Negotiating on Behalf of Others: Advice to Lawyers, Business Executives, Sports Agents, Diplomats, Politicians, and Everybody Else


Edited by: Robert H. Mnookin & Lawrence E. Susskind

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  • Sage Series on Negotiation and Dispute Resolution


    Lawrence E. Susskind, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
    Robert H. Mnookin, Harvard University

    This series is designed to promote applied research in negotiation and dispute resolution. Drawing on the multidisciplinary efforts of scholars and practitioners in the social sciences, humanities, law, public policy, psychology, urban planning, and management science, the Sage Series on Negotiation and Dispute Resolution seeks to examine the next round of research questions, including various challenges to interest–based models of conflict management originating at the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and other research centers. Taking a distinctly cross–cultural perspective, this series aims to broaden and deepen the dialogue between scholars and practitioners and to establish the highest possible standards for reflective practice.

    Volumes in this series …

    Negotiating on Behalf of Others

    Edited by Robert H. Mnookin and Lawrence E. Susskind with Pacey C. Foster


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    Abram J.Chayes

    This book is the product of the first of a series of seminars conducted by the faculty of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard on “complicating factors” in negotiations. The animating idea of the projected series was that it was time to move beyond the simple one–on-one negotiation format that has explicitly or implicitly been the focus of much of the work in negotiation theory to date, beginning with Roger Fisher and William Ury's seminal Getting to YES (1981). It was time to begin identifying and addressing elements in the setting or evolution of the negotiating process that might complicate or qualify the descriptive and prescriptive propositions developed in the study of the simple, “normal” situation. The first of these “complicating factors” selected for study was the effect of the presence of an agent in the negotiating process. The seminar was held during the spring of 1997, and, as the roster of participants shows, included many of the legendary greats in the pantheon of negotiation theory.

    The most important conclusion to emerge was that the traditional object of academic study and analysis in the field—the dyadic two–person negotiation, with each person representing and bargaining for his or her own interest—was not the “normal” situation at all, at least in a practical sense. It is instead a construct, a simplification, an abstraction from the realities of negotiating practice. Such constructs are, as Thomas Schelling remarked long ago in The Strategy of Conflict (1960), extremely important for generating theoretical propositions and, one might add, for teaching them, but their relation to the real world remains problematic. What emerged from the seminar was that the conduct of negotiations through agents, far from being a special or occasional “complicating factor,” was the norm. Indeed, it is hard to think of situations in the real political, commercial, or even personal world that fit the dyadic paradigm. In bargaining for a rug in the souk, or even in purchasing a car, one of the parties, the seller, is almost always represented by an agent, a salesperson. For practical purposes, every negotiator is an agent, accountable to somebody or some body, even if it is an amorphous constituency or membership.

    In law and economics, academic work has proceeded from another simplified dyadic conception of the relationship between “a principal” and “an agent.” It has addressed questions of the authority, information, and incentives involved in the relationship. When, how, and how much authority and information should the principal provide to the agent? What are the agent's incentives in a rationally calculating world, and how can the principal modify them to align them more closely with his or her own? Even at this rather straightforward level, the elements of the relationship are not as fully within the control of the two parties as might appear in what is essentially a consensual relationship. The law has always recognized that, in certain circumstances, the agent will have power to bind the principal without his or her consent, and even against his or her instructions. Nor is this a rare circumstance. Agents acting for corporations and other collective bodies—and how can such bodies act except through agents?—are almost always vested with relatively broad powers to bind that cannot be traced back to any positive action of the principal other than participating in the system.

    The mention of corporations and collective bodies—which includes states—widens the horizon of inquiry even further and reveals an even stranger landscape, as compared to the “normal” negotiation that has been the familiar object of theoretical study. An overwhelming portion of contemporary economic and social life, and a good deal of our personal lives too, is conducted by or with such collectivities. In this setting, the simple notion of a principal and an agent, with lines of authority running from the former to the latter, begins to evaporate. We enter a world of multiple principals and multiple agents, and oscillations between the two, where one person or entity is at times a principal and at times an agent, and at times both, with respect to the same subject and even the same negotiation. Often, the parties to the negotiation are not two but many, and the participants work across party lines to help shape the authority, information, and incentives of their negotiating partners. In such situations, anything approaching unified control of these dimensions of the relationship, proceeding in a straight line from principal to agent, is illusory. It is not only that all of them are ambiguous. Even more important, they are constantly being constructed and tested and contested—negotiated—between and among the participants in the negotiating process: “Everything has suffered a sea change into something wondrous strange” (William Shakespeare, The Tempest, Act I, Scene 2).

    The complicating factor, then, is that the world of negotiation, like most of human endeavor, is complicated. It is fraught with ambiguities and shifting relationships and changing environments. This book embarks on the quest for insight and understanding in an environment where complication is normalcy.

    Fisher, R. and W.Ury. 1981. Getting to YES. New York: Penguin.
    Schelling, T. C.1960. The strategy of conflict. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
  • Annotated Bibliography of Selected Sources

    Pacey C.FosterJonathan R.Cohen

    For readers interested in further pursuing the themes and issues raised in this volume, the following commentaries provide an introduction to the literature. This annotated bibliography is designed to be suggestive rather than exhaustive.

    Ashenfelter, O. and G.Johnson. 1969. Bargaining theory, trade unions, and industrial strike activity. American Economic Review59(1):35–49.

    In their pioneering study, Ashenfelter and Johnson use agency tensions to examine labor negotiations and empirically test conditions under which strikes are likely to occur. Using a three–party model (management, union leadership, and union rank and file), the authors obtain significant results in predicting industrial strike activity. At the core of the model lies the principa1-agent tension between the union leadership and the union rank and file, leaders sometimes choosing to strike to adjust the expectations of the rank–and-file or to solidify their leadership positions.

    Bazerman, M. H. and M. A.Neale. 1992. Negotiating through third parties. In Negotiating rationally. New York: Free Press.

    Bazerman and Neale review some of the possible effects of involving a third party—such as a mediator, arbitrator, or agent—in a negotiation. All third parties, according to the authors, should be understood to have their own goals and frequently a strong interest in reaching agreement, but unlike mediators and arbitrators, agents have a vested interest in resolution because commission is often determined by how a pie is split. Agents may also possess more information than the principals they represent, whether because of more time spent with the other party or specialized knowledge, and they may use this information to promote their own interests. Drawing on evidence from their studies of real estate negotiations, Bazerman and Neale suggest that standard arrangements by which real estate agents receive a percentage of the contracted price tend to bias the agent in favor of the seller's interests and reduce the size of the bargaining zone. The authors find that selling prices are lower when an agent knows only the seller's reservation price and impasse rates are highest when an agent knows both parties' reservation prices. Selling prices and impasse rates are both higher in agent–assisted negotiations than in direct negotiations.

