Governance in the European Union
Publication Year: 1996
Presenting a fresh alternative to traditional state-centered analyses of the process of European integration, Governance in the European Union clearly shows the interaction of subnational, national, and supranational actors in the emerging European polity. This “multilevel politics” approach offers a powerful lens for viewing the future course of European integration. The authors' empirical exploration of areas such as regional governance, social policy, and social movements underpins their broad conceptual and theoretical framework, providing significant new insight into European politics. Governance in the European Union will appeal to students and academics across the broad spectrum of political science, and will be of particular interest to those in European studies, public policy studies, comparative politics, and political theory.
- Front Matter
- Back Matter
- Subject Index
- Chapter 1: Examining the Present Euro-Polity with the Help of Past Theories
- Chapter 2: Negative and Positive Integration in the Political Economy of European Welfare States
- Chapter 3: Competencies, Cracks and Conflicts: Regional Mobilization in the European Union
- Chapter 4: Neo-Voluntarism: A New European Social Policy Regime?
- Chapter 5: Social Movements and the Changing Structure of Political Opportunity in the European Union
- Chapter 6: Imagining the Future of the Euro-Polity with the Help of New Concepts
© Editorial selection and matter © Gary Marks, Fritz W. Scharpf, Philippe C. Schmitter and Wolfgang Streeck 1996
Chapter 1 © Philippe C. Schmitter 1996
Chapter 2 © Fritz W. Scharpf 1996
Chapter 3 © Gary Marks, François Nielsen, Leonard Ray and Jane Salk 1996
Chapter 4 © Wolfgang Streeck 1996
Chapter 5 © Gary Marks and Doug McAdam 1996
Chapter 6 © Philippe C. Schmitter 1996
First published 1996 Reprinted 1998
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system, transmitted or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without permission in writing from the Publishers.
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This book is part of a broad stream of theorizing about the dynamics and consequences of institutional creation in the European Union. The topic, taken in the round, is a massive one for it touches on virtually every aspect of politics in the member states, and it would have been self-defeating for us to try to cover but a fraction of it. What we have sought to do, however, is to illuminate certain critical dynamics of European integration. Fritz Scharpf analyses the asymmetry between deregulation based in supranational EU law and re-regulation which must work its way through the EU's political process; Doug McAdam, Gary Marks and his collaborators examine the responses of domestic political actors to supranational political opportunities; Wolfgang Streeck analyses the stresses between national social policy regimes and European-wide markets and competition; and Philippe Schmitter conceptualizes alternative scenarios for the emerging Euro-polity.
The European Union is a moving target in two senses: first, because of the sheer extent of institutional reconfiguration over the past decade; second, because change in the EU is iterative (i.e. events at t0 feed into the sources of change at t1). The result is an extraordinarily dynamic polity in which innovations agreed by national governments in the major treaties create webs of constraints and inducements that lead to new conflicts and pressures on governments for further institutional negotiation. As this book makes clear, it would be naive to view the process through a teleological lens as leading inexorably to political integration. The terms used in this book to describe governance in the Euro-polity – variable geometry, multi-level, à la carte, condominio, consortio – have in common the assumption that central state executives and supranational institutions, distinctive national systems of economic governance and international markets coexist and will continue to coexist.
Each of the chapters of this book deals with the tensions that arise in a multi-level polity: among national governments regarding the allocation of resources and decision-making competencies; between national executives and supranational actors; between subnational and national governments. The logical consequence of tying actors at different levels into a single polity is that sources of contention about resources and decision-making increase exponentially. Disputes that were formerly handled by national governments in interstate negotiation are domesticated within a polity driven by a mix of national, supranational and subnational actors. Few, if [Page viii]any, observers claim that a single type of actor monopolizes decision-making. The task we have set ourselves is to generalize the dynamics of such interactions across a variety of policy areas.
The intellectual journeys the authors have taken over the past several years have crossed at many points. Philippe Schmitter, Wolfgang Streeck and Gary Marks collaborated in a larger group with David Cameron, Geoffrey Garrett, Peter Lange, Alberta Sbragia and David Soskice concerned with institutional change in the European Community. The group started out as a joint venture of scholars based at Duke University, the University of North Carolina-Chapel Hill, Stanford University and the University of Wisconsin-Madison. It received generous support from the Social Science Research Council in New York. Some group members had the opportunity to spend all or part of the 1992/3 academic year at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences at Stanford. The Center provides a most congenial forum for bringing together scholars from diverse fields, and the Marks/McAdam chapter originated in a series of sunlit conversations that took place there.
Chapters 1 and 6 were originally written while the author was a fellow of the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences where he benefited inestimably from the informal exchange of ideas that characterizes this privileged site. Both chapters have been repeatedly discussed with colleagues in Europe and the United States and cannibalized for presentation at numerous conferences. Bits-and-pieces of them (along with new material) have been published as: ‘Representation and the Future Euro-polity’, Staatswissenschaften und Staatspraxis, III, 3 (1992), pp. 379–405; ‘Quelques alternatives pour le futur système politique européen et leurs implications pour les politiques puliques europeennes’ in Yves Mény, Pierre Muller et Jean-Louis Quermonne (eds), Politiques Publiques en Europe (Paris: L'Harmattan, 1995), pp. 27–47; ‘The Future Euro-Polity and Its Impact upon Private Interest Governance within Member States’, Droit et Société, No. 28 (1994), pp. 659–676.
Work on Chapter 2 was in part supported by the Robert Schuman Centre at the European University Institute, Florence. For helpful comments the author is indebted to Colin Crouch, Dieter Freiburghaus, Philipp Genschel and Yves Mény.
The authors of Chapter 3 are indebted to Richard Haesley and Ivan Llamazares for ideas and research assistance. They would like to thank Liesbet Hooghe, David Lowery, participants in the Comparative Politics Discussion Group at the Department of Political Science, UNC-CH, and the anonymous referees for comments and advice. This research was made possible in part by grants from the Institute for Research in the Social Sciences at the University of North Carolina (to Marks), the University Research Council at the University of North Carolina (to Nielsen) and from the Josiah Trent Memorial Foundation at Duke University (to Salk). Gary Marks's co-authors are listed in alphabetical order. Part of this chapter was printed in Comparative Political Studies.
Chapter 4 was written while the author was a Fellow at the Wissenschaftskolleg Berlin. A preliminary version was presented at a conference at the European University Institute in Florence in May 1994. Part of the chapter was printed in European LawJournal, Vol. I, No. 1, pp. 31–59.
Work on Chapter 5 began while both authors were Fellows at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences. They are thus indebted to the Center and its staff for the role they played in facilitating this collaboration. In addition the authors would like to thank the following [Page x]people for their useful comments on various versions of the manuscript: Elisabeth Clemens, Myra Marx Ferree, Neil Fligstein, Christian Joppke, Alfonso Morales, Tony Oberschall, Charles Perrow, Woody Powell, Jeremy Richardson, Sidney Tarrow, Charles Tilly and Cyrus Ernesto Zirakzadeh. The order of authorship for this chapter was determined alphabetically. Part of the chapter was printed in West European Politics.
1. Hence the notion that the international system is becoming ‘neo-medieval’ has gained some currency. See Bull (1977: 264), for what seems to be the first appreciation of this. For more popular versions, see Eco (1986) and Lapham (1988).
