing the peace.
The case arose from the conviction of twelve sit-in demonstrators under Maryland's criminal trespass law. After their trial, the state enacted a public accommodations law forbidding restaurants and similar facilities from refusing service because of race, so that the offense for which they had been convicted was no longer a crime in Maryland. The Supreme Court simply vacated the lower court ruling and remanded the case for further consideration in light of the new state law. For the first time, however, members of the Court addressed the substantive issues in the sit-in cases.Cecil Roy Price
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, decided by a unanimous vote, March 28, 1966. Fortas wrote the Court's opinion; he was joined by Black.
Following the murder of three civil rights workers in Meridian, Mississippi, in 1964, a unanimous Court, citing sections of the 1866 and 1870 Civil Rights Acts that provided penalties and fines for conspiracy and deprivation of civil rights under “color of law,” validated the federal indictments of Price and other state officials who, while acting in their capacity as officers of the state, played a central role in the local Ku Klux Klan's conspiracy to murder the three rights workers.Demetrio Rodriguez
San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, decided by a 5−4 vote, March 21, 1973. Powell wrote the majority opinion; Marshall, Douglas, Brennan, and White dissented.
The right to an education is not a fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution. Wealth is not a suspect way of classifying persons. Therefore, the equal protection guarantee does not require that courts give the strictest scrutiny to state decisions to finance public schools from local property taxes, a decision resulting in wide disparities among districts in the amount spent per pupil.
States do not deny anyone the opportunity for an education by adopting this means of financing public education. Financing public schools from local property taxes rationally furthers a legitimate state purpose and so is upheld.Joshua DeShaney
DeShaney v. Winnebago County Department of Social Services, 489 U.S. 189, decided by a 6−3 vote, February 22, 1989. Rehnquist wrote the opinion; Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
A county social services agency that failed to protect a child from severe beatings by his father did not violate the child's rights under the Due Process Clause. The Due Process Clause imposes no duty on the state to provide members of the general public with adequate protective services.Commerce PowerWilliam Bingham
Bingham v. Cabbot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 19 (1795)
Bingham v. Cabot, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 382 (1798)
These cases grew out of Bingham's role in America's privateering activities during the American Revolution. In 1779, while Bingham was the American agent in Martinique, a privateer ship captured a Danish brig and brought it to Martinique as a prize. The governor of Martinique ruled that the ship and its cargo was not a legitimate prize because it was sailing under the Danish flag, and Denmark was not at war with America or France. Therefore, the governor turned the ship's perishable cargo over to Bingham to be sold in Martinique. Bingham used the proceeds to pay the Danish ship's captain his freight and damages, and he temporarily placed the remainder of the proceeds into the coffers of the Commercial Committee of Congress. Once the European owner of the vessel was “made clear and manifest,” Congress could reimburse the appropriate parties.
The owners of the privateer ship, the Cabot family, were dissatisfied with the confiscation of their prize, and in 1779 they brought suit to reclaim their losses. The county court decided in favor of Bingham, and the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts rejected the Cabots’ appeal in 1784.
In 1793, the Cabots again appealed. The United States Circuit Court reversed the two lower court decisions and ordered [Page 235]Bingham to pay $30,000 in damages to the Cabots. Bingham appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing that the Circuit Court did not have jurisdiction over cases involving prizes. Moreover, the circuit court judge did not allow Bingham to introduce important documentary evidence. The Supreme Court overturned the Circuit Court verdict, claiming in their opinions that the documents should have been allowed as evidence. In 1798, the Cabots again brought suit, and this time they won $27,000 in damages by default. Bingham again appealed to the Supreme Court, and the case was thrown out on a technicality.Robert Fulton
Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, decided without dissent, March 2, 1824. Marshall wrote the Court's opinion.
In its first definition of Congress's power over interstate commerce, the Court ruled that Congress could regulate all commerce affecting more than one state. The Court defined commerce as intercourse, including navigation and other modes of transportation, as well as commercial transactions. The Court also declared that the congressional authority to regulate commerce is superior to state power to regulate the same commerce.
This decision laid the foundation for the modern interpretation of the power that gives Congress virtually exclusive control over all business, even that which only indirectly affects interstate commerce.Peg-Leg Williams
Williams v. Fears, 179 U.S. 270, December 10, 1900. Fuller wrote the Court's opinion; Harlan dissented.
The Court upheld a statute that imposed a prohibitive license fee on interstate labor recruiters known as “emigrant agents.” Williams's arrest and conviction in Georgia for acting as an emigrant agent and the Court's subsequent ruling upholding the conviction led to a crackdown on emigrant agents throughout the South. The result was that poor African Americans in rural areas found it more difficult to migrate to places with enhanced economic opportunities, while local white landowners were guaranteed a continued source of cheap labor.Dietrich Loewe
Loewe v. Lawler (Danbury Hatters Case), 208 U.S. 274, decided by a unanimous vote, February 3, 1908. Fuller wrote the opinion.
A union attempting to organize workers in a factory in one state by boycotting stores elsewhere that sell its products (secondary boycotts) is a combination in restraint of trade and in violation of the federal antitrust law.
This decision led to adoption of provisions in the Clayton Antitrust Act of 1914 exempting labor unions from suits brought under the antitrust laws. After this decision, Loewe won a large monetary recovery at trial, and that judgment was unanimously upheld in Lawler v. Loewe, 235 U.S. 522 (1915).Drew Caminetti and Maury Diggs
Caminetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470, decided by a 5−3 vote, January 15, 1917. Day wrote the Court's opinion; McReynolds did not participate; Clark, McKenna, and E. White dissented.
The Court ruled that Congress had the power under the Commerce Clause to keep the channels of interstate commerce free from “immoral” usage. The Court also ruled that the Mann Act, although passed to prohibit prostitution in interstate commerce, also covered any “immoral” or “indecent” acts in interstate commerce.Porter L. Brown
Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, decided by a unanimous vote, January 4, 1943. Stone wrote the Court's opinion.
Brown, a raisin farmer, challenged the state of California's ability to regulate agricultural commodity markets as enforced by the California Prorate Act. The Court unanimously upheld the constitutionality of the California prorate law, dismissing the notion that proration erected an illegal combination among private persons. The court did not find any interference with interstate commerce because the regulation applied to intrastate transactions that took place before the raisins were shipped in interstate commerce. The Court upheld proration because it presented no conflict with federal agricultural policy and served a valid public policy purpose at the state level.Curt Flood
Flood v. Kuhn, 407 U.S. 258, decided by a 5−3 vote, June 19, 1972. Blackmun wrote the opinion; Powell did not participate; Douglas, Brennan and Marshall dissented.
Professional baseball remains exempt from federal antitrust laws, an exception in which Congress has acquiesced, and therefore the reserve clause, which allows a monopoly over the services of an individual player, is allowed to stand.CopyrightHenry Wheaton
Wheaton v. Peters, 33 U.S. 591, decided by a 4−2 vote, March 18, 1834. McLean wrote the Court's opinion; Johnson did not participate; Thompson and Baldwin dissented.
In the early nineteenth century the Court reporter operated as a semi-independent contractor and was free to sell copies of the Court's opinions at a profit. To increase his income, Richard Peters planned to sell a condensed version of all Supreme Court reports, including those done by his predecessors.
Former Court reporters William Cranch and Henry Wheaton objected to this proposed publication as violating their copyright interests and filed a suit to prevent Peters from publishing their reports. The Court was divided on any common law or statutory rights that Wheaton might have had and could not muster a clear majority on any of the issues. The Court remanded the case to [Page 236]the circuit court for a trial on what claims Wheaton might have against Peters, and eventually their estates settled out of court.
The case's importance for American law, however, was the conclusion that the opinions of justices, and by extension other documents written by public officials acting in their official capacity, were forever in the public domain and immune from copyright.Due ProcessLeo Frank
Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, decided by a 7−2 vote, April 12, 1915. Pitney wrote the majority opinion; Holmes and Hughes dissented.
The Court upheld a state conviction for murder although the trial court atmosphere was dominated by anti-Semitism and hostility. The majority reasoned that review of the conviction by Georgia's highest state court guaranteed the defendant due process.Leo Nebbia
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, decided by a 5−4 vote, March 5, 1934. Roberts wrote the majority opinion; McReynolds, Butler, Van Devanter, and Sutherland dissented.
The Court abandoned its “public interest” rationale for determining which areas of business were properly subject to state regulation—a line of cases begun in Munn v. Illinois (1877).
In this case the Court upheld a New York law that set an acceptable range of prices to be charged for milk. States could regulate almost any business in the interest of the public good, so long as the regulation was reasonable and effected through appropriate means, the Court said.Establishment of ReligionSteven Engel and Lawrence Roth
Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, decided by a 6−1 vote, June 25, 1962. Black wrote the majority opinion; Stewart dissented; Frankfurter and White did not participate.
Public school officials may not require pupils to recite a state-composed prayer at the beginning of each school day, even though the prayer is denominationally neutral and pupils who so desire may be excused from reciting it.
Official state-sanctioned prayers, the Court held, are unconstitutional attempts by government to establish religion.Ishmael Jaffree
Wallace v. Jaffree 472 U.S. 38, decided by a 6−3 vote, June 4, 1985. Stevens wrote the opinion; Burger, Rehnquist, and White dissented.
Moment-of-silence laws intended to restore prayer to the nation's public schools are unconstitutional. The Court struck down an Alabama law that permitted a moment of silence for prayer or meditation at the beginning of each school day. The history of the law made clear that it was intended as an endorsement of religion, to encourage students to pray. Such state endorsement of religion is a violation of the First Amendment's establishment clause.FederalismMartin Luther
Luther v. Borden, 48 U.S. 1, decided by a 5−1 vote, January 3, 1849. Taney delivered the Court's opinion; Woodbury dissented; Catron, McKinley, and Daniel did not participate.
The guaranty clause of the Constitution—stating that the United States will guarantee to each state a republican form of government—is enforceable only through the political branches, not the judiciary.
The Court refused to resolve a dispute between two competing political groups, each of which asserted it was the lawful government of Rhode Island. This dispute was a “political question,” held the Court, that it would leave to Congress.Sherman Booth
Ableman v. Booth, 62 U.S. 506, decided by a unanimous Court, March 7, 1859. Taney wrote the Court's opinion.
State courts lack the power to issue writs of habeas corpus ordering federal courts or federal officers to release a prisoner whose detention they cannot justify.
The Court overturned state court action using the writ to order federal officials to release a man convicted in federal courts of violating the Federal Fugitive Slave Act.Free Exercise of ReligionGeorge Reynolds
Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, decided by a unanimous vote, May 5, 1879. Waite wrote the Court's opinion.
This case was the first in which the Supreme Court seriously considered, interpreted, and applied the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Here, the Court made a crucial distinction between a right of belief and of practice. The Court held that the government could not prohibit religious belief, but could prohibit religious practice; in this case, polygamy.Douglas Clyde Macintosh
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, decided by a 5−4 vote, May 25, 1931. Sutherland wrote the Court's opinion; Bran-deis, Holmes, Hughes and Stone dissented.
The Court ruled that Congress had an interest in requiring aliens to take an oath pledging to take up arms in defense of the United States because it had the responsibility for raising armies in wartime. Regardless of how pure an alien's convictions may be, he or she cannot become a citizen without affirming the willingness to go to war.[Page 237]Lillian Gobitas
Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, decided by an 8−1 vote, June 3, 1940. Frankfurter wrote the majority opinion; Stone dissented.
In this first “flag-salute” case, the Court sustained a state law requiring all school children to pledge allegiance to the U.S. flag. The requirement had been challenged by Jehovah's Witnesses, for whom the pledge conflicted with their religious beliefs. They argued that the compulsory pledge violated their First Amendment freedom of religion.
Religious liberty must give way to political authority so long as that authority is not used directly to promote or restrict religion, the Court said. The “mere possession of religious convictions … does not relieve the citizen from the discharge of political responsibilities.”
In 1943 the Court reversed this decision with its ruling in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette.Daniel Seeger
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, decided by a unanimous vote, March 8, 1965. Clark wrote the Court's opinion.
The conscientious objector exemption in the United States Universal Military and Training and Service Act exempted from combatant service in the armed forces anyone who opposed participation in war as part of his “religious training and belief.” Religious belief was defined as belief in relation to a Supreme Being, and the statute specifically said that a person could not be exempted for political, social, or philosophical views that did not constitute religion. Seeger claimed that he had a religious faith apart from mere philosophical views, but did not relate that faith to a Supreme Being. As a result, he was not exempted under the act. In his suit he claimed that the statute violated the First Amendment by refusing to exempt nonreligious objectors and by discriminating between different types of religion in violation of the Fifth Amendment.
The Court held that the statute did not err in requiring religious belief as a requisite for exemption, but further held that the government could not distinguish between religions that ascribed to a Supreme Being and those that did not. Seeger thus qualified for an exemption.Jonas Yoder
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, decided by a unanimous vote, May 15, 1972. Burger wrote the Court's opinion; Powell and Rehnquist did not participate.
The Court held that the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution protected the religious rights of the Amish to withdraw their children from school.
Yoder led to demands from other religions, primarily fundamentalist Protestants, for the right to remove children from public school because of perceived challenges to specific religious beliefs.Al Smith
Employment Division, Department of Human Resources of Oregon v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, decided by 6−3 and 5−4 votes, April 17, 1990. Scalia wrote the opinion; Blackmun, Brennan, and Marshall dissented; O'Connor dissented in part of the opinion.
States may outlaw the sacramental use of the drug peyote without violating the First Amendment guarantee of free exercise of religion. In so deciding, a five-justice majority said no constitutional violation occurs when a criminal law is applied generally to all people and it has only the incidental effect of infringing on religious exercise. The Court declined to invoke a test used in earlier cases that required a state to prove it had a “compelling interest” in enforcing a statute that infringed on religious freedom. Justice O'Connor sought to keep the stricter constitutional standard.
In 1993 Congress passed the Religious Freedom Restoration Act to counteract the effects of this decision and to reinstate the “compelling interest” test in cases involving free exercise of religion.Ernesto Pichardo
Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. and Ernesto Pichardo v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, decided by a unanimous vote, June 11, 1993. Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion.
In 1987 a Santeria church announced that it planned to open a branch in Hialeah, Florida. Because adherents of the Santeria religion perform animal sacrifice as an offering to spirits, Hialeah residents expressed their strong opposition to the Santeria coming into their town. The city council adopted an ordinance incorporating Florida's animal cruelty laws, which, among other things, subjected to criminal punishment any person who unnecessarily or cruelly killed any animal. At the council's request, the attorney general of Florida issued an opinion expressing the view that religious animal sacrifice was not a “necessary” killing and was therefore prohibited by state law. The Santeria sued, claiming that the city had violated the church's rights under the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. After losing in the district and circuit courts, the church appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
Although the justices could not agree on a single rationale, the Court ruled that the city had discriminated against a particular religion, thereby violating a fundamental principle of the free exercise clause.Freedom of the PressThomas M. Patterson
Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U.S. 454, decided by a 7−2 vote, April 15, 1907. Holmes wrote the Court's opinion; Harlan I and Brewer dissented.
Thomas Patterson was a Democratic U.S. senator from Colorado and a newspaper publisher. He ran a series of editorials, [Page 238]stories, and cartoons in his papers ridiculing the Republican-dominated Colorado Supreme Court. The state's attorney general successfully brought contempt proceedings against Patterson on behalf of the court.
In his appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Patterson claimed that the state supreme court had violated his federal and state constitutional right to free speech by precluding him from demonstrating the truth of his accusations.
The Court upheld the conviction, relying primarily on the view that truth or falsity had nothing to do with criminal libel; “the provocation, and not the falsity, is the thing to be punished criminally.” The Court did not break new ground; it merely reiterated that states had the power to punish so-called “bad tendencies” in speech. Because this did not violate any federal rules, the Court dismissed the case.Jay Near
Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 1, 1931. Hughes wrote the majority opinion; Butler, Van Devanter, McReynolds, and Sutherland dissented.
A state law that bars continued publication of a newspaper that prints malicious or defamatory articles is a prior restraint of the press in violation of the First Amendment.
This decision marked the first time the Court specifically enforced the First Amendment's guarantee of freedom of the press to strike down a state law because it infringed too far on that freedom.L. B. Sullivan
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, decided by a unanimous vote, March 9, 1964. Brennan wrote the opinion.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of the press protects the press from libel suits for defamatory reports on public officials unless the officials prove that the reports were made with actual malice. Actual malice is defined as “with knowledge that it [the defamatory statement] was false or with reckless disregard of whether it was false or not”
Until this decision, libelous statements were not protected by the First Amendment.James Hill
Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, decided by a 5−4 vote, January 9, 1967. Brennan wrote the Court's opinion; Clark, Fortas, Harlan II, and Warren dissented.
In 1952, three escaped convicts held the Hill family hostage in their home for nineteen hours. The Hills were released unharmed. They later moved away and discouraged further publicity efforts about the incident. A novel about a hostage incident that involved considerable violence appeared later and was subsequently made into a play. Life magazine's account of the play described the play as a reenactment of the Hill incident and illustrated the article with photographs of scenes staged in the former Hill home. The family sued for damages. The Hills prevailed at the trial court level, but subsequent appeals reversed or limited some of the damage awards.
The Supreme Court's opinion built on the New York Times v. Sullivan decision (1964). It ruled that although the hostage situation and a Broadway play are not the stuff of politics that stood at the heart of Sullivan, “the line between the informing and the entertaining is too elusive for the protection” of freedom of the press. Hill and subsequent cases increasingly freed the press from fear of libel for reporting on people or events that could be considered newsworthy. The press could not escape liability for reckless negligence regarding the truth, but simple errors of fact by themselves could not be the basis for a libel suit.Elmer Gertz
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 25, 1974. Powell wrote the Court's opinion; Brennan, Burger, Douglas, and White dissented.
Elmer Gertz, a Chicago lawyer, sued American Opinion, the official magazine of the John Birch Society, for defamation. The jury awarded him damages, but the federal district judge overruled the jury, asserting that under the standard in New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), Gertz would have to prove “actual malice” on the part of the publisher, rather than mere falsity. New York Times applied to public figures, and, although the district court conceded that Gertz was not a public figure, it asserted that the issues were of public interest, and the New York Times standard should apply.
The Supreme Court reversed, and remanded the case for a new trial. The Court held that because Gertz was a private person, he only had to prove the publication was false and that there was “fault” on the part of the publisher.Pat Tornillo
Miami Herald v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241, decided by a unanimous vote, June 25, 1974. Burger wrote the Court's opinion.
This case asked whether a state law guaranteeing political candidates equal space in newspapers to rebut editorial criticisms violated the First Amendment guarantee of a free press. Florida's “right of reply” statute provided that a political candidate whose character or official record is attacked by any newspaper had the right to demand that the newspaper print, free of cost to the candidate, any reply he or she wished to make to the charges.
The Miami Herald criticized Pat Tornillo when he was a candidate for the state legislature. Tornillo tried to rebut these attacks, but the paper refused to print his responses. He then sought to use the statute to force the paper to give him equal space to counter a negative editorial. A Florida district court refused to do so on the grounds that the statute was unconstitutional. The Florida Supreme Court reversed the lower court's judgment, holding that the statute furthered the First Amendment's policy of ensuring a free flow of information to the public, and the Herald appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.[Page 239]
The Court held that the Florida statute violated the Herald's First Amendment rights and that the government could not direct the editorial policies of newspapers.Larry Flynt
Hustler Magazine, Inc. v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, decided by a unanimous vote, February 24, 1988. Rehnquist wrote the Court's opinion; Kennedy did not participate.
