Business and Polity: Dynamics of a Changing Relationship
Publication Year: 2011
Subject: Business, Government, & Society
Business and Polity explores, through a variety of economic and political formations over the past two and a half millennia, right from the Greco-Roman civilization to present day globalization, the behavior of two power networks: those who control the levers of political power and those who engage themselves in wealth-generating activities. It traces the dynamics of interdependence between these two powerful networks and what happens when one or the other becomes more powerful.
The rational and logical approach taken by the author reveals the links that our modern state of affairs has with the experience of past civilizations—knowledge that can potentially enhance our ability to make informed decisions to shape the global future. Though the content is academic and interdisciplinary in scope and nature, its lucid ...
- Front Matter
- Back Matter
- Subject Index
- Chapter 1: Sagacity in Governance: The Greek Exemplar
- Chapter 2: Governance Culture: Roman Mirror
- Chapter 3: Tolerant Ambience: India
- Chapter 4: Resource Raising: Uniqueness of China
- Chapter 5: An Intimidating Colossus: The Arab Miracle
- Chapter 6: Trade and Politics in the Indian Ocean
- Chapter 7: Business on Leash: Japan
- Chapter 8: Emerging Out of the Shadows: Europe
- Chapter 9: In the Limelight: Knights of Commerce
- Chapter 10: Playing with Power: Merchant Republics
- Chapter 11: Sword and Purse: Beginnings of Collaboration
- Chapter 12: Fiscal Revolution: Grip of Financiers
- Chapter 13: Economic Nationalism: Fusion of the Sword and Purse
- Chapter 14: Setting the Tone: The Portuguese
- Chapter 15: Weaving a Pattern: The Spanish Imperial Machine
- Chapter 16: Showing the Way: The Dutch Interlude
- Chapter 17: Not in a Fit of Absentmindedness: Britain's Forays
‘This is an in-depth and comprehensive study of the nature and evolution of the close relationship between business and polity over the last two millenniums and a half. Ghosh's lucid and fascinating account of this relation in different historical epochs and under diverse techno-economic and political set-ups, from Classical Greece to the modern-day United States, clearly brings out its crucial significance in making or marring fortunes of nations and provides an important perspective in understanding the ongoing interaction of business operations and government policies at both the national and the global level.’— Money and FinanceDirector, Monetary Research Project at ICRA, Calcutta Editor-in-Chief,
‘This book is a tour de force. In a lucid and engaging treatise, Dhruba Ghosh explores the nexus between business and politics, intertwined in history over a period that spans millenniums rather than centuries, to argue that the nature of this relationship shaped the rise and fall of civilisations and empires. The discussion is remarkable in its range and depth. And the story that it unfolds is fascinating. The glimpses of world history highlight how the evolution of business-politics dynamics exercised an enormous influence on outcomes in economy and society, from the past to the present. If anything, the essential hypothesis is even more relevant in our lives and times. This book should be of interest to people in the worlds of business and politics. It should also be of interest to readers in academia, media and civil society.’—Professor of Economics, Jawaharlal Nehru University, New Delhi Distinguished University Professor of Economics, New School for Social Research, New York
‘This book is unique in many ways. There is no shortage of books on India's historical and political legacy, or its future prospects as the world's largest democracy. Similarly, the socio-political and socio-economic order, as it has evolved over centuries, is well documented. However, I can think of no other book which brings all these together, and gives a new perspective on India and challenges that it faces in political as well as economic fields.[Page ii]
As the author puts it, “this book is an odyssey,” and an excursion to explore how the world has evolved through different epochs of history. I strongly recommend this book to all those who are interested in our country's future. It is elegantly written and accessible to lay readers as well as academic researchers in different fields.’—Former Member of Parliament (Rajya Sabha) Former Governor of the Reserve Bank of India
[Page iii][Page iv]
Copyright © Dhruba Narayan Ghosh, 2011
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or utilised in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording or by any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher.
First published in 2011 by
SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B1/I-1 Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, New Delhi 110 044, India
SAGE Publications Inc
2455 Teller Road
Thousand Oaks, California 91320, USA
SAGE Publications Ltd
1 Oliver's Yard, 55 City Road
London EC1Y 1SP, United Kingdom
SAGE Publications Asia-Pacific Pte Ltd
33 Pekin Street
#02-01 Far East Square
Published by Vivek Mehra for SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, typeset in 11/16 Garamond by Tantla Composition Pvt Ltd, Chandigarh and printed at Chaman Enterprises, New Delhi.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Ghosh, Dhruba Narayan, 1928-
Business and polity: dynamics of a changing relationship/D.N. Ghosh.
Includes bibliographical references and index.
1. Economic history. 2. Economic policy—History. 3. Business and politics—History. 4. Commerce—History. I. Title.
ISBN: 978-81-321-0531-2 (HB)
The SAGE Team: Elina Majumdar, Sonalika Rellan, Mathew P. J. and Deepti Saxena
For Ranjan, Suparna and Annesha
Thank You[Page viii]
Thank you for choosing a SAGE product! If you have any comment, observation or feedback, I would like to personally hear from you. Please write to me email@example.com—Vivek Mehra, Managing Director and CEO, SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd, New Delhi
SAGE India offers special discounts for purchase of books in bulk.
We also make available special imprints and excerpts from our books on demand.
For orders and enquiries, write to us at
SAGE Publications India Pvt Ltd
B1/I-1, Mohan Cooperative Industrial Area
Mathura Road, Post Bag 7
New Delhi 110044, India
E-mail us at firstname.lastname@example.org
Get to know more about SAGE, be invited to SAGE events, get on our mailing list. Write today email@example.com
This book is also available as an e-book.
I have known Mr D. N. Ghosh for several years. As Governor of the Reserve Bank of India, I sought his counsel on several intricate issues, and he has been very generous with his time and attention. Mr Ghosh has been of great help to Reserve Bank of India, especially in the area of non-banking financial companies' sector. Over the years, I have developed great respect for his intellect, insight, integrity and insistence on propriety while being pleasant, cheerful and firm. Mr Ghosh epitomises soft power. He is in many ways an innovator and an institution builder. I also heard of his work in the government, and read about his contributions to public policy during some of the turbulent times. His foray into academia may be news to the new generation, but both the compulsions that lead him there and his contributions are well known to us. His articles in the Economic and Political Weekly are constant reference materials. In this background, when Mr Ghosh suggested that I should write a foreword for this forthcoming book, I readily agreed in view of the honour involved.
I read the manuscript that he sent for the purpose and reread it. Then I studied it carefully and was simply amazed at the scholarship, the depth of understanding and the breadth of his enquiry. The articulation is informative, impressive and convincing. On occasions, I wondered whether I was equal to the task of writing a foreword to such an erudite and unique piece of writing. However, I have benefited immensely from reading the manuscript carefully and being provoked to take up the [Page xii]complex challenge of writing a foreword. This process of careful reading helped me explore the contemporary relevance of this book, in addition to its lasting contribution to the literature on the history of political economy of the world.
In India, political economy has been a relatively unexplored area. More important, the relationship between business and government, as it evolved over the centuries is a somewhat neglected area of scholarship. In the hierarchy of the caste systems, the trader comes below the ruling caste as well as the priestly caste, but above the rest, viz., the Shudras. But the ruling class always had a close relationship with business. During the Independence movement also, there were observable links between indigenous business and politics. Till recently, politicians and businessmen were separate entities for most part of their avocations. The position seems to be changing rapidly in the recent years. First, many of the businessmen have joined active political life, while many politicians turned to business as an additional occupation. Some people comment that the regimes of gentlemen-politicians has been replaced by businessmen-politicians or politician-businessmen. There is a second more important factor after the onset of the process of economic reform. While there have been large elements of deregulation and liberalisation, the role of the government continues to be dominant in a significant way in the process of reform, particularly in the area of privatisation of public enterprises or disinvestment and public-private participation in physical infrastructure like highways, and possibly social infrastructure like education. More important, the public policy in India under the reform period seems to have created an atmosphere conducive for rapid growth by being business-friendly, but not necessarily market-friendly. The latter would involve rules of the game which would enhance competitive efficiency [Page xiii]and level playing fields based on respect for contracts rather than contacts. What would be the way forward in India? This book may provide clues to appreciating the dynamics of relationship between business and politics in India also. In any case I agree with the author that this dynamic is critical in understanding the current global financial crisis and in shaping the future of global economic and financial order.
It is quite evident that the global financial crisis, and indeed, the global economic crisis has clearly been a turning point in the history of the world. Till a mere 300 years ago, China and India accounted for about half of the world output. They suffered a decline in their fortunes during the colonial era. While the second half of the 20th century saw an end to colonalisation and brought about division of the world into developed and developing economies; the developments in 21st century indicate a more diversified world. Different countries are at different levels of economic development and sophistication in the markets which seem to not only challenge the dominance of the United States, Europe and to some extent Japan, but also provide a spectrum of nation-states with diverse levels of economic development. As a consequence, it is possible that we will no longer have corner solutions (either this or that, but nothing else) but will increasingly have intermediate solutions to issues of economic policy.
Globally the corporate sector seems to have developed a larger-than-life identity of its own, and has become powerful, but the sector is not necessarily maintaining continuous individual identities as corporates. The mergers, amalgamations and takeovers of corporates have become common, and thus the corporate identities are fast changing. However, the corporate sector as a whole has developed a global domination and a global presence. Their influence over politics is now no longer [Page xiv]necessarily through one national government, but cuts across several countries. The managements of corporates, in particular in the financial sector, seem to have developed their own spheres of influence and interests that may not necessarily result in equitable distribution of surpluses among the stakeholders, in particular workers, shareholders and the management. In brief, in recent years the balance within the corporates between shareholders, board and management seems to have undergone significant change.
The technological developments are constraining the capacity of the individual nation-state to exercise their power of intervention in the economic activity of individuals or corporates as they were able to do in the 20th century. Technological developments have a tendency to make cross-border movements very economical and hence can undermine the instruments of intervention available for the nation-states. At the same time, the consequences of cross-border movements on a nation's population have to be managed by the state. As Governor Mervyn King is reported to have said, ‘Banks are global in life and national in death’. Is it possible that globalisation of business, especially finance, was premature relative to globalisation of public policy or globalised governance? It is not clear whether history provides clues on this, though Mr Ghosh alludes to premature globalisation of finance relative to globalisation of its regulation.
Within the corporate world, finance as a sector has emerged as a force by itself and has begun to acquire the character of ends than means. As it evolved in human history, finance was critical to both political matters and economic life, but it was viewed as a powerful ally of politics for most part, and often as a facilitator of wars and of promoting growth in output, whereby employment was created. In recent years, the financial sector has [Page xv]acquired a life of its own, with greater capacity to influence the politics not only at a national level but also in terms of relations between the nations. Further, finance increased its hold over real sector. A possible disconnect in the growth of real sector relative to that in the financial sector is emerging. This is illustrated by the fact that at the current stage of crisis management (March 2010), the financial markets seem to have rebounded globally and thrived, but employment and growth appear to be lagging behind, particularly in developed countries. It is not clear whether the booming financial markets are in anticipation of a definitive surge in real output and employment globally. In this regard, it is instructive to note from the book that, historically politics tended to have very diverse links with finance, its relationship ranging from antagonism to dependence, and from surrender to support; but for the most part collusive. Thus, finance had a dominant role in what Mr Ghosh calls the fiscal-military phase and in the more recent phase of US hegemony in the context of dollar as the global reserve currency.
Recent debates on public policy consequent upon the global financial crisis focus on the relationship between the state and the market. It is often argued that the ongoing financial crisis reflects excessive belief in the efficiency and self-correcting mechanisms of markets. It is, therefore, argued that the state should be empowered so that the balance between the state and the market is restored with appropriate roles to each. Various initiatives are being considered for strengthening financial regulation and establishing a new global economic order as well as appropriate international financial institutions that could provide public goods, conducive to global growth, welfare and stability. These are essentially in the nature of creating a strengthened role for state, broadly defined to include intervention in the functioning of markets by the public policy.
[Page xvi]However, it is possible to argue that the recent financial crisis represents the failure of both the market and the state within and across nation-states. The apparatus of the state, in particular the independent central banks and regulators in the financial sector seem to have failed to discharge the duties assigned and deliver the outcomes that they had assured. There are sufficient grounds to believe that the crisis is a result of the capture of the government by the markets, especially by the financial institutions and financial markets. In other words, it can be argued that the crisis was not caused by a mere failure of regulators but a capture of the regulators and the governments by the financial markets. This plausible explanation of the crisis warrants an entirely different dimension to the traditional debate on state versus market. Consequently, the debate will have to concentrate a lot more on the relationship between the state and the market in each country on one hand, and the relationship between the nation-states, national markets and international markets, on the other. This book touches on this aspect while presenting the dynamics of economic change in different historical periods. It explains the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business, and the polity that is controlled by their ruling regime. It recognises that the two forces are distinct but coexist.
The common elements in the narration of events that lead to the current financial crisis indicate that there has been close cooperation between the financial conglomerates and the ruling elite, that there has been competition for resources among these constituents within each country and that these forces ensured contagion in different degrees to different countries. Thus, as the world was led into the crisis, there have been different strategic elements of cooperation, competition and coordination [Page xvii]between state and market, nations and supranations, financial and non-financial corporates. As a reaction to the efforts made to reduce the big government which led to the crisis, there now appears to be an effort to reduce the big business, in the financial sector, namely in big banks. The outcome of the current thinking is not obvious as of now since both desirability and feasibility are being discussed. In my view, the critical issue is not merely the bigness of the state or a corporate or a bank, but the quality of governance in both the state and the market. These obviously are products of several factors: cultural, institutional, technological and social. Often, it is recognised that cultural factors influence the behaviour of economic agents in the markets, but the markets also tend to influence the cultural factors. While these are not explicitly addressed in the book, the description of the events and the analysis of structure and dynamics of relationships between business and polity in the book do provide valuable clues to a better understanding of the current dilemmas.
In terms of dominant values, the recent decades represent the height of respectability to market forces to an extent that is perhaps unprecedented in history. Historically, trade and finance were viewed with suspicion in general, though their useful role and indeed their attractiveness were not in doubt in most cultures, particularly in societies that valued material success. The recent heightened respectability to markets which was followed by the crisis now, has also resulted in, among other things, two sets of realisations. The first realisation is that economists and policy-analysts had underestimated the greed in human character. The second realisation has been that there has been a fundamental change in the human values globally which elevated markets to the status of God replacing traditional religion.
[Page xviii]The chapter on Fiscal Revolution and Grip of Financiers referring to 16th and 17th centuries is of great contemporary relevance in the context of the crisis management.
Mr Ghosh in reflecting on that period of history mentions: ‘The fiscal apparatus within the state became little more than a front behind which the financiers carried on their affairs with studied indifference towards the damage they did to the government and contempt for the suffering of the taxpaying elements of the population.’ My question in the context of the current debates on public debt incurred in managing the crisis is: Will the surging public debt of many countries place the sovereigns at the mercy of financial markets that were bailed out by the sovereign in the first place?
The chapter on ‘Pillars of US hegemony’ explains with great clarity the centrality of Washington in the support of world liquidity. That this has to change is recognised, but there is no clarity or consensus on the path towards change and destination of change. Mr Ghosh makes a brilliant summary of the masterly exposition made in the earlier chapters of the book in the chapter titled ‘Epilogue’ and the sections titled ‘Recapitulating’ and ‘Five Revolutions’ in the Epilogue deserve special mention here. He describes the globalisation of recent years as the Fifth Revolution ‘driven primarily by American hegemonic power, which is an amalgam of state and business power’. His contention is that there are clear signs that the United States is no longer in a position to offer ‘public good’ to global economy as it used to, mainly ‘through its failure to manage the global financial centre as a stable and responsible distributor of global liquidity’. Mr Ghosh sees need for change and speculates on signs of change. For a successful journey towards global stability, and by implication the process of global rebalancing, according to Mr Ghosh [Page xix]certain prerequisites have to be met by the United States. These include increasing productivity, acceptance that the margin of economic advantage that it enjoyed before is shrinking and willingness to concede that its capacity to use military power for political advantage is getting smaller.