2. For a particularly intelligent use of federalist theory to explore the emergent properties of the Euro-polity, see Sbragia (1992).
3. All deserve the prefix neo because they are revised versions of original theories that were much simpler in their causal structures and more demanding in their prior assumptions. Neo-realists and neo-rationalists seem to be much more confident in the generalizability (and logical elegance) of their approaches than are neo-functionalists; therefore, I will in deference refer to the former two as theories and to the latter as a ‘perspective’ or ‘framework’ for analysis.
Since writing this section, I have come across Martin Wight (1991), where he outlines three ‘traditions’ of thinking about international relations; (a) Machiavellian or Realist; (b) Grotian or Rationalist; (c) Kantian or Revolutionary. Leaving aside the appropriateness of his labels, I cannot help but be struck by the degree to which they seem to coincide with the three ways of looking at the more specific topic of regional integration delineated above.
4. An exception would be Robert Axelrod (1984), were it not for the fact that his Tit for tat’ strategies assume a simple iterative game and not a historically unprecedented experiment involving a succession of novel problems, each with a different pay-off structure.
5. Nowhere is this more marked (and less expected) than in the cases of Robert O. Keohane and Stanley Hoffmann (1991), since the latter was long an eloquent realistic critic of neo-functionalism and the former a leading, if critical, contributor to the neo-realist school. For the earlier work, see Hoffmann (1966) and Keohane (1986). Also Mutimer (1989).
6. Elsewhere, I have defined this ‘spill-over hypothesis’ in the following way: ‘Tensions from the global environment and/or contradictions generated by past performance (within the organization) give rise to unexpected performance in pursuit of agreed-upon objectives. These frustrations and/or dissatisfactions are likely to result in the search for alternative means for reaching the same goals, i.e. to induce actions to revise their respective strategies vis-à-vis the scope and level of regional decisionmaking’ (Schmitter 1970: 243).
7. For a case study of entropy and encapsulation, see Schmitter (1969).
8. Joseph Nye (1965) was the first to pick this theme up, but his insight remained unexploited.
9. It undoubtedly helped that in the early 1950s an unusually homogeneous group of statesmen was governing the six original member states. Their common conservative and Catholic background and high degree of mutual trust may have made them exceptionally willing to take ‘le saut dans l'inconnu’ that such a novel measure implied. Protestant Britain, it will be remembered, was governed by Clement Attlee and the Labour Party at the time. See Pineau and Rimbaud (1991: esp. 67–101).
10. The scores reported in the cells of Table 1.1 are based on a reading of the extant secondary literature on each of twenty-nine issue arenas. Needless to say, the coverage of these policies by specialists has been uneven, as has been their attention to specific causal agents and processes. The ‘yes’, ‘mixed’ and ‘no’ shadings in the table should, therefore, be regarded as tentative and subject to revision in the future. I am especially grateful to James Kinzer and Matt Tupper for their dedicated help in digesting and coding the data.
11. There has been some disagreement among specialists on the specific role that Jacques Delors, President of the Commission, and his staff have played in the ‘crafting’ of the SEA and [Page 152]the MAT. Neo-realists and neo-rationalists, such as Andrew Moravcsik (1991) and Geoffrey Garrett (1992), tend to discount it and to stress the initiatives taken at the European Council Meetings by Kohl, Mitterrand or their respective foreign ministers. For the view of a scholar not contaminated by an a priori theoretical stance who stresses the relative autonomy of the Commission and, especially, of its President (but who may be influenced by his status as a participant observer), see George Ross (1992).
12. Research by Roy Ginsberg (1991) on the foreign policy actions of the EC confirms this impression. After classifying the causes of Community action as due either to ‘integration’ (i.e. functional responses stemming from prior EC policies), ‘interdependence’ (i.e. political or economic linkages to the global interstate system) or ‘self-styled action’ (i.e. emanating from the EC's own sense of mission and independence), he observes an overall tendency for the functional explanations to decline consistently and proportionately over time from an initial high in 1976–80 (73 per cent of all foreign policy actions) to 1981–85 (64 per cent) to 1986–90 (57 per cent) – even though their absolute number continues to increase. More and more of the EC's attention in this field seems motivated either by its own autonomous initiatives or by global incentives.
13. Most of what I know about this process I owe to the magisterial article by Joseph H.H. Weiler (1991)
14. Ironically, this need to pay more attention to the role of professional norms and solidarities in the integration process comes close to advocating a return to the original international functionalism of David Mitrany (1966), in which a great deal of emphasis (and hope) was placed on the role of independent experts. Recent work on ‘epistemic communities’ seems to touch on the same theme, even if the imbrication of national and international lawyers and judges has not (yet) been subjected to its scrutiny. See, especially. Adler and Haas (1992) and Haas (1992).
15. At most, there has been very little written about how different mixes of member states might affect the long-term evolution of European institutions. For some discussion of this issue, see Galtung (1989). Presumably, if a more rigorous theoretical tradition on this subject does develop, it will come from the neo-rationalists, who can draw on an existing (if not very successful) literature on ‘optimal currency areas’ or the ‘optimal size of the firm’. For an effort to apply the theory of clubs and other aspects of economic reasoning to the EEC and other international associations, see Dosser et al. (1982).
16. The pre-First World War period and the 1920s were both times of open capital markets, free world trade and a tendency toward capitalist crisis (Polanyi 1957). In the early 1930s, the major industrial nations responded to the Great Depression with protectionist or even autarkist strategies of competitive devaluation, capital export controls, import restrictions and subsidized exports. As a result, the world economy collapsed. After the Second World War, it took more than two decades of GATT negotiations gradually to re-liberalize international trade, and it took two oil price shocks before the world capital markets were again freed from national control. In retrospect, this gradual transition from closed national economies to an uncontrolled world economy appears to have provided the optimal conditions for ‘social-democratic’ solutions at the national level. Until the mid-1970s, at any rate, Western European societies were able to profit from the economic dynamism of capitalism while stabilizing its fluctuations through Keynesian macro-economic controls, and correcting its distributive inequities through union power and social-welfare policies (Ruggie 1995).
17. In the neo-Marxist political-economic literature, much is made of declining shares of profit in the postwar decades as an indicator of the unresolvable contradiction between the capitalist economy and the democratic state. But since investment would cease when the rate of return on capital becomes negative, governments and unions would become aware of the risks of a profit squeeze for employment and growth and economies with neo-corporatist institutional structures are in theory, and were in fact, quite capable of avoiding or correcting this strategic blunder (Wallerstein 1990; Scharpf 1991a).
18. Conversely, national monetary policy does have the power to attract capital, by setting national interest rates above the international level. But in doing so, it will raise the exchange rate, which decreases the international competitiveness of the national economy.[Page 153]
19. In theory, they could still be passed on to consumers through a devaluation of the national currency. However, regulations and wage settlements tend to affect specific branches of industry, rather than the economy as a whole. The loss of competitiveness may thus not be general enough to be fully compensated (from the point of view of the affected industry) by adjustments of the exchange rate. Moreover, under the conditions of global currency speculation, export competitiveness is no longer the most important factor determining exchange rates. In addition, an independent central bank whose primary goal is price stability is perfectly capable of stabilizing the exchange rate at a higher level than would be justified by the international competitiveness of the national economy.