    Bazerman, M. H., M. A.Neale, K. L.Valley, and E. J.Zajac. 1992. The effect of agents and mediators on negotiation outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes53(1):55–73.

    Bazerman et al. describe two experiments that test the impact of agents and mediators on negotiated outcomes in real estate transactions. Their findings suggest that agents tend to (1) increase the sale price of homes, (2) increase the likelihood of impasse, and (3) receive a smaller percentage of the sales price as a commission when the bargaining zone is smaller.

    Benton, A. A. and D.Druckman. 1973. Salient solutions and the bargaining behavior of representatives and nonrepresentatives. International Journal of Group Tensions3(1–2):28–39.

    This study considers the bargaining behaviors of representatives and nonrepresentatives in allocation scenarios that involve the distribution of both even and odd available sums. Drawing on experimental data, Benton and Druckman find that situations which only permit asymmetrical payoffs elicit more competitive behavior among group representatives than among individuals with no accountability to a constituency. They also observe that the possibility of salient outcomes based on equal concessions mitigates competitive tendencies among both types of negotiators and points to potential ways to alleviate some of the negative effects of role obligations within bargaining sessions.

    Benton, A. A. and D.Druckman. 1974. Constituent's bargaining orientation and intergroup negotiations. Journal of Applied Social Psychology4(2):141–150.

    Benton and Druckman present experimental evidence that in negotiations where they are accountable to constituencies, representatives bargain harder if they have no information about their constituencies' interests or if they believe their constituency is competitive. In both cases, representatives bargain harder than nonrepresentatives. Competitive effects are mitigated if representatives believe their constituents are cooperative.

    Burke, B.1993. Negotiations involving agents and general managers in the NHL (National Hockey League). Marquette Sports Law Journal4(1):35–50.

    This is a short summary of Burke's personal negotiation techniques and theory. Burke suggests that negotiators should adopt a “cordial but not warm” style, not look at their notes, involve the athlete in preparation, enter negotiation with alternatives, let the club make an initial offer, and become familiar with standard player's contracts, collective bargaining agreements, and the bylaws of specific leagues. He also suggests that agents should not promise endorsement income to their clients because this is available only to select athletes. Finally, he advises that agents not provide al1-purpose representation but, rather, seek assistance on specialized issues like investment planning.

    Cohen, G.1993. Ethics and the representation of professional athletes. Marquette Sports Law Journal4(1):149–197.

    This article provides a summary of the NBPA (National Basketball Player's Association) agent regulations, including information on how they were developed. In the 1980s, player concerns about agents' powers and fees led to regulations for agents in baseball and basketball. The article describes NBPA certification requirements, the standard player–agent agreement, fee structure, free market effects, and code of conduct. A section titled “Free Market” describes a players' negotiation analysis. The underlying premise of the NBPA regulations is that an agent owes a player his or her undivided loyalty.

    Committee on Professional Responsibility. 1996. The evolving lawyerclient relationship and its effect on the lawyer's professional obligations. The Record of the Association of the Bar of the City of New York51:443.

    Greater competition in the legal arena, increased costs of legal services, and recent advances in technology that facilitate heightened communication between an attorney and client have altered many clients' perception of their own role in a legal proceeding. Clients today, according to the authors, desire involvement in determining not only the objectives of a legal proceeding but also the means to those objectives, and clients and attorneys alike tend to define their relationship as a joint venture rather than a compartmentalized set of representational roles. This new relationship, however, poses a dilemma in that the client's increased involvement in the legal process and client–imposed limitations on the procedural means of representation have the potential to conflict with the lawyer's professional obligations to provide competent and zealous representation. After assessing the relevant codes and rules of professional responsibility, the authors conclude that an attorney should not be subject to discipline or malpractice liability for following the client's directions, as long as those directions are lawful, the client is adequately informed, and the course of action does not contradict the attorney's professional rules.

    Croson, D. C. and R. H.Mnookin. 1996. Scaling the stonewall: Retaining lawyers to bolster credibility. Harvard Negotiation Law Review1:65–83.

    Agents provide opportunities for strategic interaction not directly available to principals. Croson and Mnookin explore a fascinating example of one such interaction: What should a plaintiff with a meritorious case do when her expected transaction costs of bringing suit exceed her expected recovery at trial? Might the defendant simply “stonewall” (i.e., refuse to pay anything), reasoning that the plaintiff will not sue because her net expected value from bringing suit is negative? Croson and Mnookin argue that through hiring a lawyer on a nonrefundable retainer, plaintiffs can “scale the stonewall” and extract a positive settlement. Put differently, a nonrefundable fee arrangement, or even the threat of it, can allow a plaintiff to make a credible threat to sue and thereby extract settlement.

    Croson, R. and R. H.Mnookin. 1997. Does disputing through agents enhance cooperation? Experimental evidence. Journal of Legal Studies26(2):331–345.

    Applying the methods of experimental economics, Croson and Mnookin test implications of the model advanced by Gilson and Mnookin (1994) (see p. 306) that, by choosing lawyers with reputations for cooperation, clients can avoid excessive litigation. Based on simulated exercises using law students as subjects, they find that “self–interested clients would frequently choose cooperative lawyers if they could be confident that either (1) the other side would do the same or, (2) if the other side did not, they could switch representation.”

    Dee, P. T.1992. Ethical aspects of representing professional athletes. Marquette Sports Law Journal3(1):111–122.

    Dee analyzes three kinds of codes that regulate agent conduct—a professional code (ABA Model Code), a sports industry code (Code of Conduct for NFLPA Contract Advisors), and a state regulation (Florida Statutes). He identifies three kinds of behavior that are governed by such codes: (1) minimal standards of competence, integrity, and diligence; (2) improper conduct; and (3) parameters of solicitation. He compares and contrasts these three codes and argues that the conduct of sports agents is regulated by laws and codes that are not centrally codified.

    Downs, G. W. and D. M.Rocke. 1994. Conflict, agency, and gambling for resurrection: The principal-agent problem goes to war (how constituencies can control interventionist chief executives). American Journal of Political Science38(2):362–380.