Asserting intentional infliction of emotional distress, invasion of privacy and defamation, Falwell brought action against Hustler magazine and its publishers for running a parody of an advertisement that lampooned him.
The Court agreed to consider the “First Amendment limitations upon a State's authority to protect its citizens from … intentional infliction of emotional distress.” Concluding that a state's interest in such protection was insufficient to deny Hustler its First Amendment rights, the Court formulated a new standard. The Court found that “only when [the public figure] can prove both that the statement was false and that the statement was made with the requisite level of culpability” may the public figure recover on an intentional infliction of emotional distress claim.
Analyzing the claim in this light, the Court reasoned that Hustler's parody lacked these requirements. The public could not have considered the parody believable. As such, the parody did not make a false statement, and Falwell was unable to recover against the publisher for intentional infliction of emotional distress.Freedom of SpeechEugene Debs
In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, decided by a 9−0 vote, May 27, 1895. Brewer wrote the Court's opinion.
Eugene V. Debs and other leaders of the 1894 Pullman strike challenged their contempt convictions for violating a federal court injunction that was intended to break the strike. A lower court upheld the validity of the injunction under the Sherman Antitrust Act.
The Supreme Court affirmed the validity of the injunction—and Debs's conviction—but on the broader grounds of national sovereignty, which the Court said gave the federal government authority to remove obstructions to interstate commerce and transportation of the mails.
Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211, decided by a unanimous vote, March 10, 1919. Holmes wrote the Court's opinion.
The federal government arrested and charged Eugene V. Debs, head of the American Socialist Party and a fervent pacifist, with violating the Sedition Act and urging resistance to the war. After his conviction, Debs appealed to the Supreme Court, which unanimously upheld the verdict. To many civil libertarians Debs was a horrifying example of how elastic the clear and present danger test could be.Emma Goldman
Goldman v. United States, 245 U.S. 474, decided by a unanimous vote, January 14, 1918. White wrote the Court's opinion.
After the U.S. entered World War I, Emma Goldman and Alexander Berkman were arrested for engaging in a conspiracy to induce evasion of the draft registration, a violation of the Selective Draft Law. They were convicted in federal district court. The Supreme Court granted a writ of error, which meant that it would hear their case.
The Court decided in favor of the government, citing its decision one week before in the Selective Draft Law Cases (1918), in which the Court upheld the constitutionality of the 1917 act. The Court also rejected the argument that a conviction for a conspiracy to cause an illegal act could not be prosecuted, even if the defendants engaged in overt acts to further the conspiracy, unless the conspirators actually caused the illegal act. The Court also found lacking the assertion that there was not enough evidence of guilt to send the case to the jury. The convictions of Goldman and Berkman were therefore affirmed.Jacob Abrams
Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, decided by a 7−2 vote, November 10, 1919. Clarke wrote the Court's opinion; Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
The defendants in this case had distributed pamphlets in Yiddish and English criticizing the Wilson administration for sending U.S. troops to Russia in the summer of 1918. The government argued that these acts were a violation of the sedition act, although it failed to prove the leaflets actually hindered the war with Germany. The trial court judge found that they might have caused revolts and strikes and thereby diminished the number of troops available to fight the Germans. The defendants appealed their convictions. The Supreme Court agreed that the government had provided sufficient proof to support this charge and that the conviction could be sustained under the clear and present danger test.Benjamin Gitlow
Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, decided by a 7−2 vote, June 8, 1925. Sanford wrote the majority opinion; Holmes and Brandeis dissented.
The First Amendment prohibition against government abridgment of the freedom of speech applies to the states as well as to the federal government. The freedoms of speech and press “are among the fundamental personal rights and ‘liberties’ protected by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment from impairment by the states,” the Court asserted, even though it rejected Gitlow's free speech claim. This ruling was the first of a long line of rulings holding that the Fourteenth Amendment extended the guarantees of the Bill of Rights to state, as well as federal, action.[Page 240]Charlotte Anita Whitney
Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, decided by a unanimous vote, May 26, 1927. Sanford wrote the opinion.
The Court upheld a state law that made it a crime to organize and participate in a group that advocated the overthrow by force of the established political system. The law was challenged as a violation of the First Amendment freedoms of speech and assembly.Harry Bridges
Bridges v. California, 314 U.S. 252, decided by a 5−4 vote, December 8, 1941. Black wrote the Court's opinion; Frankfurter, Stone, Roberts, and Byrnes dissented.
Bridges v. California, consolidated with Times-Mirror Co. v. Superior Court of California, brought together labor leader Harry Bridges and the Los Angeles Times. California state courts had found both in contempt, the newspaper for its editorial urging a judge, while sentence was pending, to send two convicted members of a labor “goon squad” to prison, and Bridges for sending a telegram threatening a longshoremen's strike if a state court enforced what he labeled an “outrageous” decision in a labor dispute. The two cases presented a direct confrontation between First Amendment rights of free speech and press and Sixth Amendment protection of a fair trial.
The Court for the first time reversed a state court finding of fact in a case of contempt by publication and extended First Amendment freedom of the press to published comments regarding pending court decisions.
Justice Black's opinion applied the traditional speech test of clear and present danger and ruled that the “substantive evil” must have a “degree of imminence extremely high” before courts could punish allegedly contemptuous speech or writings. States would have to show that comments posed a real threat to a fair trial, and neither the Times editorial nor the Bridges telegram met that test.
Bridges v. Wixon, 326 U.S. 135, decided by a 5−3 vote, June 18, 1945. Douglas wrote the Court's opinion; Jackson did not participate; Stone, Roberts, and Frankfurter dissented.
Harry Bridges was a permanent alien in the United States. A leader of the longshoreman's union, he was also allegedly affiliated with the Communist Party. The government had been trying to deport Bridges for several years, but had been unable to provide sufficient evidence to do so. Under a new statute, however, aliens could be deported if they were affiliated with communists. Bridges appealed, claiming that the law violated his First Amendment rights, and the Court was asked to determine to what extent aliens have free speech rights.
The Court held that Bridges was not “affiliated” with the Communist Party and that Bridges’ relationship with the Communist Party was only for the purposes of handling the union's activities. Most important, the Court ruled that permanent alien residents have the same First Amendment's right of free speech that citizens do and cannot be deported for espousing unpopular views.
Bridges v. United States, 346 U.S. 209, June 15, 1953. Burton wrote the Court's opinion; Clark and Jackson did not participate; Reed, Minton, and Vinson dissented.
In 1949 a federal grand jury was impaneled to determine if Bridges and his witnesses had perjured themselves during his citizenship hearing by denying that he was a communist. All of the defendants were found guilty and Bridges was sentenced to five years in prison and his citizenship was revoked. The Supreme Court reversed his conviction.Walter Chaplinsky
Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, decided by a unanimous vote, March 9, 1942. Murphy wrote the opinion.
A state does not violate the First Amendment by enacting a precisely drawn and narrowly applied law making it a crime to use, in public, “fighting words”—words so insulting as to provoke violence from the person to whom they are directed. Fighting words, the lewd and obscene, profanity, and libelous statements are among the classes of speech that have so little value in advancing thought or ideas that they fall outside the protection of the First Amendment guarantees of freedom of speech and press.Eugene Dennis
Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, decided by a 6−2 vote, June 4, 1951. Vinson wrote the majority opinion; Black and Douglas dissented; Clark did not participate.
Convictions under the Smith Act of 1940 for speaking and teaching about communist theory advocating forcible overthrow of the government do not abridge First Amendment rights.Susan Epperson
Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, decided by a unanimous vote, November 17, 1968. Fortas wrote the Court's opinion.
An Arkansas biology teacher, Susan Epperson, sought a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of a statute that forbade teachers in state schools from teaching Darwin's theory of evolution. The Court struck down the Arkansas statute as a violation of the Establishment Clause.Mary Beth Tinker
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, 393 U.S. 503, decided by a 7−2 vote, February 24, 1969. Fortas wrote the majority opinion; Harlan and Black dissented. Students have the right to engage in peaceful nondisruptive protest, the Court said, recognizing that the First Amendment guarantee of freedom of speech protects symbolic as well as oral speech.
The wearing of black armbands to protest the Vietnam War is “closely akin” to the “pure speech” protected by the First Amendment, the majority said, and therefore a public school ban on this form of protest, which did not disrupt the school's [Page 241]work or offend the rights of others, violated these students’ rights.Gregory Lee Johnson
Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 21, 1989. Brennan wrote the opinion; Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and Stevens dissented.
The First Amendment guarantee of freedom of expression precludes a state from punishing someone for desecrating the American flag in the course of a peaceful political demonstration.Hugh Hefner
United States v. Playboy Entertainment Group, Inc., 529 U.S. 803, decided May 22, 2000. Kennedy wrote the Court's opinion; Rehnquist, O'Connor, Scalia, and Breyer dissented.
The Court struck down on First Amendment grounds a federal law requiring cable channels primarily devoted to sexually explicit programming either to fully scramble their programs or to limit the material to late night and early morning hours.
The ruling invalidated a provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 ostensibly aimed at preventing children from inadvertently being exposed to so-called “signal bleed” from cable sex channels. To eliminate the signal bleed problem, Congress required cable channels devoted to “sexually explicit adult programming” to completely scramble their programs—a costly technical procedure—or to limit programs to times when there were not substantial numbers of children in the audience. Playboy Entertainment—which operated some of the most popular sex channels, challenged the provision as an infringement of freedom of speech. The Court agreed that the law was unconstitutional.Gay RightsMichael Hardwick
Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 30, 1986. White wrote the opinion; Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
The Constitution's guarantees of personal liberty and privacy do not protect private consensual homosexual conduct between consenting adults. The Court upheld Georgia's law against sodomy, which banned oral and anal sex.James Dale
Boy Scouts of America v. Dale, 530 U.S. 640, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 28, 2000. Rehnquist wrote the opinion; Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer dissented
A New Jersey antidiscrimination statute cannot override a Boy Scouts of America policy barring homosexuals as troop leaders. The group's policy was sustained under the freedom of association the Court previously recognized under the First Amendment. James Dale, an Eagle Scout, became an adult scoutmaster and later became a leader of a campus gay rights group at Rutgers University. When the local scout troop revoked his adult membership, he sued and won a ruling in New Jersey courts that his exclusion violated the state's civil rights law.Habeas CorpusClement L. Vallindingham
Ex parte Vallandingham, 68 U.S. 243, decided by a unanimous vote, February 15, 1864. Wayne wrote the Court's opinion; Miller did not participate.
In 1863 military authorities in Ohio arrested and tried Vallandigham for his public tirades against the Civil War. The court found him guilty and sentenced him to be confined in a military prison. President Lincoln commuted his sentence to exile, and he was sent to the Confederacy.
Before his exile to the Confederacy, Vallandigham petitioned the Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. The Court granted the writ, but concluded that it had no jurisdiction to review the proceedings of a military tribunal. Moreover, the Court noted that it did not have original jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of Vallandigham, and it was denied.
The Court in 1864 was not inclined to challenge presidential authority on the matter of suppressing Vallandigham and other pro-Confederate agitators. After the war the Court did in fact vacate the military prosecution of a civilian in Ex parte Milligan (1866), but that case reached the Court on appeal from a lower federal court.Lambdin P. Milligan
Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2, decided by 9−0 and 5−4 votes, April 3, 1866. Full opinions in the case were not announced until December 17, 1866. Davis wrote the majority opinion; Chase, Miller, Swayne, and Wayne dissented in part.
The president lacks the power to authorize military tribunals to try civilians in areas where civil courts are still functioning.
Five justices said that even Congress and the president acting together lacked this power.Native Americans and Treaty RightsSamuel Worcester
Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515, decided by a 5−1 vote, March 3, 1832. Marshall wrote the Court's opinion; Baldwin dissented; Johnson did not participate.
Federal jurisdiction over Indian affairs is exclusive, leaving no room for state authority. States lack any power to pass laws affecting Indians living in Indian territory within their borders. The Court reversed the conviction, under Georgia law, of two missionaries who had failed to comply with a state law requiring the licensing of all white persons living in Indian territory.[Page 242]Elias C. Boudinot
Cherokee Tobacco Case, 78 U.S. 616, decided by a 4−2 vote, May 1, 1871. Swayne wrote the Court's opinion; Chase, Nelson, and Field did not participate; Bradley and Davis dissented.
The Internal Revenue Act of 1868 imposed a tax on “distilled spirits, fermented liquors, tobacco, snuff and cigars, [to] be construed to extend to such articles produced anywhere within the exterior boundaries of the United States, whether the same shall be within a collection district or not.” At issue in this case was whether the statute applied to such goods on Indian lands. The District Court for the Western District of Arkansas concluded that the tax applied to goods in the Cherokee Nation territory.
The Cherokee owners of the tobacco, Elias C. Boudinot and Stand Wattie, appealed the district court decision. They contended that an 1866 treaty between the U.S. and the Cherokee Nation protected all products produced within the territory from present and future taxes imposed by the U.S. They further argued that the Cherokee Nation was not included within a collection district and that this lack of availability indicated Congress's intent not to tax the Cherokee Nation under the 1868 Internal Revenue Act.
The Court concluded that the Cherokee Nation territory was included within the U.S. and therefore the tax was applicable to the territory.Lone Wolf
Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, decided by a unanimous vote, January 5, 1903. White wrote the Court's opinion.
Lone Wolf sought to block congressional ratification of an agreement allotting tribal lands to non-Indians on the grounds that this transfer violated the 1867 Treaty of Medicine Lodge.
The Court rejected the argument and denied that the agreement violated the property rights of tribal members or deprived them of due process of law. The Court recognized an almost absolute congressional power over Indian affairs that was virtually exempt from judicial oversight. This power allowed the U.S. to unilaterally abrogate provisions of treaties made with Indians nations, subject only to the requirement that actions of the U.S. toward its “wards” be “guided by perfect good faith.”Powers of the PresidentDavid Neagle
In re Neagle, 135 U.S. 1, decided by a 6−2 vote, April 14, 1890. Miller wrote the Court's opinion; Field did not participate; Fuller and Lamar dissented.
David Neagle was a deputy U.S. marshal assigned to protect Supreme Court justice Stephen Field, who had received a death threat. Neagle, in defending the justice, shot and killed a man who attacked Field. Neagle was arrested for murder, but a federal court released him on a writ of habeas corpus on the grounds that he was performing his duty. The authority under which Neagle had acted, however, was not a statute, but an executive order of President Benjamin Harrison. The question before the Supreme Court was whether, under these circumstances, a federal court had the power to step into what appeared to be a state case.
The Supreme Court ruled that a deputy U.S. marshal cannot be sued in a state court when acting according to his federal duties. The Court thus strengthened the doctrine of federal supremacy over the states. Federal courts could intervene in what appeared to be solely state matters if a federal constitutional issue was involved.Richard M. Nixon
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, decided by an 8−0 vote, July 24, 1974. Burger wrote the opinion; Rehnquist did not participate.
Neither the separation of powers nor the need to preserve the confidentiality of presidential communications alone can justify an absolute executive privilege of immunity from judicial demands for evidence to be used in a criminal trial.
The Court held that President Richard Nixon must comply with a subpoena for tapes of certain White House conversations, sought for use as evidence against White House aides charged with obstruction of justice in regard to the investigation of the break-in at the Democratic National Headquarters in the Watergate Office Building in June 1972.A. Ernest Fitzgerald
Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 24, 1982. Powell wrote the opinion; White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun dissented.
Presidents are absolutely immune from civil damages suits for all official actions taken while in office. The electoral process and the impeachment mechanism provide sufficient remedy for presidential wrongdoing.Paula Jones
Clinton v. Jones, 520 U.S. 681, decided by a 9−0 vote, May 27, 1997. Stevens wrote the opinion; Breyer concurred.
A president is not immune from being sued and forced to stand trial for alleged private wrongdoing. In Nixon v. Fitzgerald (1982) the court ruled that a president is forever shielded from being sued over “official acts,” but the justices refused to extend that shield of immunity to the president's private life. In 1994 President Bill Clinton was sued for sexual harassment by Paula Corbin Jones, a former Arkansas state employee. He claimed a “temporary immunity” from being sued while serving as president. After the Court allowed Jones’ lawsuit to proceed, her lawyers learned of Monica Lewinsky, a former White House intern. When asked about her during a deposition in the Jones case, Clinton gave misleading answers, which led the House of Representatives to impeach him. He was acquitted by the Senate.[Page 243]PrivacyEstelle Griswold
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, decided by a 7−2 vote, June 7, 1965. Douglas wrote the majority opinion; Stewart and Black dissented.
A state unconstitutionally interferes with personal privacy when it prohibits anyone, including married couples, from using contraceptives. There is a right of personal privacy implicit in the Constitution, although there is disagreement on its exact source.Norma McCorvey
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, decided by 7−2 votes, January 22, 1973. Blackmun wrote the majority opinions; Rehnquist and White dissented.
The right to privacy, grounded in the Fourteenth Amendment's due process guarantee of personal liberty, encompasses and protects a woman's decision whether or not to bear a child. This right is impermissibly abridged by state laws that make abortion a crime.
During the first trimester of pregnancy, the decision to have an abortion should be left entirely to a woman and her physician. The state can forbid abortions by nonphysicians. During the second trimester, the state may regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably related to maternal health. And during the third trimester, the state may, if it wishes, forbid all abortions except those necessary to save the mother's life.Morton Halperin
Kissinger v. Halperin, 452 U.S. 713, decided by a 4−4 vote, June 22, 1981. No opinion. Rehnquist did not participate in the consideration of this case.
The court without opinion left standing the ruling of a lower court that former President Richard Nixon, former Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger and former Attorney General John N. Mitchell were liable to a damage suit brought by an individual whose home they had illegally wiretapped.Nancy Cruzan
Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department of Health, 497 U.S. 261, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 25, 1990. Rehnquist wrote the opinion; Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens dissented.
States may stop the family of a comatose patient from disconnecting life support systems unless the family shows clear and convincing evidence of the patient's previously expressed wish to die under such circumstances. Because the choice between life and death is a personal decision of overwhelming finality, the Court said, a state may require clear and convincing evidence of that personal choice.
The Court said for the first time that an individual has a constitutionally protected right to decline lifesaving food and water. All of the justices except Scalia agreed that the due process guarantee protects an interest in life as well as an interest in refusing life-sustaining treatment.
Jane E. Hodgson
Hodgson v. Minnesota, Minnesota v. Hodgson, 497 U.S. 417, decided by separate 5−4 votes, June 25, 1990. Stevens wrote the opinion striking down a statute that required a teenage girl to notify both biological parents of her decision to have an abortion; Scalia, Kennedy, Rehnquist and White dissented. A separate majority found the statute ultimately constitutional because it provided the alternative of a judicial hearing for girls who did not want to tell their parents. Brennan, Blackmun, Marshall, and Stevens dissented.
States may compel an unmarried woman under age eighteen to tell both parents before obtaining an abortion as long as states provide a judicial hearing on her decision as an alternative to parental notice. The Minnesota statute said no abortion could be performed on a minor until at least forty-eight hours after both biological parents had been notified. Part of the statute said that if the law was ever suspended by a court, it would automatically be amended to allow a judicial hearing as an alternative to a young woman's telling both parents. The so-called judicial bypass is intended to allow a teenager to show either that she is mature enough and well-informed enough to make the abortion decision herself or that the abortion would be in her best interest.