20. Garrett (1992, 1995) interprets the case law of the European Court of Justice in an ‘intergovernmentalist’ frame as the focal point of a latent consensus among governments, whereas Burley and Mattli (1993) point to the existence of serious conflicts of interest. In their (‘neo-functionalist’) interpretation, the emphasis is on the relative autonomy of the legal system and its effectiveness as a ‘mask and shield’ against direct political intervention. See also Weiler (1993, 1994) and Mattli and Slaughter (1995). What Garrett seems to ignore, within his own frame of reference, is the importance of institutional decision rules: the Court (and the Commission, for that matter) is effectively able to impose outcomes that would not find a qualified majority in the Council of Ministers but which cannot be corrected by the Council as long as the opposing governments are not themselves able to mobilize a qualified counter-majority (or, when the Court's decision involves an interpretation of the Treaty, unanimous action) in the Council.
21. Negative integration was and is pursued by the Commission primarily through ‘decisions’ and ‘directives’ under Arts 89 and 90 of the Treaty and through action against national infringements of Treaty obligations under Art. 169. Of at least the same practical importance is the direct application of European law in ordinary legal disputes before national courts and the possibility, under Art. 177. of preliminary rulings of the Court of Justice at the request of any (even inferior) national court. Again, the Council of Ministers is not involved, and national governments will typically appear before the Court only in the role of defendants.
22. According to neo-liberal theorists, the Community was meant to do no more than to establish and safeguard the postulates of economic freedom and undistorted competition in the European market. Hence the expansion of the European mandate, brought about by the Maastricht Treaty, in the fields of environmental protection, industrial policy or social cohesion, is viewed most critically by authors of this school (Mestmäcker 1992: Behrens 1994). In order to minimize potential damage, it is now also postulated that ‘the rights of individuals, granted by the Treaty of the European Communities, to participate in commerce across national borders [must] not be encroached upon by measures in the service of the newly established competencies’ (Mestmäcker 1994: 286). If this were accepted, the constraints on positive integration would be not only political, but constitutional as well.
23. I will limit myself here to the simplest form of ‘intergovernmental’ explanation. It is of course true, as has been pointed out by several critics, that actual interaction patterns are much more complex. In addition to national governments (or the ministries represented in specialized Councils), they include at least the ‘supranational’ Commission and ‘subnational’ interest organizations and films as players in connected games. I also do not rule out the possibility that, in order to explain specific decisions, two-level games and perhaps much more complex models must in fact be employed. Pragmatically, however, it still makes sense first to exhaust the explanatory power of simple, and hence transparent, models – and to add further complications only when necessary. And at any rate, the agreement of the national governments in the Council of Ministers has remained the critical bottleneck in EC decision processes.
24. Héritier interprets these conflicts as a ‘regulatory competition’, where certain ‘high-regulation countries’ attempt to influence the mode of European regulations in order to reduce their own adjustment costs. In the present context it is useful to point out that this is not the (Prisoner's-Dilemma-like) ‘competition among regulatory systems’, whose most likely outcome is competitive deregulation. In the processes studied by Héritier, all member states would prefer agreement on European regulations at high levels of environmental protection, but they [Page 154]differ about the style of regulation that the Community should adopt. Thus, their competition resembles the ‘Battle of the Sexes’ game discussed below.
25. More differentiated analyses are possible, and may be indispensable in the study of specific cases. In the area of environmental policy, for instance, governments of economically highly developed and ecologically highly impacted countries must respond to the cross-pressures of employment interests in the industrial sector and of environmentally sensitized voters. In less developed countries, by contrast, employment interests may be reinforced by the resistance of consumers to price increases caused by stringent environmental regulations. In either case, of course, government responses should also depend on the relative importance of the affected industries in the country in question.
26. Streeck (1995: 10) is correct in pointing out that process-related environmental and safety regulations may create obstacles to trade in the market for machine tools and production plants. For that reason, he includes these in his definition of ‘market-making’, as distinguished from ‘market-correcting’, regulations.
27. Moreover, product-related standardization profits from procedural innovations which minimize the need for consensus in the Council of Ministers by restricting its decisions to the definition of safety principles whose detailed specification is then left to ‘corporatist’ committees representing the affected industries and national standardization organizations (Eichener 1993; Voelzkow 1993; Scharpf 1994).
28. Heckathorn and Maser (1987) have labelled this constellation, in which a ‘cooperative’ solution to the Prisoner's Dilemma requires agreement on one of several options that differ in their distributive characteristics, a ‘Divided Prisoner's Dilemma’.
29. In their discussion of environmental policy, Rehbinder and Stewart (1984: 9) focus instead on the distinction between ‘polluter states’ and ‘environmental states’. This appears to be less useful as an explanation of voting behaviour in Brussels, since highly developed countries produce more pollution and also have an interest in more stringent, European-wide, environmental regulations.
30. Naturally, Portugal and Greece (just like eastern Germany Hank 1994) also have islands of above-average productivity, especially in new plants of multinational corporations.
31. According to surveys conducted by the Swedish employers’ association (SAF), overall costs of a man-hour in industry ranged in 1993 between 33 Swedish krona in Portugal, 56 krona in Greece and 204 krona in Germany (Kosonen 1994).
32. Of course, the intensity of price competition varies between sectors. For example, in agriculture, ‘Southern products’ hardly compete with ‘Northern products’.
33. Thus, it is not only the opposition of enterprises that stands in the way of a European social policy (Streeck 1995). Governments in economically weaker states must, on their own account, anticipate and try to avoid the exit option of capital.
34. If the affected branches of industry do not play a major role in the less developed member states, the damage done by European regulations at a high level of protection may be small enough to be compensated by side-payments from the structural and cohesion funds. It is also sometimes suggested that the agreement of some member states to relatively demanding environmental regulations may be a reflection on relatively less demanding practices of implementation.
35. Even though the Maastricht Treaty did generally allow for qualified-majority voting on environmental measures (Art. 130S), any five of the six countries with the lowest wage and non-wage labour costs in the Union (Portugal, Greece, Spain, Ireland, Britain and Italy) can easily muster a blocking minority against regulations that would damage their competitive position.
36. The theoretical background of this proposition can only be suggested here (Scharpf 1970). A need for legitimation arises when decisions override the preferences of some affected parties. Until recently, the European Community was able to rely primarily upon an ‘output-oriented’ form of legitimacy, for which the maximization of common welfare and the fair allocation of costs and benefits are crucial criteria. But as European interventions have become more frequent, more important and their allocative effects more visible, ‘input-oriented’ [Page 155]legitimacy (involving democratic discourse and the democratic accountability of decision-makers) have gained in salience.
37. This is not meant to deny the possibility of non-majoritarian forms of legitimation (Majone 1994a, 1994b; Dehousse 1995). But the respect for expertise, impartiality and procedural fairness which may legitimate the decisions of courts, central banks or American-style independent regulatory commissions is unlikely to do much for the legitimation of the results of political horse-trading in the Council of Ministers.
38. It is often argued that the European Community should not be held to ideal but unrealistic standards of democratic practice which are frequently violated in all member states. In my view, this misses the point. Under modern conditions, democracy can only be defined as a potential or, as it were, a fleet-in-being. It is neither possible nor necessary that every matter be dealt with in the full light of public attention, as long as office-holders reckon with the possibility that any case may become politicized. When that is assured, the ‘law of anticipated reactions’ must do the rest.