    Working from the assumption that a political constituency has an interest in ensuring that its leaders act in accordance with its wishes, Downs and Rocke examine how—in the context of interstate conflicts—information asymmetries between the agent or political executive and the principal or citizenry may lead the latter to employ strategies to deter either overly passive or overly aggressive executives that have nonoptimal consequences. According to the authors, the dramatic, though effective, sanction of executive removal by electoral or forcible means plays a large part in shaping foreign policy in the short term and in establishing a precedent regarding the limits of citizen tolerance and the nature of citizen preferences for subsequent leaders in the long term. Drawing on historical as well as theoretical evidence, the authors find that a constituency which places a high value on an agent's fidelity to the wishes of her principal will base its use of removal sanctions on the results of the conflict in question, despite the fact that the quality of the agent's decision—which might even represent the citizenry's sentiments—may not be reflected in the conflict's outcome. A second, nonoptimal effect of regulating agents' actions through removal sanctions is a phenomenon known as “gambling for resurrection” in which an executive, threatened with removal based on an unsuccessful intervention in a conflict, will continue involvement in the conflict because it provides the only chance for the executive to avoid removal. Ironically, the more a constituency seeks to limit executive aggressiveness, the more it encourages its executive, who now has limited liability, toward an escalation of aggressive behavior. Downs and Rocke conclude their study with an assessment of the dangers of mistaking “gambling” behavior with overly aggressive behavior or vice versa.

    Ehrhardt, C. W. and M. J.Rodgers. 1988. Tightening the defense against offensive sports agents. Florida State University Law Review16:633.

    Ehrhardt provides a summary of the evolution and rationale for the use of sports agents. He proposes that negotiation inequities between team management and players led to the use of agents, which in turn led to large increases in player salaries. Agents add value by providing four primary services: (1) negotiation of contracts, (2) negotiation of endorsements, (3) financial advice and income management, and (4) legal counsel. The primary agency problems are income mismanagement, excessive fees, conflicts, and incompetence. These problems attracted attention from lawmakers, players' associations, and special interest groups who pushed for regulations. The article also summarizes recruiting tactics and recent state laws and suggests that state regulations are ineffective and difficult to enforce.

    Enzle, M. E., M. D.Harvey, and E. F.Wright1992. Implicit role obligations versus social responsibility in constituency representation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology62(2): 238–245.

    Enzle et al. take issue with existing research on representative negotiation which suggests that representatives bargain more competitively and less flexibly than nonrepresentatives. In contrast, theory suggests that representatives, because they are responsible to constituents, will adopt strategies that maximize constituent gains—whether cooperative or competitive. Using a prisoner's dilemma game, they found that, compared with nonrepresentative dyads, dual representative or mixed dyads (1) made more cooperative choices, (2) better avoided synchronous competition, (3) better coordinated the selection of mutually beneficial cooperative strategies, and (4) achieved better economic results. They also found that when paired with unconditionally cooperative or competitive negotiators, nonrepresentatives reciprocated their opponent's strategy, matching competition with competition, and the converse. Surprisingly, representatives reciprocated only with competitive negotiators and exploited cooperative negotiators to obtain larger gains. This result could have been caused by differential surveillance of the representative and nonrepresentative teams, suggesting a potential confusion in the experiment. In general, their constituent responsibility hypothesis was supported.

    Faber, D. M.1993. The evolution of techniques for negotiation of sports employment contracts in the era of the agent. University of Miami Entertainment and Sports Law Review10(1–2): 165–193.

    This article summarizes techniques and devices for the negotiation of sports employment contracts. Player techniques include holdouts, renegotiation, and leverage (e.g., comparative salaries, other offers, free agency, and arbitration publicity value). Management techniques focus on the use of leverage (e.g., pleading poverty, outspending the competition, leveraging the surroundings, and taking advantage of inexperience). Faber also summarizes player–favorable and management–favorable contract terms.

    Falk, D. B.The art of contract negotiation. Marquette Sports Law Journal3(1):1–27.

    Falk provides a detailed look at sports negotiation techniques including high–ball, low–ball, hard–ball, and “phantom” negotiation (i.e., with an agent not having authority); bluffing; and puffing. Although Falk does not explicitly address mutual gains negotiation, he does mention concepts found in the mutual gains literature including the importance of creativity and preparation. He suggests that agents structure the negotiation atmosphere to reflect their personal styles.

    Fehr, D.1993. Union views concerning agents: With commentary on the present situation in major league baseball. Marquette Sports Law Journal4(1):71–87.

    This article focuses on the relationship between agents and unions in the sports industry. Agents in this industry are dependent on unions and conditions established by collective bargaining agreements (e.g., unions cede salary negotiation rights to agents). Fehr argues that agents are necessary because unions would not be as effective at bargaining individual salaries collectively. The article includes discussion of union and agent roles and fees.

    Fisher, R.1989. Negotiating inside out: What are the best ways to relate internal negotiations with external ones?Negotiation Journal5(1):33–41.

    Negotiations between organizations implicitly involve three levels of positional bargaining: that among interest groups within the organization, between the representative and her organization, and between the representatives of the respective organizations. Fisher identifies four potential problems that arise from these multilayered negotiations: (1) a singular focus on commitment rather than interests, (2) an unvarying perception of the external negotiator over time, (3) the segregation of internal and external negotiations, and (4) the tendency among negotiators to appraise their own roles as being simply partisan. Situating his discussion in the field of international diplomacy, Fisher advises governments and their representatives to pay more attention to elements of a negotiation such as interests, precedents, relationships, and communication; to anticipate changes in the negotiator's role; to facilitate interaction between internal and external negotiations; and to recognize the negotiator as both a partisan advocate and a co–mediator.

    Fraley, R. E., F. R.Harwell, and F.Russell. 1989. The sports lawyer's duty to avoid differing interests: A practical guide to responsible representation. COMMENT11(2):165–217.

    This article summarizes conflict of interest issues for the sports agent (particularly attorneys). It explains an agent's duty to avoid conflicts of interest, focusing of application of the Model Rules of Professional Responsibility to sports representation. Situations that can lead to conflicts include (1) representing multiple clients with competing interests, (2) negotiating endorsements for players in the same sport, (3) surrounding fee arrangements with independent agent interests, (4) advising amateur athletes and planning to represent them professionally, (5) allowing player's association lawyers to negotiate for players, (6) negotiating for players and also managing their events, and (7) representation of players and coaches by the same agents. The article suggests that agents fully disclose potential conflicts to their clients and obtain consent from them. The most important issue to consider is whether a lawyer reasonably believes that a potential conflict will materially interfere with his or her independent professional judgment.