We need to speculate: Will that meeting of prerequisites in the United States happen and how will it happen? The narration of links between business and politics in the book gives several clues but understandably no answers. However, personally I found that the most common reason for collapse of civilisations as explained in the book was intolerable inequalities in wealth and income. Hence, in my view, it is necessary, particularly for the United States to recognise the need to contain and curb high inequalities in income and wealth as the most critical step for overall rebalancing that the world is in need of.
A pertinent issue is the responsibilities of the major economies in the world, in facilitating, incentivising and persuading the United States to adopt the prerequisites mentioned by Mr Ghosh. These economies include the Euro area, Japan, China and India. A relevant issue is the sharing of burdens among these in the transition to a possible new global economic order, and here those economies which contributed more to imbalances so far have a harder task ahead.
The history of nexus between business and politics analysed brilliantly in this book and the more recent apparent capture of public policy by financial sector shows that the path towards a new global economic order is not only a political process but one in which business, big business, especially the financial sector, will play a major role. I am afraid the ongoing public debates on new global financial architecture are yet to focus on the criticality of national and global businesses in this process.
[Page xx]I thank Mr D. N. Ghosh for giving me the opportunity to write the foreword to this monumental work.Emeritus Professor, University of Hyderabad Former Governor—Reserve Bank of India Hyderabad, India
Time present and time past
Are both perhaps present in time future,
And time future contained in time past.
If all time is eternally present
All time is unredeemable (T.S. Eliot in Four Quartets)
During the last two decades of the 20th century the world went through tumultuous changes. The global landscape was changing dramatically: the Berlin Wall was torn down, the mighty Soviet Union collapsed, China was taking the capitalist road to economic growth … It was, to all appearances, a victory for market capitalism and for the policies and institutions that the world's most prosperous and powerful country stood for. Trans-national corporations became the most visible instruments for the propagation of the capitalist message all across the globe. Market spirit came to be universally idealised and globalisation came to acquire a kind of quasi-religious sanctity.
The tempest travelled over nations to sweep across our country as well, stirring in its wake spirited debates over how our policies and institutions could be restructured so that the maximum benefits could be drawn from the changing global environment. It was a theme that came to possess universities, think tanks, international seminars, business federations and various other forums. And underlying this theme was the unwritten premise that if an open and liberal market economy and ‘good policies and good institutions’ associated with it [Page xxii]were to be adopted and developed, politics must learn to keep its hands off business, restricting its role to ensuring the rule of law, providing basic regulation and putting in place a social safety net.
It is my participation in many of these debates and discussions that this book has grown out of. There were some who argued for caution in adopting the policies and institutions of the developed countries, emphasizing, in particular, that the context in which these policies and institutions had evolved over time be studied and understood first. But this view had few takers in our country, the idea being dubbed a hangover from the decades past. The overwhelming majority appeared to have been persuaded by Henry Ford's snappy verdict: ‘History is more or less bunk’. Listening to these debates and occasionally participating in them, I began to have the feeling that a kind of historical amnesia had gripped the elite of our society.
It is this feeling that brought about the idea of exploring the ever-entwined relationship between business and politics. This relationship is always in a flux, being impacted by the continuous interaction between the two vital interest groups that create and redistribute wealth in society. The way historical circumstances have converged during different eras to deliver the next push to this evolving relationship should be a matter of interest to those who are involved in the political and economic affairs of today. Of course, that is not to say such a study would necessarily throw up lessons for emulation. As the Greek philosopher Heraclitus put it, ‘Everything flows, and you cannot bathe twice in the same river.’ Nevertheless, time does weed out the non-essentials and what remains can serve as a pathfinder for the current generation.
I tossed the idea first with Amit Bhaduri. He encouraged me to explore the relationship between business and politics [Page xxiii]and trace the behavioural patterns of these two interest groups through different epochs in history. Deepak Nayyar came to my aid and worked out a kind of periodisation that would be relevant to the subject. He volunteered, despite his multifarious commitments, to go through the first draft of this book, and pointed out many unnecessary departures and glaring gaps. I remain immensely grateful to him. I am also indebted to Bimal Jalan for readily agreeing to take a quick look at the draft in the final stages, and for offering many insightful comments on the epilogue. My gratitude to Mihir Rakshit for spotting areas that called for greater clarity of exposition. The deficiencies that remain are of course mine.
It was so kind of Y. Venugopal Reddy to write the foreword. The piece is a masterly exposition of the political economy of the recent financial crisis, and of the contemporary relevance of the dynamics of the business-polity relationship—the theme of this book.
For the completion of this book, I owe debts of gratitude to many. Two organisations, ICRA and Peerless, have been generous in providing logistical support whenever I needed it. I give my thanks to Patricia Sharpe and Promod Upadhya. Udayan Majumdar cheerfully bore the burden of giving some shape to the initial drafts of some of the chapters. I never felt I was working in isolation, that is, away from the University libraries, thanks to Akhtar Parvez, the librarian, who was always there to help me out in tracing reference material, books and journals. Without him and his excellent connections, I could not have dreamt of completing this project, as it involved extensive research into the works of specialists: economic historians, political scientists and sociologists.
Somnath Dasgupta carefully and meticulously edited the final version: his sharp eye rescued me from many bloomers. Last, but [Page xxiv]not the least, the persuasive persistence of Elina Majumdar, the commissioning editor of SAGE, in completing the book within a time schedule; but for her, I would possibly have dragged on and on.
Prologue: Heritage of Antiquity: Roots of Political and Economic Power[Page xxv]
Human society, in its evolution from hunter-gatherers to agriculture and domestication of animals and permanent settlements, gradually became stable, bounded and complex, giving rise to division of labour, social inequality and political centrality. This transition is a story of continuous cultural evolution, with local groups, spurred by their environmental needs, striking out on their own paths and transiting progressively to larger systems, shaping themselves through interaction and learning. The researches of anthropologists and sociologists bring out a wide array of factors and circumstances that influence the process of local evolution and diffusion of culture and the process of transition.
Between the beginning of settled agriculture and the peak of the Roman Empire was a span of approximately eight thousand years. Archaeological findings allied with anthropological research tell a story of continuity in all known forms of human society: from relatively egalitarian, stateless societies to rank societies with political authority and eventually stratified civilised societies with states (Fried, 1967). The state is the final stage in the evolutionary process, the culmination of a slow, prolonged and connected growth process, precipitated at several stages by the somewhat random forces of population pressure [Page xxvi]and technological change.1 What gave it character was essentially the activities of loose associations transforming themselves into permanent centralised settlements and organising through political means their command over surpluses that accrue from economic activities within their territorial command. That this has been the general occurrence is confidently asserted by the sociologist Nisbet: ‘There is no historical instance of a political state not founded in circumstances of war, not rooted in the distinctive discipline of war’, though it subsequently diversified in peaceful activities or functions acceptable to the family or religious activities (Nisbet, 1976).
There is little disagreement that these social and political complexes arose in river valleys where alluvial agriculture came to be practised. Agriculture had been the primary life-giving force driving these civilisations and its development was associated with property differentials and social stratification. In the small city-states that emerged in these complexes, propertied elites assumed political and associated control. In defining the civilisational complexes in terms of an extensive list of characteristics, Gordon Childe laid special emphasis on two: emergence of a ruling class and the means it deploys to have a say in the control and management of economic surplus that is generated through different forms, namely through agriculture and associated activities and through trade (Childe, 1951).Emergence of Property Forms: Ceremonial Temples
Permanent possession of land by a settled family group conferred fixed economic resource, and those who could control strategic positions at river junctions, river fords or crossroads [Page xxvii]could mobilise a disproportionate amount of collective social power to turn it to their own use if needed. Such stratification emerged throughout the late fourth millennium. Sumerian records after 3000 bc show that, unlike the situation in most prehistoric villages, irrigated land was in much larger parcels than could be worked by individual families. With such permanent inequalities in property distribution, the strategic owners of core land with or without unusual alluvial or irrigational potential could command a greater economic surplus than the peripheral alluvial-irrigating neighbours. Also, they could have additional advantages accruing from trade through control along particular trade and communication routes, especially navigable rivers, and location of market places and store houses. Apart from the surplus that came to be generated through a combination of fixed property rights in land, other kinds of surplus-generating activities such as access to trade opportunities, came to be available to them. There were several alternative sources of creating wealth other than from land through a range of services from free persons, semi-free dependent labour and a few slaves. With the solidification of economic stratification embedded in wealth differentials, evident in all forms of social and economic activities, it was but inevitable that the dominant groups would come to acquire territorially centralised authority.
This transition, as scholars have surmised on the basis of archaeological records, passed through a particular type of ceremonial centre, the temple, something that was fairly general among the earlier civilisations. Extensive social cooperation in irrigation agriculture was associated with a strong priesthood virtually everywhere (Steward, 1963). The main purposes of the temples were essentially mundane: to serve as an inter-village diplomatic service and to redistribute economic produce and encode public duties and private property rights. The priests [Page xxviii]in earlier civilisations were more secular, more administrative and political, as a diplomatic corps, irrigation managers and redistributors. The temple was a kind of redistributive state à la the economist Karl Polanyi. With these religious institutions emerged a form of collective power that offered genuine diplomatic solutions to real social needs, in the regulation of trade, diffusion and exchange of tools and techniques, marriage regulation, migration and settlement and definition of just and unjust violence (Mann, 1986).
Ceremonial temple complexes had also developed a role for themselves. Greek and Asian temples had been offering various kinds of services that must have been of great help to the traders; they would deposit gold and treasures in temples with the priests acting as caretakers and sometimes as judges. The Babylonian Shamash was one of the market gods; originally, Jehovah was the market god of the tribe of Levi, at whose yearly festivals men of all tribes gathered to barter; the temple of Jerusalem was the centre of a financial network in the east, somewhat similar to that controlled by the later Christian Church over Western Europe.State and Property Rights: Intermixture
State and private property rights were connected to and mutually supportive of one another. From the excavated tablets of the early city of Lagash, it is surmised that there was a complicated mixture of three property forms in land administered by the temple. There were fields owned by the city's gods and administered by the temple officials, fields rented out by the temple to individual families on an annual basis and fields granted to individual families in perpetuity without rent. The first and third [Page xxix]forms were sizeable, denoting large-scale collective and private property, both employing dependent labour and a few slaves. The records show that collective and private property steadily merged, as stratification and state developed more extensively; a unified elite controlled the temples and large estates and held priestly, civil and military offices.
The earliest urban civilisation appeared in Sumer, in the far southeast of Mesopotamia bordering the Persian Gulf, and Sumerians continued as the main dominant cultural force in southern Mesopotamia from before 3000 to about 2000 bc. The fundamental political unit was the city-state, with Ur, on the Gulf, being the most important of the Sumerian cities most of the time. From time to time, one city or another would establish a kind of hegemony over all or most of the river valleys nurturing the civilisational complexes. A clear hierarchy of social order seemed to have emerged and established itself in the cities.2
One of the earliest records discovered at Ashur, a city-state in the 20th century bc, brings out clearly the kind of social and economic functions in these early states. The ruler, also the principal judge, ruled with the concurrence of three distinct bodies of citizens: the elders, the ‘town’ and the karum, interpreted to mean the people of the market, that is, the body of merchants who administered the commercial centre of the city. The karum acted as the bank of deposit, a centre for export and import, a clearinghouse and a chamber of commerce all rolled into one (Curtin, 1984: 68). During the old Babylonian period, the most significant piece of evidence attributed to Hammurabi, lawgiver of Babylon from about 1792 to 1750 bc, points to the existence of a class of independent merchants, known as Tamkaru, dominant in trade, brokerage and money lending, replacing the role [Page xxx]of temples and royal monopolies as the source of capital. The House of Elgi, as recorded in inscriptions, carried out a wide variety of business activities combined with banking; they gave loans against securities and accepted a wide range of deposits. After having flourished for hundreds of years, this bank seemed to have faded from the scene some time during the 5th century bc. A similar but younger banking firm is that of the sons of Maraschu, which operated from the town of Nippur. Apart from the banking functions of the kind practiced by the House of Elgi, they specialised in what we would call renting and leasing arrangements. They administered—as agents of tax-farmers— the royal and larger private estates, they rented out fish ponds, financed and constructed irrigation canals and charged fees to farmers within their water networks, and they enjoyed partial monopoly on the sale and distribution of beer.3Trade as a Source of Wealth
The development and expansion of trade, internal and external, started creating an alternative source of wealth other than from land. The existence of illuminating patterns of long-distance trade in preliterate societies points to the possibility of a wide range of relationships subsisting between the trade community and the host polity and society. Trade communities of merchants living among aliens in associated networks, as are found today in every continent, can be traced back through time to the very beginning of urban life. Familiar examples that come to mind are the chains of Phoenician and Greek trading towns that spread westward from the Levant or the Aegean coasts. Or some two thousands later, the Hanseatic League of independent trading towns, where merchants from Cologne on the Rhine [Page xxxi]settled along the trade routes down the Rhine and then eastward along the coast of North Sea and the Baltic.
The relationship between the trading community and the host society, taking on a complex variety of forms, has been an interesting field of study for sociologists, political scientists and economic historians. It was a kind of mixed economy in today's parlance. Trade was carried out as a private enterprise with some form of commercial control by the government (Curtin, 1984: 67). While government participated directly in trade in food, it used primarily the independent merchants as its agents. From the rich collection of clay tablets discovered in Kultepe in Turkey, the site of Kamesh, a settlement of Assyrian merchants, and the settlement of at least 20 other Assyrian commercial settlements in central and western Anatolia, there is adequate evidence to show that while the merchants were free to do their trade, they had to pay protection costs as the inescapable price for doing business. The authorities who have studied the Kultepe tablets portray an economic order where political authorities interfered in trade as much as they could to suit their particular interests, but they were careful not to suppress the underlying play of supply and demand, though the traders had to pay protection money for doing business. The Assyrian commercial documents refer to local authorities as the ‘palace’, where the Assyrian traders were welcome guests. The ultimate authority of the palace was undisputed. The visiting merchants had their own corporate organisation to act for the group. It took the form of a network of Karu; at the head was karum, in Ashur itself, below that Karum in Kamesh, and still further down the line a number of other karu in other Anatolian towns. The kind of relationship interpreted from Egyptian records is substantively no different. Traders had to carry on their operations under [Page xxxii]strict government control, though they were welcome to bring the special articles they needed (Curtin, 1984: 68–70).
In the palace-centred economies, trading merchants were recognised as communities that rendered useful service, but they were never accepted as part of the ruling power complex. It was somewhat like how the Jewish merchants came to be treated in medieval Europe. In oral traditions embodied in literary sources from the Aegean age, we often find a clear distinction between fighting men and the cautious, anaemic businessmen worn down with the care of cargoes. According to the predominance of one type or other, there developed trader-communities and warrior-communities and the hostility between them seemed to have been a fundamental fact of ancient history.City-States
The sack of Troy in about 1200 bc, symbolising the end of Aegean prosperity and of the Minoan-Mycenaean age, was the beginning of what is generally talked of as the Dark Ages in the Mediterranean world. Lasting down to about 750 bc this saw the end of the palace-centred state and the emergence of city-states in the Mediterranean, from the archaic period (8th to 6th centuries bc) to the classical period (5th to 4th centuries bc). Two decentralised civilisations around the Mediterranean dominated the first millennium Bc—Phoenica and Greece.