39. In my view, further increases in the legislative competence of the European Parliament are not the most promising short-term strategy, since they would also render European decision processes even more cumbersome than they are now. Instead, if the President of the Commission were elected by, and fully accountable to, the European Parliament, this would help to focus media attention on a highly visible position of political leadership; it would require parties in the Parliament to present candidates with a European-wide appeal; and it might, in due course, lead to the formation of European-wide political parties (Weidenfeld 1995). As Dehousse (1995) points out, however, the introduction of party-political orientations in the Commission might render its relations to national governments in the Council more difficult than they are now – an argument that finds ample support in the practice of German federalism.
40. Overviews of earlier discussions and actual practices are provided by Nicoll (1984) and Langeheine and Weinstock (1984). There have also been proposals for a ‘Europe of relativities’ which would generally define common European standards in terms of criteria that are sensitive to differences in the level of economic development. For example, the revenue to be raised by an EC-wide environmental tax might be defined as a percentage of GDP in order to avoid disproportional burdens on the less developed member states (Weizsäcker 1989). Similar models are also being discussed in reference to social policy.
41. Remarkably, negative integration in the European Community includes elaborate injunctions against distortions of competition created by subsidies, preferential public procurement and other forms of ‘affirmative action’ favouring national producers – but apparently none against the practices of competitive deregulation.
42. The other factor Schmidt (1995: 18) identifies is differences in the ‘default condition’, i.e. the economic outcomes to be expected if there should be no agreement on ‘coordinated liberalization’ at the European level. In telecommunications, technical change and international competition would undermine the economic viability of national PTT monopolies, while in electricity, the stability of existing networks would not be affected by purely economic developments.
43. In Germany or Britain, for instance, this might mean that compulsory user charges supporting public television could be successfully attacked as a subsidy distorting competition by private networks, and that the monopoly of private physicians in ambulatory health care could be invaded by American-style health maintenance organizations. While both changes might be considered highly desirable in some quarters, it is also clear that they would not find the support of democratic majorities at the national level.
44. On the other hand, governments which, for domestic reasons, might not wish to agree to a Council directive may actually prefer deregulation by way of Commission directives and decisions.
45. In the electricity field, the Commission has initiated such actions against France, Denmark, Spain, Italy, Ireland and the Netherlands. Also, the drive towards liberalization in telecommunications was initiated by a successful infringement action against British Telecom in 1985 (Sauter 1995).[Page 156]
46. For instance, when the Commission issued its terminal equipment directive under Art. 90 (3), France was joined by Italy, Belgium, Germany and Greece in initiating an (unsuccessful) Art. 173 action against key provisions of the directive. If the directive had not been issued by the Commission, but had been introduced in the Council under Art. 100A, the objecting group would of course have been strong enough to prevent its adoption (Sauter 1995: 101).
47. In fact, as Susanne Schmidt (1995: 25f) argues, the mere possibility of ‘uncontrolled’ liberalization by the Court may persuade opponent governments to agree to ‘coordinated liberalization’ through (less far-reaching) Council directives in the hope that these will be taken into account in the Court's own interpretation of the text of the Treaty.
48. This would not be meaningless, since member state bureaucracies may in fact use European directives to circumvent parliamentary controls at home. The same tendency of constituent governments to promote ‘over-integration’ at the central level can also be observed in German federalism (Scharpf 1988).
49. Presumably, if an economy has been viable so far, its regulatory costs are reflected in current prices and exchange rates.
50. The major threat to viability of the Danish model, incidentally, comes from European plans to harmonize VAT rates.
51. Here, in my view, is the real reason for the current crisis of European welfare states. Given lower rates of economic growth, rising costs of environmental protection, continued mass unemployment and a growing retirement population, the willingness of blue- and white-collar voters to bear an ever-rising tax burden has become the critical constraint on all policies dependent on democratic legitimation.
52. See Acknowledgements. For the sake of simplicity the authors use the term ‘European Union’ to describe the former European Economic Community and European Community alongside the present structure.
53. Regional offices have attracted little scholarly attention up to the present. In addition to literature cited elsewhere in this chapter, they have been described in a literature focusing on German offices (see, e.g. Zumschlinge 1989; Fastenrath 1990; Fechtner 1992; Engel 1993). For a recent comparison of offices in Germany and the United Kingdom see Jeffery 1995.
54. The chief contending theory was neo-functionalism, which views the dynamics of European integration mainly in terms of the response of politically influential policy-makers to policy spill-overs, connections across policy areas that would tend to drive the process of integration forward. There is no logical reason for this approach to ignore the role of subnational mobilization in the EU, but, from their standpoint in the 1960s and early 1970s, regional mobilization was nowhere in sight. As Ernest Haas pointed out in 1971: ‘There has been very little spillover in the “level” of action, i.e., little progressive penetration from supranational institutions into the lower reaches of decisionmaking at the national and local levels’ (Haas 1971: 13).
55. When we speak of regional representation in Brussels in the context of this chapter, we refer exclusively to subnational offices, though, of course, we are aware that subnational or regional governments have several other channels of representation in the EU (for an overview of these channels, see Hooghe and Marks forthcoming).
56. These data have been collected by the authors as part of a survey of regional offices in Brussels.
57. To gain comparability across subnational regions, the European Commission has developed three general categories of territorial unit which in descending size are designated NUTS (Nomenclature des Unites Territoriales Statistiques) 1, 2 and 3. These units do not necessarily correspond to levels of government. Each country is divided into three levels irrespective of actual governance structure.
58. Objective 1 of the EU's structural policy is to promote economic development in regions with a per capita gross domestic product of less than 75 per cent of the EU average. Other geographically targeted priorities are objective 2, which is designed to convert regions seriously affected by industrial decline, and objective 5b, which aids rural development. Objective 1 areas encompass 21.7 per cent of the population of the EC: objective 2 areas [Page 157]encompass 16.4 per cent; and objective 5b areas encompass 5.0 per cent (Commission of the European Communities 1990).
59. Respondents were asked to identify the geographical unity they considered to be their region. They were then asked to rate their degree of attachment to their town or village, their region, their nation, the European Union and Europe as a whole. Our measure of regionalism captures attachment to the region relative to that of the nation by subtracting national attachment from regional attachment.
60. Interviews with the authors.
61. See Alberta Sbragia (1993) for a discussion of the role of territory in structuring EU political institutions.
62. See Acknowledgements.
63. On this see in particular the work of Fritz Scharpf.
64. While the democratic defence of nationalism explains the absence of democratic political institutions at European level by the absence of a common ‘European identity’, one might ask whether to the contrary the development of collective identities and solidarities does not depend on the availability of institutional opportunities for successful collective action in pursuit of collective benefits. In this case, it would not be nationalism that would explain the persistence of the (democratic) nation-state, but, vice versa, the nation-state, in particular its control over the articulation of border-crossing collective interests and its institutional monopoly on democratic participation, would account for the persistence of nationalism.
65. To the extent that such rules cannot be simple, and creating them requires institutional innovation, under fragmented sovereignty the latter is typically about how to ensure cross-national tradability of goods and services while interfering as little as possible with the sovereignty of participating nation-states, and especially about avoiding needs for state-like governance at supranational level.