    Gilson, R. J. and R. H.Mnookin. 1994. Disputing through agents: Cooperation and conflict between lawyers in litigation. Columbia Law Review94(2):509–566.

    Litigation is often modeled as a prisoner's dilemma in which clients are trapped in an “arms race” of litigation expenditures, with lawyers the ultimate beneficiaries of that race. Such modeling, however, fails to consider the role of lawyers as agents. Gilson and Mnookin address that concern and obtain some fascinating insights. They argue that clients have a choice over what types of lawyers (i.e., “gladiatorial” vs. cooperative) they will hire and that, with attention to which lawyers they choose in the pre–litigation phase, clients can potentially “solve” their prisoner's dilemma. More specifically, opposing parties who cannot credibly commit to avoiding highly litigious tactics directly may credibly do so indirectly through each hiring a lawyer with a reputation for cooperation. In this provocative essay, Gilson and Mnookin offer a scenario under which lawyers can be value creators for their clients during litigation.

    Gould, M. T.1992. Further trials and tribulations of sports agents. The Entertainment and Sports Lawyer10(1):9–14.

    This short article explains that agents minimize the frustrations and inequities felt by self–represented athletes. Agent abuses arose from agent inexperience and/or incompetence, the lure of large financial rewards, and increasing competition. The article outlines four areas of agent abuse: (1) mismanagement of income, (2) solicitation of student athletes, (3) conflicts of interest, and (4) excessive fees. The article provides a brief overview of deterrence efforts and suggests that the lack of enforcement mechanisms limits the effectiveness of regulations. It also provides some suggestions for agents.

    Gruder, C. L. and N. A.Rosen. 1971. Effects of intragroup relations on intergroup bargaining. International Journal of Group Tensions1(4):301–317.

    Gruder and Rosen examine several of the ways in which intragroup relations, such as those between the representative of a bargaining party and the constituency, affect intergroup deliberations. Working within an experimental setting, the authors test the hypothesis that a representative's increased accountability to the constituency will amplify the representative's responsiveness to what is perceived to be the preferred bargaining style (fair and compromising, exploitative and demanding, or indeterminate) of the constituency. Although the anticipated interactions between the two variables of accountability and bargaining style do not occur, Gruder and Rosen find independent correlations between each of the variables and aspects of the intergroup negotiation, including the speed with which resolution was reached in the bargaining session, the number of agreements reached, and the size of concessions made.

    Jones, M. and S.Worchel. 1992. Representatives in negotiations: “Internal” variables that affect “external” negotiations. Basic and Applied Social Psychology13(3):323–336.

    Through simulations of labor–management negotiations, psychologists Jones and Worchel test the effects of several variables on an agent's perception of external negotiations. They find that (1) agents who are involved in formulating their group's strategy are more ready to accept their group's position; (2) agents who are new members of groups report less commitment to the group's position, less contribution to the prenegotiation discussions, and less satisfaction with their tasks than agents who are preexisting members of the group; and, somewhat surprisingly, (3) the possibility of the agent's reelection did not influence the agent's perception of the negotiations. They suggest that this third result may be an artifact of experimental design.

    Kentucky bill seeks to regulate player agents. 1994. The Sports Lawyer7 (November/December):7.

    This article describes a bill designed to regulate player agents who solicit student athletes. This bill would prohibit agents from giving misleading or deceptive advice, offering benefits in exchange for representation, and entering sweetheart deals with colleges (e.g., offering incentives to employees).

    King, E. V., Jr. 1993. Practical advice for agents: How to avoid being sued. Marquette Sports Law Journal4(1):89–127.

    King provides a firsthand account of issues that can lead to agent abuse. He suggests that, although their proximity to wealth can breed hunger, agents cannot get rich on their standard 3% to 4% commission. To increase their fees, agents feel pressure to provide services they are unqualified to give. King notes that multiservice, cradle–to-grave representation firms are particularly rife with opportunities for abuse. He suggests that contract negotiations are not the source of most agent abuses.

    Lax, D. A. and J. K.Sebenius. 1986. Agents and ratification. In The manager as negotiator: Bargaining for cooperation and competitive gain. New York: Free Press.

    Offering examples from managerial, legal, and political settings, Lax and Sebenius consider the costs and benefits of using agents in negotiations. Although the “perfect agent” might be understood as a surrogate or clone of the principal, the authors suggest that principals stand to profit just as easily as they may risk losses by employing representatives whose incentives, interests, bargaining behavior, propensity to take risks, perceived authority, and relationships with the other party or parties differ from their own. A negotiator who creates a real or feigned accountability may take advantage of some of the powerful situational dynamics of acting as an agent while reducing the negative effects of agent–principal asymmetries.

    Lax, D. A. and Sebenius, J. K.1991. Negotiating through an agent. Journal of Conflict Resolution35(3):474–493.

    Agents bargaining on behalf of principals, and particularly agents whose negotiated agreements require ex post ratification by their principals, often find themselves uncertain about their principals' reservation prices and even the agents' own nonmonetary payoff functions. Using a theoretical framework, Lax and Sebenius study the effects on bargaining behaviors and negotiated outcomes of these uncertainties and find that increased uncertainty regarding a principal's reservation price and the agent's payoff function will lead an agent to raise her reservation price, an effect magnified by increases in the agent's degree of risk aversion. The authors analyze the effects of this uncertainty in a variety of bargaining scenarios—including integrative bargains, distributive or “zero sum” bargains, optimal insistence prices in one–shot situations, and commitment games under different equilibrium concepts—and determine that increased uncertainty often, although not always, leads to a diminished likelihood of agreement.

    Levmore, S.1993. Commissions and conflicts in agency arrangements: Lawyers, real estate brokers, underwriters, and other agents' rewards. Journal of Law and Economics36(1–2):503–539.