The Court said a required notification of both parents, without exception, does not further legitimate state interests and noted that Minnesota made no exception for a divorced parent, parent without custody, or a biological parent who never married or lived with the pregnant woman's mother.Timothy Quill
Vacco v. Quill, 521 U.S. 793, and Washington v. Glucksberg, 571 U.S. 702, decided by 9−0 votes, June 26, 1997. Rehnquist wrote the opinions; Stevens, O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer concurred.
States may enforce their traditional laws against assisted suicide. The rulings rejected “right to die” claims brought by doctors and terminally ill patients in Washington and New York. In the case from Washington, the Court said this claimed right to die with the assistance of a doctor was not a liberty or privacy right recognized in the Fourteenth Amendment. The New York case held that it was not a denial of equal protection of the laws to deny this right to terminally ill patients, but persons sustained by life-supporting medical equipment can choose to “pull the plug” and end their lives.Property RightsMyra Clark Gaines
Patterson v. Gaines 47 U.S. 550 (January term, 1848)
Gaines v. Relf and Chew 53 U.S. 472 (December term, 1852)[Page 244]
Gaines v. Hennen 65 U.S. 553 (December term, 1860).
Gaines fought to establish herself as the legal heir of her father, Daniel Clark. Clark's will left his considerable fortune to his mother. Gaines believed that Clark had written a later will that designated her as his legitimate daughter and legal heir.
The lawsuit that began in 1834 ultimately challenged Clark's estate on two accounts. Louisiana law prevented a father from disinheriting a legitimate child—the law held that a legitimate child must receive at least 4/5 of the estate. In addition, Gaines claimed that the 1811 will was invalid because of the later will. Unfortunately for her case, that 1813 will had disappeared. Myra claimed that the executors of the 1811 will had destroyed the second will since it removed the estate from their jurisdiction.
Gaines’ case was ultimately heard by the Supreme Court seventeen times. Three rulings are particularly important. In 1848 the Court announced that Gaines was the legal heir of Clark. In 1852 the Court essentially reversed itself and declared that no evidence of a legal marriage between Clark and Gaines’ mother existed; therefore, Gaines could not be Clark's heir. In 1860, just before the outbreak of the Civil War, the Court decided that Gaines was Clark's heir. The Court confirmed that decision after the war, in 1867. The final ruling in the Gaines case came in 1891, six years after her death. Gaines never received any great sums from her case, and her heirs split a total of about $100,000.John Marshall
Fairfax's Devisee v. Hunter's Lessee, 11 U.S. 603, decided by a 3−1 vote, March 15, 1813. Story wrote the Court's opinion; Marshall, Washington, and Todd did not participate; Johnson dissented.
This case grew out of litigation surrounding the vast estates of Lord Fairfax, a Virginia loyalist who fled to England during the American Revolution. Fairfax died in 1781, bequeathing the property to his nephew, a British subject who had never lived in Virginia. In 1782 a Virginia act voided the original land grant to Lord Fairfax, and thus the transfer of the property to his nephew, contending that aliens could not inherit real property in the state. The main issue for the Supreme Court was whether the Treaty of Paris and Jay's Treaty of 1794 overrode the Virginia laws and confirmed title in the lands to Fairfax's nephew.
In 1810 Virginia's highest court ruled that the Fairfax land had been properly confiscated by Virginia during the war and that the treaties could not overrule Virginia law. This ruling was a direct confrontation with the Supremacy Clause of the Constitution and was appealed to the Supreme Court under Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789.
The Court, acting under Section 25, reversed this decision and remanded the case to the Virginia courts to settle the matter in accordance with its ruling. The Court based its decision entirely on the Supremacy Clause, which obligated the states to respect federal treaties.
In 1815 Virginia's highest court denied the authority of the Supreme Court to review state cases and in effect declared Section 25 of the Judiciary Act to be unconstitutional. This issue would return to the Court as Martin v. Hunter's Lessee.
Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 304, decided without dissent, March 20, 1816. Story wrote the Court's opinion; Marshall did not participate.
The Court upheld as constitutional Section 25 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, which gave the Supreme Court the power to review the rejection, by state courts, of federally based challenges to a state law or state action.Racial DiscriminationJoseph Cinque
United States v. Libellants and Claimants of the Schooner Amistad, 40 U.S. 518, decided by a 7−1 vote, March 9, 1841. Story wrote the Court's opinion.
Although Amistad had no direct impact on the development of American slave law, it served as a powerful example of the horrors of slavery. It also revealed the extent of proslavery complicity on the part of the national government. As such, it helped educate many northerners about the evils of slavery and the threat it posed to the legitimate administration of U.S. justice.
The case began in Cuba in 1839, when Pedro Montez and Jose Ruiz purchased fifty-three native-born Africans who had been taken to Cuba in violation of Spanish law. On the third or fourth night at sea, the Africans revolted, took over the ship and killed the captain, a mulatto cook, and two sailors. After about two months at sea, the ship ended up in Long Island Sound.
A lieutenant of the U.S. Coast Guard towed the Amistad to Connecticut, where he entered a claim for salvage with the U.S. district court. Meanwhile, a U.S. District Attorney filed a claim to the ship on behalf of the federal government so the Africans could be sent home. At the same time, he asked that the adult slaves be held for prosecution for murder.
In September 1839 a circuit court ruled that the U.S. courts had no jurisdiction over whatever crime may have occurred on the high seas. This ruling ended the attempt to prosecute the Amistads for murder. The case next went to the U.S. district court in Connecticut, which ruled that because there was no slavery in Connecticut, the U.S. could not claim salvage rights on the Africans, but only on the ship and its other cargo.
In January 1840 a U.S district court ordered the federal government to return the Amistads to Africa. Instead, the U.S. government brought an appeal to the Supreme Court.
The government argued that the Amistads should be returned to their Spanish owners, under the treaties of 1795 and 1821. The Court disagreed and concluded that “these negroes are not slaves” but had been “kidnapped” and were “entitled to their freedom.”[Page 245]Dred Scott
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, decided by a 7−2 vote, March 6, 1857. Each justice submitted a separate opinion. Taney's is considered the formal opinion of the Court; McLean and Curtis dissented.
In what many think the most ill-considered decision in Supreme Court history, the majority declared unconstitutional the already repealed Missouri Compromise of 1820. Congress, the Court declared, did not have the authority to prohibit slavery in the territories. The majority also held that blacks were not and could not become citizens of the United States and therefore were not entitled to its privileges and immunities. This part of the decision was overturned by ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment.Yick Wo
Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, decided by a unanimous vote, May 10, 1886. Matthews wrote the Court's opinion.
The Fourteenth Amendment protects persons, not just citizens. Holding that a city's arbitrary enforcement of a fire hazard ordinance had discriminated against Chinese laundry owners in violation of the amendment's equal protection clause, the Court said that guarantee applied “to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality.”Homer Plessy
Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537, decided by a 7−1 vote, May 18, 1896. Brown wrote the Court's opinion; Harlan dissented; Brewer did not participate.
A state law requiring trains to provide separate but equal facilities for black and white passengers does not infringe upon federal authority to regulate interstate commerce nor is it in violation of the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendments. The train was local; a legal distinction between the two races did not destroy the legal equality of the two races guaranteed by the Thirteenth Amendment, and the Fourteenth Amendment protected only political, not social, equality, the majority said.
In dissent, Harlan declared that the “Constitution is colorblind, and neither knows nor tolerates classes among citizens.” The “separate but equal” doctrine remained in effect until Brown v. Board of Education (1954).Berea College
Berea College v. Kentucky, 211 U.S. 45, decided by a 7−2 vote, November 9, 1908. Brewer wrote the Court's opinion; Harlan I dissented.
In 1904 the Kentucky state legislature passed a law forbidding any person or corporation to operate a desegregated school. Relying on Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), the trustees of Berea College, a private school in Kentucky, argued that the legislation interfered with their constitutionally protected right to pursue a lawful occupation.
The same Court that had decided Lochner would not accept this argument. It ruled that Berea College, “as a corporation created by this state, has no natural right to teach at all. Its right to teach is such as the state sees fit to give to it. The state may withhold it altogether, or qualify it.”William Warley
Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, decided by a 9−0 vote, November 5, 1917. Day wrote the opinion.
City ordinances that segregate neighborhoods by restricting some blocks to white residents only and other blocks to black residents only violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of due process.
This decision led to the growth of private restrictive covenants under which neighbors would agree to sell or rent their homes only to persons of the same race. The Court upheld such private covenants in Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).Clarence Norris
Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, decided by a 7−2 vote, November 7, 1932. Sutherland wrote the majority opinion; Butler and McReynolds dissented.
Under the particular circumstances of this, the “First Scottsboro Case,” in which a number of young black men charged with raping two white women were tried in a hostile community atmosphere, the failure of the trial court to provide the defendants the effective aid of an attorney for their defense constituted a denial of due process.
Norris v. Alabama, 294 U.S. 587, decided by an 8−0 vote, April 1, 1935. Hughes wrote the opinion; McReynolds did not participate.
In the “Second Scottsboro Case,” the Court set aside the conviction of the black defendant because blacks had been consistently barred from service on both the grand jury and trial jury in this case.Gordon Hirabayashi
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, decided by a unanimous vote, June 21, 1943. Stone wrote the Court's opinion.
The Court upheld the wartime curfew law placed on Japanese-Americans living on the West Coast as an appropriate exercise by the president and Congress of the federal war powers.
The curfew law, by making a classification based solely on race, did not violate the Fifth Amendment. In this instance, consideration of race was relevant to the national security.Ada Lois Sipuel Fisher
Sipuel v. Oklahoma State Board of Regents, 332 U.S. 631, decided by a unanimous vote, January 12, 1948. Per curiam opinion.[Page 246]
Ada Lois Sipuel, a black woman, applied to the University of Oklahoma Law School, but state law prohibited the university from accepting African Americans.
Sipuel was denied relief in the state court, and that decision was affirmed by the state supreme court. The National Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP) appealed to the Supreme Court.
The Court ordered Oklahoma to provide Sipuel with a legal education “in conformity with the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.” It sent the case back to the Oklahoma Supreme Court, which had to order the university to admit Sipuel to the existing all-white law school, open a separate one for her, or close the existing law school until such time as there would be one for blacks.
The state board of regents angrily created a law school overnight, roping off a small section of the state capitol in Oklahoma City. Three teachers were assigned to provide instruction to Sipuel and “others similarly situated.”
When the NAACP sought another review by the Supreme Court, a majority of the justices refused to consider whether the state had in fact established an equal facility. The NAACP could not claim any real victory in the Sipuel case, mainly because the Court refused to consider the central issue of whether separate education could be truly equal under the Constitution. Sipuel continued to fight her case, however, and eventually graduated from the University of Oklahoma Law School, where she later became a trustee.Linda Brown
Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, decided by a unanimous vote, May 17, 1954. Warren wrote the opinion.
Separate public schools for black and white students are inherently unequal, and their existence violates the equal protection guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment.
In the companion case of Bolling v. Sharpe (347 U.S. 497), the Court ruled that the congressionally mandated segregated public school system in the District of Columbia violated the Fifth Amendment's due process guarantee of personal liberty.
In Brown the Court specifically overruled the “separate but equal” doctrine first enunciated in Plessy v. Ferguson (1896) so far as it applied to public schools. The ruling also led to the abolition of state-sponsored segregation in other public facilities.The Lovings
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, decided by a unanimous vote, June 12, 1967. Warren wrote the opinion.
A state law punishing persons who enter into interracial marriages violates both the equal protection and due process clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. “Under our Constitution, the freedom to marry or not marry a person of another race resides with the individual and cannot be infringed by the state,” the Court declared.
This decision was the first in which the Court explicitly held classifications by race “inherently suspect” and justifiable only by compelling reasons.Darius and Vera Swann
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, decided by a unanimous vote, April 20, 1971. Burger wrote the opinion.
Busing, racial balance ratios, and gerrymandered school districts are all permissible interim methods of eliminating the vestiges of state-imposed segregation from southern schools.
There were limits to the remedies that might be used to eliminate the remnants of segregation, the Court said, but no fixed guidelines setting such limits could be established. The Court acknowledged that there might be valid objections to busing when so much time or distance is involved as to risk the children's health or to impinge significantly on the education process.Rights of the AccusedClarence Earl Gideon
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, decided by a unanimous vote, March 18, 1963. Black delivered the Court's opinion.
The due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment extends to state as well as federal defendants the Sixth Amendment guarantee that all persons charged with serious crimes will be provided the aid of an attorney. Betts v. Brady (1942) is overruled. States are required to appoint counsel for defendants who cannot afford to pay their own attorneys’ fees.Ernesto Miranda
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 13, 1966. Warren wrote the Court's opinion; Clark, Harlan II, Stewart, and White dissented.
The due process guarantee requires that suspects in police custody be informed of their right to remain silent, that anything they say may be used against them, and that they have the right to counsel—before any interrogation can permissibly take place.Separation of PowersWilliam Marbury
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, decided without dissent, February 24, 1803. Marshall wrote the Court's opinion; Cushing did not participate.
Congress may not expand or contract the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction. Therefore, Congress exceeded its power when, in Section 13 of the Judiciary Act of 1789, it authorized the Supreme Court to issue writs of mandamus in original cases ordering federal officials to perform particular acts. Although William Marbury had a right to receive his commission as a justice of the peace—already signed and sealed, but not delivered—the Court lacked the power, under its original jurisdiction, to order its delivery.[Page 247]
The immediate effect of the decision was to absolve the Jefferson administration of the duty to install several of President Adams's last-minute appointments in such posts.
The more lasting significance was the establishment of the Court's power of judicial review, the power to review Acts of Congress and declare invalid those it found in conflict with the Constitution.James William McCulloch
M'Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, decided without dissent, March 6, 1819. Marshall wrote the Court's opinion.
In a broad definition of the Constitution's grant to Congress of the power to enact all laws that are “necessary and proper” to execute the responsibilities given the legislative branch by the Constitution, the Court ruled that Congress had the authority to charter a national bank in the exercise of its fiscal and monetary powers.
The necessary and proper clause empowered Congress to adopt any appropriate and legitimate means for achieving a legislative goal; it was not confined to using only those means that were indispensable to reaching the desired end.
The Court also held that the national bank was immune to state taxation. Observing that the “power to tax involves the power to destroy,” the Court began to develop the doctrine that one government may not tax certain holdings of another government.Adam Clayton Powell Jr.
Powell v. McCormack, 395 U.S. 486, decided by a 7−1 vote, June 16, 1969. Warren wrote the opinion; Stewart dissented.
The House of Representatives lacks authority to exclude a duly elected representative who meets the constitutional qualifications of age, residence, and citizenship. The House acted unconstitutionally when it voted to exclude Rep. Adam Clayton Powell, D-N.Y., for misconduct and misuse of public funds.
The Court did not deny the interest of Congress in maintaining its own integrity, but said such interest could be maintained by the use of each chamber's power to punish and expel its members.
The Court rejected the argument that the case presented a “political question,” holding that a determination of Powell's right to his seat required only the interpretation of the Constitution, the traditional function of the Court.Jagdish Chadha
Immigration and Naturalization Service v. Chadha, United States House of Representatives v. Chadha, United States Senate v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, decided by a 7−2 vote, June 23, 1983. Burger wrote the opinion; White and Rehnquist dissented.
The one-house legislative veto, under which Congress claimed the power to review and veto executive branch decisions implementing laws, is unconstitutional. It violates the separation of powers between executive and legislative branches, and it runs counter to the “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered procedure” the Constitution prescribes for the enactment of legislation: approval by both chambers and signature of the president.
With this decision, invalidating a device included in one form or another in more than two hundred laws enacted since 1932, the Court struck down at one time more provisions in more federal laws than it had invalidated in its entire history.Sex DiscriminationMyra Bradwell
Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, decided by an 8−1 vote, April 15, 1873. Miller wrote the majority opinion; Chase dissented.
A state does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of the privileges and immunities of U.S. citizenship when it refuses on the grounds of gender to license a woman to practice law in its courts. The right to practice law is not a privilege or immunity of U.S. citizenship.Sally Reed
Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, decided by a 7−0 vote, November 22, 1971. Burger wrote the opinion.
The Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection invalidates a state law that automatically prefers a father over a mother as executor of a son's estate. “To give a mandatory preference to members of either sex over members of the other … is to make the very kind of arbitrary legislative choice forbidden by the equal protection clause,” the Court said in its first opinion declaring a state law unconstitutional on the grounds that it discriminated against women.Sharron Frontiero
Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, decided by a 8−1 vote, May 14, 1973. Brennan wrote the Court's opinion; Rehnquist dissented.
Sharon Frontiero, a lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force, challenged a federal statute that provided an extra housing allowance and extra medical benefits to all married men in the armed forces, but denied the benefits to married women unless they could prove they provided more than half of the family income. Frontiero's lawyers argued that sex, like race, should be considered a suspect class, which would require the government to have a compelling interest to adopt discriminatory legislation.
The Court accepted this argument, asserting “that classifications based upon sex, like classifications based upon race, alienage, or national origin, are inherently suspect, and must therefore be subjected to strict judicial scrutiny.” The Court argued that because sex was an immutable characteristic, any discrimination based on sex was suspect. Under this analysis, it easily found the federal statute unconstitutional.[Page 248]Jo Carol LaFleur
Cleveland Board of Education v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632, decided by a 7−2 vote, January 21, 1974. Stewart wrote the Court's opinion; Burger and Rehnquist dissented.
This case was consolidated with Cohen v. Chesterfield County School Board. Jo Carol LaFleur and Susan Cohen were public school teachers. They became pregnant during the 1970–1971 school year and were compelled to take mandatory maternity leave under the policies of their respective school districts. Each woman challenged the policies under 42 U.S.C. Section 1983, which protects civil rights and in part prohibits discrimination based on gender. The school districts required maternity leave beginning at a certain fixed time before expected childbirth.
The Court held that both statutes violated due process in that they provided arbitrary cut-off times when the teacher was presumed incapable of continuing work. As the Court noted, “The rules contain an irrebuttable presumption of physical incompentency, and that presumption applies even when the individual woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary.”Kim Rawlinson
Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, decided by votes of 8−1 and 7−2, June 27, 1977. Stewart wrote the opinion; White, Brennan, and Marshall dissented in part.
State law setting minimum height and weight requirements for prison guards that disqualify more than 40 percent of the women in the state but fewer than 1 percent of the men constitutes sex discrimination in violation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act because the requirements are not shown to be sufficiently related to qualities necessary for the job. White dissented. State regulation that effectively excludes women from jobs as guards at all-male maximum security positions is justified in light of the vulnerability of a woman guard to assault by male inmates, and consequent risk of the loss of security in the prison. Brennan and Marshall dissented from the latter holding.Ann Hopkins
Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, decided by a 6−3 vote, May 1, 1989. Brennan wrote the opinion; Kennedy, Rehnquist, and Scalia dissented.
An employee who shows that an impermissible motive played a part in an adverse employment decision places the burden on the employer to show that the same decision would have been made in the absence of the unlawful motive. The burden of proof on the employer to avoid a finding of liability in such a case is preponderance of the evidence.Voting RightsVirginia Minor
Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, decided by a unanimous vote, March 29, 1875. Waite wrote the opinion.
The privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee women the right to vote. A state therefore does not violate that amendment's guarantee when it denies a woman the right to vote. “[T]he Constitution of the United States does not confer the right of suffrage on anyone,” the Court said.Lawrence A. Nixon
Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, decided by a unanimous vote, March 7, 1927. Holmes wrote the Court's opinion.