66. It is in this context that the, on the surface, severest curtailment of national sovereignty within the European integration project must be seen, the intended creation under the Maastricht Treaty of a common currency and a European central bank, or ‘Eurofed’. In my view, the way monetary union has been designed by the member states, it perfectly fits the logic of the alliance of nationalism and neo-liberalism, and cannot be claimed as evidence of a commitment of member states to supranational restoration of domestic political sovereignty. Most European countries have long effectively lost control over their monetary policies, as they have had for about two decades now to follow the lead of the Deutsche Bundesbank. Moreover, the Bundesbank became the de facto European central bank, not just because of the size of the German economy, but because of the bank's independence from the German government and its insulation from political pressure that made it uniquely capable of behaving in conformity with the pressures of internationalized capital markets. It is on this model that the Eurofed, if at all, will be built.
In agreeing to monetary union, European states will formally give up something that they effectively no longer have. This holds also for Germany, which, among other things precisely because of the special status of its central bank, has been aptly characterized by Peter Katzenstein (1987) as a ‘semi-sovereign state’. Moreover, under monetary union European monetary policy will be handed over to an institution that is carefully crafted, in the image of the Bundesbank, not to require or encourage the growth of a supranational state. Instead the Eurofed will operate like an independent regulatory agency, reflecting and responding to ‘market forces’, rather than to a political will to ‘correct’ or, for that matter, ‘distort’ markets: protecting the common currency from being put at the service of political purposes like full employment; and accommodating not political pressure, but an international capital market that has long outgrown national borders and national control.
67. The reasons why majority voting, even of the ‘qualified’ kind, is rarely used 11 intergovernmental relations have been pointed out, among others, by Scharpf (1988).
68. On interest groups in the European Community, see Streeck and Schmitter (1991).
69. An equally frequently used but less appropriate term is ‘Europe of different speeds’ – a concept that assumes that ultimately all member countries will arrive at an identical destination, where they will be subject to one and the same system of supranational authority.[Page 158]
70. On the conceptual distinctions, see Marshall (1964).
71. It was to this developing core of a minimalist, market-making European social policy that the European Court of Justice later attached its own project, by reading individual and personal rights to equal treatment into the obligation of member states not to obstruct the free movement of labour, and trying to work from there towards a judicially based, non-statist construction of common European citizenship. Rather than introducing collective rights and substantive entitlements in a civil law system of contractual labour market relations – as traditionally social policy had done the European Court, to the contrary tried to use rights to equal participation in labour markets to construct rights to equal treatment under the law in areas far removed from the labour market, and the farther removed the better. Also, regardless of their civil rights rhetoric, in their core the rulings of the Court always had to refer back as their legal base to intergovernmental commitments to market-making, enshrined in agreements among sovereign states that left their sovereignty intact and grounded the rights of non-nationals in participating countries on commitments in international law, not to common citizenship, but to a ‘common market’.
72. Not necessarily the stability of the social policy regimes themselves. While these may have to be adjusted in response to market pressures or changing political fashions, the problem for the preservation of the nation-state is to protect the ability of governments to preside over such changes and maintain the appearance that they take place, or at least could take place, under political control, i.e. as a result of national political choices. ‘Saving face’ in this sense is not the least important part of the defence of national sovereignty under international interdependence.
73. It was at this time that European social policy first began to become involved in industrial relations, something that after the European-wide worker unrest of 1968 and 1969 seems to have been non-controversial. Legally the move could be justified by a broad reading of the Treaty's commitment to ‘dialogue between management and labor’.
74. Just as state formation can be instrumental to social policy, the latter, as Bismarck, among others, knew, may be instrumental to state formation. In Western Europe today, unions and social democrats tend to be federalist in their pursuit of political resources for market intervention, while the federalists in the Commission pursue social policy as a means for building legitimacy for a European supranational state. The coalition between the two reflects the fact that each side can regard the other's ends as means to its own ends, and the other's success as contributing to its own success.
75. Apart from several directives on equality of pay for women and on workplace health and safety (see below), all that was accomplished were three directives on employment protection (passed in 1975, 1977 and 1980). which, with minor exceptions, did not require changes in national practice (Addison and Siebert 1991: 601). All other initiatives, most prominently the so-called ‘Vredeling proposal’, were defeated by an increasingly well-entrenched. British-led coalition between neo-liberal advocates of labour market ‘flexibility’ and nationalist resistance to ‘harmonization’.
76. Symbolism is far from unimportant in European policy-making. In fact, in response to pressures from a Parliament that has not much else to do, and to satisfy European-minded segments of the population, a major share of European policy is devoted to building supranational façades for the Union's intergovernmental structure. An example is the ‘common European passport’, which on closer inspection reduces to national passports issued by national governments with covers of identical colour and in all Union working languages. Typically such cosmetic exercises are defended by suggestions that in the future they may somehow assume a life of their own, with the façade ‘in the long run’ somehow modifying the structure.
77. The intention of the Treaty seems to have had little to do with feminism, and certainly not with the emergent feminism of the 1970s. While French legislation going back to the Popular Front prescribed equal wages for women, no such legislation existed in other countries, raising fears among the French government that these might cut their costs and become more competitive by increasing female employment at lower wages. To the extent that legally enforced wage equality helps keep female labour market participation low, the Treaty [Page 159]would have had the, perhaps not entirely unintended, effect of preserving traditional family structures.
78. Note in addition that health and safety policy as such is not market-correcting but what Peter Lange (1992) has aptly called ‘market-braking’ – designed to prevent an ‘overheating’ of markets that would result in destruction of productive resources – correcting not market outcomes, but market failure (Majone 1993, 1994c). This has little to do with promoting social citizenship (Kenis 1991). Indeed public intervention to protect the physical integrity of workers was compatible even with nineteenth-century Victorian liberalism. As the British example shows, early development of a health and safety regime at work does not foreshadow an early and stable transition to redistributive social policy. While it is probably true that even the Thatcher government did not want to be seen by its voters as improving the competitiveness of the British economy at the expense of workers’ health and safety, in all other areas of social policy it had no such compunctions at all.
79. Technically, all twelve member states signed a ‘Protocol on Social Policy’ allowing the eleven countries that ‘wish[ed] to continue along the path laid down in the Social Charter of 1989’ to use the institutions of the Community for making ‘the necessary decisions’. The Protocol makes clear that such decisions will be of no consequence for the United Kingdom.
80. Like American firms, firms with headquarters in Britain that would not want to have a multinational works council or to comply with information and consultation obligations could refuse to obey ‘foreign’ law and ask their government to protect them, and itself, from intrusion by a foreign state. To avoid writing unenforceable, and technically illegal, law for ‘foreign’ citizens acting in a ‘foreign’ country – i.e. for multinationals based and incorporated in Britain the Eleven would have to designate, just as successive drafts of the Works Council directive envisaged for non-European firms, the largest subsidiary of a British multinational in the Eleven countries as its ‘headquarters’ liable under ‘Eleven’ law.
81. In the summer of 1994, two-and-a-half years after Maastricht, not a single piece of legislation had been passed by the Eleven under the Agreement. The first subject for which the Agreement was invoked was the draft European Works Councils directive.