    Drawing on case studies in a variety of industries, Levmore examines the trade–offs between risk and reward inherent in agency scenarios and proposes explanations for the variety of agency compensation arrangements. The study begins by considering both the uniformity of compensation or reward structures shared by an agent with multiple principals and the magnitude of this compensation. Uniform reward schemas such as flat commissions, the author suggests, decrease the agent's risk and promote joint revenue maximization among principals served by a common agent, thus reducing the conflicts among these principals. High, incentive–compatible, nonuniform, marginal commissions, although they appear to maximize profits for both the principal and the agent and to lessen principa1-agent conflict, may actually (1) shift an unacceptable degree of risk to the agent; (2) result in competitive auctions among different agents, which ultimately become inefficient and costly for both the principal and the agent; and (3) when taken to the extreme of 100% commission, prove incompatible with the need for bilateral incentives. Having based this initial analysis on the real estate industry, Levmore broadens the scope of his inquiry into compensation arrangements, uniformity of reward schemas, and incentive structures to include a survey of the behaviors of lawyers, publishers, retailers, travel agents, underwriters, and other agents, taking into account the conflicts that arise both among principals of a single agent and among agents of a single principal.

    Miller, G. P.1987. Some agency problems in settlement. Journal of Legal Studies16(1):189–215.

    The traditional litigation paradigm of the attorney as the agent of the client is too simplistic, Miller argues, to account for scenarios in which an attorney effectively purchases an equity interest in the outcome of the case by entering into a claim–sharing arrangement, thus becoming a second agent of sorts. Because the standard economic model for settlements assumes that both parties function as unitary identities, Miller seeks to establish a new model that reflects the potentially conflicting interests that may underlie claim–sharing arrangements. Taking three different arrangements— the contingent fee, the hourly fee, and unallocated fee shifting—as the basis of his study, the author traces the effects on settlement incentives of the allocation to either the attorney or the plaintiff of responsibility over settlements. Miller finds that only the contingency fee with plaintiff control may lead to potentially optimal results for both attorney and client; the other five arrangements are putatively nonoptimal because they may induce the claimant—whether the attorney or the plaintiff—to act in a manner that is unfavorable to the claim as a whole. Miller concludes with recommendations for how claimants may structure their relationships with coclaimants to reduce the inefficiencies and conflicts of interest inherent in claim–sharing arrangements.

    Mureiko, W. R.1988. The agency theory of the attorney-client relationship: An improper justification for holding clients responsible for their attorneys' procedural errors. Duke Law Journal4:733–754.

    Agency theory, according to Mureiko, fails to characterize adequately the attorney–client relationship, especially in cases concerned with assigning sanctions based on an attorney's procedural errors, and therefore has no place in judicial decisions. Although clients have long been held responsible for their representatives' substantive actions, it is only during the past century that courts have found—albeit inconsistently—clients culpable for their attorneys' procedural misconduct, despite court rulings that uphold an attorney's virtually unrestrained authority over procedural and strategic decisions. This contradiction, Mureiko argues, suggests that in procedural matters an attorney resembles an independent contractor more than an agent, because agency theory is unable to reflect a client's lack of participation in tactical choices. Although in standard agent–principal arrangements the principal may be found guilty of the agent's actions based on the relationship alone, Mureiko demonstrates that the application of agency theory in procedural misconduct rulings is often subject to policy concerns such as those involved in want–of-prosecution cases and discovery–abuse cases. Mureiko advocates the courts' abandonment of agency theory as a means to describe the attorney–client relationship for the sake of consistency, clarity of reasoning, and predictability.

    Peters, E.1955. Strategy and tactics in labor negotiations. New London, CT: National Foremen's Institute.

    Based on his experience within the California State Conciliation Service, Edward Peters describes the inner workings of labor–management negotiations through rich, contextual accounts of those negotiations. His focus is not on conciliation but on strategy and tactics, topics most richly explored through particular examples. Moreover, Peters works not merely at relaying events but at extracting abstract principles from those events.

    Pratt, J. W. and R. J.Zeckhauser, eds. 1985. Principals and agents: The structure of business. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

    A central work in the development of principa1-agent analysis, this collection of essays illustrates the application of that branch of micro–economic theory to business concerns. The goal throughout is relevance to actual business practice. The volume begins with two essays that provide theoretical overviews of the economics of agency. John Pratt and Richard Zeckhauser focus on information, incentives, and agency structure. Kenneth Arrow discusses the development of principa1-agent theory within the economic literature, highlighting the gaps between that theory and many common agency relationships observed in practice. The book then explores institutional and organizational responses to agency tensions. In the institutional arena, Robert Clark explores legal fiduciary duties as a response to agency tensions between firm stockholders and management. Frank Easterbrook addresses insider trading, more specifically whether the use by corporate insiders of material information not yet known to the market benefits investors. Mark Wolf son empirically examines agency tensions driven by informational asymmetries in the oil and gas industries, and Richard Epstein analyzes the paradigmatic ground of principa1-agent tensions: labor and employment contracts. In the organizational context, Robert Eccles uses field research to examine the firm's internal transfer prices through the lens of agency, and Harrison White explores the importance of control to agency for a variety of organizations, business and otherwise, both past and present.

    Professional Sports Agency. 1995. The Sports Lawyer. Special edition on sports agent regulation. Fall.

    An editor's note briefly summarizes regulation initiatives. The editor claims that the variety among state regulations places undue administrative burdens on agents and questions the effectiveness of state laws. Other articles include a summary of key aspects of Florida's regulation initiative, the most strict in the country; a summary of the bylaws of the National Collegiate Athletic Association dealing with the use of agents; a discussion of state regulations addressing the recruitment of student athletes; a description of a North Dakota law regulating athlete agents; and a sample NFLPA Standard Representation Agreement.

    Pruitt, D. G. and P. J.Carnevale. 1993. Determinants of demands, concessions, and contentious behavior (Chapter 4) and Group processes in negotiation (Chapter 10). In Negotiation in social conflict. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole.

    In these chapters, Pruitt and Carnevale discuss factors that can negatively affect negotiation behavior and outcomes. In the section on representation, they point out factors that affect the behavior of representatives in negotiation. For example, to the extent that agents believe that their principals are interested in winning, they will tend to bargain harder and concede more reluctantly. In the absence of information to the contrary, representatives tend to overestimate their constituents' desire to win; therefore, in most cases, they concede less and take longer to reach agreements than individuals negotiating on their own behalf. Another common factor is the eagerness of representatives to please constituents to whom they are accountable, a condition that can lead to a paradox: When representatives act tough to please their constituents, they often reach fewer agreements, thereby undermining their principals' interest in reaching an agreement. Another such factor is that surveillance of representatives may reinforce the constituent preferences they perceive. If agents believe that constituents favor compromise, surveillance will tend to push them in that direction.