Once Reconstruction ended, the Democratic Party quickly gained control of southern politics and government. With the introduction of the primary election, any real contest took place in the Democratic primary because the winner would face only token opposition from the Republicans in the general election. Because victory in the Democratic primary meant election to office, every southern state passed laws designed to keep African Americans from voting in the primary. Dr. Lawrence Nixon, a black man from El Paso, challenged the Texas white primary law as a violation of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments.
The Court held that the Texas law violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73, decided by a 5−4 vote, May 2, 1932. Cardozo wrote the Court's opinion; Van Devanter, McReynolds, Sutherland, and Butler dissented.
In Nixon v. Herndon, the Court held that a Texas law barring blacks from voting in the primary violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Texas responded by shifting responsibility for the primary away from the state to the Democratic Party and allowing the party to set whatever qualifications it wanted for eligibility. The party's executive committee immediately limited participation to whites. When Dr. Lawrence Nixon was denied a ballot, he claimed that because the party was acting under state authority, its refusal to allow him a ballot violated the Fourteenth Amendment. Party officials responded that the Democratic Party was a private group, which could determine its own membership.
The Court found the Texas arrangement unconstitutional, saying that the state had by statute delegated to the party what it could not do itself. This narrow ruling left Texas the option—which it quickly exercised—of repealing all state statutes regarding primaries, a move that left the primary completely under the control of the party with no state involvement. This method of black disfranchisement continued in southern states until Smith v. Allwright (1944), when the Court ruled that a primary, no matter how sponsored or administered, was an integral part of the election process and therefore state action that was subject to constitutional provisions.Robinson Everett
Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 28, 1993. O'Connor wrote the opinion; White, Blackmun, Stevens, and Souter dissented.[Page 249]
White voters may challenge black-majority congressional districts that are “highly irregular” in shape and lack “sufficient justification.” While the race of voters may be a consideration in redistricting, the Court said, some districts could be so bizarrely drawn that they only can be understood as an effort to segregate voters by race and, therefore, violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws.
The Court said racial gerrymanders may exacerbate the racial bloc voting that “majority-minority” districts originally were intended to counteract. Governments may justify a minority district that is irregular in shape by showing it is narrowly tailored to serve a compelling government interest.
Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, decided by a 5−4 vote, June 13, 1996. Rehnquist wrote the opinion; Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Souter dissented.
A North Carolina majority-black congressional voting district is unconstitutional because race was the predominant factor in drawing the lines and the state lacked a compelling interest for the action. The Court rejected North Carolina's arguments that the majority black district was required under federal voting rights law to eliminate the lingering effects of discrimination.
Hunt v. Cromartie, 526 U.S. 541, decided by a unanimous vote, May 17, 1999. Thomas wrote the Court's opinion.
A federal court must hold a trial in a suit challenging a redistricting plan as a racial gerrymander when the state's motivation for the plan is in dispute.
The ruling—the Court's third in the dispute—sent back to a three-judge federal court a challenge to a North Carolina congressional redistricting plan adopted in 1997. The plan replaced a scheme that the Court threw out because one of the districts—the Twelfth—was improperly drawn to include a majority black population. The new Twelfth District was about 47 percent black and was more compact than the previous district. White voters nonetheless brought a challenge to the new plan. The three-judge court ruled the plan unconstitutional on a motion for summary judgment, before a full trial. The panel said the “uncontroverted material facts” showed that the Twelfth District was drawn on the basis of “racial identification” rather than for the political purpose of producing a majority Democratic district, as the state contended.
Unanimously, the Court said the lower court should have held a full trial because of the dispute over the motivation for the plan.
Hunt v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, decided by a 5−4 vote, April 18, 2001. Breyer wrote the Court's opinion; Thomas, Rehnquist, Scalia, and Kennedy dissented.
Plaintiffs challenging a redistricting plan on racial grounds must show that the legislature had other ways to achieve legitimate political objectives that would have resulted in significantly greater racial balance than the plan being attacked.
The ruling—the Court's fourth decision in a decade-long dispute—upheld a North Carolina congressional redistricting scheme that included a heavily African American district embracing parts of three widely separated cities in the center of the state. In two previous rulings, the Court in 1993 and 1996 had first allowed and then upheld white voters’ challenge to an earlier plan that gave the newly created twelfth congressional district an African American majority. A three-judge federal district court found the redrawn district still unconstitutional, but the Court in 1999 ordered the panel to conduct a full trial on the issue.
The lower court adhered to its finding that the district was improper because the legislature had used “facially race driven” considerations without any compelling justification.
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's ruling as “clearly erroneous” and upheld the redistricting plan.War PowersTomoyuki Yamashita
In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, decided by a 6−2 vote, February 4, 1946. Stone wrote the Court's opinion; Jackson did not participate; Murphy and Rutledge dissented.
Gen. Tomoyuki Yamashita was commanding general in the Imperial Japanese Army in charge of Japanese forces in the Philippines. In the last months of World War II, Yamashita was cut off from forces nominally under his command that went on a rampage of murder, looting, and rape in Manila. He was charged with war crimes, specifically for the command responsibility of the rampaging troops. At the military trial, Yamashita was found guilty and sentenced to death. He filed a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the commission had been unlawfully convened, that the charges had failed to specify any violation, and that the commission did not follow proper procedure.
The Court originally did not want to take the case, preferring to leave postwar justice in the hands of the military, but upset by the procedural irregularities, the Court heard arguments, and a majority voted to uphold the military. Because the U.S. was technically still at war with Japan (a peace treaty would not be signed until 1952), Chief Justice Stone ruled that the Articles of War allowed military commissions to operate without regard to the due process requirements of the Constitution.Ethel and Julius Rosenberg
Rosenberg v. United States, 346 U.S. 273, decided by a 6−3 vote, June 19, 1953. Vinson wrote the majority opinion; Frankfurter, Black, and Douglas dissented.
The Court, after meeting in special session, lifted a stay of execution for Julius and Ethel Rosenberg, convicted of violating the Espionage Act of 1917 and sentenced to death.
Justice Douglas had granted the stay so that lower courts might consider the argument of the Rosenbergs’ attorney that the espionage act had been repealed by subsequent passage of the Atomic Energy Act of 1946. The Rosenbergs were convicted of having conveyed atomic secrets to the Soviet Union. They were executed as soon as the Court lifted the stay.
The Justices[Page 250]Baldwin, Henry
Birth: January 14, 1780, New Haven, Connecticut.
Education: Hopkins Grammar School, 1793; Yale College, 1797, LL.D., 1830; attended the law lectures of Judge Tapping Reeve; clerked for Alexander James Dallas.
Official Positions: U.S. representative; chairman, Committee on Domestic Manufactures.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Andrew Jackson January 4, 1830, to replace Bushrod Washington, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 6, 1830, by a 41−2 vote; took judicial oath January 18, 1830; served until April 21, 1844; replaced by Robert C. Grier, nominated by President James K. Polk.
Family: married Marianna Norton, 1802; died 1803; one son; married Sally Ellicott, 1805.
Death: April 21, 1844, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.Barbour, Philip P.
Birth: May 25, 1783, Orange County, Virginia.
Education: read law on his own; attended one session at College of William and Mary, 1801.
Official Positions: member, Virginia House of Delegates from Orange County, 1812–1814; U.S. representative, 1814–1825, 1827–1830; Speaker of the House, 1821–1823; state judge, General Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, 1825–1827; president, Virginia Constitutional Convention, 1829–1830; U.S. district judge, Court of Eastern Virginia, 1830–1836.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Andrew Jackson February 28, 1835, to replace Gabriel Duvall, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate, March 15, 1836, by a 30−11 vote; took judicial oath May 12, 1836; served until February 25, 1841; replaced by Peter V. Daniel, nominated by President Martin Van Buren.
Family: married Frances Todd Johnson, 1804; seven children.
Death: February 25, 1841, Washington, D.C.Black, Hugo L.
Birth: February 27, 1886, Harlan, Alabama.
Education: Birmingham Medical School, 1903–1904; University of Alabama Law School, LL.B., 1906.
Official Positions: police court judge, Birmingham, 1910–1911; county solicitor, Jefferson County, Alabama, 1914–1917; U.S. senator, 1927–1937.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt August 12, 1937, to replace Willis Van Devanter, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate August 17, 1937, by a 63−16 vote; took judicial oath August 19, 1937; retired September 17, 1971; replaced by Lewis F. Powell Jr., nominated by President Richard Nixon.
Family: married Josephine Foster, February 1921; died 1951; two sons, one daughter; married Elizabeth Seay DeMerritte, September 11, 1957.
Death: September 25, 1971, Washington, D.C.Blackmun, Harry A.
Birth: November 12, 1908, Nashville, Illinois.
Education: Harvard College, B.A., summa cum laude, 1929; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1932.
Official Positions: clerk, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1932–1933; judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1959–1970.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Richard Nixon April 14, 1970, to replace Abe Fortas, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate May 12, 1970, by a 94−0 vote; took judicial oath June 9, 1970; retired August 3, 1994; replaced by Stephen G. Breyer, nominated by President Bill Clinton.
Family: married Dorothy E. Clark, June 21, 1941; three daughters.
Death: March 4, 1999, Arlington, Virginia.Blair, John, Jr.
Birth: 1732, Williamsburg, Virginia.
Education: graduated with honors from College of William and Mary, 1754; studied law at Middle Temple, London, 1755–1756.
Official Positions: member, Virginia House of Burgesses, 1766–1770; clerk, Virginia Governor's Council, 1770–1775; delegate, Virginia Constitutional Convention, 1776; member, Virginia Governor's Council, 1776; judge, Virginia General Court, 1777–1778; chief justice, 1779; judge, first Virginia Court of Appeals, 1780–1789; delegate, U.S. Constitutional Convention, 1787; judge, Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals, 1789.[Page 251]
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington September 24, 1789; confirmed by the Senate September 26, 1789, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 2, 1790; resigned January 27, 1796; replaced by Samuel Chase, nominated by President Washington.
Family: married Jean Blair, December 26, 1756; died 1792.
Death: August 31, 1800, Williamsburg, Virginia.Blatchford, Samuel
Birth: March 9, 1820, New York City.
Education: Columbia College, A.B., 1837.
Official Positions: judge, Southern District of New York, 1867–1872; judge, Second Circuit of New York, 1872–1882.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Chester Arthur March 13, 1882, to replace Ward Hunt, who had retired; confirmed by Senate March 27, 1882, by a voice vote; took judicial oath April 3, 1882; served until July 7, 1893; replaced by Edward D. White, nominated by President Grover Cleveland.
Family: married Caroline Appleton, December 17, 1844.
Death: July 7, 1893, Newport, Rhode Island.Bradley, Joseph P.
Birth: March 14, 1813, Berne, New York.
Education: Rutgers University, graduated 1836.
Official Positions: none.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ulysses S. Grant February 7, 1870, succeeding James Wayne, who died in 1867 and whose seat remained vacant by act of Congress until 1870; confirmed by the Senate March 21, 1870, by a 46−9 vote; took judicial oath March 23, 1870; served until January 22, 1892; replaced by George Shiras Jr., nominated by President Benjamin Harrison.
Family: married Mary Hornblower in 1844; seven children.
Death: January 22, 1892, Washington, D.C.Brandeis, Louis D.
Birth: November 13, 1856, Louisville, Kentucky.
Education: Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1877.
Official Positions: “people's attorney,” Public Franchise League and Massachusetts State Board of Trade, 1897–1911; counsel, New England Policyholders’ Protective Committee, 1905; special counsel, wage and hour cases in California, Illinois, Ohio, and Oregon, 1907–1914; counsel, Ballinger-Pinchot investigation, 1910; chairman, arbitration board, New York garment workers’ labor disputes, 1910–1916.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Woodrow Wilson January 28, 1916, to replace Joseph R. Lamar, who had died; confirmed by the Senate June 1, 1916, by a 47−22 vote; took judicial oath June 15, 1916; retired February 13, 1939; replaced by William O. Douglas, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Family: married Alice Goldmark, March 23, 1891; two daughters.
Death: October 5, 1941, Washington, D.C.Brennan, William J., Jr.
Birth: April 25, 1906, Newark, New Jersey.
Education: University of Pennsylvania, B.S., 1928; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1931.
Official Positions: judge, New Jersey Superior Court, 1949–1950; judge, appellate division, New Jersey Superior Court, 1950–1952; associate judge, New Jersey Supreme Court, 1952–1956.
Supreme Court Service: recess appointment as associate justice by President Dwight D. Eisenhower October 16, 1956, to replace Sherman Minton, who had resigned; nominated as associate justice by President Eisenhower January 14, 1957; confirmed by the Senate March 19, 1957 by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 16, 1956; retired July 20, 1990; replaced by David H. Souter, nominated by President George Bush.
Family: married Marjorie Leonard, May 5, 1928, died 1982; two sons, one daughter; married Mary Fowler, March 9, 1983.
Death: July 24, 1997, Arlington, Virginia.Brewer, David J.
Birth: June 20, 1837, Smyrna, Asia Minor.
Education: Wesleyan University, 1852–1853; Yale University, A.B., 1856; Albany Law School, LL.B., 1858.
Official Positions: commissioner, U.S. Circuit Court, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1861–1862; judge of probate and criminal courts, Leavenworth County, 1863–1864; judge, First District of Kansas, 1865–1869; Leavenworth city attorney, 1869–1870; justice, Kansas Supreme Court, 1870–1884; judge, Eighth Federal Circuit, 1884–1889; president, Venezuela-British Guiana Border Commission, 1895.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Benjamin Harrison December 4, 1889, to replace Stanley Matthews, who had died; confirmed by Senate, December 18, 1889, by a 53−11 vote; took judicial oath January 6, 1890; served until March 28, 1910; replaced by Charles Evans Hughes, nominated by President William Howard Taft.
Family: married Louise R. Landon, October 3, 1861; died 1898; married Emma Miner Mott, June 5, 1901.
Death: March 28, 1910, Washington, D.C.Breyer, Stephen G.
Birth: August 15, 1938, San Francisco, California. Education: Stanford University, A.B., 1959; Oxford University, B.A., 1961; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1964.[Page 252]
Official Positions: Law clerk to Justice Arthur J. Goldberg, 1964–1965; assistant to assistant attorney general, Antitrust Division, U.S. Justice Department, 1965–1967; assistant special prosecutor, Watergate Special Prosecution Force, 1973; special counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee, 1974–1975; chief counsel, Senate Judiciary Committee, 1979–1980; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1980–1994.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Bill Clinton May 13, 1994, to replace Harry A. Blackmun, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate, July 29, 1994, by an 87−9 vote; took judicial oath August 3, 1994.
Family: married Joanna Hare, 1967; two daughters, one son.Brown, Henry B.
Birth: March 2, 1836, South Lee, Massachusetts. Education: Yale University, A.B., 1856; studied briefly at Yale Law School and Harvard Law School.
Official Positions: U.S. deputy marshal for Detroit, 1861; assistant U.S. attorney, 1863–1868; circuit judge, Wayne County, Michigan, 1868; federal judge, Eastern District of Michigan, 1875–1890.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Benjamin Harrison December 23, 1890, to replace Samuel Miller, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 29, 1890, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 5, 1891; retired May 28, 1906; replaced by William H. Moody, nominated by President Theodore Roosevelt.
Family: married Caroline Pitts, July 1864; died 1901; married Josephine E. Tyler, June 25, 1904.
Death: September 4, 1913, Bronxville, New York.Burger, Warren E.
Birth: September 17, 1907, St. Paul, Minnesota.
Education: attended the University of Minnesota, 1925–1927; St. Paul College of Law (now William Mitchell College of Law), LL.B., magna cum laude, 1931.
Official Positions: assistant U.S. attorney general, Civil Division, Justice Department, 1953–1956; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1956–1969.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Richard Nixon May 21, 1969, to replace Chief Justice Earl Warren, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate June 9, 1969, by a 74−3 vote; took judicial oath June 23, 1969; retired September 26, 1986; replaced as chief justice by William H. Rehnquist, named by President Ronald Reagan.
Family: married Elvera Stromberg, November 8, 1933; one son, one daughter.
Death: June 25, 1995, Washington, D.C.Burton, Harold H.
Birth: June 22, 1888, Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts. Education: Bowdoin College, A.B., 1909; Harvard University, LL.B., 1912.
Official Positions: member, Ohio House of Representatives, 1929; director of law, Cleveland, 1929–1932; acting mayor of Cleveland, November 9, 1931-February 20, 1932; mayor of Cleveland, 1935–1940; U.S. senator, 1941–1945.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Harry S. Truman September 19, 1945, to replace Owen J. Roberts, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate September 19, 1945, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 1, 1945; retired October 13, 1958; replaced by Potter Stewart, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Family: married Selma Florence Smith, June 15, 1912; two daughters, two sons.
Death: October 28, 1964, Washington, D.C.Butler, Pierce
Birth: March 17, 1866, Pine Bend, Minnesota.
Education: Carleton College, A.B., B.S., 1887.
Official Positions: assistant county attorney, Ramsey County, Minnesota, 1891–1893; county attorney, 1893–1897.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Warren G. Harding November 23, 1922, to replace William R. Day, who had retired; confirmed by Senate December 21, 1922, by a 61−8 vote; took judicial oath January 2, 1923; served until November 16, 1939; replaced by Frank Murphy, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Family: married Annie M. Cronin, August 25, 1891; eight children.
Death: November 16, 1939, Washington, D.C.Byrnes, James F.
Birth: May 2, 1879, Charleston, South Carolina.
Education: St. Patrick's Parochial School (never graduated); studied law privately; admitted to the bar in 1903.
Official Positions: court reporter, Second Circuit of South Carolina, 1900–1908; solicitor, Second Circuit of South Carolina, 1908–1910; U.S. representative, 1911–1925; U.S. senator, 1931–1941; director, Office of Economic Stabilization, 1942–1943; director, Office of War Mobilization, 1943–1945; secretary of state, 1945–1947; governor of South Carolina, 1951–1955.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt June 12, 1941, to replace James McReynolds, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate June 12, 1941, by a voice vote; took judicial oath July 8, 1942; resigned October 3, 1942; replaced by Wiley B. Rutledge, appointed by President Roosevelt.
Family: Married Maude Perkins Busch, May 2, 1906.
Death: April 9, 1972, Columbia, South Carolina.Campbell, John A.
Birth: June 24, 1811, Washington, Georgia.
Education: Franklin College (now the University of Georgia), graduated with first honors, 1825; attended U.S. Military Academy at West Point, 1825–1828.[Page 253]
Official Positions: Alabama state representative, sessions of 1837 and 1843; assistant secretary of war, Confederate States of America, 1862–1865.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin Pierce March 21, 1853, to replace Justice John McKinley, who had died; confirmed by the Senate March 25, 1853, by a voice vote; took judicial oath April 11, 1853; resigned April 30, 1861; replaced by David Davis, nominated by President Abraham Lincoln.
Family: married Anna Esther Goldthwaite in the early 1830s; four daughters, one son.
Death: March 12, 1889, Baltimore, Maryland.Cardozo, Benjamin N.
Birth: May 24, 1870, New York City.
Education: Columbia University, A.B., 1889; A.M., 1891; Columbia Law School, 1891, no degree.
