Summary
Contents
Subject index
This auspicious new volume is designed for linguists who are interested in the deeper issues of their science. Introduction to Linguistic Philosophy lays a solid foundation of linguistic philosophy presenting theories of leading linguistic analysts such as Frege, Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, and Quine. I. E. MackenzieÆs exploration into these theories equips readers for advanced work on most topics in semantics and the study of language. The structure of this book reflects the fact that the philosophical study of language is not systematic, but centers on aspects of language that are considered to be of fundamental conceptual significance. Therefore, this book need not be read in any specific order. Whenever a chapter presupposes an understanding of something that is explained elsewhere in the book, a specific cross-reference is given. MackenzieÆs approach to the philosophy of language stresses the importance of observing how language is used rather than the assuming that it conforms to a pre-existing logical structure. In addition to dealing with foundational issues, such as truth, meaning, and the nature of language, this book explores specific linguistic phenomenaùdescriptions, names, non-extesional contexts and quantificationùwhich have attracted considerable philosophical attention. Introduction to Linguistic Philosophy is a student-centered resource that is recommended for students in linguistics, communication, and philosophy.
Names, Sense, and Nominatum
Names, Sense, and Nominatum
4.1. The Name Relation
It is customary in philosophy of language and semantics to adopt some form of what Carnap (1956:96–144) called the method of the name relation. The name relation is normally thought to hold between an expression in a language and a concrete or abstract object, of which the expression is said to be a name. Various terms are used to express this relation, for example: ‘x is a name for y,’ ‘x designates y’, ‘x stands for y’, ‘x refers to y’, ‘x denotes y’ (although the last has a rather different sense in the work of Russell). Conversely, the object named by a given expression may be called the nominatum (plural: nominata) of that expression ...
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