    Putnam, R. D.1988. Diplomacy and domestic politics: The logic of two-level games. International Organization42(3):427–460.

    In this article, Putnam analyzes the relationship between domestic politics and international relations. Taking into account the existing literature, he suggests that we need to move beyond the observation that domestic politics influences international relations and vice versa, and develop theories that integrate both these levels to discover when and how they affect one another. He discusses the politics of international negotiations, which are often conceived as two–level games, and the role of decision makers or chief negotiators in these negotiations, in which states must balance sovereignty and interdependence. Putnam breaks the negotiations down into Level I, the negotiation phase, and Level II, the ratification phase, and then defines “win–sets” for each level, suggesting that the size of each “win–set” and the degree of overlap between them are integral to the outcome of the negotiations. He also considers the behavior of an agent in circumstances involving voluntary and involuntary defection and the prospects for agreement. Putnam looks at the determinants of the “win–set”; details Level II preferences and coalitions, Level II institutions, and Level I negotiator strategies; and outlines the significant features of the links between diplomacy and politics.

    Raiffa, H.1982. Salary negotiations in professional sports. In The art and science of negotiation. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

    Raiffa notes that the introduction of free agency in 1977 led to dramatic increases in baseball salaries; slower increases were seen in salaries in football, where free agency was not allowed. He accurately predicted collusion among teams to reduce the effects of competition introduced by free agency and provides statistics on salary increases in baseball and football.

    Rubin, J. Z., D. G.Pruitt, and S. H.Kim. 1994. Social conflict: Escalation, stalemate, and settlement.
    2d ed
    . New York: McGraw-Hill.

    Social psychologists Rubin, Pruitt, and Kim explore three fundamental stages of conflict: escalation, stalemate, and settlement. Defining conflict as the “perceived divergence of interest, or a belief that the parties' current aspirations cannot be achieved simultaneously,” the authors argue that most conflicts, from the intrafamilial to the international levels, pass through these common stages. They also describe basic strategies parties adopt in response to conflict: contending, yielding, and problem solving. Although their backgrounds are in social psychology, their approach is by no means limited to that discipline. They support their views with thorough references to research from many fields as well as descriptions of specific instances of conflict. In short, this book provides both a fine introduction to the study of conflict and an excellent overall treatment of that subject.

    Rubin, J. Z. and F. E. A.Sander. 1988. When should we use agents? Direct vs. representative negotiation. Negotiation Journal4(4):395–401.

    Rubin and Sander outline the distinctive features, benefits, and risks of negotiating directly versus negotiating through representatives. Although an agent's impact may vary according to whether the situation is competitive or collaborative in nature, the authors suggest that agents often lend a principal substantive knowledge, process expertise, emotional detachment, and the possibility of tactical flexibility. The use of representatives might also negatively influence a negotiation because agents add structural complexity and increase the likelihood of miscommunication between parties. Agents may fail to share a principal's goals or standards, introduce their own agendas into the negotiation, lack an emotional engagement with the situation, and, consciously or not, encourage a more adversarial negotiating climate.

    Slusher, A. E.1978. Counterpart strategy, prior relations, and constituent pressure in a bargaining simulation. Behavioral Science23(6):470–477.

    In simulations of labor–management bargaining, Slusher tests three hypotheses: (1) a shift in strategy by the bargaining counterpart from competitive to cooperative will produce “more later cooperation and more positive attitudes by the bargaining representative” than the reverse shift, (2) representatives under more constituent pressure are more competitive, and (3) where “conflictual prior relations exist, a constituent with strong feelings about his recommendations is preferred.” The experimental results support each hypothesis. Perhaps most interesting is the implication of these results for the question of whether negotiators should begin with “easy” issues and work up to “tough” ones, or vice versa. Slusher suggests that if negotiators care most about their overall level of cooperation, they should follow the former approach, but if they care most about their future relationship, they should try the latter.

    Smith, W. P.1987. Conflict and negotiation: Trends and emerging issues. Journal of Applied Social Psychology17(7):641–677.

    Smith presents a concise overview of recent developments in the study of conflict and negotiation. His section on representative bargaining summarizes significant experimental findings. He points out that accountability and surveillance are two of the most important variables in the study of representative negotiation. In the absence of surveillance, agents tend to be sanctioned by their principals based on outcomes. Where observation is possible, agents may also be evaluated based on their tactics. In general, absent information about constituent expectations, agents bargain harder than they would on their own behalf. Increased accountability and/or surveillance increases this effect. Bargaining toughness will be mitigated when agents know that they are trusted by their principals, when they know their principals prefer conciliation, or when there is an ongoing relationship between the agents. Finally, Smith observes that the effect of intragroup dissension on the behavior of agents is not well understood.

    Uphoff, R. J.1992. The criminal defense lawyer: Zealous advocate, double agent, or beleaguered dealer?Criminal Law Bulletin28(5):419–456.

    In 1967, Abraham Blumberg questioned the traditional concept of a criminal defense lawyer as a zealous advocate, suggesting instead that defense lawyers have come to act as double agents serving both sides of the plea–bargaining process. Uphoff argues that theoretical formulations of the defense lawyer as either a zealous advocate or a double agent do not coincide with the actual practices of criminal defense attorneys. After considering the systemic variables that affect the behavior of defense attorneys and the response of defendants to plea offers in three different samples, he proposes that “beleaguered dealer” would more adequately describe the role of defense counsel. Uphoff concludes his study with detailed recommendations for how indigent defense services may be restructured so as to enhance the zealousness of defense attorneys in the face of economic and procedural constraints.

    Valley, K. L., S. B.White, M. A.Neale, and M. H.Bazerman. 1992. Agents as information brokers: The effects of information disclosure on negotiated outcomes. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes51(2):220–236.

    This article describes the results of an experiment testing the impact of availability information about the parties' reservation prices on the final sale or size of the agent's commission in a real estate transaction. Findings show that sale prices are highest when an agent knows only the seller's reservation price and lowest when only the buyer's reservation price is known. Valley et al. hypothesize that knowledge of only one reservation price serves to anchor the negotiation closest to that price. There was no support for the hypothesis that increased knowledge about reservation prices will increase the size of an agent's commission; however, the authors found that commissions were higher than the surplus generated for principals, suggesting a need to reevaluate the costs and benefits of agent use in this context.