Official Positions: justice, New York Supreme Court, 1913; judge, New York State Court of Appeals, 1913–1932; chief judge, 1926–1932.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Herbert Hoover February 15, 1932, to replace Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., who had retired; confirmed by the Senate February 24, 1932, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 14, 1932; served until July 9, 1938; replaced by Felix Frankfurter, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Death: July 9, 1938, Port Chester, New York.Catron, John
Birth: ca. 1786, Pennsylvania or Virginia.
Official Positions: judge, Tennessee Supreme Court of Errors and Appeals, 1824–1831; first chief justice of Tennessee, 1831–1834.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Andrew Jackson March 3, 1837, to fill a newly created seat; confirmed by the Senate March 8, 1837, by a 28−15 vote; took judicial oath May 1, 1837; served until May 30, 1865; seat abolished by Congress.
Family: married Matilda Childress.
Death: May 30, 1865, Nashville, Tennessee.Chase, Salmon P.
Birth: January 13, 1808, Cornish, New Hampshire.
Education: Dartmouth College, 1826.
Official Positions: U.S. senator, 1849–1855, 1861; governor of Ohio, 1856–1860; secretary of the Treasury, 1861–1864.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Abraham Lincoln December 6, 1864, to replace Chief Justice Roger B. Taney, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 6, 1864, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 15, 1864; served until May 7, 1873; replaced by Morrison R. Waite, appointed by President Ulysses S. Grant.
Family: married Katherine Jane Garniss, March 4, 1834; died December 1, 1835; married Eliza Ann Smith, September 26, 1839; died September 29, 1845; one daughter; married Sara Belle Dunlop Ludlow, November 6, 1846; died January 13, 1852; one daughter.
Death: May 7, 1873, New York City.Chase, Samuel
Birth: April 17, 1741, Somerset County, Maryland.
Education: tutored by father; studied law in Annapolis law office; admitted to bar in 1761.
Official Positions: member, Maryland General Assembly, 1764–1784; delegate, Continental Congress, 1774–1778, 1784–1785; member, Maryland Committee of Correspondence, 1774; member, Maryland Convention and Council of Safety, 1775; judge, Baltimore Criminal Court, 1788–1796; chief judge, General Court of Maryland, 1791–1796.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington January 26, 1796, to replace John Blair, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate January 27, 1796, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 4, 1796; served until June 19, 1811; replaced by Gabriel Duvall, nominated by President James Madison.
Family: married Anne Baldwin May 21, 1762; seven children, three of whom died in infancy; married Hannah Kitty Giles, March 3, 1784; two daughters.
Death: June 19, 1811, Baltimore, Maryland.Clark, Tom C.
Birth: September 23, 1899, Dallas, Texas.
Education: Virginia Military Institute, 1917–1918; University of Texas, A.B., 1921; LL.B., 1922.
Official Positions: assistant district attorney, Dallas County, 1927–1932; special assistant, Justice Department, 1937–1943; assistant U.S. attorney general, 1943–1945; U.S. attorney general, 1945–1949; director, Federal Judicial Center, 1968–1970; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals, various circuits, by special arrangement, 1967–1977.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Harry S. Truman August 2, 1949, to replace Frank Murphy, who had died; confirmed by the Senate August 18, 1949, by a 73−8 vote; took judicial oath August 24, 1949; retired June 12, 1967; replaced by Thurgood Marshall, nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson.
Family: Married Mary Jane Ramsey, November 8, 1924; one daughter, two sons.
Death: June 13, 1977, New York City.[Page 254]Clarke, John H.
Birth: September 18, 1857, Lisbon, Ohio.
Education: Western Reserve University, A.B., 1877, A.M., 1880. Official Positions: federal judge, U.S. District Court for Northern District of Ohio, 1914–1916.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Woodrow Wilson July 14, 1916, to replace Charles Evans Hughes, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate July 24, 1916, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 9, 1916; resigned September 18, 1922; replaced by George Sutherland, nominated by President Warren G. Harding.
Death: March 22, 1945, San Diego, California.Clifford, Nathan
Birth: August 18, 1803, Rumney, New Hampshire.
Education: Haverhill Academy; studied law in office of Josiah Quincy in Rumney; admitted to New Hampshire bar, 1827.
Official Positions: Maine state representative, 1830–1834; attorney general of Maine, 1834–1838; U.S. representative, 1839–1843; U.S. attorney general, 1846–1848; minister to Mexico, 1848–1849.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James Buchanan December 9, 1857, to replace Benjamin R. Curtis, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate January 12, 1858, by a 26−23 vote; took judicial oath January 21, 1858; served until July 25, 1881; replaced by Horace Gray, nominated by President Chester A. Arthur.
Family: married Hannah Ayer, ca. 1828; six children.
Death: July 25, 1881, Cornish, Maine.Curtis, Benjamin R.
Birth: November 4, 1809, Watertown, Massachusetts.
Education: Harvard University, graduated 1829 with highest honors; Harvard Law School, graduated 1832.
Official Positions: Massachusetts state representative, 1849–1851.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Millard Fillmore December 11, 1851, to replace Justice Levi Woodbury, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 20, 1851, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 10, 1851; resigned September 30, 1857; replaced by Nathan Clifford, nominated by President James Buchanan.
Family: married Eliza Maria Woodward, 1833; died 1844; five children; married Anna Wroe Curtis, 1846; died 1860; three children; married Maria Malleville Allen, 1861; four children.
Death: September 15, 1874, Newport, Rhode Island.Cushing, William
Birth: March 1, 1732, Scituate, Massachusetts.
Education: graduated Harvard, 1751, honorary LL.D., 1785; honorary A.M., Yale, 1753; studied law under Jeremiah Gridley; admitted to the bar in 1755.
Official Positions: judge, probate court for Lincoln County, Massachusetts (now Maine), 1760–1761; judge, Superior Court of Massachusetts Bay province, 1772–1777; chief justice, Superior Court of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts, 1777–1780, Supreme Judicial Court, 1780–1789; member, Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1779; vice president, Massachusetts Convention, which ratified U.S. Constitution, 1788; delegate to electoral college, 1788.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington September 24, 1789; confirmed by the Senate September 26, 1789, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 2, 1790; served until September 13, 1810; replaced by Joseph Story, nominated by President James Madison.
Family: married Hannah Phillips, 1774.
Death: September 13, 1810, Scituate, Massachusetts.Daniel, Peter V.
Birth: April 24, 1784, Stafford County, Virginia.
Education: privately tutored; attended Princeton University, 1802–1803.
Official Positions: member, Virginia House of Delegates, 1809–1812; Virginia Privy Council, 1812–1835; lieutenant governor of Virginia, 1818–1835; U.S. district judge, Eastern District of Virginia, 1836–1841.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Martin Van Buren February 26, 1841, to replace Justice Philip Barbour, who had died; confirmed by the Senate March 2, 1841, by a 22−5 vote; took judicial oath January 10, 1842; served until May 31, 1860; replaced by Samuel F. Miller, nominated by President Abraham Lincoln.
Family: married Lucy Randolph, 1809; died 1847; married Elizabeth Harris, 1853; two children.
Death: May 31, 1860, Richmond, Virginia.Davis, David
Birth: March 9, 1815, Cecil County, Maryland.
Education: graduated Kenyon College, 1832; Yale Law School, 1835.
Official Positions: Illinois state representative, 1845–1847; member, Illinois constitutional convention, 1847; Illinois state circuit judge, 1848–1862; U.S. senator, 1877–1883.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Abraham Lincoln December 1, 1862, to replace John A. Campbell, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate December 8, 1862, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 10, 1862; resigned March 4, 1877; replaced by John Marshall Harlan, nominated by President Rutherford B. Hayes.
Family: married Sarah Walker, October 30, 1838; died 1879; one son (two children died in infancy); married Adeline Burr, March 14, 1883; two daughters.
Death: June 26, 1886, Bloomington, Illinois.[Page 255]Day, William R.
Birth: April 17, 1849, Ravenna, Ohio.
Education: University of Michigan, A.B., 1870; University of Michigan Law School, 1871–1872.
Official Positions: judge, Court of Common Pleas, Canton, Ohio, 1886; first assistant U.S. secretary of state, 1897–1898; U.S. secretary of state, 1898; member, United States delegation, Paris Peace Conference, 1898–1899; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1899–1903; umpire, Mixed Claims Commission, 1922–1923.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Theodore Roosevelt February 19, 1903, to replace George Shiras Jr., who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate February 23, 1903, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 2, 1903; resigned November 13, 1922; replaced by Pierce Butler, nominated by President Warren G. Harding.
Family: married Mary Elizabeth Schaefer, 1875; four sons.
Death: July 9, 1923, Mackinac Island, Michigan.Douglas, William O.
Birth: October 16, 1898, Maine, Minnesota.
Education: Whitman College, B.A., 1920; Columbia Law School, LL.B., 1925.
Official Positions: member, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1936–1939; chairman, 1937–1939.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt March 20, 1939, to replace Louis D. Brandeis, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate April 4, 1939, by a 62−4 vote; took judicial oath April 17, 1939; retired November 12, 1975; replaced by John Paul Stevens, nominated by President Gerald R. Ford.
Family: married Mildred Riddle, August 16, 1923; divorced 1953; one son, one daughter; married Mercedes Hester Davison, December 14, 1954; divorced 1963; married Joan Martin, August 1963; divorced 1966; married Cathleen Ann Heffernan, July 1966.
Death: January 19, 1980, Washington D.C.Duvall, Gabriel
Birth: December 6, 1752, Prince George's County, Maryland.
Education: classical preparatory schooling; studied law.
Official Positions: clerk, Maryland Convention, 1775–1777; clerk, Maryland House of Delegates, 1777–1787; member, Maryland State Council, 1782–1785; member, Maryland House of Delegates, 1787–1794; U.S. representative, 1794–1796; chief justice, General Court of Maryland, 1796–1802; presidential elector, 1796, 1800; first comptroller of the Treasury, 1802–1811.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James Madison November 15, 1811, to replace Samuel Chase, who had died; confirmed by the Senate November 18, 1811, by a voice vote; took judicial oath November 23, 1811; resigned January 14, 1835; replaced by Philip Barbour, nominated by President Andrew Jackson.
Family: married Mary Brice, July 24, 1787; died March 24, 1790; one son; married Jane Gibbon, May 5, 1795; died April 1834.
Death: March 6, 1844, Prince George's County, Maryland.Ellsworth, Oliver
Birth: April 29, 1745, Windsor, Connecticut.
Education: A.B., Princeton, 1766; honorary LL.D., Yale (1790), Princeton (1790), Dartmouth (1797).
Official Positions: member, Connecticut General Assembly, 1773–1776; state's attorney, Hartford County, 1777–1785; delegate to Continental Congress, 1777–1784; member, Connecticut Council of Safety, 1779; member, Governor's Council, 1780–1785, 1801–1807; judge, Connecticut Superior Court, 1785–1789; delegate, Constitutional Convention, 1787; U.S. senator, 1789–1796; commissioner to France, 1799–1800.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President George Washington March 3, 1796, to replace John Jay, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate March 4, 1796, by a 21−1 vote; took judicial oath March 8, 1796; resigned September 30, 1800; replaced by John Marshall, nominated by President John Adams.
Family: married Abigail Wolcott, 1771; four sons, three daughters survived infancy.
Death: November 26, 1807, Windsor, Connecticut.Field, Stephen J.
Birth: November 4, 1816, Haddam, Connecticut.
Education: graduated Williams College, 1837, class valedictorian; studied law in private firms; admitted to the bar in 1841.
Official Positions: Alcalde of Marysville, 1850; California state representative, 1850–1851; justice, California Supreme Court, 1857–1863.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Abraham Lincoln March 6, 1863, for a newly created seat; confirmed by the Senate March 10, 1863, by a voice vote; took judicial oath May 20, 1863; retired December 1, 1897; replaced by Joseph McKenna, nominated by President William McKinley.
Family: married Sue Virginia Swearingen, June 2, 1859.
Death: April 9, 1899, in Washington, D.C.Fortas, Abe
Birth: June 19, 1910, Memphis, Tennessee.
Education: Southwestern College, A.B., 1930; Yale Law School, LL.B., 1933.
Official Positions: assistant director, corporate reorganization study, Securities and Exchange Commission, 1934–1937; assistant director, Public Utilities Division, Securities and Exchange [Page 256]Commission, 1938–1939; general counsel, Public Works Administration, 1939–1940, and counsel to the Bituminous Coal Division, 1939–1941; director, Division of Power, Department of the Interior, 1941–1942; undersecretary of the interior, 1942–1946.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Lyndon B. Johnson July 28, 1965, to replace Arthur J. Goldberg, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate August 11, 1965, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 4, 1965; resigned May 14, 1969; replaced by Harry A. Blackmun, nominated by President Richard Nixon.
Family: married Carolyn Eugenia Agger, July 9, 1935.
Death: April 5, 1982, in Washington, D.C.Frankfurter, Felix
Birth: November 15, 1882, Vienna, Austria.
Education: College of the City of New York, A.B., 1902; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1906.
Official Positions: assistant U.S. attorney, Southern District of New York, 1906–1909; law officer, Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, 1910–1914; assistant to the secretary of war, 1917; secretary and counsel, President's Mediation Commission, 1917; assistant to the secretary of labor, 1917–1918; chairman, War Labor Policies Board, 1918.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt January 5, 1939, to replace Benjamin Cardozo, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 17, 1939, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 30, 1939; retired August 28, 1962; replaced by Arthur Goldberg, nominated by President John F. Kennedy.
Family: married Marion A. Denman, December 20, 1919.
Death: February 22, 1965, Washington, D.C.Fuller, Melville W.
Birth: February 11, 1833, Augusta, Maine.
Education: Bowdoin College, A.B., 1853; studied at Harvard Law School and read law, 1853–1855.
Official Positions: member, Illinois House of Representatives, 1863–1864; member, Venezuela-British Guiana Border Commission, 1899; member, Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, 1900–1910.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Grover Cleveland April 30, 1888, to replace Morrison R. Waite, who had died; confirmed by Senate July 20, 1888, by a 41−20 vote; took judicial oath October 8, 1888; served until July 4, 1910; replaced as chief justice by Edward D. White, nominated by President William Howard Taft.
Family: married Calista Ophelia Reynolds, June 28, 1858; died 1864; two daughters; married Mary Ellen Coolbaugh, May 30, 1866; eight children, seven of whom survived childhood.
Death: July 4, 1910, Sorrento, Maine.Ginsburg, Ruth Bader
Birth: March 15, 1933, Brooklyn, New York.
Education: Cornell University, B.A., 1954; attended Harvard University Law School, 1956–1958; graduated Columbia Law School, J.D., 1959.
Official Positions: judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1980–1993.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Bill Clinton June 22, 1993, to replace Byron R. White, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate, August 3, 1993, by a 96−3 vote; took judicial oath August 10, 1993.
Family: married Martin D. Ginsburg, 1954; one daughter, one son.Goldberg, Arthur J.
Birth: August 8, 1908, Chicago, Illinois.
Education: Northwestern University, B.S.L., 1929; J.D., summa cum laude, 1930.
Official Positions: secretary of labor, 1961–1962; U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, 1965–1968.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John F. Kennedy August 29, 1962, to replace Felix Frankfurter, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate September 25, 1962, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 1, 1962; resigned July 25, 1965; replaced by Abe Fortas, nominated by President Lyndon B. Johnson.
Family: married Dorothy Kurgans, July 18, 1931; one daughter, one son.
Death: January 19, 1990, Washington, D.C.Gray, Horace
Birth: March 24, 1828, Boston, Massachusetts.
Education: Harvard College, A.B., 1845; Harvard Law School, 1849.
Official Positions: reporter, Massachusetts Supreme Court, 1854–1864; associate justice, 1864–1873; chief justice, 1873–1881.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Chester A. Arthur December 19, 1881, to replace Nathan Clifford, who had died; confirmed by Senate December 20, 1881, by a 51−5 vote; took judicial oath January 9, 1882; served until September 15, 1902; replaced by Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., nominated by President Theodore Roosevelt.
Family: married Jane Matthews, June 4, 1889.
Death: September 15, 1902, Nahant, Massachusetts.Grier, Robert C.
Birth: March 5, 1794, Cumberland County, Pennsylvania. Education: Dickinson College, graduated 1812.[Page 257]
Official Positions: president judge, District Court of Allegheny County, Pennsylvania, 1833–1846.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James K. Polk August 3, 1846, to replace Justice Henry Baldwin, who had died; confirmed by the Senate August 4, 1846, by a voice vote; took judicial oath August 10, 1846; retired January 31, 1870; replaced by William Strong, nominated by President Ulysses S. Grant.
Family: married Isabella Rose, 1829.
Death: September 25, 1870, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.Harlan, John Marshall
Birth: June 1, 1833, Boyle County, Kentucky.
Education: Centre College, A.B., 1850; studied law at Transylvania University, 1851–1853.
Official Positions: adjutant general of Kentucky, 1851; judge, Franklin County, 1858; state attorney general, 1863–1867; member, Louisiana Reconstruction Commission, 1877; member, Bering Sea Tribunal of Arbitration, 1893.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Rutherford B. Hayes October 17, 1877, to replace David Davis, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate November 29, 1877, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 10, 1877; served until October 14, 1911; replaced by Mahlon Pitney, nominated by President William Howard Taft.
Family: married Malvina F. Shanklin, December 23, 1856; six children.
Death: October 14, 1911, Washington, D.C.Harlan, John M.
Birth: May 20, 1899, Chicago, Illinois.
Education: Princeton University, B.A., 1920; Rhodes scholar, Oxford University, Balliol College, B.A. in jurisprudence, 1923; New York Law School, LL.B., 1924.
Official Positions: assistant U.S. attorney, Southern District of New York, 1925–1927; special assistant attorney general, New York, 1928–1930; chief counsel, New York State Crime Commission, 1951–1953; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, 1954–1955.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Dwight D. Eisenhower November 8, 1954, to replace Robert Jackson, who had died; confirmed by the Senate March 16, 1955, by a 71−11 vote; took judicial oath March 28, 1955; retired September 23, 1971; replaced by William H. Rehnquist, nominated by President Richard Nixon.
Family: married Ethel Andrews, November 10, 1928; one daughter.
Death: December 29, 1971, Washington D.C.Holmes, Oliver Wendell, Jr.
Birth: March 8, 1841, Boston, Massachusetts.
Education: Harvard College, A.B., 1861; LL.B., 1866.
Official Positions: associate justice, Massachusetts Supreme Court, 1882–1899; chief justice, 1899–1902.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Theodore Roosevelt December 2, 1902, to replace Horace Gray, who had died; confirmed by Senate December 4, 1902, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 8, 1902; retired January 12, 1932, replaced by Benjamin N. Cardozo, nominated by President Herbert Hoover.
Family: married Fanny Bowdich Dixwell, June 17, 1872.
Death: March 6, 1935; Washington, D.C.Hughes, Charles Evans
Birth: April 11, 1862, Glens Falls, New York.
Education: Madison College (now Colgate University), 1876–1878; Brown University, A.B., 1881, A.M., 1884; Columbia Law School, LL.B., 1884.
Official Positions: special counsel, New York state investigating commissions, 1905–1906; governor of New York, 1907–1910; U.S. secretary of state, 1921–1925; U.S. delegate, Washington Armament Conference, 1921; U.S. member, Permanent Court of Arbitration, 1926–1930; judge, Permanent Court of International Justice, 1928–1930.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William Howard Taft April 25, 1910, to replace David J. Brewer, who had died; confirmed by Senate May 2, 1910, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 10, 1910; resigned June 10, 1916, to become Republican presidential candidate; replaced by John H. Clarke, nominated by President Woodrow Wilson; nominated chief justice February 3, 1930, by President Herbert Hoover, to replace Chief Justice Taft, who had retired; confirmed by Senate February 13, 1930, by a 52−26 vote; took judicial oath February 24, 1930; retired July 1, 1941; replaced by Harlan F. Stone, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Family: married Antoinette Carter, December 5, 1888; one son, three daughters.
