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Relativism and the Value of Science
Relativism and the value of science

In Chapter 4, I discussed Thomas Kuhn's critique of the common view that science has increased our knowledge of the world enormously through using objective and shared standards for assessing theories. Like Kuhn, Paul Feyerabend has claimed that this view of scientific knowledge is deeply mistaken, as science sometimes does not lead to an accumulation of knowledge on the basis of objective and shared standards. Rather, it contains revolutionary episodes during which existing theories are completely overthrown, and our standards of theory appraisal are radically changed. He also argues that the transition from pre-science to science contains similar revolutionary episodes. Unlike Kuhn, Feyerabend sometimes argues that such changes can be so thorough that it ...

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