    Weiler, P. C.1993. Agent representation of the athlete. In Cases, materials, and problems on sports and the law. St. Paul, MN: West.

    This chapter provides a good general review of the legal issues surrounding representation of athletes. It defines the primary role for agents as negotiating employment terms with secondary roles including endorsement negotiation, revenue management, and tax planning and explains the prerequisites for becoming a sports agent. The chapter includes information on the role of agents vis–à–vis collective bargaining agreements, salary caps, and so on. The author offers examples of breakdown in agent–client relationships revolving around standards of competence, fee structures, conflicts of interest, and recruitment of college athletes and summarizes the emergence of sports agent regulation.

    Weiler, P. C.1993. Agent representation of the athlete. In Statutory and documentary supplement to cases, materials, and problems on sports and the law. St. Paul, MN: West.

    This volume contains regulations such as the NBPA Regulations Governing Player Agents, Minnesota statutes, California Labor Code, Florida statutes, and the NCAA Constitution.

    Yasser, R. L.1994. Sports law: Cases and materials.
    2d ed
    . Cincinnati: Anderson.

    Chapter 8, “Representation of Professional Athletes,” describes the seven functions of a sports agent and five common areas of agent abuse. It also examines the duties imposed on agents by common law, statutes, and regulations and applies Model Rules of Professional Conduct to typical categories of agent abuses. Chapter 9, “Negotiation of Contracts,” suggests that a mutual gains approach is particularly important in sports negotiation and provides a summary of applicable negotiation theory. This chapter cautions that the desire to protect the client's relationship with the team after the negotiation can create a conflict for agents during negotiations.

    About the Authors

    Eileen E Babbitt is Assistant Professor of International Politics and Director of the International Negotiation and Conflict Resolution Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. Her research interests include preventative diplomacy, postsettlement peace building, and roles for third parties in protracted intergroup conflicts. She is currently editing a book on the refraining of protracted conflicts and implications for intervention, as well as initiating research projects on trust building and on negotiating self–determination.

    Max H. Bazerman is the J. Jay Gerber Distinguished Professor at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management of Northwestern University. From 1998 to 2000, he is the Thomas Henry Carroll Ford Visiting Professor of Business Administration and Marvin Bower Fellow at the Harvard Business School. His research focuses on decision making, negotiation, and the natural environment. He is the author or coauthor of more than 100 research articles as well as the author, coauthor, or coeditor of nine books, including Smart Money Decisions (in press), Judgment in Managerial Decision Making (4th edition, 1998), Cognition and Rationality in Negotiation (1991, with M. Neale), and Negotiating Rationally (1992, with M. Neale).

    Abram J. Chayes is Felix Frankfurter Professor of Law, Emeritus, Harvard Law School, and Co–Director of the Project on International Compliance and Dispute Settlement. He is a member of the Steering Committee of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School. In the 1980s, he represented Nicaragua in the World Court case against the United States concerning the Reagan Administration's policy of support for the contras. He is the author of The Cuban Missile Crisis: International Crisis and the Role of Law(1974; 2nd edition, 1987) and coauthor of The New Sovereignty: Compliance With Treaties in International Regulatory Regimes (1995, with Antonia H. Chayes).

    Jonathan R. Cohen is Assistant Professor at the University of Florida Levin College of Law in Gainesville. Trained as a lawyer and an economist, he is currently writing about ethical dimensions of negotiation and lawyering. His recent publications address the use of apology in legal disputes, the roles of rationality in negotiation, and theological implications of human cloning.

    Joel Cutcher–Gershenfeld is Visiting Associate Professor at MIT's Sloan School of Management. He is also Co–Chair of PON's Program on Negotiations in the Workplace. He has recently coauthored a book on the global diffusion of new work systems, titled Knowledge–Driven Work: Unexpected Lessons From Japanese and U.S. Work Practices, and is coauthor of a forthcoming book on organizational learning. He has coedited three other books on training and public policy and is the author or coauthor of more than 60 articles or book chapters. Currently, he is co–leading research on the implementation of new work systems for MIT's Lean Aerospace Initiative, the employment implications of instability in the aerospace industry, the status of collective bargaining in the United States (for the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service), and the global diffusion of ADR principles (for the Society of Professionals in Dispute Resolution).

    Wayne Davis is Practice Manager at Fidelity Consulting, an internal management consulting unit of Fidelity Investments. He has been associated with the Harvard Negotiation Project for more than 15 years as a teacher, researcher, and developer of negotiation curricula and supporting teaching materials. His current focus is on intraorganizational negotiations and on the impact of “competition at Internet speed” on organizational behavior.

    Roger Fisher is Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project, Williston Professor of Law Emeritus at Harvard Law School and coauthor of Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd edition, 1991). His latest book, Getting It Done: How to Lead When You're Not in Charge (1998), was coauthored by Alan Sharp with John Richardson. He is concerned with developing concepts and tools that help practitioners deal with their differences in a less costly and more effective manner. He is the founder and Senior Advisor to Conflict Management, Inc., and the nonprofit Conflict Management Group.

    Pacey C. Foster is a doctoral candidate in organization studies at the Wallace E. Carroll School of Management at Boston College. He is the former associate director of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School and has worked in alternative dispute resolution for more than 10 years. His current research and practice interests include negotiation pedagogy, integrating negotiation and action research methods, and exploring the social mechanisms underlying conflict behavior in organizational networks.

    Gordon M. Kaufman is Professor of Operations Research and Management at the Sloan School of Management at MIT. His major interests lie in the mathematical modeling of negotiation processes and in teaching competitive decision making. His current research involves testing hypotheses of Internet negotiation.

    David C. King is Associate Professor of Public Policy at Harvard University, where he teaches about the U.S. Congress, interest groups, and political parties. His books include Turf Wars: How Congressional Committees Claim Jurisdiction (1997) and Why People Don't Trust Government (1997), which he coedited with Joseph S. Nye and Philip D. Zelikow. His current research explores the causes and consequences of political polarization.

    Terri Kurtzberg is a Ph.D. candidate in organization behavior from the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University, as well as a Research Associate for the Ernst and Young Center for Business Innovation. Her background includes a B.A. in psychology and an M. A. in education from the University of Chicago. Her primary research focuses on creativity in organizational and negotiating work teams. Other research interests include knowledge transfer and learning, conflict resolution, and the effects of electronic media on communication and negotiation effectiveness.