Death: August 27, 1948, Osterville, Massachusetts.Hunt, Ward
Birth: June 14, 1810, Utica, New York.
Education: graduated with honors from Union College, 1828; attended Tapping Reeve law school.
Official Positions: member, New York Assembly, 1839; mayor of Utica, 1844; member, New York Court of Appeals, 1866–1869; New York State commissioner of appeals, 1869–1873.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ulysses S. Grant December 3, 1872, to replace Samuel Nelson, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 11, 1872, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 9, 1873; retired January 27, 1882; replaced by Samuel Blatchford, nominated by President Chester A. Arthur.[Page 258]
Family: married Mary Ann Savage, 1837; died 1845; three children; married Marie Taylor, 1853.
Death: March 24, 1886, Washington, D.C.Iredell, James
Birth: October 5, 1751, Lewes, England.
Education: educated in England; read law under Samuel Johnston of North Carolina; licensed to practice, 1770–1771.
Official Positions: comptroller of customs, Edenton, North Carolina, 1768–1774; collector of customs, Port of North Carolina, 1774–1776; judge, Superior Court of North Carolina, 1778; attorney general, North Carolina, 1779–1781; member, North Carolina Council of State, 1787; delegate, North Carolina convention for ratification of federal Constitution, 1788.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington February 8, 1790; confirmed by the Senate February 10, 1790, by a voice vote; took judicial oath May 12, 1790; served until October 20, 1799; replaced by Alfred Moore, nominated by President John Adams.
Family: married Hannah Johnston, July 18, 1773; two daughters, one son.
Death: October 20, 1799, Edenton, North Carolina.Jackson, Howell E.
Birth: April 8, 1832, Paris, Tennessee.
Education: West Tennessee College, A.B., 1850; University of Virginia, 1851–1852; Cumberland University, 1856.
Official Positions: custodian of sequestered property for Confederate states, 1861–1865; judge, Court of Arbitration for Western Tennessee, 1875–1879; state legislature, 1880; U.S. senator, 1881–1886; judge, Sixth Federal Circuit Court, 1886–1891, U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, 1891–1893.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Benjamin Harrison February 2, 1893, to replace Lucius Q.C. Lamar, who had died; confirmed by the Senate February 18, 1893, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 4, 1893; served until August 8, 1895; replaced by Rufus W. Peckham, nominated by President Grover Cleveland.
Family: married Sophia Malloy in 1859; died 1873; six children, two died in infancy; married Mary E. Harding in April 1874; three children.
Death: August 8, 1895, Nashville, Tennessee.Jackson, Robert H.
Birth: February 13, 1892, Spring Creek, Pennsylvania.
Education: Local schools in Frewsburg, New York; Albany Law School, 1912.
Official Positions: general counsel, Bureau of Internal Revenue, 1934–1936; assistant U.S. attorney general, 1936–1938; U.S. solicitor general, 1938–1939; U.S. attorney general, 1940–1941; chief U.S. prosecutor, Nuremberg war crimes trial, 1945–1946.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associated justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt June 12, 1941, to replace Harlan F. Stone, who was promoted to chief justice; confirmed by the Senate July 7, 1941, by a voice vote; took judicial oath July 11, 1941; served until October 9, 1954; replaced by John M. Harlan, nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Family: married Irene Alice Gerhardt, April 24, 1916; one daughter, one son.
Death: October 9, 1954, Washington, D.C.Jay, John
Birth: December 12, 1745, New York City.
Education: privately tutored; attended boarding school; graduated from King's College (later Columbia University), 1764; clerked in law office of Benjamin Kissam; admitted to the bar in 1768.
Official Positions: secretary, Royal Boundary Commission, 1773; member, New York Committee of 51, 1774; delegate, Continental Congress, 1774, 1775, 1777, president, 1778–1779; delegate, New York provincial congress, 1776–1777; chief justice, New York State, 1777–1778; minister to Spain, 1779; secretary of foreign affairs, 1784–1789; envoy to Great Britain, 1794–1795; governor, New York, 1795–1801.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President George Washington September 24, 1789; confirmed by the Senate September 26, 1789, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 9, 1789; resigned June 29, 1795; replaced by Oliver Ellsworth, nominated by President Washington.
Family: married Sarah Van Brugh Livingston, April 28, 1774; died 1802; five daughters, two sons.
Death: May 17, 1829, Bedford, New York.Johnson, Thomas
Birth: November 4, 1732, Calvert County, Maryland.
Education: educated at home; studied law under Stephen Bordley; admitted to the bar, 1760.
Official Positions: delegate, Maryland Provincial Assembly, 1762; delegate, Annapolis Convention of 1774; member, Continental Congress, 1774–1777; delegate, first constitutional convention of Maryland, 1776; first governor of Maryland, 1777–1779; member, Maryland House of Delegates, 1780, 1786, 1787; member, Maryland convention for ratification of the federal Constitution, 1788; chief judge, general court of Maryland, 1790–1791; member, board of commissioners of the Federal City, 1791–1794.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington November 1, 1791, to replace John Rutledge, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate November 7, 1791, by a voice vote; took judicial oath August 6, 1792; [Page 259]resigned February 1, 1793; replaced by William Paterson, nominated by President Washington.
Family: married Ann Jennings, February 16, 1766; died 1794; three boys, five girls, one of whom died in infancy.
Death: October 26, 1819, Frederick, Maryland.Johnson, William
Birth: December 27, 1771, Charleston, South Carolina.
Education: graduated Princeton, 1790; studied law under Charles Cotesworth Pinckney; admitted to bar in 1793.
Official Positions: member, South Carolina House of Representatives, 1794–1798; Speaker, 1798; judge, Court of Common Pleas, 1799–1804.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Thomas Jefferson March 22, 1804, to replace Alfred Moore, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate March 24, 1804, by a voice vote; took judicial oath May 7, 1804; served until August 4, 1834; replaced by James M. Wayne, nominated by President Andrew Jackson.
Family: married Sarah Bennett, March 20, 1794; eight children, six of whom died in childhood; two adopted children.
Death: August 4, 1834, Brooklyn, New York.Kennedy, Anthony M.
Birth: July 23, 1936, Sacramento, California.
Education: Stanford University, A.B., 1958; London School of Economics, 1957–1958; Harvard Law School, J.D., 1961.
Official Positions: judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, 1976–1988.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ronald Reagan November 30, 1987, to replace Lewis F. Powell Jr., who had retired; confirmed by a 97−0 vote of the Senate, February 3, 1988; took judicial oath February 18, 1988.
Family: married Mary Davis, 1963; three children.Lamar, Joseph R.
Birth: October 14, 1857, Elbert County, Georgia.
Education: University of Georgia, 1874–1875; Bethany College, A.B., 1877; Washington and Lee University, 1877.
Official Positions: member, Georgia legislature, 1886–1889; commissioner to codify Georgia laws, 1893; associate justice, Georgia Supreme Court, 1903–1905; member, mediation conference, Niagara Falls, Canada, 1914.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William Howard Taft December 12, 1910, to replace William Henry Moody, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 15, 1910, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 3, 1911; served until January 2, 1916; replaced by Louis D. Brandeis, nominated by President Woodrow Wilson.
Family: married Clarinda Huntington Pendleton, January 30, 1879; two sons, one daughter.
Death: January 2, 1916, Washington, D.C.Lamar, Lucius Q.C.
Birth: September 17, 1825, Eatonton, Georgia.
Education: Emory College, A.B., 1845.
Official Positions: member, Georgia House of Representatives, 1853; U.S. representative, 1857–1860, 1873–1877; U.S. senator, 1877–1885; secretary of interior, 1885–1888.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Grover Cleveland December 6, 1887, to replace William Woods, who had died; confirmed by U.S. Senate January 16, 1888, by a 32−28 vote; took judicial oath January 18, 1888; served until January 23, 1893; replaced by Howell E. Jackson, nominated by President Benjamin Harrison.
Family: married Virginia Longstreet, July 15, 1847; died 1884; one son, three daughters; married Henrietta Dean Holt, January 5, 1887.
Death: January 23, 1893, Macon, Georgia.Livingston, Henry Brockholst
Birth: November 25, 1757, New York City.
Education: graduated from College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1774; honorary LL.D., Harvard (1810), Princeton; studied law under Peter Yates; admitted to bar in 1783.
Official Positions: member, New York Assembly, Twelfth, Twenty-fourth, and Twenty-fifth sessions; judge, New York State
Supreme Court, 1802–1807.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Thomas Jefferson December 13, 1806, to replace William Paterson, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 17, 1806, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 20, 1807; served until March 18, 1823; replaced by Smith Thompson, nominated by President James Monroe.
Family: married Catharine Keteltas, five children; married Ann Ludlow, three children; married Catharine Kortright, three children.
Death: March 18, 1823, Washington, D.C.Lurton, Horace H.
Birth: February 26, 1844, Newport, Kentucky.
Education: Douglas University (University of Chicago), 1860; Cumberland Law School, L.B., 1867.
Official Positions: chancellor in equity, 1875–1878; judge, Tennessee Supreme Court, 1886–1893; judge, U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, 1893–1909.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William Howard Taft December 13, 1909, to replace Rufus W. Peckham, who had died; confirmed by Senate December 20, [Page 260]1909, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 3, 1910; served until July 12, 1914; replaced by James C. McReynolds, nominated by President Woodrow Wilson.
Family: married Mary Francis Owen, September 1867; three sons, two daughters.
Death: July 12, 1914, Atlantic City, New Jersey.McKenna, Joseph
Birth: August 10, 1843, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.
Education: Benicia Collegiate Institute, graduated in 1864; admitted to the bar in 1865.
Official Positions: district attorney, Solano County, California, 1866–1870; member, California Assembly, 1875–1876; U.S. representative, 1885–1892; judge, U.S. Ninth Judicial Circuit, 1892–1897; U.S. attorney general, 1897.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William McKinley December 16, 1897, to replace Stephen J. Field, who had retired; confirmed by Senate January 21, 1898, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 26, 1898; retired January 5, 1925; replaced by Harlan F. Stone, nominated by President Calvin Coolidge.
Family: married Amanda Frances Bornemann, June 10, 1869; three daughters, one son.
Death: November 21, 1926, Washington, D.C.McKinley, John
Birth: May 1, 1780, Culpeper County, Virginia.
Education: read law on his own; admitted to the bar in 1800.
Official Positions: Alabama state representative, sessions of 1820, 1831, and 1836; U.S. senator, 1826–1831 and 1837; U.S. representative, 1833–1835.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Martin Van Buren September 18, 1837, for a newly created Supreme Court seat; confirmed by the Senate September 25, 1837, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 9, 1838; served until July 19, 1852; replaced by John A. Campbell, nominated by President Franklin Pierce.
Family: married Juliana Bryan; married Elizabeth Armistead.
Death: July 19, 1852, Louisville, Kentucky.McLean, John
Birth: March 11, 1785, Morris County, New Jersey.
Education: attended local school; privately tutored; read law with John S. Gano and Arthur St. Clair Jr.
Official Positions: examiner, U.S. Land Office, 1811–1812; U.S. representative, 1813–1816, chairman, Committee on Accounts; judge, Ohio Supreme Court, 1816–1822; commissioner, General Land Office, 1822–1823; U.S. postmaster general, 1823–1829.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Andrew Jackson March 7, 1829, to replace Robert Trimble, who had died; confirmed by the Senate March 7, 1829, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 11, 1830; served until April 3, 1861; replaced by Noah H. Swayne, nominated by President Abraham Lincoln.
Family: married Rebecca Edwards, 1807; died 1840; four daughters, three sons; married Sarah Bella Ludlow Garrard, 1843; one son, died at birth.
Death: April 3, 1861, Cincinnati, Ohio.McReynolds, James C.
Birth: February 3, 1862, Elkton, Kentucky.
Education: Vanderbilt University, B.S., 1882; University of Virginia, LL.B., 1884.
Official Positions: assistant U.S. attorney, 1903–1907; U.S. attorney general, 1913–1914.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Woodrow Wilson August 19, 1914, to replace Horace H. Lurton, who had died; confirmed by the Senate August 29, 1914, by a 44−6 vote; took judicial oath October 12, 1914; retired January 31, 1941; replaced by James F. Byrnes, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Death: August 24, 1946, in Washington, D.C.Marshall, John
Birth: September 24, 1755, Germantown, Virginia.
Education: tutored at home; self-taught in law; attended one course of law lectures at College of William and Mary, 1780.
Official Positions: member, Virginia House of Delegates, 1782–1785, 1787–1790, 1795–1796; member, Executive Council of State, 1782–1784; recorder, Richmond City Hustings Court, 1785–1788; delegate, state convention for ratification of federal Constitution, 1788; minister to France, 1797–1798; U.S. representative, 1799–1800; U.S. secretary of state, 1800–1801; member, Virginia Constitutional Convention, 1829.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President John Adams January 20, 1801, to replace Oliver Ellsworth, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate January 27, 1801, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 4, 1801; served until July 6, 1835; replaced by Roger B. Taney, nominated by President Andrew Jackson.
Family: Married Mary Willis Ambler, January 3, 1783; died December 25, 1831; ten children.
Death: July 6, 1835, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.Marshall, Thurgood
Birth: July 2, 1908, Baltimore, Maryland.
Education: Lincoln University, A.B., cum laude, 1930; Howard University Law School, LL.B., 1933.[Page 261]
Official Positions: judge, Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 1961–1965; U.S. solicitor general, 1965–1967.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Lyndon B. Johnson June 13, 1967, to replace Tom C. Clark, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate August 30, 1967, by a 69−11 vote; took judicial oath October 2, 1967; retired October 1, 1991; replaced by Clarence Thomas, nominated by President George Bush.
Family: married Vivian Burey, September 4, 1929, died February 1955; married Cecilia Suyat, December 17, 1955; two sons.
Death: January 24, 1993, Bethesda, Maryland.Matthews, Stanley
Birth: July 21, 1824, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Education: Kenyon College, graduated with honors, 1840.
Official Positions: assistant prosecuting attorney, Hamilton County, 1845; clerk, Ohio House of Representatives, 1848–1849; judge, Hamilton County Court of Common Pleas, 1851–1853; member, Ohio Senate, 1855–1858; U.S. attorney for southern Ohio, 1858–1861; judge, Superior Court of Cincinnati, 1863–1865; counsel, Hayes-Tilden electoral commission, 1877; U.S. senator, 1877–1879.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Rutherford B. Hayes January 26, 1881, to replace Noah Swayne, who had retired; no action by Senate; renominated by President James A. Garfield, March 14, 1881; confirmed by Senate May 12, 1881, by a 24−23 vote; took judicial oath May 17, 1881; served until March 22, 1889; replaced by David J. Brewer, nominated by President Benjamin Harrison.
Family: married Mary Ann Black, February 1843; died 1885; eight children; married Mary Theaker, 1887.
Death: March 22, 1889, Washington, D.C.Miller, Samuel F.
Birth: April 5, 1816, Richmond, Kentucky.
Education: Transylvania University, M.D., 1838; studied law privately; admitted to the bar in 1847.
Official Positions: justice of the peace and member of the Knox County, Kentucky, court, an administrative body, in the 1840s.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Abraham Lincoln July 16, 1862, to replace Justice Peter V. Daniel, who had died; confirmed July 16, 1862, by a voice vote; took judicial oath July 21, 1862; served until October 13, 1890; replaced by Henry B. Brown, nominated by President Benjamin Harrison.
Family: married Lucy Ballinger, November 8, 1842; died 1854; three children; married Elizabeth Winter Reeves, widow of his law partner, 1857; two children.
Death: October 13, 1890, Washington, D.C.Minton, Sherman
Birth: October 20, 1890, Georgetown, Indiana.
Education: Indiana University, LL.B., 1915; Yale University, LL.M., 1917.
Official Positions: public counselor, Public Service Commission, 1933–1934; U.S. senator, 1935–1941; assistant to president, 1941; judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 1941–1949.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Harry S. Truman September 15, 1949, to replace Wiley B. Rutledge, who had died; confirmed by the Senate October 4, 1949, by a 48−16 vote; took judicial oath October 12, 1949; retired October 15, 1956; replaced by William J. Brennan Jr., nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Family: married Gertrude Gurtz, August 11, 1917; two sons, one daughter.
Death: April 9, 1965 in New Albany, Indiana.Moody, William H.
Birth: December 23, 1853, Newbury, Massachusetts.
Education: Harvard College, A.B., cum laude, 1876; Harvard
Law School, 1876–1877; read law with Richard Henry Dana.
Official Positions: city solicitor, Haverhill, 1888–1890; district attorney, Eastern District of Massachusetts, 1890–1895; U.S. representative, 1895–1902; secretary of the Navy, 1902–1904; U.S. attorney general, 1904–1906.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Theodore Roosevelt December 3, 1906, to replace Henry B. Brown, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 12, 1906, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 17, 1906; retired November 20, 1910; replaced by Joseph R. Lamar, nominated by President William Howard Taft.
Death: July 2, 1917, Haverhill, Massachusetts.Moore, Alfred
Birth: May 21, 1755, New Hanover County, North Carolina.
Education: educated in Boston; studied law under his father; received law license, 1775.
Official Positions: member, North Carolina legislature, 1782, 1792; North Carolina attorney general, 1782–1791; trustee, University of North Carolina, 1789–1807; judge, North Carolina Superior Court, 1799.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John Adams December 6, 1799, to replace James Iredell, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 10, 1799, by a voice vote; took judicial oath April 21, 1800; resigned January 26, 1804; replaced by William Johnson, nominated by President Thomas Jefferson.
Family: married Susanna Eagles.
Death: October 15, 1810, Bladen County, North Carolina.[Page 262]Murphy, Francis W.
Birth: April 13, 1890, Sand (now Harbor) Beach, Michigan. Education: University of Michigan, A.B., 1912, LL.B., 1914; graduate study, Lincoln's Inn, London, and Trinity College, Dublin.
Official Positions: chief assistant U.S. attorney, Eastern District of Michigan, 1919–1920; judge, Recorder's Court, Detroit, 1924–1930; mayor of Detroit, 1930–1933; governor general of the Philippines, 1933–1935; U.S. high commissioner to the Philippines, 1935–1936; governor of Michigan, 1937–1939; U.S. attorney general, 1939–1940.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt January 4, 1940, to replace Pierce Butler, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 16, 1940, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 5, 1940; served until July 19, 1949; replaced by Tom C. Clark, nominated by President Harry S. Truman.
Death: July 19, 1949, Detroit, Michigan.Nelson, Samuel
Birth: November 11, 1792, Hebron, New York.
Education: graduated, Middlebury College, 1813.
Official Positions: postmaster, Cortland, New York, 1820–1823; presidential elector, 1820; judge, Sixth Circuit of New York, 1823–1831; associate justice, New York Supreme Court, 1831–1837; chief justice, New York Supreme Court, 1837–1845; member, Alabama Claims Commission, 1871.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John Tyler February 4, 1845, to replace Justice Smith Thompson, who had died; confirmed by the Senate February 14, 1845, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 27, 1845; retired November 28, 1872; replaced by Ward Hunt, nominated by President Ulysses S. Grant.