82. In discussing subsidiarity, Goetschy notes ‘the striking fact … that the social and political actors [at the European level during the ‘social dimension’ campaign] have been very careful not to jeopardize the national dynamics or national coherences at work’, which she attributes to the ‘prudence’ of European decision-makers rather than their impotence (1991: 270). Goetschy correctly notes that subsidiarity, as understood by the Community. ‘took its full meaning [only] when the harmonization principle was supplemented by the mutual recognition principle’ (1991: 269), i.e. by an explicit or implicit assumption of functional equivalence of member countries’ national social policy regimes.
83. Application of subsidiarity to subnational levels of government, like regions or Länder, is largely rhetorical, except perhaps where, like in Germany, subnational units have strong constitutional standing in national law.
84. For a detailed analysis of the co-decision procedure see Streeck (1993: esp. 151 152 and 168–171).
85. It may have been precisely because the concept of subsidiarity, taken out of its original context, invites not only nationalist but also neo-liberal or Protestant. Thatcherite and ‘British’ misunderstandings that it was introduced as a tactical peace formula by promoters of supranational state-building.
86. Hauser (1991) believes that with the Union having neither taxing powers nor control over transfer payments and social services diffusion of best practice, promoted among other things by Community sponsoring of comparative research and of policy ‘observatories’, will be the most important force against what he calls the ‘immobility scenario’ in European social policy. Similarly Mitchell and Rojot, who believe that ‘growing awareness of differences in approach to benefits across countries could have important long-term effects on benefits and social insurance within Europe. The fact that there are alternative routes to retirement income and health care is becoming more and more evident’ (1993: 164). See also Collins (1985: 184), who argues that the main role of the European Social Fund in vocational training lies in its funding of pilot projects that spread information on innovative or superior methods.[Page 160]
87. The reason for this was British resistance. In return for the Charter remaining non-binding, the British government allowed the eleven other members to pass it, with Britain not participating in spite of several British objections having been taken into account. The procedure prefigured the Maastricht ‘Social Protocol’
88. It is true, however, that had the Charter become law, it would have meant a major change in one Community country, the United Kingdom – which is why it ultimately had to remain non-binding. In Britain the notion of constitutionally guaranteed basic rights for workers and trade unions is unknown. While the Parliament is free to legislate such rights as it sees fit, a new Parliament with a different majority is free to revoke them. Legal rights were therefore never high on British unions’ political agenda, and, unlike other countries, could never become an important commodity for political exchange. However, the Thatcher experience in the 1980s taught British unions that their capacity to resist a hostile government through industrial and political as distinguished from legal action had sharply declined. Not being able to get legal protection from their national state, British unions began in the late 1980s to place their hopes on Brussels, whose proposed Charter of Fundamental Rights of Workers, largely trivial for unions elsewhere in Europe, came to be increasingly seen as a potential substitute for a constitutionalized floor of legal protection that would be enforceable even on a Conservative parliamentary majority. It is very likely that this goes a long way to explain the change in British unions’ attitudes towards the European Community, as well as Thatcher's vigorous defence of the ‘sovereignty’ of the British Parliament.
89. Information and consultation may in principle be made obligatory by a European directive, which could be enacted by qualified-majority vote among the eleven members of the Maastricht “Social Policy Community”. To avoid legislating, the Community has long promoted voluntary arrangements for information and consultation, called ‘European Works Councils’. See Streeck and Vitols (1995).
90. This too may be defended as required for the preservation of national diversity: ‘To make sure that the various traditions and susceptibilities in this Community of ours are respected, the Commission has proposed a choice between three forms of worker participation as a preliminary to drawing up the European Company Statute’ (Oelors 1989: 7).
91. The version of the European Works Council directive that was finally passed admits any information and consultation arrangement that is agreed between management and labour, as long as it satisfies a set of minimum requirements.
92. While observing that ‘neither the Charter nor the action programme put important new constraints on labour markets or on national employment policies’, Teague and Grahl (1991: 209) hope that they will ‘increase the weight of Community comparisons and comparators both in the formation of public policy at national level and, ultimately, in employment bargaining itself. This, of course, is hardly borne out by the British experience: namely the reelection of the Major government in 1992 in spite of its opt-out, only a few months previously, of European social policy.
93. Many British observers believe that multinational firms operating in Britain will for this reason have to include their British workforces in the European Works Council they may under future European legislation be forced to have for their operations in member countries covered by the Social Protocol. In this way, regime diffusion is expected to bring potentially fundamental change to British industrial relations.
94. Majone puts the same matter more affirmatively when he observes that ‘in the Community, but increasingly also in the member states, social-policy measures will be accepted only if they can be shown to be consistent with the values of a liberal economic order’ (1992: 4). Majone's notion of a ‘regulatory’ social policy shares with the concept of neo-voluntarism a strict rejection of functionalist expectations of social policy expansion: ‘The historical development of the Community has shown again and again the limits of such functionalist logic’ (1992: 9). It also discards the prospect of a nation-state-like social policy at European level: ‘We may conclude that no such policy will be adopted, now or in the foreseeable future’ (1992: 11). According to Majone, ‘social regulation’ as an alternative form of social policy is not adequately described in Marshallian terms; it is, however, compatible with the limited resources controlled by the Community, as well as with ‘subsidiarity’ and the preservation of [Page 161]national ‘diversity’. Being free from traditional concerns with redistribution, social regulation ‘addresses primarily quality-of-life issues, and reflects the political culture of post-industrial society’ (1992: 7), whatever that may be.
95. These observations are based on interviews with German union officials.
96. In effect, this amounts to the passage of a ‘balanced budget amendment’ by way of an international treaty.
97. It is true that the European Trade Union Confederation has no real negotiating competence either. The difference is, however, that the weakness of its peak association weakens the class-political capacities of labour, with the failure of organizational centralization amounting to political failure. For capital, to the contrary, non-centralization is an interest-conscious strategic move.
98. Employers can live with this, even in systems that they find in principle uncomfortable. This is because international competitive pressure reinforces the position of capital inside national systems regardless of whether the formal rules remain unchanged. Changes in such rules can in any case later be sought in the course of ‘cooperative’ efforts to increase competitiveness and secure employment.
99. See Acknowledgements.
100. For simplicity we use the term ‘European Union’ to apply to the various institutions – the European Economic Community, the European Community – that are the precursors of the current Union.
101. See Chapter 3 above for details of the regional representation in Brussels.
102. This point was forcefully made to the first author in interviews with directors of regional offices in Brussels. On the limits placed by existing member states on the development of a Europe of the Regions, see Anderson (1991).
103. The MAT was also preceded very closely by an agreement with the EFTA countries – Austria, Finland, Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland – to establish the European Economic Area (EEA). Originally conceived as a way of postponing the issue of enlargement, it would extend most of the provisions of the SEA (and, hence, most EC rules) to all nineteen members, while leaving some especially sensitive issues such as agriculture, fishing, energy and industrial subsidies pending. Although widely hailed as a success after protracted negotiations, it does not seem to have had the intended effect of putting off the issue of full membership until further progress has been made on monetary and political union. Switzerland's citizenry subsequently rejected the opportunity to join.
104. Reading it, one sympathizes with de Gaulle's disdainful reference to supranationality for leading to the creation of a new European language: ‘Volapuk intégré’.