The Phoenician states of the Levant coast, entering a power vacuum along the eastern shores of the Mediterranean left by the collapse of the Hittites and the Mycenaeans and the retreat of Egypt to the Nile, emerged as a dominant power for about five centuries. It was exclusively a naval and trading power, [Page xxxiii]the ‘bride of the sea’, united by a loose federal, geopolitical alliance of city-states. In the 10th and 9th centuries, Tyre probably enjoyed some primacy over other cities of Phoenician and was ruled by kings whose power was limited by the merchant oligarchy. Phoenicians, as a rule, did not fight unless they had to. In Tyre and Sidon, they paid tribute to oriental monarchs instead of striking for independence. The Phoenicians, unlike the Greeks, were not looking for lands to settle but for anchorages and staging points on the trade route from Phoenicia to Spain, a source of silver and tin. The Phoenician coastal towns eventually lost their naval supremacy to the Greeks and their political independence first to Nebuchadnezzar II, and then to the Persians, all in the 6th century bc.Emergence of Empires
Though the multi-city structure in early civilisations continued for several centuries, the autonomy of city-states began to weaken as regional confederations emerged. Gradually, they were conquered by extensive empires, with large and hierarchical organisation of power. From the rise of the great world empire of Sargaon of Akkad (2500–2350 bc) to the fall of the Roman Empire in the West (ad 476), the historical record is filled with a bewildering profusion of empires and their rulers. How were the ruling regimes relating to the enterprisers of resource generating economic activities to realise their political objectives? We explore these relationships in five civilisations: Greek, Roman, Indian, Chinese and Arab, roughly covering about 15 centuries, from the five centuries before Christ to the end of the first millennium.[Page xxxiv]Notes
1. The state forms—in embryo in the stratified society and the transition to the final form, as Oppenheimer argues in his classic sociological study of The State—are marked by six stages. The first stage, of continuous raiding and killing between groups, was followed by one in which a dominant group extended a protective cover to others for carrying out agricultural and connected economic activities, a critically important step ‘where the bear becomes the beekeeper’. The third stage arrives when the peasants regularly bring the surplus as tribute to the ruler. This tribute is found in many well-known instances in history: Huns, Magyars, Tartars and Turks have derived their largest income from this source. What follows is the union of warring groups in command of specific territories. Gradually, the territorial rulers acquire the right to arbitrate and the means to enforce it, marking the near completion of the evolution of the primitive state.
2. For a good summary based on archaeological evidence, see Philip D. Curtin, Cross-Cultural Trade in World History,Chapter 4.
3. See Heichelheim, 1958, as quoted in A History of Money, Glyn Davies, 1994, 50.
Oh, do not ask, “What is it?”
Let us go and make our visit.—T.S. Eliot1
This book is an odyssey undertaken to explore and understand the relationship between business and politics as it has evolved through different epochs in history to stand at where it does today. This intersection of politics, business/economics and sociology has always interested scholars from a range of disciplines with different perspectives. Pluralists like Robert A. Dahl and Erik Olson debate the impact of competing interest groups on policy processes. Sociologists like Charles Wright Mills and Michael Useem dissect the nature of influence exercised by large business corporations on political decision-makers and the channels that are used for this purpose. Then, Vernon, Caves and Dunning, among others, made the corporation itself an important subject of enquiry in international relations in the 1970s and 1980s, particularly because of the influence of the market-driven global compass of corporate operations. Next to the pluralist and neo-corporatist perspectives, there is a clutch of methodological approaches (Buchanan and Tullock, 1962) that apply economic models to political processes. These studies characterise the political market as one in which interest groups invest resources to obtain favourable decisions or non-decisions from politicians, who in turn pursue their self-interest by gathering resources and support (Fuchs, 2008).
[Page xxxvi]Business corporations operating across geographies face complex operational issues involving the sovereign governments with which they have to interact. The host and the home states have large, though often conflicting, stakes in the ways the global business corporations function. These are not technical or legal issues that the corporations can resolve on their own; these can be sensitive issues that make the involvement of the home government critical. Global business corporations, located mostly in the developed countries, have their own equations with their home governments. The functional and geographical dispersion of these corporations over the past three centuries and the economic power that they have come to wield are linked inextricably with the gradual rise to the hegemony of these advanced countries. Little wonder that these hegemonies and the global business corporations, between themselves, have set the policies that govern the structure of geo-political and economic relations in today's world.
The journey on which we embark seeks to unravel how and why we have come to inherit the present configuration of power and thereby enhance our ability to make informed decisions to shape the future. A hegemonic power is a product of history. Joseph Schumpeter had once remarked that the compulsion of the insistent present makes us oblivious of the truth of the past sanctified by centuries. Human decisions taken at crucial stages have changed the course of history; these decisions, taken individually or collectively, may have been influenced by ideology or by technology or by a mere instinct of power or wealth grabbing.
We are now at a turning point in global history. As we try to understand more of the past, we begin to make some sense of our times. We begin to see our times not as an everlasting present, but as a historical period. The contemporary world has come into existence through a very tortuous route. It has very [Page xxxvii]little in common with the road maps of history on which ideologues of every description draw their straight lines.Dissecting the Dynamics
The potential energy inherent in any society often expresses itself in changing profiles of material output, patterns of employment and class distribution of income. The single most important element residing deep within the system is the driving need to extract wealth through activities that a particular socio-economic configuration may permit. This is, in a sense, the logic of a system that ‘expresses the potential energy created by its nature … What is logical about these movements is that they express the outcome of the system's nature, as a released spring expresses the energy stored up within it’ (Heilbroner, 1985: 25).
How does the inner nature express itself? In an abstract philosophical vein, each society in each period of history, as Hegel elaborates, is a structurally interrelated whole, unified by some inner principle. For Hegel, it is the Geist, or the inner spirit, the style of a period. For Marx, it is the mode of production that determines all other social relations; historical change occurs through a dialectical process, with the new mode negating the previous one while also preparing the way for the next to come.
Many sociologists are not comfortable with the Hegelian-Marxist conception of society as an integral entity defined by its web of interconnectedness and one whose movement may be explained through the dialectical approach. The Marxist theory is perceived as having failed to predict the direction of historical development, let alone its timing. Politically, many see the culmination of Marxist dialectic not in universal freedom and prosperity with the withering away of the coercive state as predicted by Marx, but in an oppressive and grossly inefficient state capitalism.
[Page xxxviii]As against the holistic view of society, it may be more useful if we are to understand the dynamics of economic change through the interaction of two forces: the techno-economic structure in any society that is controlled by business in its own interest and the polity that is controlled by the ruling regime for purposes it considers to be for the collective good. The two forces are distinct, but co-exist in an unordered manner, each with a different axial principle. Each has, in a sense, its own realm and the two realms are not congruent with one another. They have different rhythms of change and follow different norms that legitimise different and even contrasting types of behaviour. But the way these two realms function and interact may create a dynamic that may become decisive in changing or even destroying societies.
In any society—primitive, imperial or capitalist—the dynamic expresses itself through a continuous creative process that extracts wealth to generate a surplus over what is required for maintenance or reproduction. The way that surplus is generated, accumulated and redistributed holds the key to the relationship between business and polity. In a broad sense, business generates and accumulates surplus while it is polity that redistributes the surplus—and also has the responsibility to create conditions that facilitate the production of this surplus.Two Realms: Business and Politics
Business is imbued with a ‘restless Faustian spirit’ that takes as its motto ‘the endless frontier’, and as its goal ‘the complete transformation of nature’ (Bell, 1978). This acquisitive spirit, which is the central theme in Werner Sombart's exposition of capitalism,2 respects no absolute limit.
Acquisitive orientation is, however, not confined only to the Age of Capital; it was manifest in pre-capitalist formations as well. In Classical Greece, Medieval Europe and Japan, or in China during the course of its dynastic cycles, business as a calling did not enjoy the kind of social recognition that it does today, given the cultural and religious milieu then prevailing, but, nonetheless, its march continued unabated.
Essentially, business signifies the single-minded pursuit of all those activities that contribute to the generation of surplus and its accumulation, in agriculture, industry, trade, finance or any associated ancillary and supportive services. It is the opportunity for generating more surplus that drives business forward; ‘the pursuit of profit, and forever renewed profit’, as Max Weber puts it (Weber, 1981: 17). The critical source of surplus is derived from the different kinds of activities undertaken by business, from a money sum to a larger money sum through commodities, as Marx's M-C-M' formula so brilliantly schematises the repetitive, expansive metamorphosis through which accumulated surplus manifests itself. M stands for money, C for commodity, and M' for money plus an increment, equating surplus value. Surplus expands through the very logic of the process, one that Wallerstein describes as ‘network of commodity chains’ of commodities that link together more and more of the [Page xl]separate steps involved in the production of goods, beginning with the extraction of raw materials and ending with the sale of finished items. These commodity chains combine small, discrete M-C-M' steps into longer strides, converting many small profits into fewer larger ones (Wallerstein, 1979). Marx's M-C-M' formula is a powerful tool that can be extended to the pre-capitalist circuit (C-M-C) where the commodity is the object and money merely the intermediary, or the new world of globalised finance where there can be a straight route from M to M'.
Owners of business generate a surplus through various modes such as agriculture and related activities, trade, crafts, mechanised production or any other innovative combination of factors of production for meeting the needs of the society. Harvey captures the essence when he defines business in generic terms as ‘the molecular processes of capital accumulation in space and time’ that flows ‘through continuous space, towards or away from territorial entities, through the daily practices of production, trade, commerce, capital flows, money transfers, labour migration, technology transfer, currency speculation, flows of information, cultural impulses and the like’ (Harvey, 2003: 26–27). We use the term ‘business’ in this all-inclusive sense here.3 The opportunities for the generation of surplus from the pursuit of any of the activities that Harvey lists keep changing as an economy evolves and diversifies and depending on the context, this book uses the term trade, industry, plantation or any other species of productive activity as a proxy for business.
Politics in a general sense is the activity to pursue and attain goals through the exercise of regulatory and coercive power, centrally administered and territorially bounded— that is, state power. A political regime may be motivated by a diverse range of interests beyond self-preservation, by objectives [Page xli]such as acquisition of territory, enhancement of coercive reach, acquisition of wealth through military exploits or spread of cultural, religious and ideological beliefs. Territorial boundaries— in a world never yet dominated by a single state—also give rise to regulated interstate relations where geo-political diplomacy assumes importance. A polity will require different kinds and orders of resources; through successive civilisations, political power holders had to necessarily turn to business, to actors who operate in the resource generating activities.Structure of Relationships
Business and polity have been closely interlinked at any given time—whether economic growth, stagnation or decline—since polity needs resources. While the focus of interest of the two power networks is different, they have come together for many common objectives. Through history, these objectives have been found to have been associated almost invariably with war or war-like activities such as conquest or plunder or with their direct fallout or unintended consequences.
Polity may rightfully appropriate a part of the surplus that business generates, as the price for extending a protective umbrella over business, but ruling political regimes may be driven on occasion to adopt coercive measures for raising resources, for self-preservation or for greater glory and power and even try to expropriate the accumulated surplus or wealth of business communities. This imposes an unsustainable burden on business, stifling its incentives to grow; it also creates a fundamental dilemma for the polity. The polity has to be strong enough to enforce private property rights but wise enough to refrain from using its strength to expropriate private property. If business [Page xlii]does not get protective cover from the polity, it may be forced to move out and seek protection from other regimes, as happened, for example, during the religious persecution in Europe in the 16th century.
Business has also been found to have demonstrated its capability to assert its bargaining power in relation to polities through capture of strategic functions such as financing of rulers (Heilbroner, 1985: 42). When the major European powers were venturing out in the Atlantic, they were prepared to share part of their sovereign powers in several areas with the companies set up by merchant communities to explore new trading opportunities. The two classes of actors have been accommodating when their interests have converged and even, on occasion, when they had nursed antagonistic opinions; we have also seen a fusion of two interests, when, for example, the wealth-creating business class takes upon itself the role and responsibilities of the ruling class or vice versa. This has been particularly visible at many turning points in history: the collapse of the Roman Empire; the withering away of the Islamic hegemony; the breakdown of the feudal system; maritime exploration into the Atlantic or the onset of the industrial revolution. When this happens, we may talk of a crisis or a revolution meaning a turning point so decisive that the system comes to an end and is replaced by one or more alternative successor systems or is changed completely beyond recognition. Such were the turning points at the time of the fall of the Western Roman Empire or of the Abbasid Arab Empire. This may not be a quick event but a ‘transition’, a long period lasting a few generations.
This book presents a historical overview of the relationships between business and polity as they have come to evolve via numerous twists and turns at different periods in the past, [Page xliii]beginning from the ancient economy to the global capitalist economy of today. We will follow a chronological pattern, but as the canvas is broad, we will be selective.
Outlining the heritage of our antiquity in the prologue, we start with the early civilisational complexes—Graeco-Roman, Chinese, Indian and Arab—and continue to the end of the 1st millennium ad. Then we deal with the explosion of maritime trade in the first five centuries of the 2nd millennium ad; trade that linked regions and polities from the Muslim Mediterranean in the west to China in the extreme east and anchored by India in the middle. During the same period, two feudal regions, Japan and Europe, were lying in obscurity; they were to flower later, but theirs is an exciting story during the incubation period. Our focus here will be on critical events and circumstances that brought about this change: the emergence of strong and independent business communities within medieval Europe, the rise of cities, guilds, communes and merchant republics, the establishment of powerful fiscal-military and mercantilist states, the age of the trading empires, the imperial phase of the 19th century and the post-World War II developments that led up to the current phase of a globalised world dominated by a super-power.
As we go along, we will analyse the conjuncture of events and circumstances that had a significant influence on the business-polity dynamics, how these dynamics evolved within the political, economic and technological framework of each period. We will also focus on some core elements of this relationship—for instance, attitude towards property rights, the rule of law, business innovations, mobility of capital and such other aspects—the purpose being to gain a perspective on the origin and evolution of the capitalist ethic and culture that we find today.[Page xliv]Notes
1. ‘The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock’, T.S. Eliot, 1917.
2. Sombart identified greed and gold as the drivers of capitalism, as of all humans endeavour. Though his own exposition of the development of capitalism was unsystematic and contradictory (See New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics Vol. 4), his emphasis on money making as the driver, is relevant. ‘The love of money is one of the founders of human society … no less than Columbus found out’ (Bell, 1978: 292).
3. The term the businessman was first used in the US in the 1830s to denote a type of merchant who traded not only in goods but also in land and whatever else could result in a profit (Swedberg, 2005: 16).
Epilogue: Stirrings for a New Configuration[Page 364]
Man's struggle against power is the struggle of memory against forgetfulness—Milan Kundera
Our odyssey has now come to an end. We have sailed through several civilisational complexes over the past 2,500 years in which were embedded a variety of political and economic formations. We have watched out for the behaviour of two power networks: those who control the levers of political power and those who engage themselves in wealth generating activities, how they had been found interacting between themselves and how the forces released through such interaction have impacted historical change. The dynamics of the two powerful networks that constitute business and politics take us from one historical epoch to another. It does not follow any immutable law. The transition is basically path dependent, where change is transmitted through a series of feedbacks that give momentum to the system, pushing it forward in a direction set by the past and carrying it into the future.
The chapters of the book were remembrances of the past, of the meteoric rise and catastrophic fall of many great civilisations, and give us insights into how the outcomes were [Page 365]primarily influenced by the interactive dynamics of political and economic processes. The course of events was driven as much by the inexorable march of economic forces as by the unpredictability of human wills. The cycles of birth, growth and decline of civilisations have no preset pattern. They do not necessarily offer an infallible guide to the future, but it will nevertheless be unwise to ignore the past.