Family: married Pamela Woods, 1819; died 1822; one son; married Catherine Ann Russell, ca. 1825; two daughters, one son.
Death: December 13, 1873, Cooperstown, New York.O'Connor, Sandra Day
Birth: March 26, 1930, El Paso, Texas.
Education: Stanford University, B.A., 1950, Stanford University Law School, LL.B., 1952.
Official Positions: deputy county attorney, San Mateo, California, 1952–1953; assistant attorney general, Arizona, 1965–1969; Arizona state senator, 1969–1975, majority leader, state Senate, 1973–1974; judge, Maricopa County Superior Court, 1975–1979; judge, Arizona Court of Appeals, 1979–1981.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ronald Reagan August 19, 1981 to replace Potter Stewart, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate by a 99−0 vote, September 21, 1981; took judicial oath September 26, 1981.
Family: married John O'Connor, 1952; three sons.Paterson, William
Birth: December 24, 1745, County Antrim, Ireland.
Education: graduated from College of New Jersey (Princeton), 1763; M.A., 1766; studied law under Richard Stockton; admitted to the bar, 1769.
Official Positions: member, New Jersey Provincial Congress, 1775–1776; delegate, New Jersey State Constitutional Convention, 1776; New Jersey attorney general, 1776–1783; delegate, U.S. Constitutional Convention, 1787; U.S. senator, 1789–1790; governor, New Jersey, 1790–1793.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington March 4, 1793, to replace Thomas Johnson, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate March 4, 1793, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 11, 1793; served until September 9, 1806; replaced by Henry B. Livingston, nominated by President Thomas Jefferson.
Family: married Cornelia Bell, February 9, 1779; died 1783; three children; married Euphemia White, 1785.
Death: September 9, 1806, Albany, New York.Peckham, Rufus W.
Birth: November 8, 1838, Albany, New York.
Education: Albany Boys’ Academy; studied privately in Philadelphia.
Official Positions: district attorney, Albany County, 1869–1872; corporation counsel, City of Albany, 1881–1883; judge, New York Supreme Court, 1883–1886; judge, New York Court of Appeals, 1886–1895.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Grover Cleveland December 3, 1895, to replace Howell E. Jackson, who had died; confirmed by Senate December 8, 1895, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 6, 1896; served until October 24, 1909; replaced by Horace H. Lurton, nominated by President William Howard Taft.
Family: married Harriette M. Arnold, November 14, 1866; two sons.
Death: October 24, 1909, Altamont, New York.Pitney, Mahlon
Birth: February 5, 1858, Morristown, New Jersey.
Education: College of New Jersey (Princeton), A.B., 1879; A.M., 1882.
Official Positions: U.S. representative, 1895–1899; New Jersey State senator, 1899–1901; president, New Jersey Senate, 1901; associate justice, New Jersey Supreme Court, 1901–1908; chancellor of New Jersey, 1908–1912.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William Howard Taft February 19, 1912, to replace John Marshall Harlan, who had died; confirmed by the Senate March 13, 1912, by a 50−26 vote; took judicial oath March 18, 1912; retired December 31, 1922; replaced by Edward T. San-ford, nominated by President Warren G. Harding.[Page 263]
Family: married Florence T. Shelton, November 14, 1891; two sons, one daughter.
Death: December 9, 1924, Washington, D.C.Powell, Lewis F., Jr.
Birth: September 19, 1907, Suffolk, Virginia.
Education: Washington and Lee University, B.S., 1929; Washington and Lee University Law School, LL.B., 1931; Harvard Law School, LL.M., 1932.
Official Positions: president of the Richmond School Board, 1952–1961; member, 1961–1969, and president, 1968–1969, Virginia State Board of Education; president of the American Bar Association, 1964–1965; president, American College of Trial Lawyers, 1968–1969.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Richard Nixon October 22, 1971, to replace Hugo L. Black, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 6, 1971, by an 89−1 vote; took judicial oath January 6, 1972; retired June 26, 1987; replaced by Anthony Kennedy, nominated by President Ronald Reagan.
Family: married Josephine M. Rucker, May 2, 1936; three daughters, one son.
Death: August 25, 1998, Richmond, Virginia.Reed, Stanley F.
Birth: December 31, 1884, Minerva, Kentucky.
Education: Kentucky Wesleyan University, A.B., 1902; Yale University, A.B., 1906; legal studies, University of Virginia and Columbia University (no degree); graduate studies, University of Paris, 1909–1910.
Official Positions: representative, Kentucky General Assembly, 1912–1916; general counsel, Federal Farm Board, 1929–1932; general counsel, Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 1932–1935; special assistant to attorney general, 1935; solicitor general, 1935–1938.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt January 15, 1938, to replace George Sutherland, who had retired; confirmed by Senate January 25, 1938, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 31, 1938; retired February 25, 1957; replaced by Charles E. Whittaker, appointed by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Family: married Winifred Elgin, May 11, 1908; two sons.
Death: April 2, 1980, New York City.Rehnquist, William H.
Birth: October 1, 1924, Milwaukee, Wisconsin. Education: Stanford University, B.A., 1948, M.A., 1948; Harvard University, M.A., 1950; Stanford University Law School, LL.B., 1952.
Official Positions: law clerk to Supreme Court Justice Robert H. Jackson, 1952–1953; assistant U.S. attorney general, Office of Legal Counsel, 1969–1971.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Richard Nixon October 21, 1971, to replace John M. Harlan, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 10, 1971, by a 68−26 vote; took judicial oath January 7, 1972; nominated chief justice by President Ronald Reagan June 20, 1986; confirmed by the Senate, 65−33, September 17, 1986; took judicial oath September 26, 1986; replaced as associate justice by Antonin Scalia, nominated by President Reagan.
Family: married Natalie Cornell, August 29, 1953; died October 17, 1991; one son, two daughters.Roberts, Owen J.
Birth: May 2, 1875, Germantown, Pennsylvania.
Education: University of Pennsylvania, A.B. with honors, 1895; LL.B. cum laude, 1898.
Official Positions: assistant district attorney, 1903–1906; special deputy attorney general, Eastern District of Pennsylvania, 1918; special U.S. attorney, 1924–1930; umpire, Mixed Claims Commission, 1932; chairman, Pearl Harbor Inquiry Board, 1941–1942.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Herbert Hoover May 9, 1930, to replace Edward T. San-ford, who had died; confirmed by the Senate May 20, 1930, by a voice vote; took judicial oath June 2, 1930; resigned July 31, 1945; replaced by Harold H. Burton, nominated by President Harry S. Truman.
Family: married Elizabeth Caldwell Rogers, 1904; one daughter.
Death: May 17, 1955, West Vincent Township, Pennsylvania.Rutledge, John
Birth: September 1739, Charleston, South Carolina.
Education: privately tutored; studied law at the Middle Temple in England; called to the English bar February 9, 1760.
Official Positions: member, South Carolina Commons House of Assembly, 1761–1776; South Carolina attorney general pro item, 1764–1765; delegate, Stamp Act Congress, 1765; member, Continental Congress, 1774–1776, 1782–1783; president, South Carolina General Assembly, 1776–1778; governor, South Carolina, 1779–1782; judge of the Court of Chancery of South Carolina, 1784–1791; chief, South Carolina delegation to the Constitutional Convention, 1787; member, South Carolina convention to ratify U.S. Constitution, 1788; chief justice, South Carolina Supreme Court, 1791–1795; member, South Carolina Assembly, 1798–1799.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington September 24, 1789; confirmed by the Senate September 26, 1789, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 15, 1790; resigned March 5, 1791; replaced by Thomas Johnson, nominated by President Washington. Later sworn in by virtue of recess appointment as chief justice August 12, 1795; [Page 264]appointment not confirmed, and service terminated December 15, 1795.
Family: married Elizabeth Grimke, May 1, 1763; died 1792; ten children.
Death: July 18, 1800, Charleston, South Carolina.Rutledge, Wiley B.
Birth: July 20, 1894, Cloverport, Kentucky.
Education: University of Wisconsin, A.B., 1914; University of Colorado, LL.B., 1922.
Official Positions: judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1939–1943.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt January 11, 1943, to replace James F. Byrnes, who had resigned; confirmed by the Senate February 8, 1943, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 15, 1943; served until September 10, 1949; replaced by Sherman Minton, nominated by President Harry S. Truman.
Family: married Annabel Person, August 28, 1917; two daughters, one son.
Death: September 10, 1949, York, Maine.Sanford, Edward T.
Birth: July 23, 1865, Knoxville, Tennessee.
Education: University of Tennessee, B.A. and Ph.B., 1883; Harvard, B.A., 1884, M.A., 1889; Harvard Law School, LL.B., 1889.
Official Positions: special assistant to the U.S. attorney general, 1906–1907; assistant U.S. attorney general, 1907–1908; federal judge, U.S. District Court for the Middle and Eastern Districts of Tennessee, 1908–1923.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Warren G. Harding January 24, 1923, to replace Mahlon Pitney, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate January 29, 1923, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 19, 1923; served until March 8, 1930; replaced by Owen J. Roberts, nominated by President Herbert Hoover.
Family: married Lutie Mallory Woodruff, January 6, 1891; two daughters.
Death: March 8, 1930, Washington, D.C.Scalia, Antonin
Birth: March 11, 1936, Trenton, New Jersey.
Education: Georgetown University, A.B., summa cum laude, 1957; Harvard Law School, LL.B., magna cum laude, 1960.
Official Positions: general counsel, White House Office of Telecommunications Policy, 1971–1972; chairman, Administrative Conference of the United States, 1972–1974; assistant attorney general, Office of Legal Counsel, 1974–1977; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit, 1982–1986.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ronald Reagan June 24, 1986, to replace William H. Rehnquist, who had been promoted to chief justice; confirmed by a 98−0 vote of the Senate, September 17, 1986; took judicial oath September 26, 1986.
Family: married Maureen McCarthy, 1960; nine children.Shiras, George, Jr.
Birth: January 26, 1832, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.
Education: Ohio University, 1849–1851; Yale University, B.A., 1853, honorary LL.D., 1883; studied law at Yale and privately; admitted to the bar in 1855.
Official Positions: none.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Benjamin Harrison July 19, 1892, to replace Joseph P. Bradley, who had died; confirmed by the Senate July 26, 1892, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 10, 1892; retired February 23, 1903; replaced by William R. Day, nominated by President Theodore Roosevelt.
Family: married Lillie E. Kennedy, December 31, 1857; two sons.
Death: August 2, 1924, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania.Souter, David H.
Birth: September 17, 1939, Melrose, Massachusetts.
Education: Harvard College, B.A., 1961; Oxford University (Rhodes Scholar), 1961–1963; Harvard University Law School, LL.B., 1966.
Official Positions: assistant attorney general, New Hampshire, 1968–1971; deputy attorney general, New Hampshire, 1971–1976; attorney general, New Hampshire, 1976–1978; associate justice, New Hampshire Superior Court, 1978–1983; associate justice, New Hampshire Supreme Court, 1983–1990; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit, 1990.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Bush July 23, 1990, to replace William J. Brennan Jr., who had retired; confirmed by the Senate, October 2, 1990, by a 90−9 vote; took judicial oath October 9, 1990.
Family: Unmarried.Stevens, John Paul
Birth: April 20, 1920, Chicago, Illinois.
Education: University of Chicago, B.A., 1941; Northwestern University School of Law, J.D., magna cum laude, 1947.
Official Positions: law clerk to Justice Wiley B. Rutledge, 1947–1948; associate counsel, Subcommittee on the Study of Monopoly Power, House Judiciary Committee, 1951; member, U.S. Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws, 1953–1955; judge, Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, 1970–1975.[Page 265]
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Gerald R. Ford November 28, 1975, to replace William O. Douglas, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 17, 1975, by a 98−0 vote; took judicial oath December 19, 1975.
Family: married Elizabeth Jane Sheeren, 1942, divorced 1979; one son, three daughters; married Maryan Mulholland Simon, 1980.Stewart, Potter
Birth: January 23, 1915, Jackson, Michigan.
Education: Yale College, B.A., cum laude, 1937; Yale Law School, LL.B., cum laude, 1941; fellow, Cambridge University, Cambridge, England, 1937–1938.
Official Positions: member, Cincinnati, Ohio, city council, 1950–1953; vice mayor of Cincinnati, 1952–1953; judge, Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1954–1958.
Supreme Court Service: received recess appointment as associate justice by President Dwight D. Eisenhower October 14, 1958, to replace Harold H. Burton, who had retired; nominated associate justice by President Eisenhower January 17, 1959; confirmed by the Senate May 5, 1959, by a 70−17 vote; took judicial oath October 14, 1958; retired July 3, 1981; replaced by Sandra Day O'Connor, nominated by President Ronald Reagan.
Family: married Mary Ann Bertles, April 24, 1943; two sons, one daughter.
Death: December 7, 1985, Hanover, New Hampshire.Stone, Harlan Fiske
Birth: October 11, 1872, Chesterfield, New Hampshire.
Education: Amherst College, A.B., 1894, M.A., 1897, LL.D., 1913; Columbia University, LL.B., 1898.
Official Positions: U.S. attorney general, 1924–1925.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Calvin Coolidge January 5, 1925, to replace Joseph McKenna, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate February 5, 1925, by a 71−6 vote; took judicial oath March 2, 1925; nominated chief justice by President Franklin D. Roosevelt June 12, 1941, to replace Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate June 27, 1941, by a voice vote; took judicial oath July 3, 1941; served until April 22, 1946; replaced by Fred M. Vinson, nominated by President Harry S. Truman.
Family: married Agnes Harvey, September 7, 1899; two sons. Death: April 22, 1946, Washington, D.C.Story, Joseph
Birth: September 18, 1779, Marblehead, Massachusetts.
Education: attended Marblehead Academy; graduated from Harvard, 1798; LL.D., 1821; read law under Samuel Sewall and Samuel Putnam; admitted to bar, 1801.
Official Positions: member, Massachusetts legislature, 1805–1808; Speaker of the House, 1811; U.S. representative, 1808–1809; delegate, Massachusetts Constitutional Convention, 1820.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James Madison November 15, 1811, to replace William Cushing, who had died; confirmed by the Senate November 18, 1811, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 3, 1812; served until September 10, 1845; replaced by Levi Woodbury, nominated by President James K. Polk.
Family: married Mary Lynde Oliver, December 9, 1804; died June 1805; married Sarah Waldo Wetmore, August 27, 1808; seven children.
Death: September 10, 1845, Cambridge, Massachusetts.Strong, William
Birth: May 6, 1808, Somers, Connecticut.
Education: Yale College, A.B., 1828; M.A., 1831.
Official Positions: U.S. representative, 1847–1851; Pennsylvania Supreme Court justice, 1857–1868.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Ulysses S. Grant February 7, 1870, to replace Robert C. Grier, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate February 18, 1870, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 14, 1870; retired December 14, 1880; replaced by William B. Woods, nominated by President Rutherford B. Hayes.
Family: married Priscilla Lee Mallery, November 28, 1836; died 1844; two daughters, one son; married Rachel Davis Bull, a widow, November 22, 1849; two daughters, two sons.
Death: August 19, 1895, Lake Minnewaska, New York.Sutherland, George
Birth: March 25, 1862, Buckinghamshire, England.
Education: Brigham Young (University) Academy, 1879–1881; University of Michigan Law School, 1882.
Official Positions: Utah state senator, 1896–1900; U.S. representative, 1901–1903; U.S. senator, 1905–1917; chairman, advisory committee to the Washington Conference for the Limitation of Naval Armaments, 1921; U.S. counsel, Norway-United States arbitration, The Hague, 1921–1922.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Warren G. Harding September 5, 1922, to replace Justice John H. Clarke, who had resigned; took judicial oath October 2, 1922; confirmed by the Senate September 5, 1922, by a voice vote; retired January 17, 1938; replaced by Stanley F. Reed, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Family: married Rosamund Lee, June 18, 1883; two daughters, one son.
Death: July 18, 1942, Stockbridge, Massachusetts.Swayne, Noah Haynes
Birth: December 7, 1804, Frederick County, Virginia. Education: studied law privately; admitted to the bar in Warrenton, Virginia, in 1823.[Page 266]
Official Positions: Coshocton County (Ohio) prosecuting attorney, 1826–1829; Ohio state representative, 1830 and 1836; U.S. attorney for Ohio, 1830–1841; Columbus city councilman, 1834.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Abraham Lincoln January 21, 1862, to replace John McLean, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 24, 1862, by a 38−1 vote; took judicial oath January 27, 1862; retired January 24, 1881; replaced by Stanley Matthews, nominated by President Rutherford B. Hayes and renominated by President James A. Garfield.
Family: married Sarah Ann Wager, 1832; four sons, one daughter.
Death: June 8, 1884, New York City.Taft, William Howard
Birth: September 15, 1857, Cincinnati, Ohio.
Education: Yale University, A.B., class salutatorian, 1878; Cincinnati Law School, LL.B., 1880.
Official Positions: assistant prosecuting attorney, Hamilton County, Ohio, 1881–1883; assistant county solicitor, Hamilton County, 1885–1887; judge, Ohio Superior Court, 1887–1890; U.S. solicitor general, 1890–1891; judge, U.S. District Court for the Sixth Circuit, 1892–1900; chairman, Philippine Commission, 1900–1901; governor general of the Philippines, 1901–1904; secretary of war, 1904–1908; president of the United States, 1909–1913; joint chairman, National War Labor Board, 1918–1919.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Warren G. Harding June 30, 1921, to replace Chief Justice Edward D. White, who had died; confirmed by the Senate June 30, 1921, by a voice vote; took judicial oath July 11, 1921; retired February 3, 1930; replaced by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes, nominated by President Herbert Hoover.
Family: married Helen Herron, June 19, 1886; two sons, one daughter.
Death: March 8, 1930, in Washington, D.C.Taney, Roger Brooke
Birth: March 17, 1777, Calvert County, Maryland.
Education: graduated from Dickinson College in Pennsylvania, 1795, honorary LL.D.; read law in office of Judge Jeremiah Chase in Annapolis.
Official Positions: member, Maryland House of Delegates, 1799–1800; Maryland state senator, 1816–1821; Maryland attorney general, 1827–1831; chairman, Jackson Central Committee for Maryland, 1827–1828; U.S. attorney general, 1831–1833; acting secretary of war, 1831; U.S. secretary of the Treasury, 1833–1834 (appointment rejected by Senate).
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Andrew Jackson December 28, 1835, to replace John Marshall, who had died; confirmed by Senate on March 15, 1836, by a 29−15 vote; took judicial oath March 28, 1836; served until October 12, 1864; replaced by Salmon P. Chase, nominated by President Abraham Lincoln.
Family: married Anne Phoebe Carlton Key, January 7, 1806; died 1855; six daughters; one son, died in infancy.
Death: October 12, 1864, Washington, D.C.Thomas, Clarence
Birth: June 23, 1948, Pin Point, Georgia.
Education: Immaculate Conception Seminary, 1967–1968; Holy Cross College, B.A., 1971; Yale University Law School, J.D., 1974.
Official Positions: assistant attorney general, Missouri, 1974–1977; assistant secretary of education for civil rights, 1981–1982; chairman, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, 1982–1990; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1990–1991.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Bush July 1, 1991, to replace Thurgood Marshall, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate, October 15, 1991, by a 52−48 vote; took judicial oath October 23, 1991.
