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P. M. Churchland, D. C. Dennett, J. Fodor, J. Haugeland, A. Newell, H. A. Simon, K. Sterelny & M. B. Turner

In: The Philosophy of Psychology

Part 3: Cognitive Science and Psychology

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Cognitive Science and Psychology
Cognitive science and psychology

The rise of cognitive science in the ‘60s produced a revolution not only in the kind of theories advanced by psychologists but also in philosophy of psychology and psychological metatheory. Hitherto, psychological metatheory was roughly conceived as being concerned with issues in the philosophy of science. As such it was fundamentally an applied epistemological enterprise driven largely by philosophical issues coming out of a liberalized logical empiricist tradition (see, e.g., Koch, 1959; Marx, 1963; Turner, 1967).

With the rise of cognitive science, however, the philosophy of psychology shifted somewhat and became more explicitly concerned with metaphysical issues of a certain sort, in particular, issues surrounding the philosophy of mind (together with correlative issues in the philosophy of language).1

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