Passing through a wide spectrum of political regimes, from the agriculture-intensive civilisations in the vast land mass of Eurasia to the capital-intensive civilisations in northwest Europe and America, we have observed that each civilisational complex has its distinctive characteristics. Out of the layers of those crowded experiences, we have in this epilogue tried to extract a few lessons that continue to be as relevant as they were in the past; we should not become, as Toynbee once said, victims of non-learning of those lessons that have certain universal relevance.Recapitulating: Politics in Command
In the empires of antiquity, land was the principal source of wealth and the farming community, as the generators of that wealth, supported and nourished the political superstructure. Ruling political classes, themselves large holders of landed wealth, would normally aim to maintain a kind of relationship with the peasant community that would keep them contented, for they constituted the main resource for the polity for the conduct and prosecution of war. Ancient Greece of the classical period in the 5th century bc was an exemplar: through Solon's path-breaking land reforms, it restructured the landholding pattern to make it more equitable, established a democratic constitutional structure and paved the way for a cohesive and stable [Page 366]polity. Rome was a striking contrast: its governing class failed to discipline itself, becoming far too self-centred, acquiring wealth for its personal benefit in complete disregard of the interests of the farming community, even though it provided the main resource for the spectacular rise of the Republican Rome. The ruling class thus dug its own grave.
The making and unmaking of the Arab Empire was an interesting variant. The Arabs built up a colossus with lightning speed, and nursed it carefully, exploiting the potential for trade in the conquered territories by allowing freedom to the merchants to carry on uninterrupted their business activities. The Caliphs understood the value of a mutually supportive relationship between business and polity. While this ensured peace and prosperity for nearly three centuries, the ruling class became victims, in the later decades of the Arab Muslim Empire (as was in the case of the Roman Empire), of an insatiable craze for acquiring personal wealth for themselves, in collaboration with the business class; this led to a creeping deterioration of political governance followed by its terminal decline.
The key to prosperity and stability for the polity was a pragmatic and positive approach towards business. Such pragmatism as observed in land-based civilisations in antiquity has three aspects. The first is a balance between the political ambition of the ruling class and the availability of resources from the wealth-generating sources. A wise polity would not only not allow these sources to dry up but also create conditions for sustained agricultural prosperity and welfare of the peasant community. Chinese imperial regimes had been farsighted in this regard. It had never been easy for any polity to keep this balance; the late Imperial Western Roman world and the Chinese dynastic cycles give illuminating insights into the consequences of the failure.
[Page 367]Second, logistics of garnering and managing the economic surplus extracted from the peasant community had been of crucial importance. China showed the way as to how these relationships could be institutionalised. It was far ahead of the times in establishing fiscal and bureaucratic machineries within the state to guard against any arbitrariness. This explains in a way why China was successful in ensuring a relatively longer run for its dynasties than many of its contemporaries as, for example, the Mauryan Empire in India, even though the Mauryans had a reasonably efficient land revenue policy.
Third, in the imperial polities there prevailed cultural and ideological inhibitions against trade as a calling. This created unenviable dilemmas for the ruling classes: they could not brush aside the diktat of the cultural czars nor could they ignore the benefits that could accrue to the polity by using the resource from trade. The Greek polity was wise enough to adopt a pragmatic attitude, encouraging foreigners and resident non-citizens, mainly slaves, to engage in trading activities. This was a kind of laissez-faire ambience that allowed businessmen to flourish and prepare the foundations of Athenian prosperity. China, on the contrary, was averse to encouraging trade, being apprehensive that traders acquiring economic power and wealth could pose a challenge to the existing power structure rooted and derived from agriculture. This put China at a disadvantage in optimising its resource raising options from different sources and curbed its ability to grapple with the geopolitical convulsions on its northern frontier.Harmonious Balance
As we move from land-based civilisations of antiquity to the present, we observe that the relative importance of land-based sources progressively declines, though it continues to retain its [Page 368]importance in the political regimes within the vast landmass of Eurasia. By the beginning of the second millennium, maritime trade acquired a long-distance global character that was much more extensive and intensive than what prevailed in the earlier centuries. Previously isolated peoples were brought into closer contact, leading to intensive cultural interaction between Mediterranean, African and Asian civilisations. An extensive network of trade developed, among the regions accessing the Indian Ocean, extending from China in the East to the Islamic regimes in the Middle East in command of the Mediterranean, with India as the pivotal link. The geopolitical medium through which merchants and their goods circulated was generally frictionless and continuous. Trade emerged, apart from land, as an important source of wealth, marking a shifting configuration in business-polity relationships.
During this period, when trade was in the ascendant, ruling the high seas along the trading line from the Sea of China to the Mediterranean, two regions were lying secluded, within the self-contained feudal socio-economic structures, at the two ends of the long trading line: Japan at the eastern end and northwest Europe at the other end. For business it was a story of contrasts. In Japan, with a strong feudal tradition, with powerful chiefs concentrating political, economic and feudal powers in their hands, business had to struggle hard for survival; traders survived by sharing profits from trading with the feudal chiefs. Japan had to wait till 1868 when the Meiji restoration removed the feudal shackles. On the other hand, in northwest Europe, history turned out to be in the favour of business. The ruling princes, involved as they were, in their feudal and dynastic wars, left business relatively free to pursue its course. In fact, the ruling princes receiving financial support from the merchant community whenever needed, and gave it protective cover in return.[Page 369]Five Revolutions
Europe reached a watershed in the 16th century. We have traced the series of coincidences through which Europe arrived at this century. Many causal paths, some long term and steady, others recent and sudden, others old but with a discontinuous historical growth, came together at a particular time and place. A series of coincidences, but nonetheless the continuance of this process has been a miracle. And then over the next four hundred years, several revolutions took place, in conjunction and in succession.
The first spark was radical changes in warfare technology; these were enormously more resource-guzzling than what the world had ever seen before, and beyond what the feudal economic structure could provide. With the onset of the Military Revolution, the ruling classes started relating to business entrepreneurs for exploring new avenues of resources outside the feudal ones. These relationships proved basically unstable. With no institutionalised fiscal arrangements to service their debts, the princes were unable to ensure uninterrupted flow of finance for their military ventures. Also the reliance on mercenaries had its own risks for they could be faithless. It became necessary for the princes to internalise the logistics of organisation and administration of men, material and finances, by creating within the framework of government resource-raising fiscal machinery with bureaucratic underpinnings. This led to a series of transformations in business-polity relationships—from the earlier ad hoc and personalised arrangements between princes and business houses, into institutionalised collaborative arrangements. The outcome was the strong fiscal military states that came to be developed with the help of financial techniques and expertise made available by the business and financial community. Business was thus involved in numerous ways in state formation. [Page 370]This is the Second Revolution in the relations between business and polity.
The growing relationship between business and polity deepened when Europe was hit by an economic crisis in the 17th century. The partnership then took an overtly economic character, the underlying rationale of which has been termed mercantilist philosophy by later economic historians. This was a combination of fiscalism and mercantilism that could not have come about except through the strong bonds that had come to be cemented earlier. Ad hoc collaboration deepened through fruitful partnership leading to the formation of a fiscal-military-mercantilist state that lay at the roots of European hegemony in later centuries. This is the Third Revolution in business-polity relations.
The Atlantic exploration, marking the beginning of Europe's age of conquests and settlements, was the Fourth Revolution. It was spearheaded through a tactical combination of the military power of the state and the aggressive grabbing instinct that European business had acquired over the past few centuries. This new dimension of relationships between polity and business came to be forged during the westward expansion of the Atlantic powers. The nations on the Atlantic seaboard believed that their national interests lay in development of long-range and large-scale international markets through aggressive warfare. War and trade went hand in hand. The international arena became their arena for expansion, with political regimes and business entrepreneurs working hand in hand.
During this revolution, Britain secured a competitive advantage over her rivals. The core of her strategy lay in giving freedom to business to explore new avenues of trade and to acquire and control, if need be, territorial possessions, in support of business ventures, with the full assurance that the state would [Page 371]extend naval support whenever needed. It is not that the other major powers were passive, but none could equal the ‘adaptive efficiency’ of British polity and business. The aggressive culture that came to be moulded through competitive power struggles and through encounter with other civilisations lay at the core of what we call imperialist expansion. The spread of Commercial and Industrial Revolutions all over the globe cemented the business-polity relationships and laid the foundation for Pax Britannica. All this in essence is the precursor to today's globalisation, the Fifth Revolution, which has engulfed the entire globe under American leadership.Hegemonic Leadership
Today's globalisation, the Fifth Revolution, is driven primarily by American hegemonic power which is also an amalgam of state and business power, though it is different from Pax Britannica. US polity and transnational business had been playing complementary and supporting roles for nearly two centuries. In periods of geopolitical turmoil the two roles get so intertwined that it becomes difficult, if not impossible, to separate one from the other. It is through the combined strength of the two powers, overt or covert, that the United States has been able to maintain its hegemony since the end of the World War II. In a progressively globalising economy driven by the principle of free markets, business corporations in the United States and in other developed countries have been trying to preserve a pattern of asymmetries that works in their favour through the exercise of monopoly power, enforcement of unfair and unequal exchange and several kinds of extortionate practices. US politics, in particular, has been consistently engaged in ensuring that US business is enabled to sustain and exploit whatever asymmetries [Page 372]and resource endowment advantages can be assembled by way of state power (Harvey, 2003: 33).
Hegemony is not sheer domination; it is, to use Gramsci's definition, something different, the additional power that accrues to a dominant group by virtue of its capacity to lead society in a direction that not only serves the dominant group's interests but is also perceived by subordinate groups as serving a more general interest. Dominant groups have the capacity to present their rule as credibly serving not just their interests but also in the delivery of certain global public goods. It aims to ensure stability not only at the domestic level, but also, at the global level, both on the political and economic fronts. It also means that if there be disruption, it possesses the wherewithal, whether by itself or in collaboration with others, to bring it back to equilibrium.Signs of Change
There are clear signs today that the United States is no longer in a position to offer what is generally accepted to be ‘public goods’ by the global community. Its hegemonic power is getting undermined in several respects. For example, there is a disturbing asymmetry between the political ambition of the hegemonic power and its capacity to continue to finance it without creating a potential threat to global financial stability. Though the United States has vast military power, the use of that power for political advantage is turning out to be counter-productive. The United States is simply unable to fund out of its savings the political commitments undertaken by its polity. The margin of economic advantage it used to enjoy is gradually shrinking. The United States has but 4.5 per cent of the world's population [Page 373]and around 20 per cent of its income when measured by purchasing power parity. By 2050, the share of population may decline slightly, but its share of GNP is likely to decline rather sharply, perhaps to a mere 10 per cent of income (Sachs, 2005: 359). It cannot expect that the present arrangements by which the United States finances its fiscal deficit by drawing on the savings of other countries can continue indefinitely. Allowing the United States to pile up debt depends on the perception that the global power is providing public goods that the rest of the world considers acceptable. For some it was so in the cold war era, but it is no longer now. This inability on the part of the United States to pay its own way by increasing its own productivity is a standing threat to global stability; this has worsened further with its failure to manage and regulate the global financial system. The recent financial crisis, which originated in the United States, has jeopardised the momentum of global growth. The United States is no longer in a position to service the global community as a stable and responsible distributor of global liquidity. The world remains on the edge of a precipice.A New Configuration?
In the changing economic and political reality of today's world, the United States has to work along with other nations towards global stability. With its command over enormous scientific, technological and economic resources, the United States can certainly contribute towards global prosperity, but it must learn to adjust its role to meet the expectations of the global community. It has to shed its belief that a set of political and economic values like liberty, democracy, equality, private property and markets' which, as Samuel Huntington writes, are at the core [Page 374]of the national identity of the United States, are universally acceptable.1 It must accept that any interference in national affairs, however indirect, in the name of democracy or economic development, evokes painful memories of the arbitrary and cynical nature of colonial rule. Its political objective has to fit in within the framework of a harmonious comity of nations.
The last two decades have witnessed a remarkable shift in the distribution of economic power and resources within the global community. Developing countries have travelled a long way from the time when Gunnar Myrdal, the Swedish Nobel prize winning economist, wrote that Asian countries were doomed to remain impoverished thanks to overpopulation, inadequate savings and poor education (Myrdal, 1968). The burgeoning growth of some of the developing countries is testimony, ironically though it may sound, that the impetus towards globalisation, pushed by the hegemonic power through TNCs, has been the major contributing factor towards growth. Even after the recent global crisis, the reactions to a liberalised business ambience—propagated as gospel for much of the 20 years since the end of the Cold War by the United States with sporadic support from industrialised countries such as the UK and institutions including the International Monetary Fund—have been measured among the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and the other key emerging markets. In fact these countries are gently pushing forward reforms based prima facie on a philosophy of eclectic pragmatism rather than of wholesale retreat into autarchic nationalism. While countries have been adapting themselves, determined overwhelmingly by domestic considerations, to the new realities, they are increasingly becoming conscious that the business-centric political policies that lie at the core of the economic ideology of globalisation have to undergo significant changes.
[Page 375]For centuries, the business-polity relationship has primarily revolved, almost exclusively, around the interests of the two groups, the ruling political regimes and the wealth-creating elite groups. This relationship needs a fundamental reorientation in the changing geopolitical environment in the interest of political and economic stability at the global level. It is being increasingly realised that the needs and aspirations of other interest groups in the society, equally important for its stability, are intimately connected with the way wealth is created and distributed. Each nation has therefore to strive to restructure the relationship in a way that answers to the needs of the different stakeholders of the society. CSR (Corporate Social Responsibility) is a grudging recognition by wealth creators that, apart from creating value for their owners, it is incumbent on them to accept social responsibility for their acts of omission and commission.
The diverse wealth-generating activities of the economic entrepreneurs have to focus on the generation of employment and economic opportunities firmly anchored, not on the needs of the wealth creators, per se, but on creating a harmonious balance between diverse interest groups. In particular, it would be dangerous to ignore the interests of the poor and deprived communities who have become increasingly assertive, even in nations which are the new emerging high-growth economies of today. The disadvantaged can no longer be left to remain as spectators to history; they want to be and have to be made active participants in the process of change and development.
Delivery of global public goods such as counter terrorism, action to control environmental damage and climate change—all these make daily headlines, but one that does not, even though it is equally important, is elimination of poverty. Arguably, poverty lies at the root of many of the political and social ills of today. Decade after decade of development has resulted in failed [Page 376]development goals, leaving about one-third of the world's population marginalised. The structural adjustment programmes of the late 1970s and 1980s have added to the miseries in several countries. This lies at the core of the anti-globalisation movement. Shorn of its rhetoric, it has a powerful point to make, namely, that the kind of globalisation that is being driven by the TNCs under the protective umbrella of the United States means in substance public subsidy for the rich and market discipline for the poor.
In an interdependent world that has become virtually interdependent, the need for a reorientation of business-polity relationships has to be accepted not only as a national but also as a truly global responsibility. Well-conceived and transparent policies are needed at the political level, designed and enforced to ensure better investment decisions for stronger and more sustainable economies. Such policies should take a fresh look at the basic building blocks of business and free markets: accounting, disclosure, incentives, regulation and responsibility. We must revisit standards of governance and ethics of market capitalism and fundamentals necessary for a strong and functioning capital markets.
This apart, behaviour of TNCs in different developing nations or of movement of people across nations cannot be left to unregulated market forces or to the whims of individual nations. The role of TNCs, for example, that has been an indispensable part of US hegemonic power has to undergo a fundamental change. Certainly the global community would like to preserve and nurture the kinds of scientific and technological benefits that the TNCs are in a position to offer, but, for this to happen, several institutional arrangements for supervision at the global level over their policies and practices have to be in place. The global community has to create institutions that help [Page 377]support national policies anchored on the needs of the people within each country without hindering the process of growth. Global imbalances can be resolved and stability attained only through organised international coordination and consensually established international institutions (Nayyar, 2002). We cannot solve problems, as Albert Einstein once famously remarked, by using the same kind of thinking we used when we created them.