    Brian S. Mandell is Lecturer in Public Policy and Chair of Harvard University's Wexner–Israel Fellowship Program and Pew Faculty Fellow and Senior Research Associate at Harvard's Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs. His current teaching and research address the theory and practice of negotiation, emphasizing third–party facilitation and consensus building in protracted policy disputes. He writes about international mediation and is completing a book on new approaches to conflict management. Before arriving at Harvard, he taught at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs at Carleton University in Ottawa. Previously, he was a strategic analyst for the Canadian Department of National Defence specializing in United Nations peacekeeping and the implementation of arms control treaties.

    Janet Martinez is a Senior Associate and Program Manager at the Consensus Building Institute. She teaches—at MIT and Harvard University—graduate and executive courses in negotiation, public policy, and international dispute resolution in the private, nonprofit, and public sectors. A lawyer and mediator, she has published cases, simulations, and articles on negotiation and consensus building. Her two current research interests are international dispute settlement system design (based on an analysis of the World Trade Organization) and the use of “parallel informal negotiation” in international trade and environment institutions. She is currently a Ph.D. candidate at MIT.

    Robert B. McKersie is Society of Sloan Fellows Professor of Management Emeritus at the MIT Sloan School of Management. His research interests have been in labor–management relations, with particular focus on bargaining activity. With Richard Walton, he coauthored A Behavioral Theory of Labor Negotiations (1965). Subsequently, he focused his attention on the subject of productivity (authoring a book with Lawrence Hunter titled Pay, Productivity and Collective Bargaining) and participated in a multiyear project at the Sloan School that resulted in the award–winning book by Thomas Kochan and Harry Katz titled The Transformation of American Industrial Relations. More recently, he has returned to the subject of the bargaining process and coauthored, with Richard Walton and Joel Cutcher–Gershenfeld, Strategic Negotiations. He continues to do research on strategies being pursued in different industries to bring about more effective organizational arrangements. The auto, steel, and transportation sectors are of special interest.

    Robert H. Mnookin is Chairman of the Steering Committee of the Program on Negotiation, Director of the Harvard Negotiation Research Project, and the Williston Professor of Law at Harvard Law School. His major interest is in studying barriers to the negotiated resolution of conflict and how to overcome them. His most important new project is a book on how lawyers can create value through negotiation.

    Don Moore is a doctoral student at the Kellogg Graduate School of Management at Northwestern University. His research interests lie in decision making and negotiation. His dissertation is on the role of time pressure in negotiation.

    Kalypso Nicolaïdis is Associate Professor of Public Policy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. She teaches courses on negotiation, international institutions, the European Union, and nationalism. She is also currently a University Lecturer at Oxford University. Her research combines her interests in the sources of cooperation in regional and multilateral settings, the interface between trade and regulation issues, and the dynamics of bargaining under complexity. She is completing a book on the principle of mutual recognition and the lessons that can be drawn from Europe for the rest of the world.

    Bruce M. Patton is Deputy Director of the Harvard Negotiation Project and a founding director of CMI/Vantage Partners LLC, an international consulting firm that helps organizations build and sustain important internal and external relationships that can make differences and conflict a source of creativity and competitive advantage rather than a drag on productivity. He is also the Thaddeus R. Beal Lecturer on Law at Harvard Law School, where he teaches the Negotiation Workshop he pioneered with Roger Fisher. He is the coauthor, with Fisher and William Ury, of Getting to YES: Negotiating Agreement Without Giving In (2nd edition, 1991) and the coauthor, with Douglas Stone and Sheila Heen, of Difficult Conversations: How to Discuss What Matters Most (1999).

    Jeswald W. Salacuse is Henry J. Braker Professor of Commercial Law at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University. He specializes in international negotiation, international business transactions, and law and development. He has written numerous books and articles on various aspects of law and international relations, including Making Global Deals—Negotiating in the International Marketplace (1991), International Business Planning: Law and Taxation (with W. P. Streng, 1982), An Introduction to Law in French–Speaking Africa, Nigerian Family Law, and The Art of Advice (1994).

    Lawrence E. Susskind is Ford Professor of Urban and Environmental Planning at MIT, President of the Consensus Building Institute, and Director of the Harvard–MIT Public Disputes Program. His major interest lies in multiparty dispute resolution, particularly in the public policy arena. His most important new project is the development of strategies (such as parallel informal negotiation) that can be used to generate more creative (i.e., value–generating) options in diplomatic contexts. He is the senior author of The Consensus Building Handbook(1999), which spells out alternatives to Robert's Rules of Order for all kinds of groups and ad hoc assemblies that wish to operate by consensus.

    Kathleen Valley is Associate Professor at the Harvard Business School. Her professional focus is on personal and professional relationships and their effects on negotiation processes and outcomes. Her latest project is Fight, Play Fair, or Work Together: Mutually Developed Scripts in Negotiations, a theoretical and empirical investigation of the ways in which social closeness and contextual differences affect the “script” that evolves during a negotiation.

    Michael Watkins is Associate Professor of Business Administration at the Harvard Business School. He teaches and does research at the intersection between leadership and negotiation, exploring how leaders negotiate and negotiators lead. He recently completed a study exploring how new leaders coming into top management positions should manage their first 6 months on the job. This research will be published by Harvard Business School Press as Right From the Start: Taking Charge in a New Leadership Role. He is working on a book on international negotiations tentatively titled Negotiating in a Complex World.

    Michael Wheeler is Professor of Management at the Harvard Business School. He is the author or coauthor of six books and numerous articles in scholarly journals and the public press. His research focuses on negotiation and dispute resolution, notably in the context of environmental policy, facility siting, and real estate development. He is the coeditor (with Deborah Kolb) of Negotiation Journal and has been a member of the Steering Committee of the Program on Negotiation at Harvard Law School since 1984. His current research focuses on complexity, specifically, the theoretical and practical implications of the fact that interests, BATNAs, and even the parties themselves often change in the process of negotiation.

    Richard J. Zeckhauser is the Frank P. Ramsey Professor of Political Economy at the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University. He also teaches in the Law School and the Economics Department at Harvard. His research starts from the observation that uncertainty and strategic behavior are pervasive in our world; his major research interests are the challenges of making wise decisions under uncertainty and effective structures for relationships, whether between firms, individuals, or nations. He is currently studying how corporations and stock analysts manipulate earnings and earnings estimates, the game plan of elite colleges and their applicants in the minuet of early admissions, and how health insurance is and should be structured.

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