105. Stephen Krasner (1991) has subjected the Treaty (or, better, Treaties) of Westphalia to detailed scrutiny. He demonstrates quite convincingly how difficult it would have been for an observer at the time to discern their significance. In retrospect, they have come to be regarded as a watershed in the historical development of the European state system. Reading the texts themselves, Krasner finds – in addition to the (few) clauses that consecrate the state as a uniquely endowed type of political actor – many that explicitly protected the status of a considerable variety of non-state entities (bishoprics, imperial cities, the Holy Roman Empire itself) and sanctioned a level of interference in domestic affairs that manifestly contradicted the notion of national sovereignty. I suspect that should the Maastricht Treaty in retrospect be credited with marking an analogous watershed in the development of the ‘post-state’, future political archaeologists will scrutinize its clauses and wonder how that could have been possible.
106. It also ‘warns’ the member states that three other policy fields will shortly be added to the current listing: civil protection, energy and tourism (Annex II, Protocol 2).
107. In his ‘speculative’ effort to explain how countries put themselves in this unprecedented situation, Weiler (1991: 2443–2447) stresses two factors: (1) that in situations of complex interdependence, national actors may prefer to forgo their own unitary veto power in order to be able to force a recalcitrant member to conform; (2) that member states may have unwittingly fallen into the ‘trap’ of Community discipline when the immediate stakes were high and when they were not fully cognizant of the longer-term consequences of what [Page 162]they were agreeing to. Both of these are eminently respectable reasons from a neo-functionalist perspective.
108. The reference to ‘peoples’ rather than ‘states’ is unusual – and significant since it opens up novel possibilities for an eventual shift to constituencies other than those defined at the national level by existing states. Needless to say, none of the founding treaties or their amendments make an effort to define what ‘Europe’ is.
109. Which is (more or less) defined elsewhere (Art. 3b) as follows: ‘In areas which do not fall in its exclusive jurisdiction, the Community shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member State and can, therefore, by reason of the scale or effects of proposed action be better achieved by the Community.’ Who should determine what ‘sufficiently’ means and what criteria would be applied to estimate the economies of scale or the extent of externalities is presumably left to an unspecified political process. For a particularly stimulating discussion of the ambiguities of subsidiarity, see Gretschmann (1991).
110. The acquis communautaire is one of the most sacred of EC, now EU, concepts. It refers to the sum total of obligations that have accumulated since the founding of the ECSC and are imbedded in innumerable treaties and protocols. So far, any state which applies to the EC/EU is expected to accept as a matter of principle the responsibility for fulfilling all these obligations, although in the actual negotiations for entry it is possible to delay the application of some of them. It is expressly designed to prevent any prospective member from ‘shopping around’ for its own mix of obligations.
111. There is another peculiar item of ‘corporatist-type subsidiarity’ in the Declaration on Co-operation with Charitable Associations (Annex II, Protocol 22), in which the signatories stress the importance of working through these intermediaries when dealing with social policy.
112. For an almost caricatural example of unrequited neo-realism, see Mearsheimer (1990) For a discussion of the prospects for German hegemony, see Saña (1990).
113. Since writing this, I have chanced upon Quermonne (1992), in which the treaty is given a similarly ambiguous, ‘tripartite’ reading.
114. For a particularly eloquent defence of its ‘limited but real powers’, see Hoffmann (1982). Also Puchala, where it is found, even after the signing of the SEA, that ‘the weight of evidence tends to lie on the side of (European integration's having) strengthened states’ (1988: 461).
115. Perhaps it is also significant that many of the new items of Euro-speak seem to be emerging in English, rather than French, which was the language initially dominant within the Eurocracy.
The Economist (14 December 1991: 54) asked its readers: ‘Sprechen Sie Maastricht?’ To the concepts of cohesion, convergence, competence, opting out, subsidarity and unanimity, they added: ‘in every nook and cranny’, which they defined as ‘a quaint English phrase to describe where Brussels bureaucrats would be if there were no subsidiarity’. An industrious Frenchman, François Gondrand (1991), has compiled a glossary of Euro-speak with 1,000 entries!
116. From this perspective, the British allergy to the ‘F-word’, which seems so ridiculous to a North American or German, is well founded. What they are objecting to is the possible emergence of a supranational stato, i.e. any political form – however decentralized or deconcentrated that accumulates sovereign powers within a single set of institutions at the European level. Cf. the discussion between Ian Davidson (1991) and Martin Wolf (1991) in the Financial Times. Samuel Brittan (1991) has attempted to clarify the terms of discussion for the British and concludes that ‘the true dividing lines are between different ideas on the role of the state rather than between countries or between federalists and nationalists’.
117. For a brief account of the failure of Euro-corporatism, see Schmitter and Streeck (1991).
118. Alberta Sbragia (1992) pays special attention to the Swiss and German versions of federalism because they accord a prominent and guaranteed role to subnational political units in their respective upper houses of parliament. Fritz Scharpf (1988) has explicitly explored the parallels between the German federal system and the EC. For the historical lessons Switzerland has to offer, see Muret (1966) and Böckcnförde (1991).[Page 163]
119. Although Ernst B. Haas was careful to avoid this assumption in his Beyond the Nation-State, in which he defined as his dependent variable ‘the process of increasing the interaction and the mingling so as to obscure the boundaries between the system of international organizations and the environment provided by their nation-state members’ (1964: 29). In their Europe's Would-be Polity, Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold admit candidly that ‘we have no concept of a termination state for the Community’ (1970: 138).
120. In all fairness, I should note Donald Puchala's (1972) effort to delineate a ‘concordance system’ which resembles something approaching my confederatio type; Leon Lindberg and Stuart Scheingold's (1970) discussion of a ‘sector-integrated supranational system’ which is close to the consortio type; and Ernst B. Haas's (1971) musings on ‘regional communes’ (also a consortio and ‘asymmetrical regional overlap’ (perhaps something like my condominio).
121. There is one very important exception to this generalization. From very early on, the German Länder insisted that they be informed and participate at least indirectly in the deliberations of the Council of Ministers on issues assigned exclusively to them by the constitution of the Federal Republic. See Hrbek and Thaysen (1986).
122. For some appropriately critical remarks on the likelihood of the emergence of a ‘Europe des Régions’ rather than a ‘Europe des États’, see Marks (1992) and Anderson (1991). One of the most obvious impediments is the very asymmetric fashion in which regional governance is distributed across national polities in Europe. Great Britain, for example, completely lacks this intermediate layer (although the issue of devolution of authority to Scotland did emerge during the 1992 elections). Portugal and Greece have only recently begun to experiment with regionalization in order to attract more EC funds. Unfortunately for the issue of economic and social cohesion, it is invariably the most developed internal regions that are the best equipped and most eager to exploit the Brussels connection.
123. For the notion of an ‘implementation deficit’, see Schaefer (1991).
124. The deliberations of both the European Council and the Council of Ministers are secret. Neither publicizes the voting behaviour of its members or the positions taken by them on a given issue. The only way of learning what governments have proposed or how they have voted is to rely on leaks to the press and the efforts of journalists to reconstruct what happened. This lack of transparence contributes, along with the modest powers of the European Parliament, to the so-called ‘democracy deficit’ and to the generally low level of public attention to Community issues.