Most in the liberal world are immensely relieved that the communist interlude is behind them, but they or the rest of the global community are not at all sure that we have moved into a safer or more hopeful or more livable world. What we have learnt from our historical survey is that any large system that is built around a hegemonic power may suddenly collapse like a sand pile. What happens within a sand pile, the shifting and sliding of the grains, is as critically important as what is visible from the outside. Scientists say that the sand pile is a system that could break down not only under the force of a mighty blow but also at the drop of a pin. This is the spectre that is now haunting the whole world.Note
1. Huntington, 1993, as quoted in Noam Chomsky (2003).
- Agora: A central feature of the polis. Originally a market place, the agora also served as the chief social and political meeting place. Along with the acropolis (the upper fortified part of a city), the agora housed the most important buildings of the city-state.
- Archon: The chief magistrate in many Greek cities. In Athens there was a council of archons which was a form of executive government.
- Asiento: A contract, especially contacts of financiers with the crown, or contract to supply slaves.
- Augustus: A title meaning ‘divinely ordained’ conferred by the Roman Senate on the first Roman emperor, Gaius Julius Caesar Octavianus (Augustus), in 27 bc and thereafter assumed by all succeeding emperors.
- Augsburg, Peace of: (25 September 1553). The treaty that ended the German religious wars of the Reformation period. It marks the defeat of the Habsburg Emperor Charles V politically and religiously—failures which were repeated in the Thirty Years' War of 1618–1648 and in the Treaties of Westphalia (1648)—and thus represents an important stage in the evolution of Germany into a collection of petty states instead of a united absolute monarchy.
- Auto de fe: Act of the Faith; burning or other public condemnation of crypto-Jews, heretics, etc.; public ceremony held by the Spanish Inquisition.
- Bakufu: Headquarters of the shogun (see also the note 3 in Chapter 7). Baku-han: A modern term referring to the Tokugawa system of government in which the shogunate (bakufu) exercised authority over several daimyo (han).
- Boule: Council. Boule usually refers to the Council of Five Hundred. The Council consisted of 50 citizens from each of the 10 phylai (see Demos), selected by lot for one year from candidates nominated for the 139 demes. The Boule was crucial for the working of the Athenian democracy.
- Basileus: The king archon designating the highest state official, after whom the year was named. He was responsible for organising state [Page 379]festivals and presided over the People's Court in cases concerning family law and inheritances.
- Bull: A letter issued by the Pope that contains an order and/or statement of religious doctrine.
- Bushi: The military aristocracy in Japan; the samurai.
- Caliph: The supreme leader of the Islamic world after Muhammad's death in ad 632, the successor to Muhammad. Secular and religious authority was combined in the office of the caliph, who claimed to be appointed by God.
- Carreira da India: Round voyage between Lisbon and Goa.
- Casa da India: India House at Lisbon.
- Chonin: Non-samurai urban dwellers, merchants and artisans.
- Consul: After the fall of the monarchy, the Republican Romans established a joint annual magistracy shared by two elected senators (originally called praetors) to act as the head of the executive and to lead the armies in war. Their power was that of the king, limited by their annual term and duality.
- Cortes: Portuguese Parliament or assembly of three estates of nobility, clergy and people.
- Conquistador: Military adventurers, mostly commoners, who led the Spanish exploration of the New World during the 16th century. Fierce and often ruthless figures, they were motivated both by missionary zeal and greed for gold and other riches. Description applied to the Spanish military pioneers in America.
- Consulado: The Consulado in Seville and other Spanish cities was the corporation of merchants trading there.
- Creole: New World settler of white, Spanish descent.
- Cruzado: Portuguese coin, originally of gold, whose value was fixed at 400 reis (A small Portuguese copper coin of low value) in 1517. During the 17th century, the cruzado was roughly valued at four English shillings.
- Demos: People. The word means (a) the entire Athenian people (= the Athenian state), (b) the common people (= the poor), (c) the People's Assembly (= Ekklesia), (d) rule of the people (= democratia), (e) municipality, that is, one of the 139 demos created by Cleisthenes in 507 bc and collected into 30 trittyes, which were again collected into 10 phylal. [Page 380]
- Denarius: A Roman monetary unit represented by a silver coin, the standard of the Roman monetary system. During the imperial period, these coins were progressively devalued (see also Sesterces and the note in Chapter 2).
- Ducat: First minted in 1284 by the city of Venice. A gold coin with the portrait of the ruler (for example, the Duke, the Dodge) on it. Later, simply, a monetary unit of account.
- Equestrian: The Equestrian order, the knights, second to the senatorial order, originally consisted of the income bracket sufficient to enable them to keep and equip a horse to enable them to serve in the cavalry. The order in the late Republican and imperial times included some very rich men who ran the commercial life of Rome. The qualification of membership in the late Republic was 400,000.
- Estado da India: ‘State of India’ Portuguese India, often loosely applied to all the Portuguese fortresses and settlements between the Cape of Good Hope and Japan.
- Fidalgo: Nobleman, gentleman.
- Florin: First minted in 1252 by the city of Florence, later any of the several gold coins patterned after the Florentine florin (for example, the Dutch florin).
- Fluyt (flyboat): In early modern Europe, a small, rapid and highly efficient vessel designed for inexpensive, utilitarian hauling; a Dutch innovation.
- Galleon: Large Spanish oceangoing warship.
- Galley: Warships driven by oars in battle and equipped with sails for cruising. The galley was the standard European battle vessel until the late 16th century, when the sail-powered, more heavily armed galleon began to replace it. Open-ended vessel, used in coastal traffic and in the Mediterranean.
- Geniza: See note 12 in Chapter 5.
- Hadith: Traditions recounting the words and deeds of Muhammad; the source of Muslim scriptures.
- Han: A daimyo domain.
- Intendant: In 17th- and 18th-century France, the absolute monarchy's key regional administrator. An intendant of justice, finance and police presided over each local government district and army intendants were civilian supervisors of the armies. Under Louis XIII and his Minister Cardinal Richelieu, intendants ruthlessly imposed justice and supervised tax collection. Overthrown by the rebellions known [Page 381]as Fronde (1648–1653), they gradually reemerged under Louis XIV as information gatherers and then as superb local administrators.
- Peso: Unit of value in which Spanish-American treasure was expressed; there were also silver and gold coins bearing the name peso.
- Escudo: Castilian coin.
- Helot: In ancient Sparta, serfs who were forced to perform agricultural labour; originally the Messenians, a group conquered by the Spartans and reduced to near slave status.
- Hoi Polloi: The many or the majority. A term used synonymously with Demos.
- Hoplite: A heavily armoured foot soldier of ancient Greece, who fought in close formation, usually in ranks of eight men, each carrying a heavy bronze shield (a ‘hoplon’), a short iron sword and a long spear.
- Huguenots: The name originated between 1510 and 1535 at Geneva, where those in favour of an alliance with the Swiss canton, Frieburg, were called Eidnots, literally ‘partakers of an oath’. They joined with the Bernese who had declared for the Reformed religion. The name came to be attached to French Protestants.
- Latifundia: In Latin, literally, broad fields, in Roman times, a great landed estate, usually worked on by slave labour.
- Liturgy: Public service for the state. Some state expenditures were met not from state revenues but by requiring a rich person as a civic duty to defray the expenses in question for one year.
- Lombards (Langobardi): The last of the German invaders, entering northern Italy in the 6th century.
- Madrasa: Islamic school, established after the 10th century.
- Magyar: Dominant ethnic group of disputed origins in Hungary.
- Manumission: The formal act of emancipating a slave, sometimes by written agreement or payment of the slave to the master.
- Metic: In ancient Greece a merchant, usually a foreigner, who was a member of a class of resident non-citizens in the polis.
- Mulatto: In areas that were former colonies of Spain, Portugal, France and in the United States, a term for a person of mixed Negro and European parentage.
- Mycenae: An ancient Greek city on the Pelopponesian Peninsula, which rose to military power around 1500 bc.
- Mycenaean: Civilisation, influenced by Minoan Crete and the ancient cities on the Eastern Mediterranean, flourished politically and culturally until about 1300 bc. [Page 382]
- Optimates: In the contentious politics of Late Republican Rome, the diehard defenders of patrician privilege; literally the best; opposing the Optimates were the Populates or the People's party.
- Patrician: In medieval and early modern cities, a hereditary elite of bourgeois office holders, rentiers, and high-status merchants, to be distinguished from the ordinary guild merchants.
- Patriciate: The hereditary aristocratic class of ancient Rome.
- Phalanx: In ancient Greece, a military formation in which heavily armed infantrymen line up close together in deep ranks, defended by a wall of shields.
- Polis(pluralpoleis): (a) city, (b) city-state. The typical polis had a territory smaller than 30 sq km and a citizen population of less than 1000 adult males. In addition to the citizens (politai), a polis was populated by free foreigners (xenoi, in some poleis called metics). Foreigners and slaves lived in polis, but were not members of it. The polis usually consisted of a city and its hinterland. The city was the political, religious, economic and military centre, even if most of the citizens lived on the land, outside the city wall.
- Principate: The system of government established by Augustus with the Roman emperor (Princeps) as its head. Other terms used to denote the imperial position were Imperator, Augustus and Caesar.
- Quraysh: The Bano Quraysh, the dominant tribe in Mecca.
- samurai: In medieval and early modern Japan, a class of warriors (from the Japanese saburu, meaning ‘service’). The samurai were originally rural landowners, generally illiterate, who served as military retainers. Later they emerged as military aristocrats and then as military rulers.
- Saracen: A term that Greek-speaking Byzantine chroniclers and other European peoples used for Muslim Arabs.
- Satrap: The governor of a province (satrapy) of the ancient Persian Empire.
- Sesterces: The main unit of coinage under the principate in Rome: originally a quarter of a silver denarius. It was devalued by Nero to a ratio of 5:32 (see also the note in Chapter 2).
- Sharia: Islamic system of law based on the Qur'an.
- Shiatu Ali: ‘The party of Ali’—Shi'ites of the minority Muslim sect who maintain that the leadership of the community resides solely with descendants of Muhammad through Alui and Fatima.
- Sophists: A group of ancient Greek teachers of rhetoric, philosophy and the art of living, 5th-4th centuries bc, known for their adroit, [Page 383]subtle and specious reasoning: Sophistry is now applied to any form of devious but convincing argument.
- Shogun: From the 12th to the 19th century, the chief military figure of Japan.
- Shugo: Military governor appointed under the Kamakura and Ashikaga shogunates.
- Sunni: Majority Muslim sect adhering to the belief that leadership of the community belongs to the most qualified person, regardless of descent from the Prophet.
- Sura: Chapter of the Qur'an.
- Trieres: Galley with three banks of oars, one above the other. It was the most common types of warship in the 5th and 4th centuries bc and had a crew of 200 men, of whom 170 were rowers.
- Ulama: Muslim religious scholar.
- Okios: The Greeks used this to describe the household: the house and all those who lived within, the husband, wife and family including the slaves.
- Okiomania: The Greeks used the word to describe the management of a household and its possessions; this is the source of the English word economy.
- Za: Guild in Japan.
- Zeugites: Citizens in ancient Greece who produced between 200 and 300 measures of corn, wine and olives a year and thus belonged to the third Solonian property class.
- Templars: A western Christian military order in the Middle Ages.
- Thete(pluralthetes): Properly, a day labourer, and then a citizen who produced less than 200 measures of corn and belonged to the fourth Solonian property class.
- Tithe (archaic): Tenth part, tax payable to church.
Reference List and Select Bibliography[Page 384]Before European Hegemony: The World System A.D. 1250–1350, Oxford University Press, New York, 1989.,From Imperial History to Global History, in ShigeruAkita (Ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9781403919403,Alam, Muzaffar and SanjaySubrahmanayam, (Eds), The Mughal State, 1526–1750, Oxford University Press, Delhi, 1998.From Versailles to Wall Street, 1919–1929, Penguin, London, 1977.,A Short History of Modern Japan, 1867–1937, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1946.,The Global Financial System, 1750–2000, Reaktion Books, London, 2001.,Alston, Lee J., EggertssonThrainn and NorthDouglass C. (Eds), Empirical Studies in Institutional Change, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139174633Aspects of Roman History, A.D. 14–117, Routledge, London, 1998.,Explaining Long-term Economic Change, Cambridge University Press, 1995. [First published by The Macmillan Press, 1991.],Passages from Antiquity to Feudalism, London, 1974.,Banking and Business in the Roman World, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.,Trade, Plunder and Settlement, Maritime Enterprise and the Genesis of the British Empire, 1480–1630, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984.,Byzantium, The Bridge from Antiquity to the Middle Ages, Phonix, London, 2002.,War, Politics, and Colonization, 1558–1625, in N.Canny (Ed.), The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998., [Page 385]The Ideological Origins of the British Empire, Cambridge University Press, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511755965,History: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, 2000.,Main Currents in Sociological Thought, Vols I and II, Penguin, 1965.,The Long Twentieth Century Money, Power and the Origins of Our Times, Verso, London, 1994.,Adam Smith in Beijing, Lineages of the Twenty-first Century, Verso, London, 2007.,Ashton, T.S., and R.S.Sayers (Eds), Papers in English Monetary History, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1953.A Social and Economic History of the Near East in the Middle Ages, Collins, London, 1976.,The Brenner Debate, Agrarian Class Structure and Economic Development in Pre-industrial Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511562358and ,The Arabs, Penguin Books, 1955.,Crusades, Commerce and Culture, Indiana University Press, Bloomington, IN, 1962.,The Worlds of Medieval Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.,Baechler, Jean, John A.Hall and MichaelMann (Eds), Europe and the Rise of Capitalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.Lombard Street, London, 1873.,Cities and Economic Development, From the Dawn of History to the Present, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1988.,Economics and World History-Myths and Paradoxes, Harvester Wheatsheaf, London, 1993.,Ancient Rome, The Rise and Fall of an Empire, BBC Books, London, 2006.,Monopoly Capital, An Essay on the American Economic and Social Order, Penguin, 1966.and ,The Trial of Templars,,Canto Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1978.Capitalism in Amsterdam in the Seventeenth Century, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1950.,A History of Historical Writing, Dover Publications, New York, 1937.,The Crucible of Europe, The Ninth and Tenth Centuries in European History, Thames and Hudson, London, 1976., [Page 386]Good Capitalism, Bad Capitalism and the Economics of Growth and Prosperity, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2007., and ,‘Archaic’ and ‘Modern’ Globalization in the Eurasian and African Arena, 1750–1850, in A.G.Hopkins (Ed.), Gobalization in World History, Pimloco, London, 2002.,The Birth of the Modern World, 1780–1914, Global Connections and Comparisons, Backwell Publishing, Oxford, 2004.,A History of Business, Volume I, From Babylon to the Monopolists, 1961, Volume II, From the Monopolists to the Organisation Man, University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1963.,A History of Capitalism, 1500–2000 (Translated by and ), Aakar Books, Delhi, 2004.,The ‘Hub of Empire’: The Caribbean and Britain in the Seventeenth Century, in N.Canny (Ed.), Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. I ‘The Origins of Empire’, Oxford, 1998.,The Cultural Contradictions of Capitalism, Basic Books, New York, 1978.,The Age of Absolutism, 1660–1815, Hutchinson's University Press, London, 1954.,Liberty or Death, Wars That Forged a Nation, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2006.and ,Review Essay: From Commerce to Conquest the Dynamics of British Mercantile Imperialism in Eighteenth-Century Bengal, and the Foundation of the British Indian Empire, in Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars, Vol. 22, Issue 1, 1990.,The Formation of Islam: Religion and Society in the Near East, 600–1800, Cambridge University Press, New York, 2003.,The Economic Problems of the Roman Empire at the Time of Its Decline, in Carlo M.Cipolla (Ed.), The Economic Decline of the Empires, 1970.,Against the Gods, The Remarkable Story of Risk, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 1996.,The Power of Gold the History of an Obsession, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2000.,A Splendid Exchange, How Trade Shaped the World, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York, 