Family: married Kathy Grace Ambush, 1971; one son; divorced 1984; married Virginia Lamp, 1987.Thompson, Smith
Birth: January 17, 1768, Dutchess County, New York.
Education: graduated Princeton, 1788; read law under James Kent; admitted to the bar, 1792; honorary law doctorates from Yale, 1824; Princeton, 1824; and Harvard, 1835.
Official Positions: member, New York state legislature, 1800; member, New York Constitutional Convention, 1801; associate justice, New York Supreme Court, 1802–1814; appointed to New York State Board of Regents, 1813; chief justice, New York Supreme Court, 1814–1818; secretary of the Navy, 1819–1823.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James Monroe December 8, 1823, to replace Brockholst Livingston, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 19, 1823, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 10, 1823; served until December 18, 1843; replaced by Samuel Nelson, nominated by President John Tyler.
Family: married Sarah Livingston, 1794; died September 22, 1833; two sons, two daughters; married Eliza Livingston; two daughters, one son.
Death: December 18, 1843, Poughkeepsie, New York.Todd, Thomas
Birth: January 23, 1765, King and Queen County, Virginia.
Education: graduated from Liberty Hall (now Washington and Lee University), Lexington, Virginia, 1783; read law under Harry Innes; admitted to bar in 1788.[Page 267]
Official Positions: clerk, federal district for Kentucky, 1792–1801; clerk, Kentucky House of Representatives, 1792–1801; clerk, Kentucky Court of Appeals (Supreme Court), 1799–1801; judge, Kentucky Court of Appeals, 1801–1806; chief justice, 1806–1807.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Thomas Jefferson February 28, 1807, to fill a newly created seat; confirmed by the Senate March 3, 1807, by a voice vote; took judicial oath May 4, 1807; served until February 7, 1826; replaced by Robert Trimble, nominated by President John Quincy Adams.
Family: married Elizabeth Harris, 1788; died 1811; five children; married Lucy Payne, 1812; three children. Death: February 7, 1826, Frankfort, Kentucky.Trimble, Robert
Birth: November 17, 1776, Berkeley County, Virginia. Education: Bourbon Academy; Kentucky Academy; read law under George Nicholas and James Brown; admitted to the bar in 1803.
Official Positions: Kentucky state representative, 1802; judge, Kentucky Court of Appeals, 1807–1809; U.S. district attorney for Kentucky, 1813–1817; U.S. district judge, 1817–1826.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John Quincy Adams April 11, 1826, to replace Thomas Todd, who had died; confirmed May 9, 1826, by a 27−5 vote; took judicial oath June 16, 1826; served until August 25, 1828; replaced by John McLean, nominated by President Andrew Jackson.
Family: married Nancy Timberlake, August 18, 1803; at least ten children.
Death: August 25, 1828, Paris, Kentucky.Van Devanter, Willis
Birth: April 17, 1859, Marion, Indiana.
Education: Indiana Asbury University, A.B., 1878; University of Cincinnati Law School, LL.B., 1881.
Official Positions: city attorney, Cheyenne, 1887–1888; member, Wyoming territorial legislature, 1888; chief justice, Wyoming Territory Supreme Court, 1889–1890; assistant attorney general, Department of the Interior, 1897–1903; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, 1903–1910.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President William Howard Taft December 12, 1910, to replace Edward D. White, who became chief justice; confirmed by U.S. Senate December 15, 1910, by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 3, 1911; retired June 2, 1937; replaced by Hugo L. Black, nominated by President Franklin D. Roosevelt.
Family: married Dellice Burhans, October 10, 1883; two sons.
Death: February 8, 1941, in Washington, D.C.Vinson, Frederick Moore
Birth: January 22, 1890, Louisa, Kentucky.
Education: Kentucky Normal College, 1908; Centre College, A.B., 1909; LL.B., 1911.
Official Positions: commonwealth attorney, Thirty-second Judicial District of Kentucky, 1921–1924; U.S. representative, 1924–1929, 1931–1938; judge, U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, 1938–1943; director, Office of Economic Stabilization, 1943–1945; administrator, Federal Loan Agency, 1945; director, Office of War Mobilization and Reconversion, 1945; secretary of the Treasury, 1945–1946.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Harry S. Truman June 6, 1946, to replace Chief Justice Harlan F. Stone, who had died; confirmed by the Senate June 20, 1946, by a voice vote; took judicial oath June 24, 1946; served until September 8, 1953; replaced by Earl Warren, nominated by President Dwight D. Eisenhower.
Family: married Roberta Dixson, January 24, 1923; two sons.
Death: September 8, 1953, Washington, D.C.Waite, Morrison R.
Birth: November 27, 1816, Lyme, Connecticut.
Education: graduated from Yale College, 1837.
Official Positions: Ohio state representative, 1850–1852; representative to the Geneva Arbitration, 1871; president of the Ohio Constitutional Convention, 1873–1874.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Ulysses S. Grant January 19, 1874, to replace Salmon P. Chase, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 21, 1874, by a 63−0 vote; took judicial oath March 4, 1874; served until March 23, 1888; replaced by Melville W. Fuller, nominated by President Grover Cleveland.
Family: married his second cousin, Amelia C. Warner, September 21, 1840; five children.
Death: March 23, 1888, Washington, D.C.Warren, Earl
Birth: March 19, 1891, Los Angeles, California.
Education: University of California, B.L., 1912; J.D., 1914. Official Positions: deputy city attorney, Oakland, California, 1919–1920; deputy district attorney, Alameda County, 1920–1925; district attorney, Alameda County, 1925–1939; California attorney general, 1939–1943; governor, 1943–1953.
Supreme Court Service: nominated chief justice by President Dwight D. Eisenhower September 30, 1953, to replace Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, who had died; confirmed March 1, 1954, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 5, 1953; retired June 23, 1969; replaced by Warren E. Burger, nominated by President Richard Nixon.
Family: married Nina P. Meyers, October 14, 1925; three sons, three daughters.
Death: July 9, 1974, Washington, D.C.[Page 268]Washington, Bushrod
Birth: June 5, 1762, Westmoreland County, Virginia.
Education: privately tutored; graduated College of William and Mary, 1778; read law under James Wilson; member, Virginia bar; honorary LL.D. degrees from Harvard, Princeton, and University of Pennsylvania.
Official Positions: member, Virginia House of Delegates, 1787; member, Virginia convention to ratify U.S. Constitution, 1788.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John Adams December 19, 1798, to replace James Wilson, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 20, 1798, by a voice vote; took judicial oath February 4, 1799; served until November 26, 1829; replaced by Henry Baldwin, nominated by President Andrew Jackson.
Family: married Julia Ann Blackburn, 1785.
Death: November 26, 1829, in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania.Wayne, James M.
Birth: 1790, Savannah, Georgia.
Education: College of New Jersey (Princeton University), 1808, honorary LL.B., 1849; read law under three lawyers including Judge Charles Chauncey of New Haven; admitted to the bar January 1811.
Official Positions: member, Georgia House of Representatives, 1815–1816; mayor, Savannah, 1817–1819; judge, Savannah Court of Common Pleas, 1820–1822; Georgia Superior Court, 1822–1828; U.S. representative, 1829–1835; chairman, Committee on Foreign Relations.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Andrew Jackson January 7, 1835, to replace William Johnson, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 9, 1835 by a voice vote; took judicial oath January 14, 1835; served until July 5, 1867; replaced by Joseph Bradley, nominated by President Ulysses S. Grant.
Family: married Mary Johnson Campbell, 1813; three children.
Death: July 5, 1867, Washington, D.C.White, Byron R.
Birth: June 8, 1917, Fort Collins, Colorado.
Education: University of Colorado, B.A., 1938; Rhodes Scholar, Oxford University, 1939; Yale Law School, LL.B., magna cum laude, 1946.
Official Positions: law clerk to Chief Justice Fred M. Vinson, 1946–1947; deputy U.S. attorney general, 1961–1962.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President John F. Kennedy March 30, 1962, to replace Charles E. Whittaker, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate April 11, 1962, by a voice vote; took judicial oath April 16, 1962; retired June 28, 1993; replaced by Ruth Bader Ginsburg, nominated by President Bill Clinton.
Family: married Marion Stearns, 1946; one son, one daughter.White, Edward D.
Birth: November 3, 1845, Lafourche Parish, Louisiana.
Education: Mount St. Mary's College, Emmitsburg, Maryland, 1856; Georgetown College (University), Washington, D.C., 1857–1861; studied law at University of Louisiana (Tulane) and with Edward Bermudez; admitted to the bar in 1868.
Official Positions: Louisiana state senator, 1874; associate justice, Louisiana Supreme Court, 1878–1880; U.S. senator, 1891–1894.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Grover Cleveland February 19, 1894, to replace Samuel Blatchford, who had died; confirmed by the Senate February 19, 1894, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 12, 1894. Nominated chief justice of the United States by President William Howard Taft, December 12, 1910, to replace Melville Fuller, who had died; confirmed by the Senate December 12, 1910, by a voice vote; took judicial oath December 19, 1910; served until May 19, 1921; replaced as chief justice by former president Taft, appointed by President Warren G. Harding.
Family: married Virginia Montgomery Kent, November 1894.
Death: May 19, 1921, in Washington, D.C.Whittaker, Charles E.
Birth: February 22, 1901, Troy, Kansas.
Education: University of Kansas City Law School, LL.B., 1924.
Official Positions: judge, U.S. District Court for Western District of Missouri, 1954–1956; judge, Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, 1956–1957.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Dwight D. Eisenhower March 2, 1957, to replace Stanley Reed, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate March 19, 1957, by a voice vote; took judicial oath March 25, 1957; retired March 31, 1962; replaced by Byron R. White, nominated by President John F. Kennedy.
Family: married Winifred R. Pugh, July 7, 1928; three sons.
Death: November 26, 1973, Kansas City, Missouri.Wilson, James
Birth: September 14, 1742, Caskardy, Scotland.
Education: attended University of St. Andrews (Scotland); read law in office of John Dickinson; admitted to the bar in 1767; honorary M.A., College of Philadelphia, 1776; honorary LL.D., 1790.
Official Positions: delegate, first Provincial Convention at Philadelphia, 1774; delegate, Continental Congress, 1775–1777, 1783, [Page 269]1785–1787; delegate, U.S. Constitutional Convention, 1787; delegate, Pennsylvania convention to ratify U.S. Constitution, 1787.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President George Washington September 24, 1789; confirmed by the Senate September 26, 1789, by a voice vote; took judicial oath October 5, 1789; served until August 21, 1798; replaced by Bushrod Washington, nominated by President John Adams.
Family: married Rachel Bird, November 5, 1771; died 1786; six children; married Hannah Gray, September 19, 1793; one son died in infancy.
Death: August 21, 1798, Edenton, North Carolina.Woodbury, Levi
Birth: December 22, 1789, Francestown, New Hampshire.
Education: Dartmouth College, graduated with honors, 1809; Tapping Reeve Law School, ca. 1810.
Official Positions: clerk, New Hampshire Senate, 1816; associate justice, New Hampshire Superior Court, 1817–1823; governor, New Hampshire, 1823–1824; Speaker, New Hampshire House, 1825; U.S. senator, 1825–1831, 1841–1845; secretary of the Navy, 1831–1834; secretary of the Treasury, 1834–1841.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President James K. Polk December 23, 1845, to replace Justice Joseph Story, who had died; confirmed by the Senate January 3, 1846, by voice vote; took judicial oath September 23, 1845; served until September 4, 1851; replaced by Benjamin R. Curtis, nominated by President Millard Fillmore.
Family: married Elizabeth Williams Clapp, June 1819; four daughters, one son.
Death: September 4, 1851, Portsmouth, New Hampshire.Woods, William B.
Birth: August 3, 1824, Newark, Ohio.
Education: attended Western Reserve College for three years; graduated from Yale University, 1845.
Official Positions: mayor of Newark, Ohio, 1856; Ohio state representative, 1858–1862, Speaker in 1858–1860 and minority leader in 1860–1862; chancellor, middle chancery district of Alabama, 1868–1869; U.S. circuit judge for the Fifth Circuit, 1869–1880.
Supreme Court Service: nominated associate justice by President Rutherford B. Hayes December 15, 1880, to replace William Strong, who had retired; confirmed by the Senate December 21, 1880, by a 39−8 vote; took judicial oath January 5, 1881; served until May 14, 1887; replaced by Lucius Q.C. Lamar, nominated by President Grover Cleveland.
Family: married Anne E. Warner, June 21, 1855; one son, one daughter.
Death: May 14, 1887, Washington, D.C.source: Lee Epstein and Thomas G. Walker, Constitutional Law for a Changing America: Rights, Liberties, and Justice, fifth edition (Washington, D.C.: CQ Press, 2004).
How to Read a Court Citation[Page 270]
The official version of each Supreme Court decision and opinion is contained in a series of volumes entitled United States Reports, published by the U.S. Government Printing Office.
While there are several unofficial compilations of Court opinions, including United States Law Week, published by the Bureau of National Affairs; Supreme Court Reporter, published by West Publishing Company; and United States Supreme Court Reports, Lawyers’ Edition, published by Lawyers Cooperative Publishing Company, it is the official record that is generally cited. An unofficial version or the official slip opinion might be cited if a decision has not yet been officially reported.
A citation to a case includes, in order, the name of the parties to the case, the volume of United States Reports in which the decision appears, the page in the volume on which the opinion begins, the page from which any quoted material is taken, and the year of the decision.
For example, Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 553 (1946) means that the Supreme Court decision in the case of Colegrove against Green can be found in volume 328 of United States Reports beginning on page 549. The specific quotation in question will be found on page 553. The case was decided in 1946.
Until 1875 the official reports of the Court were published under the names of the Court reporters, and it is their names, or abbreviated versions, that appear in cites for those years, although U.S. volume numbers have been assigned retroactively to them. A citation such as Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137 (1803) means that the opinion in the case of Marbury against Madison is in the first volume of reporter Cranch beginning on page 137. (Between 1875 and 1883 a Court reporter named William T. Otto compiled the decisions and opinions; his name appears on the volumes for those years as well as the United States Reports volume number, but Otto is seldom cited.)
The titles of the volumes to 1875, the full names of the reporters, and the corresponding United States Reports volumes are:
1–4 Dall. Dallas 1–4 U.S. 1–9 Cranch or Cr. Cranch 5–13 U.S. 1–12 Wheat. Wheaton 14–25 U.S. 1–16 Pet. Peters 26–41 U.S. 1–24 How. Howard 42–65 U.S. 1–2 Black Black 66–67 U.S. 1–23 Wall. Wallace 68–90 U.S.
Online Sources of Decisions[Page 271]
The Internet is a valuable source for reading the full text of Supreme Court decisions, listening to oral arguments from historic cases, and receiving alerts when new decisions are posted online.
A number of Internet sites offer free Supreme Court information. Here are some of the best:U.S. Supreme Court
Access method: WWW
To access: http://www.supremecourtus.gov
The official site of the United States Supreme Court provides online users with opinions, calendars, order lists, an automated docket, and a booklet about the Court.
The Supreme Court posts opinions within hours after they are announced from the bench. The documents posted are the “slip” opinions, which contain page numbers so that users can cite them before they are formally published.Cornell Legal Information Institute
Access method: WWW
To access: http://supct.law.cornell.edu/supct
Although several Internet sites provide Supreme Court opinions, the Cornell Legal Information Institute is a popular choice because it is so easy to use.
Cornell offers the full text of all Supreme Court decisions from May 1990 to the present. Decisions are posted the same day the Court releases them and can be accessed by using the name of the first party, the name of the second party, keyword, date, and other variables.
The site also provides over six hundred historic Supreme Court decisions dating back to the Court's beginnings on topics such as school prayer, abortion, administrative law, copyright, patent law, and trademarks. Some of the cases include Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Roe v. Wade, New York Times Co. v. United States, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District, Miranda v. Arizona, Griswold v. Connecticut, New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, Gideon v. Wainwright, and Brown v. Board of Education. Cases can be accessed by topic, party name, or opinion author.
The site also has the full text of the Supreme Court Rules, the Court calendar for the current term, the schedule of oral arguments, biographical data about current and former justices, and a glossary of legal terms.Liibulletin
Access method: E-mail
To access: Send an e-mail message to email@example.com
The liibulletin is a free mailing list that alerts subscribers when new Supreme Court decisions are placed on the Internet. The list provides syllabi of new decisions, in addition to instructions about how to obtain the full text. Cornell Law School's Legal Information Institute operates the site.
To subscribe, send an e-mail message to firstname.lastname@example.org and leave the subject line blank. In the message area type: subscribe liibulletin firstname lastname, where firstname and lastname are replaced by your first and last names.Oyez Oyez Oyez: A U.S. Supreme Court Database
Access method: WWW
To access: http://www.oyez.org/oyez/frontpage
This site offers over 2000 hours of recordings of oral arguments from more than 250 historic Supreme Court cases dating back to 1956. The site is operated by Northwestern University, and the recordings are digitized from tapes in the National Archives.
Listening to the cases requires RealAudio software. Oyez offers a link to another Internet site where the software can be downloaded for free.
Some of the cases available include Planned Parenthood v. Casey, Hustler Magazine v. Falwell, Regents of the University of California v. Bakke, Roe v. Wade, Furman v. Georgia, Griswold v. Connecticut, and New York Times v. Sullivan. The database can be searched by title, citation, subject, and date. For each case, the site provides recordings of oral arguments and text listing the facts of the case, the constitutional question involved, and the Court's conclusion.
Oyez also provides brief biographies of all current and former justices and a virtual tour of the Supreme Court building.[Page 272]FindLaw
Access method: WWW
To access: http://www.findlaw.com/casecode/supreme.html
This site provides the full text of all Supreme Court decisions from 1893 to the present. The database can be browsed by year and U.S. Reports volume number, and it also can be searched by citation, case title, and keywords. The decisions are in HTML format, and many have hyperlinks to citations from previous decisions.
The site also offers the full text of the U.S. Constitution, with annotations by the Congressional Research Service, and links to cited Supreme Court cases. FindLaw, a legal electronic publisher owned by West Group, operates the site.FedWorld/FLITE Supreme Court Decisions
Access method: WWW
To access: http://www.fedworld.gov/supcourt/index.htm
FedWorld's database contains the full text of all Supreme Court decisions issued between 1937 and 1975. The database was originally compiled by the U.S. Air Force, and has been placed online by the National Technical Information Service.
The more than seven thousand decisions are from volumes 300 to 422 of U.S. Reports. They can be searched by case name and keyword. The decisions are provided in ASCII text format.source: Bruce Maxwell, How to Access the Federal Government on the Internet: Washington Online, 3d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quarterly, 1997); http://www.supremecourtus.gov/ (accessed October 6, 2003).
Photo Credits[Page 295]
Page number Credit 2 Collection of Paul Avrich 5 Special Collections, University of Arkansas Libraries 7 Vonda Reed 10, 19, 21, 23, 37, 52, 71, 76, 87, 95, 124, 138, 153, 162, 164, 175, 185, 198 Library of Congress 28 Special Collections and Archives, University at Albany, SUNY 31 Langum Family Collection, Illinois State Historical Library 33 Terrence McCarthy 40 Reuters 58 Associated Press 67 Atlanta Journal Constitution 108 Bill Pierce 118 National Anthropological Archives, Smithsonian Institution 120 Washington Post 127 Maryland Historical Society 136 Indiana Historical Society 148 University of Texas at El Paso Library, Special Collections Department 206 The Bancroft Library, University of California, Berkeley 213 http://Earthstation.com