125. The Treaty of Rome only specifies that ‘Any European State may apply to become a member of the Community’ (Art. 237), although later Council decisions made it explicit that their national political institutions had to be democratic (without defining what this meant). The cultural boundaries of European-ness remain ambiguous, and are currently being tested by Turkey's (so far, frustrated) application for full membership.
There are no explicit treaty provisions for exiting from the EC/EU, although this is presumably a right for all member states. In 1985, some twelve years after Denmark's accession, Greenland subsequently chose to withdraw and was allowed to do so peacefully. In any case, the Community lacks the military-coercive capacity to prevent any such defection.
For a general discussion of the enlargement issue (without any theoretical guidance), see Church (1990). For a more recent treatment that goes a long way to placing the issue in its broader theoretical context, see Michalski and Wallace (1992).
126. Under the new rules, the European Parliament possesses the right to veto both the initial discussion and the eventual admission of new members. The threat to do either could give it a considerably enhanced, direct influence over the eventual design of EC/EU institutions. All the Euro-deputies would have to say is ‘no new members until the democracy deficit is tilled’! In the past, they have shown a strong desire to increase not just their own powers, but also the federalist properties of the system as a whole. For evidence that the MEPs are prepared to use this capacity for blackmail to extort changes from the Commission or the Council of Ministers, see Lange (1992: 247)
127. It should be noted in passing how very important (and fortuitous) it was that the signing of the SEA and, hence, deepening of member commitment to the EC preceded the [Page 164]transformative events in the East. How different the outcome might have been if Western European integration had not accelerated prior to the disintegration of Eastern Europe!
128. It is not clear whether the loose arrangements surrounding the WEU ‘defense pillar’ in the MAT are going to be considered part of the acquis communautaire and, hence, whether new applicants will be required to join it as a condition for full membership. This could cause additional difficulty since most of those likely to be in the first round are neutrals which might prefer to be absolved of such a collective responsibility – if only to facilitate the passage of eventual national referenda. Countries in the second round, such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, presumably would jump at the chance to be brought under the WEU umbrella.
129. As he has done often in the past, Stanley Hoffmann put the matter most dramatically: ‘Goods can be “integrated” and maximized, so to speak, anonymously; the integration of foreign and military policies, in a world in which security and leadership are the scarcest of values, means what it has always meant: the acceptance by some of the predominance of others’ (1964: 1275). The present issues in Europe are (a) whether security is still the same scarce commodity and (b) whether the amount needed can be produced collectively without the hegemony of a single national state.
130. Hence, the notion that the EC is on its way to becoming the world's first ‘great civilian power’, i.e. capable of acting as a unit in a variety of arenas of international politics, but not of backing up its actions with armed force. See Pinder (1991: 169–198), although the originator of this notion seems to have been Duchêne (1972: 43). For the contrary view that the EC is likely to develop into an aggressive superpower imposing Pax Bruxellana on the world, see Galtung (1973).
Since 1970, regular meetings of foreign ministers and senior civil servants have sought to elaborate a common foreign policy through a procedure known as European Political Cooperation (EPC). This has resulted in a steadily increased flow of information across member states and some successful collective efforts, e.g. in the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), in the peace process in Central America and in negotiations with other economic blocs such as the Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN). It has also produced some notable failures to come up with common positions, e.g. with regard to South Africa and the Middle East. For a useful overview, see Pijpers et al. (1988) and Ginsberg (1989).
131. The locus classicus for an analysis of this interaction between war-making and state-building is Charles Tilly (1975), especially the introductory ‘Reflections’ by Tilly and the chapters by Samuel Finer and Gabriel Ardant. See also Tilly (1985). I am also indebted to a seminar conducted at the Center for Advanced Study in the Behavioral Sciences by Charles Tilly for the benefit of the Consortium for 1992 on 16 January 1992, at which these issues were discussed extensively in relation to the emerging structures of the EC.
132. For a provocative discussion of ‘alternative security policies for Europe’, see Galtung (1989: 118–136).
133. It is tempting to interpret this outcome in terms of a race between two competing sources of differentiation for the politicization of their respective publics: regionalization, which would aggregate interests along lines of historical–cultural discrimination and/or around locationally specialized systems of production, vs sectoralization, which would bring together actors according to product lines or policy arenas that transcend national boundaries. The basic administrative structure of the Commission with its twenty-three sectorally defined Directorates-General favours the latter, although there is growing evidence of experimentation with the former.
134. I leave aside the early stages of the integration process in which the French administrative style was clearly hegemonic – for both reasons. Not only has the prestige of the statist, grandes écoles approach declined (along with French administrative performance), but enlargement has greatly augmented the variety of available policy styles. Also, to the extent that the outcome of integration becomes less ‘concentric’, i.e. less coordinated by the Commission in Brussels, the EC/EU institutions dispersed throughout Europe should be [Page 165]expected to acquire at least some of the administrative traits of the sites where they will be located.
135. For a discussion that argues that the shift in scale is one of several factors that have affected the emerging system of European interest representation and that is driving it in the direction of a more pluralist, American-style outcome than is presently characteristic of any of the member states of the EC/EU, see Streeck and Schmitter (1991).
136. The literature on Euro-federalism is considerable, but unsatisfactory on the key issue of agency. It is much better at asserting why ‘the federal method’ would be a rational solution to a multitude of European problems, than at explaining who might bring it off, Federalists take great comfort in Euro-Barometer data that show 76 per cent of a sample of the European public saying that they are in favour of the EC's developing into the USE (United States of Europe), but that does not offer a convincing answer to the question of how to get these people sufficiently concerned so that they will actively promote such an outcome. For a history of federalist efforts, see Burgess (1989). For more recent advocacy of federalist solutions, see Wistrich (1989) and Pinder (1991).
137. William Wallace has suggested drawing a distinction between two parallel integration processes: ‘Informal integration consists of those intense patterns of interaction which develop without the impetus of deliberate political decisions, following the dynamics of markets, technology, communications networks, and social change. Formal integration consists of those changes in the framework of rules and regulations which encourage – or inhibit, or redirect – informal flows. Informal integration is a continuous process, a flow: it creeps unawares out of the myriad transactions of private individuals pursuing private interests. Formal integration is discontinuous: it proceeds decision by decision, bargain by bargain, treaty by treaty’ (1990: 9). Coming from one of the leading spokesmen for ‘intergovernmentalism’, this recognition of the importance of functional interdependencies and influence processes is a bit surprising, but most welcome. The book in which these remarks appeared, however, is devoted almost exclusively to bargaining among national states and the operations of international organizations.
138. One very salient example is the increased self-assertion of the German Länder with regard to the ratification of the MAT by the Bundesrat. See the feature article in Der Spiegel (23 March 1992). During the 1992 British elections, increased autonomy for Scotland became such a major issue that the then Conservative Foreign Secretary, Douglas Hurd, felt compelled to remind the Scots that it might not be so easy: ‘Scotland could not slide out of the United Kingdom on Monday and slide into the Community as the thirteenth member on Tuesday. … The lawyers would have a series of field days. There would be many months or years of disputes and uncertainty. … Many European countries could put obstacles in Scotland's path as they would be reluctant to set a precedent for their own potential breakaway regions.’ Financial Times (21–22 March 1992).
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