2008.,In Defense of Globalisation, Oxford University Press, 2004.,Tudor England, Penguin, 1950.,The Greatness of Antwerp, in the New Cambridge History of Modern Europe, Vol. II, the Reformation, 1520–1559, Cambridge, 1990., [Page 387]European Warfare in a Global Context, 1660–1815, Routledge, 2007.,The Pursuit of Glory, Europe 1648–1815, Penguin Books, London, 2008.,The Eighteenth Century, Europe 1688–1815, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.,The Origins of the International Economic Disorder. A Study of United States Monetary Policy from World War II to the Present, Berkeley, CA, University of California Press, 1977.,Great Transformations, Economic Ideas and Institutional Change in the Twentieth Century, Cambridge University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9781139087230,Boardman, John, JasperGriffin and OswynMurray (Eds), The Oxford History of the Roman World, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986.The Shield of Achilles, War, Peace and the Course of History, Penguin, London, 2002.,The European Dynastic States, 1494–1660, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1991.,Bonney, Richard, (Ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.The Thirty Years' War 1618–1648, Osprey Publishing Oxford, 2002.,Borthwick, Mark (Ed.), Pacific Century, The Emergence of Modern Pacific Asia, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1992.Silk Road Monks, Warriors and Merchants on the Silk Road. (Translated by HelenLoveday), English edition published by Odyssey Books and Guides, Hong Kong, 2004.,Gentlemanly Capitalism and the Making of a Global British Empire: Some Connections and Contexts, 1688–1815, in ShigeruAkita (Ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2002.,The Business of Empire: The East India Company and Imperial Britain, 1756–1833, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006.,The Dutch Seaborne Empire, 1600–1800, Penguin Books by arrangement with Hutchinson of London, 1965. (1990 Reprint.),The Portuguese Seaborne Empire 1415–1825, Carcanet in association with the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1991 (the original year of publication, 1969).,The Dutch Economic Decline in Corlo M.Cipolla (Ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires, Methuen and Co., London, 1970.,Bourbon Spain and Its American Empire, in Bethell (Ed.), The Cambridge History of Latin America, Vol. I, Cambridge University Press, 1984., [Page 388]The Rise of Merchant Empires, 1400–1700, A European Counterpoint, in James D.Tracy (Ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-distance Trade in the Early Modern Period, 1350–1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.,Italian Merchant Organisation and Business Relationships in Early Tudor London, in SanjaySubramanyam, (Ed.), Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, Variorun Ashgate Publishing Limited, Hampshire, Great Britain, 1996.,The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, Harper & Row, New York, 1966. (English Translation, 1972–1973.),Civilisation and Capitalism, 15th-18th Century, The Structure of Everyday Life, Vol. 1, The Wheels of Commerce, Vol. 2, The Perspective of the World, Vol. 3, Collins/Fontana Press, London, 1984.,A History of Civilizations, Penguin, 1993.,Memory and the Mediterranean, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2001. (Translated from the 1998 French edition by SiânReynolds.),On History, University of Chicago Press, 1980.,Merchants and Revolution, Commercial Change, Political Conflict and London's Overseas Traders, 1550–1653, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993.,The Sinews of Power, War, Money and the English State 1688–1783, Unwin Hyman, 1989. (Reprinted by Routledge, London, 1994.),The Renaissance, Longman, New York, 1988.,The Economics of Imperialism, Penguin, London, 1977.,Social Conflicts in the Roman Republic, Chatto & Windus, London, 1971.,The Calculus of Consent: Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy, The University of Michigan Press, Ann Arbor, 1962.and ,Aspects of Greek History, 750–323 bg A Source-based Approach, Routlege, New York, 1996.,The Civilisation of the Renaissance in Italy, Penguin Books, London, 1990.,The Legacy of the Ancient World, Vol. I, Penguin Books, London, 1953. (First published in 1923.),Republics of Merchants in Early Modern Europe, in JeanBaechler, John A.Hall and MichaelMann (Eds), Europe and the Rise of Capitalism, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1988.,Venice and Amsterdam: A Study of Seventeenth-Century Elites, Second Edition, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994., [Page 389]The Penguin History of Greece, Penguin Books, 1963.,Butlin, R.A. and R.A.Dodgshon (Eds), A Historical Geography of Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.British Imperialism: Innovation and Expansion, 1688–1914, Longman, London, 1993.and ,Revolutionary Empire, The Rise of the English-Speaking Empires from the Fifteenth Century to the 1780s, Jonathan Cape, London, 1981.,Louis XIV, Longman, London, 1993.,Cambridge Ancient History, Fifth century bc, Vol. V, 1992.Cambridge Economic History of Europe [CEHE], Vol. IV, The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, E.E. RichAndssrf and C.H.Wilson (Eds), Cambridge, 1967.A Concise History of the World, from Paleolithic Times to the Present, Second Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.,Aristocratic Century, The Peerage of Eighteenth-Century England, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511607998,Canny, N. (Ed.), The Origins of Empire, British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. I, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205623.001.0001What Is History, Penguin, London, 1964.,City of Capital: Politics and Markets in the English Financial Revolution, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1996.,Money, Labour and Land: Approaches to the Economies of Ancient Greece, Routledge, London, 2002.and ,City Bankers 1890–1914, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.,Big Business: The European Experience in the Twentieth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997.,Cassis, Youssef, (Ed.), Finance and Financiers in European History 1880–1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.Alternatives to Economic Globalisation, Berret-Koehler Publishers, San Francisco, 2004.and ,Devil Take the Hindmost, A History of Financial Speculation, Farrar, Strauss and Giroux, New York, 1999.,Scale and Scope, Dynamics of Industrial Capitalism, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1990.,Medieval India, From Sultanat to the Mughals, Part I, Delhi Sultanat, (1206–1526), Har-Anand Publications, New Delhi, 2009 (, [Page 390]Fourth Revised Edition).Kicking away the Ladder, Development Strategy in Historical Perspective, Anthem Press, London, 2002.,The Rise of Merchant Banking, Unwin Hyman, London, 1984.,Chase-Dunn, Christopher and Salvatore J.Babones, (Eds), Global Social Change, Historical and Comparative Perspectives, The John Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 2006.Trade and Civilisation in the Indian Ocean: An Economic History from the Rise of Islam to 1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1985.,Reflections on the Organising Principle of Pre-modern Trade, in James D.Tracy (Ed.), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.,What Happened in History, Penguin Books, London, 1942.,Social Evolution, Collins, 1951.,World Orders, Old and New, Pluto Press, London, 1994.,Hegemony or Survival, Penguin, London, 2003.,Day of Empire, How Hyperpowers Rise to Global Dominance and Why They Fall, Doubleday, New York, 2007.,Guns, Sails and Empires, Technological Innovation and European Expansion 1400–1700, Barnes and Noble Books, New York, 1965.,Economic Decline of Empires. (Edited with an introduction.)Methuen and Co., London, 1970.,Cipolla, Carlo M., (Ed.), The Industrial Revolution 1700–1914, Harvester Press, Hassocks, UK, 1976.Before the Industrial Revolution, European Society and Economy 1000–1700, Meuthuen and Company (1976),,Third editionby Routledge, London, 1993.Economic History of Europe, D.C. Heath, Boston, 1952.and Others,The ‘End of History’ Debate Revisited, in BrianBrivati, JuliaBuxton and AnthonySheldon (Eds), The Contemporary History Handbook, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1996.,Athenian Economy and Society: A Banking Perspective, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1992.,Eli Heckscher and the Idea of Mercantilism, in Coleman, D.C. (Ed.), Revisions in Mercantilism, Methuen and Co., London, 1969.,A History of Political Thought, From Ancient Greece to Early Christianity, Blackwell, London, 2000., [Page 391]Banks and Industrial Finance in Britain, 1800–1939, Cambridge University Press, 1991.,The Reformation: A History, The Modern Library, New York, 2003.,Colonial Encounters in the Age of High Imperialism, Harper Collins, New York, 1996.,Time and the Space of History, Yale University Press, 2007.,Cicero and the Roman Republic, Penguin, 1956.,The Foundations of Capitalism, Philosophical Library, New York, 1959.,The Roman Republic, London, 1978.,The Class Struggle in the Ancient Greek World, Duckworth, London, 1981.,Crouch, Colin and WolfgangStreek (Eds), Political Economy of Modern Capitalism, SAGE Publications, London, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.4135/9781446217849The First Merchant Venturers, The Ancient Levant in History and Commerce, Thames and Hudson, London, 1966.,Cross-cultural Trade in World History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511661198,Economic Systems and Society, Capitalism, Communism and the Third World, Penguin, London, 1974.,After Tamerlane, The Rise and Fall of Global Empires, 1400–2000, Penguin Books, London, 2007.,Globalism and Imperialism: The Global Context of British Power, 1830–1960, in ShigeruAkita (Ed.), Gentlemanly Capitalism, Imperialism and Global History, 2002.,The World of the Indian Ocean Merchant 1500–1800, Collected Essays, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2001.,A Miracle Mirrored, The Dutch Republic in European Perspective, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.and ,A History of Money, From Ancient Times to the Present Day, University of Wales, Cardiff, 1994.,Athenian Propertied Families, 600–300 bc, Oxford, 1971.,Wealth and the Power of Wealth in Classical Athens, Ayer Company, New Hampshire, Reprint Edition, 1984.,Society and Economy in The Cambridge Ancient History, Vol. V, The Fifth Century bc,,Second Edition, Cambridge University Press, 1992. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521233477Europe, A History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996., [Page 392]Gold Standard, in PeterNewman et. al., The New Palgrave Dictionary of Money and Finance, Vol. 2, Macmillan, London, 1992.,Crisis in Finance: Crown, Financiers and Society in Seventeenth Century France, David and Charkes, UK, 1973.,The European Nobility, 1400–1800, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996.,Economic Policy in Europe since the Late Middle Ages, The Visible Hand and the Fortune of Cities, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1992., and ,The Scandal of Empire, India and the Creation of Imperial Britain, Permanent Black, Delhi, 2007.,Empires, Conell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1986.,Europe between Revolutions, 1815–1848, Fontana Press, London, 1967.,Early Rome and Italy in The Oxford History of the Roman World(Ed.) in JognBoardman et. al., Oxford, 1986.The New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, Macmillan, London, 1987. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230279803, and ,Capital and Finance in the Age of Renaissance A Study of the Fuggers and Their Connections. (Translated from the German by H.M.Lucas, original edition, 1928, Reprint by , Bookseller, New York, 1963.),The Gold Standard in Theory and History, Metheun, New York, 1985.,The Political Systems of Empires, The Free Press, New York, 1969.,Politicised Economies: Monarchy, Monopoly and Mercantilism, Texas A and M University Press, College Station, 1997.and ,Europe Divided, 1559–1598, Fontana Press, London, 1968.,The Old World and the New 1492–1650,,Canto edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970.Richelieu and Olivares,,Canto edition, Cambridge University Press, 1989.Empires of the Atlantic World Britain and Spain in America 1492–1830, Yale University Press, New Haven, 2006.,Elliott, J.H. and L.W.B.Brockliss, (Eds), The World of the Favourite, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1999.Philip II and Macedonean Imperialism, London, 1976.,Reformation Europe, 1517–1559, Fontana Press, London, 1963., [Page 393]Elton, G.R. (Ed), The Reformation, 1520–1559, The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. II,second edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.The Pattern of Chinese Past, Methuen, London, 1973.,Money Powers of Europe, in the Nineteenth and Twentieth Centuries, D. Appleton-Century, New York, 1938.,Unequal Exchange: A Study of the Imperialism of Trade, Monthly Review Press, New York, 1972.,Genoa and Genoese, 958–1528, The University of North Carolina Press, 1996.,The Political Systems of Empires, The Free Press, New York, 1969.,Cicero, A Turbulent Life, John Murray, London, 2001.,Gold and Spices: The Rise of Commerce in the Middle Ages, Holmes and Meier, New York, 1998.,The Cash Nexus, Money and Power in the Modern World, 1700–2000, Allen Lane, 2001.,Empire, The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and the Lessons for Global Power, Allen Lane, London, 2002.,The Ascent of Money, A Financial History of the World, Allen Lane, London, 2008.,The City, Penguin, revised edition, 1965.,Colonisation: A Global History, Routledge, London, 1997.,The Ancient Greeks, Penguin Books, London, 1966.,Aspects of Antiquity, Discoveries and Controversies,,Second Edition, Penguin Books, London, 1968.The World of Odysseus,,Second Edition, Chatto & Windus, London, 1977.Politics in the Ancient World,,Canto edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511612893The Ancient Economy, Penguin Books, London, 1985.,Comparing the Tokaguawa Shogunate with Hapsburg Spain: Two Silver-Based Empires in a Global Setting, in , 1991.,Path Dependence, Timelags and the Birth of Globalisation: A Critique of O'Rourke and Williamson, in European Review of Economic History, Vol. 8, Issue 1, April, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1361491604001066and ,Who Owns History, Rethinking the Past in a Changing World, Hill & Wang, New York, 2002., [Page 394]The Man Who Saw the Future, Thomson, New York, 2004.,Forster, Robert and ForsterElborg (Eds), European Society in the Eighteenth Century, Harper Torchbooks, New York, 1969.The Rise of Europe, 1100–1250, in The Middle Ages, 950–1250, Edited by RobertFossier, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997.,Egypt, Greece and Rome: Civilizations of the Ancient Mediterranean, Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1996.,The Greek Achievement, The Foundations of the Western World, Allen Lane, London, 1999.,The Evolution of Political Society, An Essay in Political Anthropology, Random House, New York, 1967.,Global Capitalism, Its Rise and Fall in the Twentieth Century, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2006.,Monetary Trends in the United States and the United Kingdom, University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1982. http://dx.doi.org/10.7208/chicago/9780226264257.001.0001and ,Business Power in Global Governance, Viva Books, New Delhi, 2008. (Published in Arrangement with Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder Co., USA.),The End of History and the Last Man, Avon Books, New York, 1992.,The Imperialism of Free Trade in Economic History Review, Second Series, Vol. VI, 1953.and ,Famous First Bubbles: The Fundamentals of Early Manias, MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 2000.,The English Civil Wars, 1642–1651, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2003.,Monopolies in America: Empire Builders and Their Enemies, From Jay Gould to Bill Gates, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.,The Debt Boomerang: How Third World Debt Harms Us All, Boulder, Westview, 1992.,Military Power, Conflict and Trade, Frank Cass, London, 2004.,Representation of Slavery in English Literature, in Economic and Political Weekly, 29 September 2001.,India and China: Partnership or Rivalry in a Globalising World, in Economic and Political Weekly, 25 December 2004.,Machiavellian Virue and Economic Globalism, in Economic and Political Weekly, 30 July 2005., [Page 395]Governance and Accountability, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2007.,Economic Backwardness in Historical Perspective, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1962.,Continuity in History and Other Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1968.,Europe in the Russian Mirror: Four Lectures in Economic History, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1970. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511561146,The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire (28 selected chapters), Wordsworth Classics, UK, 1998.,Merchants and Moneymen, The Commercial Revolution, 1000–1500, Arthur Barker Limited, London, 1972.and ,Power and Greed, A Short History of the World, Robinson, London, 2002.,The Pope, His Banker, and Venice, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.,War and the State in Early Modern Europe, Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States, 1500–1660, Routledge, London, 2002.,The Origins of Value, The Financial Innovations That Created Modern Capital Markets, Oxford University Press, New York, 2005., and ,The Medieval World, Translated by , Parkgate Books, London, 1990.,Medieval Civilisation 400–1500, Translated by , Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1989.,The Building of Renaissance Florence, An Economic and Social History, John Hopkins University Press, 1991. (Originally published in 1980.),The Roman World, 44 bc-ad 180, Routledge, London, 1997.,A Modern History of Japan: From Tokugawa Times to the Present, Oxford University Press, New York, 2003.,The Fall of the Roman Empire, Phoenix Giant, London, 1997.,Europe Reshaped, 1848–1878, Fontana Press, London, 1976.,The Influence of the City Over British Economic Policy, in YoussefCassis (Ed.), Finance and Financiers in European History, 1880–1960, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992.,The Political Economy of Empire, 1880–1914, in AndrewPorter (Ed.), The Nineteenth Century, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, 1999., [Page 396]History, Historians and the Dynamics of Change, Praeger, Westport, CT, 1993.,Coordination, Commitment, and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild, in Journal of Political Economy, Vol. 102, No. 41, 1994., Paul Milgrom and ,Europe Reshaped, 1848–1878, Fontana, London, 1976.,American Leviathan, Empire, Nation and Revolutionary Frontier, Hill & Wang, New York, 2007.,The Merchant, in JacquesLe Goff, (Ed.), The Medieval World. (Translated by ), Parkgate Books, London, 1990.,Studies in Islamic History and Institutions, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1968.,False Dawn the Delusions of Global Capitalism, Granta Books, London, 1998.,US Power and Multinational Corporation, Basic Books, New York, 1975.,War and Change in World Politics, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511664267,Rise of the Bourgeoisie, Demise of Empire: Ottoman Westernisation and Social Change, Oxford University Press, New York, 1996.,Dominance Without Hegemony and Its Historiography, in R.Guha, (Ed.), Subaltern Studies, IV, Oxford University Press, New York, 1992.,Grunebaum, Gustave E.von, (Ed.), Unity and Variety in Muslim Civilisation, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1955.The Entrepreneur and Economic Development, in I.Livingstone, (Ed.), Economic Policy for Economic Development, Penguin, London, 1971.,Essays in Indian History, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995.,Habib, Mohammad and Nizami KhaliqAhmad, (Eds), A Comprehensive History of India, Volume V, The Delhi Sultanate (ad 1206–1526) (Published under the auspices of The Indian History Congress)People's Publishing House, New Delhi, 1970.The Medieval Inquisition, Holmes and Meier Publishers, New York, 1981.,Florence and the Medici Pattern of Control, Thames & Hudson, Great Britain, 1977.,Renaissance Europe, 1480–1520, Fontana Press, London, 1971.,The Civilization of Europe in the Renaissance, Fontana, London, 1991., [Page 397]Powers and Liberties, The Causes and the Consequences of the Rise of the West, Penguin Books in association with Basil Blackwell, London, 1986.,Japan, From Prehistory to Modern Times, Tuttle Publishing, Tokyo, 1971.,Maritime Trade and State Development in Early South East Asia, University of Hawai Press, Honolulu, 1985.,Trade and Statecraft in the Age of the Cholas, New Delhi, 1980.,American Treasure and the Rise of Capitalism (1500–1700), in Economica9, No. 27, pp. 338–57, at 344, 1981.,Banks and Politics in America, From the Revolution to the Civil War, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1957.,The Athenian Democracy in the Age of Demosthenes, Structure, Principles and Ideology, University of Oklahame Press, Norman, 1999. (First published in 1991 by Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, UK.),The New Imperialism, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2003.,A Brief History of Neoliberalism, Ibid., 2005.,History and Politics in Capitalism and the Historians. (Edited with an introduction) Routledge, London, 1954.,The Nature and Logic of Capitalism, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1985.,Helm, Dieter(Ed.), The Economic Borders of the State, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1989.From Colony to Superpower, US Foreign Relations since 1776, The Oxford History of the United States, Oxford University Press, New York, 2008.,The Development of the French Economy, 1750–1914, Cambridge University Press, 1992.,The Rise and Fall of the House of Medici, Penguin, 1979.,A Theory of Economic History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1969.,The World Turned Upside Down, Radical Ideas during the English Revolution, Maurice Temple Smith, London, 1972.,Change and Continuity in Seventeenth-Century England, revised edition, Yale University Press, 1991.,The Roman Middle Class in the Republican Period, Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 1974.,Class Conflict and the Crisis of Capitalism, Essays in Medieval Social History, Verso, London, 1990., [Page 398]Hinshaw, Randall(Ed.), The World Economy in Transition, What Leading Economists Think, Edward Elgar, UK, 1996.The Passions and The Interests, Political Arguments for Capitalism before its Triumph, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1977.,The Rhetoric of Reaction: Perversity, Futility, Jeopardy, Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1991.,Rival Views of Market Society and Other Recent Essays, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1992.,The Age of Revolution, 1789–1848, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1962.,Industry and Empire, From 1750 to the Present Day, Penguin Books, London, 1968.,The Age of Capital, 1848–1875, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1977.,The Age of Empire 1875–1914, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, London, 1987.,Nations and Nationalism Since 1780, Programme, Myth and Reality, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.,Revolutionaries Contemporary Essays, Phoenix, London, 1994 (Originally published in 1973).,The Communist Manifesto, A Modern Edition (with an introduction by the author), Verso, London, 1998.,Globalisation, Democracy and Terrorism, Little Brown, London, 2007.,Echoes of the Marseillaise, Verso, London, 1990.,City-State and Market Economy, in RichardBonney (Ed.), Economic Systems and State Finance, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999.,Rethinking World History, Essays on Europe, Islam and World History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511626104,Holt, P.M., Ann K.S.Lambton and BernardLewis (Eds), The Cambridge History of Islam, Volume IA and Volume IB, Cambridge University Press, 1970.Cities, Capitalism and Civilisation, Allen & Unwin, London, 1986.,Europe Hierarchy and Revolt 1320–1450, Fontana Press, London, 1975.,Holmes, George, (Ed.), The Oxford History of Medieval Europe, Oxford University Press, 1992.[Page 399]Hopkins, A.G. (Ed.), Globalisation in World History, PIMLICO, London, 2002.Conquerers and Slaves: Sociological Studies in Roman History, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1978.,The Age of Transition, Trajectory of the World System, Zed Books, London, 1996.and et. al.,The Corrupting Sea, A Study of Mediterranean History, Blackwell, Oxford, 2000.and ,After the Nation State, HarperCollins, London, 1994.and ,A History of the Arab Peoples, Faber & Faber, London, 1991.,War in European History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1978.,China's Imperial Past: An Introduction to Chinese History and Culture, Stanford University Press, Stanford, California, 1975.,Trade, Development and Foreign Debt, Vol. I, International Trade, Vol. II, International Finance, Pluto Press, London, 1992.,Europe: Privilege and Protest 1730–1789, Fontana Press, London, 1980.,War and State Formation in Ancient China and Early Modern Europe, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511614545,A Critique of Economic Theory, Penguin Books, London, 1972.and ,Political Order in Changing Societies, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1968.,The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order, Penguin, London, 1996.,European Jewery in the Age of Mercantilism, 1550–1750,,Third Editionby the Litman Library of Jewish Civilisation, London, 1998.Israel, Jonathan, (Ed.), The Anglo-Dutch Moment Essays on the Glorious Revolution and Its World Impact, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.Worldy Goods: A New History of the Renaissance, Papermac, London, 1996.,A History of Christianity, Penguin, London, 1976.,The Renaissance, A Short History, Phoenix Press, London, 2000.,The Later Roman Empire, 284–602, A Social, Economic and Administrative Survey, Vol. II, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1964., [Page 400]The European Miracle, Environments, Economics and Geopolitics in the History of Europe and Asia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981.,Europe and The Sea, Blackwell, London, 1993.,The Iron Century, Social Changes in Europe, 1550–1660, Widenfeld and Nicholson, London, 1971.,Empire, How Spain Became a World Power, 1492–1763, Harper Collins, New York, 2003.,Kaplan, Amy and Donald E.Please, (Eds), Cultures of United States Imperialism, Duke University Press, Durham, 1993.Marxism and the City, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/0198279248.001.0001,Economy and Nature in the Fourteenth Century, Money, Market Exchange, and the Emergence of Scientific Thought, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511496523,The Honorable Company, A History of the English East India Company, HarperCollins, London, 1993.,A Constitutional History of India 1600–1935, (First Published in 1930) Reprinted, Low Price Publications, Delhi, 1990.,The Court of the Caliphs, When Baghdad Ruled the Muslim World, Phoenix, London, 2004.,The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000, New York, 1987.,Jacques Coeur, Merchant Prince of the Middle Ages, Books for Libraries Press, New York, 1927 (Reprinted in 1971).,Trade and Banking in Early Modern England, Manchester University Press, 1988.,The World in Depression, 1929–1939, Allen Lane, London, 1973.,Maniacs, Panics and Crashes, A History of Financial Crises,,second edition, Macmillan, 1989.World Economic Primacy: 1500–1990, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1996.,The State, Democracy and Globalisation, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2004.and ,The Greeks, Penguin Books, London, 1951.,The French Religious Wars 1562–1598, Osprey Publishing, Oxford, 2002.,The Power of Commerce: Economy and Governance in the First British Empire, Cornel University Press, Ithaca, 1994.,State-Directed Development, Political Power and Industrialisation in the Global Periphery, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511754371, [Page 401]The City: A Global History, Phoenix, London, 2005.,A History of India, Routledge, London, 1998.and ,Kumar, Dharma, (Ed.), The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. II: c.1757–1970, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1983. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CHOL9780521228022The City of London, Vol. III, Illusions of Gold, 1914–1945, Pimlico, London, 2000.,Bankers and Pashas: International Finance and Economic Imperialism, Harvard University Press, 1958.,The Unbound Prometheus, Technological Change and Industrial Development in Western Europe from 1750 to the Present, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1969.,The Wealth and Poverty of Nations, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1998.,Venice and History, Johns Hopkins University, 1966.,Langford, Paul, (Ed.), The Eighteenth Century, 1688–1815, The Short Oxford History of the British Isles, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2002.Mercanaries, Ballantine Books, New York, 2005.,Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583803,A History of Modern China, Penguin, 1954.,Business Organization and the Myth of the Market Economy, Cambridge University Press, 1991.,Medieval Thought St Augustine to Ockham, Penguin, 1958.,The Arabs in History, London, 1950 (Published in India by Goodward Books, 2001).,The Arabs in Eclipse, in Cipolla (Ed.), The Economic Decline of Empires, 1970.,The Muslim Discovery of Europe, Phoenix, London, 1981.,The Middle East, 2000 Years of History from the Rise of Christianity to the Present Day, Phoenix, London, 1995.,The Multiple Identities of the Middle East, Schocken Books, New York, 1999.,From Babel to Dragomans: Interpreting the Middle East, Oxford University Press, New York, 2004.,God's Crucible, Islam and the Making of Europe, 570–1215, W.W. Norton, New York, 2008.,The Reconquest of Spain, London and New York, 1978.,The Golden Age of Islam. (Translated by JoanSpencer, North-Holland Medieval Translations, Vol. 2), North-Holland Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1975., [Page 402]The Commercial Revolution of the Middle Ages, 950–1350, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583933,War, Politics and Society in Early Modern China, 900–1795, Routledge, London, 2005.,The End of the Twentieth Century and the End of the Modern Age, Tichnor and Fields, New York, 1993.,International rivalry and Warfare, in T.C.W.Blanning (Ed.), The Eighteenth Century, 1688–1815, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2000.,British Policy, Trade, and Informal Empire in the Mid-Nineteenth Century, in The Nineteenth Century, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999.,A History of Credit and Power in the Western World, Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 2004.and ,Extraordinary Popular Delusions and the Madness of Crowds, Harmony Books, New York, 1980.,Corruption and the Decline of Rome, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1988.,Majumdar, R.C. (Ed.), The Age of Imperial Unity, Bharatiya Vidya Bhavan, Bombay, 1951.An Advanced History of India, Macmillan, London, 1953., and ,The Pursuit of Power, Basil Backwell, Oxford, 1982.,Contours of the World Economy, 1–2030, Essays in Macro-Economic History, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007.,Marxist Economic Theory, Merlin Press, London, 1962.,The Sources of Social Power, Vol. 1, A History of Power from the Beginning to ad 1760, Cambridge University Press, 1986.,The Sources of Social Power, Vol. II, The Rise of Classes Ad Nation States, 1760–1914, Cambridge University Press, 1993.,The Industrial Revolution in the Eighteenth Century, Methuen and Co., London, 1961 (Revised from the first English edition, 1928).,Merchants, Traders and Entrepreneurs, Indian Business in the Colonial Era, Permanent Black, Ranikhet, Distributed by Orient Longmans, Hyderabad, 2008. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230594869,The Eighteenth Century, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205630.001.0001,Egypt in the Reign of Muhammad Ali, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1984. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563478, [Page 403]Power and Imagination, City-States in Renaissance Italy, Pimlico, London, 2002.,The Nature of History, Third Edition, Macmillan, London, 1989.,Western Aristocracies and Imperial Court ad 364–425, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1975 (in Clarendon Paperback, 1990).,Indo-Portuguese Trade and the Fuggers of Germany, Sixteenth Century, Manohar Publishers, New Delhi, 1997.,The Roman Imperial Civilisation, Double Anchor Books, New York, 1959.,Merchant Communities, 1350–1750, in James D.Tracy (Ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World, 1350–1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.,McKitterick, Rosamond(Ed.), The Early Middle Ages, 400–1000, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2001.The Pursuit of Power, Technology, Armed Force and Society since ad 1000, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1983.,The Indian Ocean: A History of People and the Sea, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1993.,Money and Business, The History of Business, John Wiley and Sons, New York, 2001.,The Company, A Short History of a Revolutionary Idea, The Modern Library, New York, 2003.and ,Rome, the Greek World and the East, Vol. I, The Roman Republic and the Augustan Revolution, University of North Carolina Press, 2002.,Politics: A Very Short Introduction, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995.,The Economics of Ancient Greece, Cambridge, 1957.,The Lever of Riches, Technological Creativity and Economic Progress, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990.,Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy, Penguin Books, London, 1967.,The Oxford History of the American People, Oxford University Press, New York, 1965.,Global Capital and National Governments, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003.,The German-Jewish Economic Elite 1820–1935 A Socio-Cultural Profile, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989.,Plebs and Politics in the Late Roman Republic, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2001. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482885, [Page 404]The Mind and the Market, Capitalism in Modern European Thought, Alfred A. Knoff, New York, 2002.,Richard Cantillon: Entrepreneur and Economist, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1986.,Asian Drama, An Enquiry into the Poverty of Nations, Pantheon, 1968.,1848 The Revolution of Intellectuals, Oxford University Press, 1946, Reprint 1993.,Towards Global Governance, in DeepakNayyar (Ed.), Governing Globalisation, Issues and Institutions, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002.,The Existing System and the Missing Institutions, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2002.,Trade and Globalisation, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2008.,Developing Countries in the World Economy, The Future in the Past, Wider Annual Lecture12, UNU-WIDER, 2009.,The Rise of Financial Capitalism, International Markets in the Age of Reason, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.,Company of Adventurers: The Story of the Hudson's Bay Company, Penguin, London, 1985.,The Growth of the Medieval City: From Late Antiquity to the Early Fourteenth Century, Longman, London, 1997.,The Later Medieval City, 1300–1500, Longman, London, 1997.,The Social Philosophers, St. Albans, Granada, 1976.,Structure and Change in Economic History, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 1981.,Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511808678,Institutions, Transaction Costs and the Rise of Merchant Empires, in James D.Tracy, The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991.,Understanding the Process of Economic Change, Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 2005.,The Rise of the Western World: A New Economic History, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511819438and ,A History of Venice, Vintage Books, New York, 1989.,The Middle Sea: A History of the Mediterranen, Vintage Books, London, 2006.,A History of the Economic Institutions of Modern Europe: An Introduction of der Moderne Kapitulismus of Werner Sombart, F.S. Crofts and Co., New York, 1933., [Page 405]European Economic Development: The Contribution of the Periphery, in Economic History Review, second series, Vol. 35, 1982.,Trade, Economy, State and Empire, in P.J.Marshall, The Eighteenth Century, Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. II, Oxford University Press, 1998.,Imperialism and the Rise and Decline of the British Economy, 1688–1989, in New Left Review, Vol. a, 1999.,Once More: When Did Globalisation Begin? in European Review of Economic History, Vol. 8, Issue 1, April, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S1361491604001078and ,The End of the Nation State, Harper Collins, London, 1995.,The Logic of Collective Action, Public Goods and the Theory of Groups, Harvard, 1965.,The Rise and Decline of Nations, Yale University Press, New Haven, 1982.,The State (Introduction by ), Free Life Editions, New York, 1975.,The Merchant of Prato, Daily Life in a Medieval Italian City, Penguin Books, London, 1957.,Globalisation and National Economic Welfare, Palgrave Macmillan, New York, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1057/9780230512481,Europe in Crisis, 1598–1618, Fontana Press, London, 1979.,The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, Cambridge University Press, 1988.,Europe and the Wider World, 1500–1700, The Military Balance in JamesTracy, (Ed.), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires.,Medici Money, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2005.,Whatever Happened to Imperialism and Other Essays, Tulika, New Delhi, 1995.,The Origin of Money in Ancient Greece, The Political Economy of Coinage and Exchange, Cambridge Journal of Economics, Vol. 30, No. 4, 2006.,Merchants and States, in James D.Tracy (Ed.), The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge, 1991.,The History of Japan, Greenwood Press, West Port CT, 1998.,The Rise of Professional Society, England since 1880, Routledge, London, 1989. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203408629, [Page 406]The East India Company, 1784–1834, Oxford India Press, Indian Branch, 1961.,The Growth and Composition of Trade in the Iberian Empires, 1450–1750, in James D.Tracy, (Ed.), 1990.,Prehistoric India to 1000 bc, Penguin Books, Hammondsworth, England, 1950.,Property and Freedom, Vintage Books, New York, 1999.,Russia Under the Old Regime, Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1974.,A History of Europe, Vol. 1, Doubleday, Garden City, New York, 1958.,Pizzorno, Alessandro(Ed.), Political Sociology, Selected Readings, Penguin Books, 1971.Finance, Trade and Politics in British Foreign Policy, 1815–1914, Oxford University Press, 1968.,The Penguin Book of the Renaissance, Penguin, London, 1964.,The Development of the Modern State, Stanford University Press, 1978.,The Great Transformation, Beacon Press, Boston, 1957.,The Great Divergence: China, Europe and the Making of the Modern World Economy, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 2000.,World History, A New Perspective, Pimlico, London, 2000.,The Nineteenth Century, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. III, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198205654.001.0001,Medieval Economy and Society:1972.,Prak, Maarten(Ed.), Early Modern Capitalism: Economic and Social Change in Europe 1400–1800, Routledge, London, 2001.What Did Merchants Do? Reflections on British Overseas Trade, 1660–1790, in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. XLIX, No. 2, June, 1989.,The An Lu-Shan Rebellion and the Origins of Chronic Militarism in Late T'ang China, in , The Essays on Tang Dynasty, 1976.,Spain, c. 1492: Social Values and Structures, in , Implicit Understandings, Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1994.,Merchants, Sailors and Pirates in the Roman World, Tempus, Charleston, USA, 2003., [Page 407]Raychaudhuri, Tapan and IrfanHabib (Eds), The Cambridge Economic History of India, Vol. I, c.1200–1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982.Money, Banking and Credit in Medieval Bruges, Italian Merchant Bankers, Lombards and Money-Changers, Cambridge, MA, 1948.,The Rise and Decline of the Medici Bank, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1963.,Business, Banking and Economic Thought, in Late Medieval and Early Modern Europe (Edited by JuliusKirshner), The University of Chicago Press, Chicago, 1974.,Maritime Traders in the Ancient Greek World, Cambridge University Press, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511482908,The Interstate System in Terrence K.Hopkins, ImmanuelWallerstein et. al. (Eds), The Age of Transition, Trajectory of the World System, 1945–2025, Zed Books, London, 1996.and ,The Emergence of Civilisation, The Cyclades and the Aegean in the Third Millennium bc, Methuen, London, 1972.,Reinhard, Wolfgang, (Ed.), Power Elites and State Building, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996.American Globalism: Mass, Motion and the Multiplier Effect, in A.G.Hopkins (Ed.), Globalisation in World History, Pimlico, London, 2002.,Rich, E.E. and C.H.Wilson (Eds), The Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. IV. The Economy of Expanding Europe in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1967.Richards, John F. (Ed.), The Imperial Monetary System of Mughal India, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 1987.The Political Economy of Transformation: Liberalisation and Property Rights, in JeffreyBanks and Eric A.Hanushek (Eds), Modern Political Economy Old Topics and New Directions, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1995.and ,The History of Development, From Western Origins to Global Faith, Zed Books, London, 1997.,Economic Philosophy, Penguin Books, London, 1962.,Freedom and Necessity, An Introduction to the Study of Society, George Allen and Unwin, London, 1970.,Guns and Sails in the First Phase of English Colonization, 1500–1650, in NicholasCanny (Ed.), The Origins of Empire, The Oxford History of the British Empire, Oxford University Press, 1998a., [Page 408]Sea-power and empire, 1688–1793, in P.J.Marshall (Ed.), The Oxford History of the British Empire, Vol. 2: The Eighteenth Century, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998b.,Islam and Capitalism (Translated by ), Allen Lane, London, 1974 (First published in France in 1966).,Has Globalisation Gone Too Far, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1997.,Goodbye Washington Consensus, Hello Washington Confusion, Harvard University, 2006.,The City Deweller and Life in Cities and Towns, in Jacquesde Goff (Ed.), The Medieval World, 1990.,Theorists of Economic Growth from David Hume to the Present: With a Perspective on the Next Century, Oxford University Press, New York, 1990.and ,Rothschild, K.W., (Ed.), Power in Economics, Penguin, 1971.The Use of History, Hodder and Stoughton, London, 1946.,Revolutionary Europe 1783–1815, Fontana Press, London, 1964.,Europe in the Eighteenth Century, Aristocracy and the Bourgeois Challenge, Widenfeld & Nicholson, London, 1972.,The First Crusade,,Canto Edition, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1951.The End of Poverty, Penguin Books, 2005.,What's Wrong with Democracy, From Athenian Practice to American Worship, University of California Press, Berkeley, 2004.,Japan, A Short Cultural History, Appleton, New York, 1943.,Voltaire's Bastards, The Dictatorship of Reason in the West, The Free Press, New York, 1992.,The Collapse of Globalism and the Reinvention of the World, Atlantic Books, London, 2005.,The Myth of the Great Depression 1873–1896,,second edition, Macmillan, London, 1985.Bank of England Operations, 1890–1914, London, 1936.,A History of Economic Change in England 1880–1939, Oxford University Press, 1967.,The Bank of England 1891–1944, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976.,The Embarrassment of Riches, An Interpretation of Dutch Culture in the Golden Age, Fontana Press, London, 1991.,The Growth of Big Business in the United States and Western Europe 1850–1939, Cambridge University Press, 1993., [Page 409]Patriots and Liberators, Revolution in the Netherlands, 1780–1813, Fontana Press, London, 1992.Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper & Row, New York, 1942.,History of Economic Analysis, Allen and Unwin, London, 1954.,The Logic of World Power: An Enquiry into the Origin, Currents and Contradictions of World Politics, Pantheon, New York, 1974.,Money and the Greek Mind, Homer, Philosophy and Tragedy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511483080,The Rise of Free Trade Imperialism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1970. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511562228,Shaikh, Nermeen, (Ed.), The Present as History, Critical Perspectives on Global Power, Stanza, 2008 (Reprint edition of the original publication by Columbia University Press in 2007).The Rise of the Merchant Class in Tokugawa Japan, 1600–1868, An Introductory Survey, J.J. Agustin Locust Valley, New York, 1958.,The Islamic World in Ascendancy: From the Arab Conquests to the Siege of Vienna, Prager, Westport, CT, 2000.,Creating a World Economy, Merchant Capital, Colonisation and World Trade, 1400–1825, Westview Press, Boulder, Colorado, 1991.,Smith, Bardwell L., (Ed.), Essays on T'ang Society: Interplay of Social, Political and Economic Forces, E.J. Brill, Leiden, 1976.Smith, David A., DorothyJ. and Steven C.Topic (Eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, Routledge, London, 1999. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203160787British Imperialism, 1750–1970, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998.,The International Monetary System, 1945–1981 (An updated and expanded edition of The International Monetary System, 1945–1976) Harper and Row, New York, 1982.,A History of India, Volume Two, From the Sixteenth Century to the Twentieth Century, Penguin Books, London, 1965.,Money and Its Use in Medieval Europe, Cambridge University Press, 1988. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511583544,Power and Profit: The Merchant in Medieval Europe, Thames and Hudson, New York, 2002.,Gold and Iron, Bismarck, Bleichröder and the Building of the German Empire, Penguin, 1977.,Theory of Culture Change, Urbana, University of Illinois Press, 1963., [Page 410]Globalisation and Its Discontents, W.W. Norton and Company, New York, 2002.,Europe Transformed, 1878–1919, Fontana Press, London, 1983.,Europe Unfolding 1648–1688, Fontana Press, London, 1969.,On the Medieval Origins of the Modern State, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1970.,Subrahmanyam, Sanjay(Ed.), Merchant Networks in the Early Modern World, Variorum, Hampshire, UK, 1986.Evolution of Europe: The Portuguese in the Indian Ocean during the Sixteenth Century, in James D.Tracy, (Ed.), The Rise or Merchant Empires: Long Distance Trade in the Early Modern World 1350–1750, Cambridge University Press, 1993.and ,Medieval Seafarers of India, Roli Books, New Delhi, 2006.,Commercial Crisis and Change in England, 1600–1642, Cambridge, UK, 1959.,The State and the Industrial Revolution 1700–1914, in Carlo M.Cipolla (Ed.), The Industrial Revolution 1700–1914, The Fontana Economic History of Europe, Vol. 3, Harvester Press, Brighton, UK, 1976.,The Economic Sociology of Capitalism: An Introduction and Agenda, in VictorNee and RichardSwedberg (Ed.), The Economic Sociology of Capitalism, Princeton University Press, 2005.,Sylla, Richard, RichardTilly and GabrielTortella (Ed.), The State, the Financial System, and Economic Modernization, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999.The Roman Revolution, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1939.,Warriors into Traders: The Power of the Market in Early Greece, University of California Press, Berkley, 1997.,Religion and the Rise of Capitalism, Harcourt, Brace and World, New York, 1926.,History and Society (Edited and with an Introduction by J.M.Winter), Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1978.,The Habsburg Monarchy, 1809–1918, Penguin Books, London, 1985 (Originally published in 1948).,Europe: Grandeur and Decline, Penguin Books, 1983 (Originally published in 1950).,A History of India, Vol. I, Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, UK, 1966., [Page 411]Thirsk, Joan and J.P.Cooper (Eds), 17th Century Economic Documents, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1972.The Slave Trade, The History of the Atlantic Slave Trade 1440–1870, Picador, London, 1997.,Europe Since Napoleon,,revised edition, Penguin, London, 1966.Mercanaries, Pirates and Sovereigns, State Building and Extraterritorial Violence in Early Modern Europe, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994.,Athenian Democracy, Routledge, New York, 2004.,Coercion, Capital and European States, ad 900–1992, Blackwell Publishers, Oxford, 1992.,European Revolutions 1492–1992, Blackwell, Oxford, 1993.,Entanglements of European Cities and States, in CharlesTilly and Wim P.Blockmans (Eds), Cities and Rise of States in Europe, ad 1000 to 1800, Westview Press, Colorado, 1994.,On the Efficiency of the Financial System, in Lloyds Bank Review, No. 153, 1984.,A Study of History (An abridgment of volumes i-vi by ) Dell Publishing, New York, 1946.,Tracy, James D., (Ed.), The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-Distance Trade in the Early Modern Period, 1350–1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511563089The Political Economy of Merchant Empires, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511665288,The Oxford History of Indian Business, Oxford University Press, New Delhi, 2004.,Japan's Capitalism: Creative Defeat and Beyond, Cambridge University Press, 1993.,The Sui (589–618) and T'ang (618–907) Dynasties, in Bardwell (Ed.), (1976), Reprinted from ArnoldToynbee, ed., Half the World: The History and Culture of China and Japan, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, New York, 1973.,Udovitch, A., (Ed.), The Islamic Middle East, 700–1900: Studies in Economic and Social History, Darwin Press, Princeton, 1981.United Nations Centre for Transnational Corporations (UNCTC)World Investment Report-Transnational Corporations as Engines of Growth, United Nations, New York, 1992.Prosperity and Upheaval: The World Economy 1945–1980, Penguin Books, London, 1986.,Structural Changes in European Long-distance Trade, and Particularly in the Re-export Trade from South to North, 1350–1750, in James D.Tracy, The Rise of Merchant Empires, Long-distance in the Early, [Page 412]Modern World 1350–1750. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990.Towns and Trade, 400–1500, in Robin A.Butlin and RobertaDodgshon (Eds), An Historical Geography of Europe, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1998.,A History of Gold and Money, 1450–1920, Verso, London, 1991.,Power and Plenty as Objectives of Foreign Policy in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries, in D.C.Coleman (Ed.), Revisions in Mercantilism, Methuen and Co., London, 1969.,On the Modernity of the Dutch Republic, in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 33, No. 1, March, 1973.,The Economy of Europe in an Age of Crisis, 1600–1750, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1976.,European Urbanisation 1500–1800, Metheun, London, 1984.,The Industrial Revolution and the Industrious Revolution, in The Journal of Economic History, Vol. 54, pp. 240–270, 1994. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700014467,De Vries, Jan, and AdVan Der Woude (Eds), The First Modern Economy, Success, Failure and Perseverance of the Dutch Economy, 1500–1815, Cambridge University Press, New York, 1997. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511666841The Global Economic System, Routledge, London, 1992.,The Modern World-System, Academic Press, New York, 1974.,The Capitalist World-economy, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1979.,After Liberalism, The New Press, New York, 1995.,The End of the World As We Know It, University of Minnesota Press, Minneapolis, 1999.,European Liberalism, The Rhetoric of Power, The New Press, London, 2006.,The Fall of Rome and the End of Civilisation, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005.,General Economic History (with a New Introduction by ), Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, NJ, 1981 (Originally published in English in 1927).,Weiss, Linda, (Ed.), States in the Global Economy, Bringing Domestic institutions Back in, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2003. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511491757The Enigma of Globalisation, A Journey to a New Stage of Capitalism, Routledge, London, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.4324/9780203217573,Imperialism and Colonisation: Essays on the History of European Expansion, Greenwood Press, Westport CT, 1997.,Schools and Streams of Economic Thought, Rand McNally, Chicago, 1960., [Page 413]The Banking Panics of the Great Depression, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511571985,Framing the Middle Ages Europe and the Mediterranean, 400–800, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780199264490.001.0001,Capitalism and Slavery, The University of Carolina Press, 1944.,Culture and Society 1780–1950, Penguin, London, 1961.,Globalisation, Convergence and History, in Journal of Economic History, Vol. 56, No. 2, June, 1996. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0022050700016454,What Washington Means by Policy Reform, in JohnWilliamson, (Ed.), Latin American Adjustment: How Much Has Happened, Institute for International Economics, Washington, 1989.,What Should the World Think about the Washington Consensus, The World Bank Research Observer, Vol. 15, No. 2, pp. 251–64, August, 2000. http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/wbro/15.2.251,Trade, Society and the State, Chapter VIII, in Cambridge Economic History of Europe, Vol. IV.,Anglo-Dutch Commerce and Finance in the Eighteenth Century, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1966.,British Business History, 1720–1994, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1995.,Europe of the Dictators, 1919–1945, Fontana Press, London, 1966.,Ouvrad Speculator of Genius 1770–1846 (Translated by ), Barrie and Rockliff, London, 1962.,China Transformed, Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, New York, 1997.,Medieval Economic Thought, Cambridge University Press, 2002. http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/CBO9780511811043,World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All, ILO, Geneva, 2004.The Atlantic Frontier, Colonial American Civilisation, 1607–1763, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1947.,
About the Author